Aux Armes! The European Dilemma In European security and foreign policy they use a different calendar, according to their calendar we are in the year 15 A.W., After the Wall. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 meant a great change for the whole planet, but few thought at the time, that this event would open a general debate in European politics. The relevance of the fall of the wall derives mainly from two changes provoked by the event. First, NATO’s structure and objectives during the cold war became outdated. The recent reform of it’s governing structure and objectives ended, de facto, the existing transatlantic military alliance, and changed it into anti-terrorist cooperation. The communist block had meant for many years the common enemy for Americans and Europeans, the glue that stuck together all countries under a protective umbrella. This common enemy was very helpful when it came to soothing little differences. With the fall of the USSR, the glue disappeared and the fractures became evident. Contrary to what many think, the arrival of G. W. Bush at the White House has only exacerbated the exiting differences. Secondly, the disappearance of the communist threat ended a situation that was quite comfortable for transatlantic relationships. In the time B.W., Before the Wall, the US secured a loyal ally, which, if didn’t cooperate militarily, it certainly did economic and politically. On the other side, the Europeans found themselves in a privileged situation, under the protective umbrella of the American military, and without the need of spending on defense, or worrying about international conflicts. It is in this era of American protection, when the right elements for the abandonment of power politics concur in Europe. This rejection of power politics allowed, according to Kagan1, the construction of the European unity. Europe didn’t need to worry about international conflicts, those were American preoccupations. According to this theory, it is precisely at this time when the different psychologies which are so evident today, appear on either side of the Atlantic. The Americans, proud of their military power, and the Europeans, proud of their soft power and conciliation in international politics. This European psychology has lasted very little though. September 11th, and specially the Madrid bombings of March the 11th, have triggered all the alarms in the old continent. Goodbye to the post-modern paradise, the post-wall Europe has been hit full speed by a new and scary international paradigm, and this time there’s no American protection. Traditional European politics of conciliation and integration are being questioned. “We need more muscle!” bellow strategic analysts in EuroNews, and Chirac’s thesis of a multi-polar world gains support throughout Europe. This is an important moment for the continent, the way we face these new challenges will affect in great measure the future evolution of the EU. Will we maintain ourselves far from power politics, a strategy that has allowed us by some measure to become what we are today? Or will Europe “seize it’s rightful position in a globalized world,” an assume an active role in international conflicts? There exists basically two fundamental arguments in favor of greater investment in defense and greater international presence specially in military conflicts. The thesis which Americans fear most is the neo-gaullism proposed by Chirac. According to this theory, we need to develop a European nationalism of sorts, which would lead us into greater spending in military equipment, and ultimately to a multi-polar world dominated by say, the US, the EU, and China. The greater international presence that this theory proposes is but an assertion of European power. The advantages that derive from this project are obvious. A stronger voice in international conflicts, and a greater capacity to shape international society according to European interests and needs. This thesis though, poses two great risks. First, it would mean the return of power politics to Europe, which in turn entails great risk for the EU since the pacific solution to conflicts has meant one of the main pillars of European construction. Secondly it runs the risk of depreciating the image of the European “club” with the consequent drawbacks. The second line of though that champions a greater investment in military muscle is a mix of pre-wall psychology and the neo-gaullism described above. Supporters of this theory wish to maintain traditional European values. It is precisely these values, amongst which we find peace and stability, that require a greater European presence in international conflicts. They are champions of what we could describe as a version of “Europe and the global south2.” Exporting European values becomes a desirable objective, and in the actual circumstances, goes this theory, military power is necessary to defend our ideals and achieve these objectives. Petesberg Missions, which are basically the military humanitarian missions of the EU, are an example of what this theory campaigns for. The third option of course, is to continue with peace politics, and the military detachment from international society that has prevailed until recently. The question is, can we maintain these policies in a world where global terrorism positions itself as one of the main issues of the twenty-first century? The decision Europe takes in the next few years will be one of the most decisive ones when in comes to shaping the European project. The European dilemma is served.