By 22 May the party of power had emerged as the clear winner in Georgia's parliamentary elections. President Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) scored even higher than he did in January's presidential election. Under Georgia's system of proportional representation, the UNM netted 59.9% of the votes (49 of the 75 seats), as opposed to President Saakashvili's 52%.

The results of voting in single-mandate districts were even more discouraging for the opposition. Here, the president's supporters received 71 of 75 mandates. Most of these are not unpopular party functionaries, but authoritative and respected figures, who are also prepared to provide significant financial support for the party of power stood for election.

Over the next five years, the pro-presidential majority in the new Georgian parliament will guarantee that the interests of the politically active majority are safeguarded. The thirty oppositional figures who got into parliament ‘by accident' can look forward to a purely symbolic role. The local mentality and temperament being what it is, any other scenario is unlikely.

We could go into detail about how the government achieved its result; how it used the media, electoral information and the financial, organizational and administrative resources at its control. Georgia today lacks the most minimal guarantees of electoral freedom. There is no lack of independent observers to attest to that, as far as the campaign itself is concerned, and the events on election day itself. The premature death of Badri Patarkatsishvili, who might have united the Georgian opposition is also a matter of profound regret. But none of this changes the situation: there was no alternative to Mikhail Saakashvili, and there still is not.

Georgia's opposition

So what of Georgia's opposition parties? The gap between figures published by the Electoral Commission and the claims of the parties themselves hardly merits discussion. This is not because the exit poll data is trustworthy: it can also be manipulated by what you might call non-sociological means. it too. The main grounds for this conclusion is that when the opposition called its supporters out on 22 May, it claimed a crowd of 100,000. Yet the true number was little more than 3,000.

According to the Electoral Commission, the largest opposition party, United Opposition (UO), got 17.65% (14 mandates on the party list plus two single mandates). But the day after the elections, UO's Levan Gachechiladze announced his victory, reporting that his bloc had received 40% of the votes, as against the ruling party's 33%.'The United Opposition intends to reject the mandates received in the parliamentary elections, and stay with its people,' announced Gachechiladze.

The Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) got 8.22% (six mandates), according to the Electoral Commission. The comment of its leader Georgy Targamadze was that the elections were ‘anything but elections'. Another representative Kakha Kukava added: ‘We must aim to dissolve the elected parliament and schedule repeat elections.'

The Labor Party trailed with 7.56% (six mandates), according to the Commission. It's leader Shalva Natelashvili had this to say: ‘The Georgian people will not put up with the total falsification of elections, and today's events will be the beginning of the end for Saakashvili's regime. Acts of protest will continue until the regime schedules repeat elections," was the comment of his fellow party member Iosif Shatberashvili.

Another two mandates in majority districts were received by the Republican Party.

However, despite the opposition's doubts about the probity of the elections, by the 24th the Georgian press was reporting that two deputies from the opposition who were elected on majority lists were not going to give up their deputy mandates. ‘I don't care, I want to defend the rights of the residents of the Kazbeg region in the Georgian parliament, and I have obligations towards the people who personally voted for me,' said Roman Marsagishvili. Composer Nugzar Ergemlidze, who got into parliament on the Labor party list, agreed: ‘We must fight for the rights of citizens in parliament, and not outside it.'

CDM leader Targamadze also soon hastened to modify his initial alarmist remarks: ‘This doesn't mean that we should go to extremes. We will be in the minority, but the truth and the moral majority is on our side.' Having reached no agreement on a boycott or on any concerted protest, what became clear was the disastrous crisis of trust between these opposition parties who all declared themselves so affronted by Saakashvili.

There can be no doubt that the authorities are aggravating the situation by dividing the forces of the opposition. However, in the end, it lacks any uniting idea or positive programme. They are just a group of extremely ambitious individuals, some of whom are closely related to the President's own team.

The view of international observers

Saakashvili's opponents also face another difficulty. Quite apart from the difficulties they are having in ‘mobilizing the masses', they are up against the fact the international observers have all recognised the elections as ‘free and fair'. They have even gone so far as to say that it was ‘a further positive step on the path towards Georgian democracy.' Nauryz Aidarov, head of the mission sent by the CIS stated quite categorically that the elections exceeded their boldest expectations: ‘They were extremely transparent and democratic. They were 100% up to international standards.' This despite the scandalous note of protest sent by the Georgia Interior Ministry to the secretariat of the CIS, demanding the ‘immediate withdrawal of the Russian Federation's armed forces from the zone of the Abkhaz conflict.'

The optimism of the Ukrainian mission sent to observe the election should come as no surprise: ‘The elections showed significant progress in the improvement of electoral legislation, and in the organisation of the voting process.' By way of summary, Georgia's Central Election Commission Levan Tarkhnishvili could only conclude that ‘these were free and fair elections, and every voter had the chance to make an independent choice.'

The prospect ahead

Representatives of Georgia's party of power are confident that the political situation is under control. The first sitting of the new parliament has already been announced for 10 June. The new speaker will probably be David Bakradze, former head of the Georgian Interior Ministry and ex-supporter of Nino Burdzhanadze. There will not be a civil war in the country. The president's opponents, having nothing new to offer to the nation, have failed to raise a protest movement.

On the international scene, Georgia is viewed through the prism of countries' own interests. Now that elections have been held, it is important to maintain a national consensus and the appearance of stability. Nothing the opposition can do is going to change that. And indeed, if they reject the voters' choices they will look as if they do not respect the voters.

So what next? The wider picture is unclear. The main point is that neither the January presidential elections nor these parliamentary ones were true elections. They did not resolve the issue of power. The strategic dimensionr of Georgia's future development was not addressed either, neither issue being on the agenda of Georgian politics. What the election did achieve, and this is what Saakashvili needed, was the endorsement of his Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Now that he has his fresh parliament, nothing will change in the Georgian president's policy towards Russia, Abkhazia and the other republics which remain unrecognized. Indeed, Saakashvili may even try and engineer a change in the situation by force majeur. For as the pundits are fond of pointing out, the ruling party of Georgia and its opponents agree on virtually all foreign policy issues.

What we do know is that straight after the election results were announced, the new head of the Georgian Interior Ministry Eka Tkeshelashvili went to Brussels to meet the UN High Representative for Foreign Policy Javier Solana, while the Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Georgy Baramidze flew to Berlin to take part in a NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Georgia's geopolitical endgame

The real agenda of Georgia's elections is to make up for ground lost in the ‘Bucharest humiliation', NATO's recent postponement of its membership plans for Georgia and Ukraine. It is no coincidence that now that all the ‘formalities have been observed' and the voting results recognised on the international stage, Mikhail Saakashvili has two priorities. He plans to speed up talks on integration into NATO. He is also going to try and attract ‘friendly countries' to take part in a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This is the geopolitical reality of the South Caucasus today. Russia's leader will once again have to face the issue of Georgia's integration into NATO, as well the deliberate escalation of the problem of Sevastopol's future.

As for the situation in Georgia itself, all the political manoeuvering basically comes down to only thing: President Saakashvili's desire, like many post-Soviet political regimes, to finish off the opposition. Between the lines of his ritual post-election statement about ‘high level of support' and ‘a more pluralistic multi-party parliament', the real message is clear: ‘You have no support. You can either be marginalised, or join Georgia's political mainstream.' That is what the Georgian leader's political programme is really all about.

Finally, but no less importantly, there is the problem facing Saakashvili in 2013. Will he go for a third term? It is too early to tell how he plans to hold onto power in five years time.