It is difficult to explain under what circumstances a group of individuals decides to forget the greatest tragedy experienced by the community of which it forms part. For this reason, the decision of the Armenian government to disregard the genocide that the Armenian people suffered at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1915-23 is a shocking phenomenon worthy of special attention. What then accounts for the approach of the current government in Yerevan?

Also in openDemocracy on Armenia, Turkey and genocide:

Sabine Freizer, "Armenia's emptying democracy" (30 November 2005)

Hrant Dink, "The water finds its crack: an Armenian in Turkey" (13 December 2005)

Vicken Cheterian, "The pigeon sacrificed: Hrant Dink, and a broken dialogue"(23 January 2007)

Peter Balakian, "Hrant Dink's assassination and genocide's legacy" (29 January 2007)

Taner Akçam, "Turkey and history: shoot the messenger" (16 August 2007)

Ben Kiernan, "Blood and soil: the global history of genocide" (11 October 2007)

Fred Halliday, "Armenia's mixed messages" (15 October 2008)

Martin Shaw, "Uses of genocide: Kenya, Georgia, Israel, Sri Lanka" (9 February 2009)

Martin Shaw, "A century of genocide, 1915-2009" (23 April 2009)

Armenia and Turkey, after two years of negotiations mediated by Switzerland, have agreed upon two protocols that were signed on 10 October 2009. They concern, respectively, the establishment of diplomatic relations and the fostering of bilateral relations. 

The first presents several problems, which are likely in time to be resolved so that the protocol eventually can be implemented. Undoubtedly, and sooner rather than later, Armenia and Turkey will normalise their ties (as has frequently occurred in so many other cases in the diplomatic history of nations, including former enemies). However, a period devoted to the generation of mutual trust and reciprocal commitments might have generated a framework free from suspicion and fears, oriented towards a more solid opening of bilateral links.

The second protocol is incomprehensible and inadmissible, for it proposes the creation of a sub-committee to examine the "historical dimension" of the relationship between Turks and Armenians. The only "historical dimension" that can be examined is a fact that is irrefutable for everyone alike: the genocide. This protocol, therefore, aims at "examining" the occurrence of the genocide. The accompanying proposal constitutes the greatest historical setback to the Armenian cause; but neither is it useful for new generations of Turks, who need to build their present and future on the basis of the truth of their history.

A great number of testimonies of many individuals, Armenian and non-Armenian, provide eloquent evidence of the events of 1915 and after; many images of the events survive, and have been circulated all over the world. The official documents and reports of the time contain copious accounts of what happened, the character and dimensions of an epic atrocity. The Armenian genocide is a fact, not a debate. 

Between history and politics

The history of subterfuge and denial in the recognition of the genocide includes the fate of a report submitted to the United Nations sub-committee on human rights in 1973 and 1975 by a Rwandan, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko; this pointed out "the existence of abundant impartial documentation related to the massacre of the Armenian people, considered to be the first genocide of the 20th century". When the report reached the UN committee on human rights in 1979, the paragraph had disappeared. In 1985, another report produced by the British researcher Benjamin Whitaker restored the explicit recognition of the genocide experienced by the Armenians. 

In the 1990s, an important number of individual nations recognised the Armenian genocide via legislative laws or executive resolutions. The nascent Republic of Armenia, which attained its independence in 1991, had little to do with this; it was the diaspora that, after decades of efforts, succeeded in reaffirming the cause of the genocide. The diaspora was always ahead of the state in this matter. For the Armenian people, the issue of the genocide has always been a social rather than a state matter. However, it was always clear that its defence was also a guarantee of the survival of the Armenian state. 

In this context, the second Armenian-Turkish protocol is opprobrious. Turkey itself has taken no steps towards acknowledging the genocide, yet the government of Armenia itself calls it into question. This raises a number of questions: about the role of Armenia's government and its internal balance, the attitude of Armenian citizens towards the issue of the genocide, the extent of a desire in Yerevan to heal wounds, the absence of a sense of contrition or responsibility in Turkey, the effect of the economic crisis in Armenia on political calculation, and the replacement of the moralpolitik of the fight against genocide by the realpolitik of the oblivion of genocide.

Perhaps a combination of the latter two motives might explain the position of the Armenian government. This would interpret the move in terms of the short-term and material benefits of certain domestic sectors in Armenia, whose position is reinforced by an exaggerated perception of national weakness. If this is the case, it requires a response: a coalition of the diaspora, civic actors in Armenia and influential world opinion in defence of memory and against the pragmatic silencing of horror. 

The Armenian genocide was one of the first and cruellest genocides of the 20th century. Its disdain may be the prelude to widespread impunity. The solitude of the victims - past and present - is the prologue to more barbarism.

The cold war has concluded nearly everywhere and is not going to restart. Dmitri Medvedev-Vladimir Putin's Russia is often disgruntled, and seeking to expand its influence, but no longer aggressively ideological; China is likely to continue behaving, as the current financial crisis demonstrates, as a moderate and peaceful if ascendant power. The only place where the cold war is still alive is in the western hemisphere. Barack Obama's major challenge is to put an end to this abnormality.

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is at the Universidad de San Andrés in Argentina He earned a doctorate in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University school of advanced international studies, and lived, researched and taught in Colombia from 1981-98

Also by Juan Gabriel Tokatlian in openDemocracy:

"Colombia needs a Contadora: a democratic proposal" (30 May 2006)

"The partition temptation: from Iraq to Latin America" (29 November 2006)

"Latin America, China, and the United States: a hopeful triangle " (9 February 2007)

"A Latin American's memo to Bush" (9 March 2007)

"After Bush: dealing with Hugo Chávez" (13 March 2007)

"The global drug war: beyond prohibition" (4 December 2007)

"Washington and Latin America: farewell, Monroe" (7 October 2008)Only in a dogmatic and exaggerated perspective can any of these three examples be seen as representing a serious threat to United States national interests and international security. They may be problematic, but they are minor concerns compared to far larger concerns: the global financial crisis, transnational terrorism, state collapse, climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and traditional great-power rivalries.

In each case, the incoming president can design and implement a low-cost, high-effect strategy. First, Obama's outstanding national victory in popular votes and representative electors in the presidential election on 4 November 2008 included an exceptional triumph in Florida (home to so many families of Cuban emigrants) and was reinforced by Democratic victories in both houses of Congress. This may allow him gradually to dismantle the US embargo against Cuba and began serious conversations with the Raúl Castro government as part of the search for diplomatic normalisation.

Second, Obama can have a notable influence on Colombian political dynamics. The Farc is not defeated but has been strategically weakened by the events of 2007-08. President Álvaro Uribe's re-election for a controversial third term is not a prerequisite for the continued strengthening of the Colombian state. Democracy in this Andean country can be revitalised with progressive US aid. Human rights and trade can be, simultaneously, at the core of Washington's next set of undertakings vis-à-vis Bogotá. The US president-elect's signals and initiatives can generate a momentum for peace in the coming years.

Third, the case of Venezuela is more complex but not unmanageable. Pragmatism in Washington and Caracas has allowed for Venezuela's regular and secure provision of oil to two countries with which it has difficult relationships. At the same time, ideology has created important differences and a useless escalation of rhetoric. The traditional instruments of diplomacy have proven limited when dealing with Chávez: neither the failed coup d'etat of 2002 nor the containment-plus-encirclement strategy of post-2004 has worked. A new modus vivendi can be attained by a mixture of real incentives and mutual assurances.

In all three cases, Washington must be the leading actor; though it may be helped by frontline states (Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina). In each example, substantive and symbolic proposals can be arranged and deployed. If Barack Obama wants to exhibit change with great impact and low cost Latin America is the perfect place. If he hopes for appreciation and support worldwide the example of a potential new deal with Latin America may generate more trust and extended recognition. But the first move should come from Washington.

***

Also in openDemocracy on Barack Obama and the world:

John C Hulsman, "Memo to Obama: the middle east needs you" (11 November 2008)

A Wess Mitchell, "Memo to Obama: a Europe policy 3.0" (11 November 2008)

Anita Inder Singh, "Obama's Afghan challenge" (12 November 2008)

Zaid Al-Ali, "What Obama means for Iraq" (13 November 2008)

Boris Dolgin, "Obama: a Russian view" (13 November 2008)

"The United States and Iran: a new course" (24 November 2008) - a paper from top US-based experts calling for policy change

Plus - openUSA tracks the Obama project

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is at the Universidad de San Andrés in Argentina. He earned a doctorate in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University school of advanced international studies, and lived, researched and taught in Colombia from 1981-98

Also by Juan Gabriel Tokatlian in openDemocracy:

"Colombia needs a Contadora: a democratic proposal" (30 May 2006)

"The partition temptation: from Iraq to Latin America" (29 November 2006)

"Latin America, China, and the United States: a hopeful triangle " (9 February 2007)

"A Latin American's memo to Bush" (9 March 2007)

"After Bush: dealing with Hugo Chávez" (13 March 2007)

The 2007 world drug report from the United Nations office of drugs and crime (UNODC) estimates that there are approximately 200 million consumers (ages 15 to 64) of naturally-based and synthetic drugs. The figure of individuals with a serious drug problem, 25 million, corresponds to 0.6% of the world's inhabitants between 15 and 64, and it represents 0.38% of the whole global population.

Marijuana is used by some 158.8 million people; thus the percentage of users of hard drugs worldwide is even smaller. Therefore the crucial questions are: should we continue fighting a punitive, failed "war on drugs" in the name of a very limited number of persons who consume cocaine and heroin? Is not the consumption of drugs a health issue which does not demand such a coercive strategy to cope with it? Should the international system continue to pay and suffer for an American-led prohibitionist Kulturkampf  that chases the ever elusive chimera of abstinence?

The facts regarding the "war on drugs" are staggering. For example, in 1990 the Latin American countries eradicated 23,080 hectares of illicit crops while in 2006 they destroyed 280.694 hectares of coca, marijuana and poppy plantations. In the last seventeen years the total area of illicit crops that were fumigated, both by air and manually, is the equivalent to four times the size of the state of Delaware in the United States (see Ben Wallace-Wells, "How America Lost the War on Drugs", Rolling Stone, 27 November 2007).

In Colombia, the drug barons of the 1980s are mostly dead or imprisoned, but the country is witnessing the proliferation of small, more sophisticated, cell-like "boutique" cartels; Mexico has close to 40% of its territory under the direct influence of organised criminal organisations; Brazil is suffering an unprecedented level of urban violence linked to the drug business; and some Caribbean islands are on the verge of collapse due to the combination of the narcotics trade and gang crime.

In 2001, the last year of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the production of heroine was seventy-four metric tonnes; in 2006, under the nominal control of the US-led "coalition of the willing", the production of heroin in Afghanistan reached 6,100 metric tonnes. In the early 1970s, Mexico was the leading producer of marijuana, by the early 1980s it was Colombia; by 2007, the United States is the principal producer of marijuana, with approximately 10,000 metric tonnes.

Also in openDemocracy on the drug gangs and urban violence in Latin America:

Isabel Hilton, "Álvaro Uribe's gift: Colombia's mafia goes legit" (24 October 2005)

Sue Branford, "Colombia's other war" (14 November 2005)

Sergio Aguayo Quezada, "Mexico: a war dispatch" (25 June 2007)

Rodrigo de Almeida, "The shadow of urban war" (18 July 2007)

Arthur Ituassu, "Tropa de Elite: Brazil's dark sensation" (2 November 2007) Even though harsher penalties on money-laundering have been imposed almost everywhere since 2001, the seizure of assets related to money-laundering in the United States and the rest of the world are insignificant. Millions of people are jailed in the industrialised nations and the underdeveloped countries because of minor offences related to drug consumption, while violent organisations grew stronger and more virulent. Thanks to the current futile policies of leading governments and state agencies, al-Qaida and related armed groups are becoming richer as well as more effective and powerful.

By 2008, the United Nations, under the auspices of its office on drugs and crime, must assess the record of the last decade in the fight against narcotics as determined by its special session on drugs in 1998. As of December 2007, none of the targets the session outlined has been attained. In view of this repeated global failure it is time to rethink the "war on drugs" (see the International Drug Policy Consortium).

A broad alliance - a sort of "coalition of the healing" - in favour of bold ideas may lead to a more enlightened path beyond the current failed model on narcotics (see Ethan Nadelmann, "Think Again: Drugs", Foreign Policy, September-October 2007). What is clear is that the current prohibitionist Kulturkampf needs to be replaced by a comprehensive harm-reduction policy: in terms of health and of law, at the individual and community level, and on the local and the international scale. What this might look like, after so many decades of frustration, pain and ineffectiveness, should be the primary focus of a new debate on drugs.