For some time now, the New York Times has been running a
series of articles entitled "Generation Faithful" which examine the changing
dynamics of youth culture in the Middle East.
With economic stagnation on the rise and with few credible
political identities to which to turn, the articles conclude that many Middle
Eastern youths are drawn to Islam as a means of coping with their individual
and collective frustrations.
One article in particular highlights the Islamicization of
young Egyptians, who are often forced by economic constraints to postpone
marriage. In a society where marriage represents "the gateway to independence,
sexual activity and societal respect", these kinds of delays are often
unbearable for young men and women who are thirsting for autonomy, personhood - and each other. Enter
religion.
Like Egypt,
marriage is an exceedingly important marker of prestige and social stature in Iran. Yet as
Iranian youth undergo the same economic and social frustrations as their Egyptian
counterparts, they seem to be becoming less rather than more pious.
Undoubtedly, Iran's
Islamic tradition and spirituality has deep roots. Ironically however, it appears to have
been in the post-revolutionary era that young Iranians have begun to question
the deeply entrenched institution of marriage and embrace new
conceptualizations of sexuality and gender relations.
This may partly due to necessity. As in Egypt, the troubled Iranian economy cannot
provide enough work for its young people, who represent around two thirds of Iran's total
population. The age of marriage in contemporary Iran has soared from the
pre-revolutionary era, when 18 was the average age of marriage for women; it is
now 27. In one survey, 97 percent of Iranian youth stated economic constraints
as their primary reason for postponing marriage.
But challenging traditional norms with regards to sex and
gender may also be a means of venting political frustration. Since they are
expected to follow a strict code of Islamic conduct in public places, Iranian
youth seem increasingly determined to express defiance through their
individual, private lives - including sexual activity.
Of course, there is no reliable data to confirm that sexual
activity is on the rise (few would dare ask and even fewer would dare answer).
But many observers agree that the shift in attitude towards sex and gender is
palpable. Moreover, it does not seem to
have escaped attention of the Iranian government. Last year, the Iranian
government started actively promoting temporary marriage, or sigheh, as a way
to solve Iran's
"social problems".
Temporary marriage is a Shi'a custom endorsed in the Quran
under Surah 4:24 and intended for sexual enjoyment (rather than pro-creation,
like permanent marriage). The practiced died out in the Sunni community when it
was outlawed by the Second Calif Umar in the 7th century, but the
ruling was considered illegitimate by Shi'a Muslims. Thus, the practice has
continued, though it has traditionally been looked down upon by members of the
Iranian middle and upper classes.
When a man and a woman enter into a temporary marriage
contract, they specify the length of the relationship - which may range from
one minute to ninety nine years - and the amount of financial compensation the
woman receives. When the contract expires, the marriage automatically dissolves
without divorce process. Children born of a temporary marriage are legally
legitimate.
For the Islamic Republic, promoting temporary marriage is
likely an effort to re-assert control over changing Iranian values. But will
the policy stem the tide of change, or merely accelerate it?
Strong cultural taboos continue to militate against the use
of temporary marriage, and some Iranian feminists condemn it for being little
more than "thinly disguised prostitution". Even some religious scholars
question the policy, which they believe will allow wealthy men to take
advantage of economically disadvantaged girls.
But some women such as Shahla Sherkat, a prominent Iranian
feminist, believe that temporary marriage could be a useful institution.
Sherkat believes that as a result of temporary marriage "sexual relations will
become freer, youth can satisfy sexual needs, sex will become depoliticized,
our society's obsession with virginity will disappear."
If Sherkat is correct, temporary marriage will indeed be an
interesting variable in the rapidly changing youth culture in Iran -
especially for women. Indeed, it may allow youth with a legal way to bring
their private lives in to the open, in a more direct affront to the Islamic
Republic's rigid control of the public sphere.
