The article "Russian Strategy" by Sir Roderic Lyne, formerly Ambassador in Moscow, is brilliant in style and profound in its analysis of the results of the August 2008 crisis in the Caucasus. It also contains constructive recommendations for reducing the current tension in Russo-British relations, which should be carefully studied by both politicians and diplomats in Moscow, Washington and European capitals. By way of a commentary I will concentrate on some of the points raised by Sir Roderic, while adding one or two thoughts of my own.
The August 2008 events in and around South Ossetia are by any measure of military conflict much less serious than most of the conflicts in the post-Soviet space and Yugoslavia, not to mention the local wars of the Cold War period. The political fallout from the crisis in the Caucasus could, however, very considerably surpass all the pivotal moments after the collapse of the USSR, including the NATO strike on Yugoslavia in 1999 and the USA's "Black September" in September 2001. The consequences of the crisis embrace regional and global levels, as well as local.
The post-Soviet space is becoming one of the main arenas of international conflict and threats to international security, along with the Extended Middle East (EME) and South Asia. What is particularly worrying is that the rivalry could subsequently become not only economic and political, but military as well. It could take the form of military confrontation between the major powers and alliances in zones of conflict. These parallels may be conventional, but a new cold war could become a reality.
The main question after the August 2008 crisis is the following: will it remain an isolated episode in the post-Soviet space and the relations between Russia and the West, which can be quite quickly "repaired" on the basis of NATO's new, more respectful and serious attitude to Russia's declared interests - and a more definite and realistic formulation of her interests by Russia?
Or will the South Ossetian events be one of the first signs of a new stage in the collapse of the Soviet empire - from now on along the lines of what happened in Yugoslavia? If so, it could be followed by crises and military conflicts on the border with Ukraine over the Crimea; with Kazakhstan in the northern and western provinces where there is a Russian-speaking population; between Armenia and Azerbaidzhan over Karabakh, involving Turkey and Russia and between Uzbekistan, Tadzhkistan and Kirgiziya over Fergana and fresh water. Conflicts in South Ossetia could quickly spread to North Ossetia, turning the whole region into one big zone of instability and violence, with the most calamitous direct results for Russia herself.
In this event the countries of "far abroad" would be drawn in on the political front and in the future, possibly, militarily as well. We cannot rule out military conflict in the post-Soviet space between Russia and NATO (or Russia and China). Russia would in all probability be defeated in military actions with conventional weapons and would possibly be obliged to have recourse to nuclear weapons with unpredictable consequences for the whole world.
There are two fundamentally differing schools of thought in Russia at the moment around this crucial issue. The leadership considers, as President Medvedev has said, that "a heavy black line" should be drawn under past events and cooperation built up on a completely new basis. In the Duma, political circles, society in general and the media there is a strong feeling that this is the beginning of the restoration of the USSR or the Russian Empire, which will make Russia once more a superpower confronting the West.
The August 2008 crisis has, like a mirror image, highlighted two polar positions in the West in respect of the post-Soviet period and directly related to Georgia and Ukraine. One is that NATO expansion towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) against the wishes of Russia will give rise to dangerous conflicts and must be deferred, but cooperation should be developed. The other is that expansion should be accelerated in order to prevent Moscow subjugating by force its recalcitrant neighbours and resurrecting the traditional "Russian imperialism" strategy.
In these circumstances one could propose a strategic line for Russian policy with two interdependent directions. The first - as quickly and as decisively as possible to change the way in which the political elite in Ukraine regard NATO as guarantor for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and Russia as a threat to these values. The second - the use of multiple channels of cooperation to make Russia's role for the EU and the West much more significant (the so-called "capitalisation" of relations), rather than just a supplier of oil and gas.
The practical implementation of this dual strategy presupposes that Russia should emphasise at the highest level its role as the chief and most influential guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its CIS neighbours, providing, of course, that they maintain military and political neutrality. After the events of August 2008 this is especially important so as to strengthen the shaky unity of CIS and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
Military force was used to great effect and now we should build on the new respect for Russia by acting with reasonable restraint and adopting a flexible and constructive diplomatic line towards the West. Taking account of NATO's increasing difficulties and its very high stakes in the Afghan operation, we could activate a Russian approach providing Russian advisers and military supplies to Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian and economic aid. At the same time Russia's CSTO allies could be brought in, which would also achieve NATO recognition for this organisation. This is the more important because Russia is no less, and possibly more, interested than NATO in averting a Taliban backlash.
Together with the indefinite deferral of NATO expansion towards the CIS, we could activate talks on ABM in Europe, on nuclear arms reduction and a return to one or another form of compliance with an adapted CFE treaty. In these circumstances it would be wise to hold a steadier course in our relationship with Iran with six-way talks involving the UN Security Council and the Chinese People's Republic.
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Alexei Arbatov is the Head of the Center for International Security Center of the Institute for International Economy and International Relationships of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Member of Russian Parliament (State Duma), a member of the YABLOKO faction and Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, 1994-2003. Dr. Arbatov is author of a number of books and numerous articles and papers on issues of global security, strategic stability, disarmament, Russian military reform and various current domestic and foreign political issues.He is at present Moscow Carnegie Center Scholar in Residence.
