About Akiva Eldar

Akiva Eldar is an award-winning Israeli journalist with the daily newspaper Ha'aretz

Articles by Akiva Eldar

Iran, the Arabs and Israel: the domino-effect

Israel's former prime minister Ehud Olmert article in the Washington Post on 17 July 2009, assailing Barack Obama's campaign against West Bank settlements, made a lot of noise in Israel. Few noticed that the same paper the next day published a piece by the crown prince of Bahrain.

Akiva Eldar is an award-winning Israeli journalist with the daily newspaper Ha'aretz, where this article was first published

Also by Akiva Eldar in openDemocracy:

"The United States and Israel: moment of truth" (18 May 2009)

"Binyamin Netanyahu's mirage" (15 June 2009)

In his own op-ed, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa notes that peace is not a lightbulb easily switched on, but admits that the Arabs have made public-relations blunders. He writes: "An Israeli might be forgiven for thinking that every Muslim voice is raised in hatred, because that is usually the only one he hears. Just as an Arab might be forgiven for thinking every Israeli wants the destruction of every Palestinian." Khalifa urges the Arabs to communicate directly with the Israelis and tell them their story.

If Olmert's defence of the settlements was reinforcement for his successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Bahraini prince's call for normalisation between the Arabs and Israel was balm to Barack Obama. For the start of normalisation between the nations is a key item on the United States president's agenda - and the undertone intended to ease the creation of a blueprint for a final-status agreement.

Washington has learned the lesson of the Annapolis meeting on 27 November 2007, and concluded that a senior American presence in the negotiating room is needed for talks to succeed. This presence will be a quiet observer in the initial stage, who however will become an active mediator if the gap between the sides turns out to be too big. If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2009 the international "quartet" of middle-east mediators - United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations - will produce a detailed roadmap for regional peace.

Washington's curveball

The United States envoy George Mitchell has become even more certain during his latest visits to the region of the need to avoid repeating the mistake of conducting negotiations while disregarding the situation on the ground. He has convinced his superiors to postpone discussions on an agreement until things are calm and the political process has (as far as possible) been protected from surprises - such as attacks on Jews or settlements on Palestinian land.

It is Israel that has insisted that the roadmap's first stage - before solutions are discussed - must be the neutralisation of these problems. Ariel Sharon was interested in security problems, while the Palestinians talked about the settlements. Israel cited the Palestinians' difficulty in dismantling "terrorist capabilities and infrastructure" (in the language of the roadmap) as an excuse to postpone freezing settlements and evacuating outposts. This chapter ended when General Keith Dayton, responsible for training the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank, began to praise the Palestinians at every turn for their efforts to impose order in every city and on every street the Israeli army restored to their control.

At the same time, semi-official envoys such as Thomas Pickering are trying to allay Hamas's fears. (Pickering's meeting with Mahmoud al-Zahar in June 2009, under Swiss auspices, was not his first with the group's leaders in the recent past.) The quiet on the Gaza front - even though Netanyahu and defence minister Ehud Barak are ignoring Obama's demand to ease the siege - is not due to the summer heat.

Barack Obama and his staff reject the criticism of Ehud Olmert and others that they are excessively preoccupied with the settlements and are diverting attention from the vital problems: borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security. In Washington's view, an Israeli suspension of unilateral acts and Arab moves toward normalisation are essential stages in the political process. Obama believes that a visit to Saudi Arabia by an Israeli journalist will have a greater influence on Israeli public opinion than a visit to Israel by an American president.

Tehran's gift

But Arab princes are also subject to public opinion. In a meeting in Oxford in early 2009 attended by Israelis and Arabs, Prince Turki al-Faisal - formerly Saudi Arabia's intelligence minister and his country's ambassador to the United States - posed a question: how would an Arab ruler appear in the eyes of his public if he invited an Israeli leader to visit his country, and the next day al-Jazeera reported the establishment of a new Israeli settlement?

It goes without saying that from such an Arab viewpoint, as from an American, there is no difference between the expansion of an illegal outpost in the West Bank and the construction of Jewish homes in east Jerusalem. In the event, "creating facts" near the holy places is more serious.

The Arab leaders' original interpretation of their initiative was that normalisation would wait for Israel's withdrawal from the territories. Things changed after the priorities changed: the common Iranian threat pushed aside the common Israeli enemy.

This is reflected in an article by Hosni Mubarak in the Wall Street Journal on 19 June 2009. Egypt's president promised Israelis to begin normalisation measures alongside the peace process. The piece by Bahrain's crown prince in the Washington Post is a further product of Obama's effort to enlist the moderate Arab states in a government-bypassing public-relations campaign to reach Israeli public opinion.

These states shared with Obama a refusal to believe that Binyamin Netanyahu, an Israeli leader who likens Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Hitler, would declare war on the great American patron. But also like Obama, they did not take into account that Israeli leaders' fear of the settlers is greater than all external threats.

Also in openDemocracy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2009:

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: hope after attack" (1 January 2009)

Ghassan Khatib, "Gaza: outlines of an endgame" (6 January 2009

Avi Shlaim, "Israel and Gaza: rhetoric and reality" (7 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the Israel-United States connection" (7 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the wider war" (13 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "After Gaza: Israel's last chance" (17 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the war after the war" (22 January 2009)

Tarek Osman, "Egypt's dilemma: Gaza and beyond" (12 January 2009)

Menachem Kellner, "Israel's Gaza war: five asymmetries" (14 January 2009)

Khaled Hroub, "Hamas after the Gaza war" (15 January 2009)

Prince Hassan of Jordan, "The failure of force: an alternative option" (16 January 2009)

Martin Shaw, "Israel's politics of war" (20 January 2009)

Conor Gearty, "Israel, Gaza and international law" (21 January 2009)

Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey-Israel relations after Gaza" (26 January 2009)

Sadegh Zibakalam, "Iran and the Gaza war" (26 January 2009)

Khaled Hroub, "The ‘Arab system' after Gaza" (27 January 2009)

Hugo Slim, "NGOs in Gaza: humanitarianism vs politics" (30 January 2009)

Lucy Nusseibeh, "The four lessons of Gaza" (4 February 2009)

Martin Shaw, "Uses of genocide: Kenya, Georgia, Israel, Sri Lanka" (9 February 2009)

Prince Hassan of Jordan, "Palestine's right: past as prologue" (11 February 2009)

Colin Shindler, "Israel's rightward shift: a history of the present" (23 February 2009)

Eyal Weizman, "Lawfare in Gaza: legislative attack" (1 March 2009)

Gershon Baskin, "The state of Israel: key to peace" (19 May 2009)

Gideon Levy, "Barack Obama: Israel's true friend" (25 May 2009)

Gershon Baskin, "Israel's path: from occupation to peace" (7 July 2009)

Binyamin Netanyahu’s mirage

The Israeli prime minister's speech at Bar-Ilan University on 14 June 2009 returned the middle east to the days of George W Bush's "axis of evil". Binyamin Netanyahu delivered a patriarchal, colonialist address in the best neoconservative tradition: the Arabs are the bad guys, or at best ungrateful terrorists; the Jews are the good guys, rational people who need to raise and care for their children. In the West Bank settlement of Itamar, they're even building a nursery-school.

Akiva Eldar is an award-winning Israeli journalist with the daily newspaper Ha'aretz

Also by Akiva Eldar in openDemocracy:

"The United States and Israel: moment of truth" (18 May 2009)

No empathy for the refugees from Jaffa who lost their entire world; not a word for the Muslim connection to Jerusalem; not a fragment of a quote from the Qur'an, nor a line of Arabic poetry.

Netanyahu's provincial remarks were not intended to penetrate the hearts of the hundreds of millions of al-Jazeera viewers in the Muslim world. Instead, he sought to appease Tzipi Hotovely, the settler Likud member of the Knesset, and make it possible to live peaceably with the settler foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman. Netanyahu's demand that Palestinians recognise Israel as the state of the Jewish people didn't even leave him an opening for forging reconciliation with the Arab citizens in the country.

The prime minister's declaration that Jerusalem will remain the "undivided capital" of Israel - only Israel - slammed the door before the entire Muslim world. His Hebron, moreover, is solely the city of the Jewish patriarchs; the Arabs have no such rights at all. The Palestinians can have a state, but only if those foreign invaders show us they know how to eat with a fork and knife. Actually, without a knife.

The demilitarisation of the Palestinian state was mentioned in the Clinton guidelines (December 2000), the Taba understandings (January 2001) and the Geneva accord (December 2003), as was the "right of return" (to Palestine, not Israel). The difference between these documents and the Bar-Ilan address is not only that the former recognised the Palestinians' full rights to the West Bank and east Jerusalem. The real difference lies in the tone - in the degrading and disrespectful nature of Netanyahu's remarks. That's not how one brings down a wall of enmity between two nations, that's not how trust is built.

It's hard to believe that a single Palestinian leader will be found who will buy the defective merchandise Netanyahu presented at Bar-Ilan.

 

Among openDemocracy's recent articles on Israel-Palestine and middle-east diplomacy:

Khaled Hroub, "The ‘Arab system' after Gaza" (27 January 2009)

Lucy Nusseibeh, "The four lessons of Gaza" (4 February 2009)

Prince Hassan, "Palestine's right: past as prologue" (11 February 2009)

Thomas O'Dwyer, "Israel: how things fell apart" (13 February 2009)

Colin Shindler, "Israel's rightward shift: a history of the present" (13 February 2009)

Gershon Baskin, "The state of Israel: key to peace" (19 May 2009)

Gideon Levy, "Barack Obama: Israel's true friend" (25 May 2009)

Robert G Rabil, "Barack Obama's middle east: pragmatism and hope" (1 June 2009)

Nader Hashemi, "What Obama must say (and do) in Egypt" (3 June 2009)

Godfrey Hodgson, "The Cairo speech: letter to America" (8 June 2009)

Karim Kasim & Zaid Al-Ali, "The Cairo speech: Arab Muslim voices" (8 June 2009)

The United States and Israel: moment of truth

On the eve of his summit at the White House with Barack Obama on 18 May 2009, Israel's prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu made a distinctive claim: that although three Israeli prime ministers had supported a two-state solution, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had continued and, if anything, worsened.Akiva Eldar is an award-winning Israeli journalist

This article was first published in the newspaper Ha'aretz

Netanyahu better not try this argument with the United States president. Obama's conduct and the pre-summit messages sent by his aides demonstrate that the lesson they draw from the failure of the process launched in 1993 is completely different from the lesson Netanyahu learned. The current US administration, unlike Netanyahu, does not put the entire blame on the Palestinians. At best (from Netanyahu's perspective), the administration blames both sides equally. Obama should conclude that it would be wrong to waste time seeking a new solution to the conflict. It's much better to look for new ways to implement the old one; that is, to find better means of cajoling and enforcing than those used by previous US administrations.

But the conversation between the two men on 18 May could produce a much worse outcome: an agreement to set up "task forces" to "prepare the ground to renew negotiations" based on a two-state solution. This would allow the next Israeli prime minister to say that this miserable formula has guided four Israeli prime ministers and three American presidents. If Obama strives to develop mechanisms like the "roadmap", the Annapolis declaration and "task-forces", he might go down in history as the American president who put the final nail in the coffin of the Oslo process. The fifteen years of  the"peace process" have, after all, served as an alibi to build more than 100 new settlements and outposts in the West Bank; and to enlarge the settler population from 110,000 to nearly 300,000, excluding east Jerusalem.

Even if Binyamin Netanyahu and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, spend the rest of their days negotiating the final settlement, the lack of an active mediator presenting a detailed plan might make Obama's two-state solution turn out very much like George W Bush's Palestinian-state vision. Without an American leader equipped with both carrots and sticks, the president's initiative will be forgotten, just like the Bush-instigated United Nations decision to establish a Palestinian state. Without all this, Iran will mock the peace plan sold to Obama by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

To convince both Palestinians and Israelis that the rules of the game have changed, Obama must demand that Netanyahu carry out his part of an agreement he actually signed with Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat: the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998. A reminder: at Wye river, Netanyahu promised to change the status of 1% of Area C (under Israeli civilian and military control) to Area A (complete Palestinian control), and 12% to Area B (Israeli military and Palestinian civilian control). He also committed to resume negotiations immediately on the territories' permanent status, and to avoid any changes to the territories' current status.

Netanyahu will probably claim that his honouring of the agreement was what brought down his first government (June 1996-July 1999). However, Netanyahu's cabinet secretary and negotiator Dani Naveh revealed in a memoir that at the height of the Wye summit, an unpublished survey showed that 46% of Jewish Israelis supported Netanyahu, while 37% supported Ehud Barak (the overall Israeli population at the time was split 41%-37% in Netanyahu's favour).

Despite this support, Netanyahu avoided implementing the agreement, missed a chance to set up a national-unity government, bowed down to the radical right, lost the American president's trust, and eventually lost the prime minister's chair as well. A Ha'aretz-Dialog poll published on 15 May 2009 finds that most of the Israeli population supports an agreement with the Palestinians on a two-state basis. Now, as then, Netanyahu's fate rests in the United States president's hands.

Also in openDemocracy on Israeli politics and the Palestinians:

Eyal Weizman, "The politics of verticality" - in eleven parts (April-May 2002)

Eyal Weizman, "Ariel Sharon and the geometry of occupation" - in three parts (September 2003)

Eric Silver, "Israel's political map is redrawn" (November 2005)

Jim Lederman, "Ariel Sharon and Israel's unique democracy" (12 January 2006)

Laurence Louër, "Arabs in Israel: on the move" (19 April 2007)

Volker Perthes, "Beyond peace: Israel, the Arab world, and Europe" (22 January 2008)

Avi Shlaim, "Israel at 60: the ‘iron wall' revisited" (8 May 2008)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: hope after attack" (1 January 2009)

Ghassan Khatib, "Gaza: outlines of an endgame" (6 January 2009)

Avi Shlaim, "Israel and Gaza: rhetoric and reality" (7 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the Israel-United States connection" (7 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the wider war" (13 January 2009)

Menachem Kellner, "Israel's Gaza war: five asymmetries" (14 January 2009)

Khaled Hroub, "Hamas after the Gaza war" (15 January 2009)

Prince Hassan of Jordan, "The failure of force: an alternative option" (16 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "After Gaza: Israel's last chance" (17 January 2009)

Martin Shaw, "Israel's politics of war" (19 January 2009)

Conor Gearty, "Israel, Gaza and international law" (21 January 2009)

Paul Rogers, "Gaza: the war after the war" (22 January 2009)

Khaled Hroub, "The ‘Arab system' after Gaza" (27 January 2009)

Lucy Nusseibeh, "The four lessons of Gaza" (4 February 2009)

Carsten Wieland, "The Gaza war and the Syria-Israel front" (5 February 2009)

Prince Hassan, "Palestine's right: past as prologue" (11 February 2009)

Thomas O'Dwyer, "Israel: how things fell apart" (13 February 2009)

Colin Shindler, "Israel's rightward shift: a history of the present" (13 February 2009)

This week's editor

Heather McRobie


Niki Seth-Smith is a freelance journalist and co-editor of OurKingdom.

Syndicate content