Tom Griffin (London, OK): Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams spoke at Westminster last night on the latest leg of an international tour intended to build support for a united Ireland. In the event, it was a remarkably open-ended occasion, one much more about canvassing ideas than about presenting a finished strategy.
That tone is also reflected in Adams' piece in Comment is Free today:
To achieve all of this requires those of us who share these goals to find ways in which we can work together. Is it possible to put in place a formal structured broad front approach to campaign for a united Ireland? Or would it be better to opt for an informal, organic and popular movement based on core principles?
One definite proposal is for a major conference in Britain next February:
Of course this conversation, this dialogue, with people here in Britain or in the US or elsewhere will not in itself achieve a united Ireland. That is a matter for agreement between the people who live on the island of Ireland. But British policy toward Ireland is key to unlocking the potential for this change to occur. So, we need the active support of people in Britain.
We need to reach out to the widest possible public opinion, to the trade unions, the business sector, the community and voluntary sector, to the political class, as well as with those of other ethnic minorities who have experienced a similar history of colonisation and immigration.
One interesting moment last night highlighted some of the dilemmas of building a broadbased campaign in Britain. Adams remarked that there may yet be an independent Scotland before there is an independent Ireland.
Dundee West MP Jim McGovern argued that there was no appetite for Scottish independence in the Irish community in his constituency, and noted that while Scottish Labour MPs were well represented at the meeting, there were no SNP MPs present.
"I don't want to become embroiled in Scottish politics" Adams responded.
I was quoting Brendan O'Leary, but to be frank, I don't believe in Kingdoms of any kind, United or otherwise. I'm a republican. I don't believe in elites of monarchies or all of that nonsense.
Brendan O'Leary did make a very interesting and informative speech, which is probably available on the web somewhere. But he did make the point that in terms of the politics of these islands, and he's making this point as a political scientist, that Scotland could have its independence before Ireland. Whether he's right or wrong is another matter.
Diane Abbott MP returned to the subject in closing the meeting:
There was reference to the situation in Scotland. I wouldn't dare as an English MP say anything about Scottish politics. I know our Scottish colleagues in the context are sturdy unionists, but let me say this. Whatever you think of Alex Salmond, and my Scottish colleagues don't think much, there is no question that his activities have tended to loosen the ties that bind unionism. Whatever Scottish people think about it, he has acted to weaken unionism among English people, and that cannot be not advantageous to the cause of Irish unity.My own brief contribution from the floor was a plea for Irish republicans to take note of the renewed interest in republican ideas in sections of the British left, and to set the case for Irish unity in the context of the possibilities for a broader republican ethos emerging out the demand for political reform in the wake of the expenses scandal.
Comments
The traditional left in Britain has supported Irish independence, while at the same time being passionately opposed to Scottish indepence. This has never seemed, to me, to be consistent nor to stand up to critical scrutiny. Adam's analysis of the British state, on the other hand, as an, elite led, imperialist project imposed on the different nationalities of these islands, would lead him to a different view on Scottish indepenence.
The fact that a policy developed in the late 19th cent. to buy Scottish and Irish acquiecence through preferential bugetary allocations, failed in Ireland's case and is still seen as necessary in Scotland's case, shows how Adams, amongst others, could come to hold the later position.
Alex Buchan
Brian Walker
The highly diverse Northern Ireland website I write for, Slugger O'Toole, greeted Gerry Adam's initiative with a generally dusty response, regardless of poltical allegiance. Much comment poured scorn on my own view that Adams' more open minded approach towards achieving Irish unity was a sign of a new realism and something of a departure from SF's traditional dogmatic narrative. However,what I called his open mindedness was generally taken to mean that SF is now at a loss for a strategy, having been humbled in the recent European election in the Republic, where the party is facing calls for a return to community politics, having failed to create their own version of a big repubican tent. My comment:
Adams tries softer sell for unity
Gerry Adams launched the British leg of Sinn Fein’s United Ireland campaign at Westminster last night. I went along in a quandary. Having read the write up of the New York launch, I wondered if he had anything new to say. More to the point, had I? No use sniping or sneering, there’s enough of that elsewhere. In the event, I think I detected a new openmindedness, a much softer sell involving an adjustment to reality, certainly light years away from the old dogma of bombing the Brits out of Ireland or even the Sinn Fein hard line doctrine of inevitability. Adams is on a search for new allies for a revived project. Last night’s attendance ws largely limited to the usual suspects of the old hard-ish left wing and the sympathetic diaspora, elements not notably influential in post-Thatcher Britain. He admits it’s a daunting task. And yet he sounded like a Sinn Fein leader in comfortable command with all the time in the world, rather than Gerry Adams under pressure north and south. True, the old mantra were incanted (although absent form the Guardian’s shortened version of the speech): “ .. the underlying cause of the conflict persists – that is the British government’s claim to jurisdiction over a part of Ireland.” Yet this jarred with his basic thrust.
In the middle of questions and comments, Adams suddenly defined his problem: “All of us involved in the Good Friday Agreement are to some extent victims of our own success.” And that surely is the nub of it. What now is the onward strategy? In contrast to the old certainties, Adams was really open to anything, “formal” like the Smash the H block campaign or a looser “more informal,” process based on a statement of principles that produced the economic pressures that came from the McBride principles. “Is it possible to put in place a formal structured broad front approach to campaign for a united Ireland? Or would it be better to opt for an informal, organic and popular movement based on core principles?” It was strange to hear Gerry Adams talking like this.
There are “three interlinked challenges” in the campaign: “getting the British government to change from upholding the Union to becoming a persuader for Irish unity” (How?) Getting the Irish government to prepare for Irish unity.( No sign yet of that “Green Paper”) And engaging with Ulster Unionism on the type of Ireland we want to create.( Unionists are 2% in the Union, 20% in a United Ireland etc). The north-south institutions are a start. The aspiration fundamentally remains rooted in the rational enough belief that “Irish Unity makes sense”.
What might the process look like? Adams quoted Professor Brendan O’Leary approvingly , speaking at the New York event.
“Professor Brendan O’Leary, in his contribution to this very debate, suggested that republicans and nationalists and unionists should examine the possibilities of some form of federal arrangement. Others may have different ideas and suggestions. This is one part of the debate we must have.
But O’Leary warned it would all take a long time. There would not be a nationalist majority by 2023 and he was of the view that the gains by nationalists in the overall population of the North had likely flattened out.
There was, he said, “no quick victory” for Irish nationalism “through the cradle.”
As such, a “substantial portion of unionists and Protestants” needed to be converted to the idea of a united Ireland. There were, he said “practical and principled” reasons to advocate a federal Ireland. O’Leary argued that the “population explosion” in the South stood to give the North much less clout in a united Ireland than once would have been the case. A federal Ireland, he said, would dilute this effect. Such a federation would not necessarily be based on the historical four provinces but a two unit federation between the existing six county North and the South which, he said, could break into smaller units if it so desired. There would be a need to persuade others such as immigrant groups in the North in order to establish a required backdrop for unity of peace and pluralism, said O’Leary. The arrival of those groups made a federal Ireland more possible.
O’Leary focused on the difficulties of winning over public opinion in the South to the idea of unity. “There had been “estrangement” over the 90 years of partition and a fear in the South over potential violence from northern Protestants. Consent for unity on the southern side, he said, would minimally require the cooperation of the SDLP in the North, Fianna Fáil, Labour and the Greens in the South. ”
By the way, it’s worth noting that Sinn Fein appear not to be formally committed to continuing the existing six county devolved institutions in a united Ireland although the governments and parliaments are. However, this is the sort of unbuttoned thinking that Sinn Fein supporters will have to address before their next conference in February. It will take place against an Irish background of a reappraisal of the party’s reduced role in the south and possible challenge to its republican dominance in the north. In Britain David Cameron flirts with a new departure for unionism which, while by no means abandoning the British-Irish partnership, is far from adopting the language of persuader for Irish unity. So it’s far from clear who Sinn Fein’s effective new allies might be.
Alex,
I think part of the reason for the difference is that Ireland was dominated electorally by nationalism, and by Conservative-oriented Ulster Unionism in the North, long before the Labour Party came on the scene, whereas it's only in recent years that the SNP has really challenged Labour as the dominant force in Scotland.
Brian,
Thanks for the pointer to a very useful take on the meeting.
I think political realism has always been a feature of Gerry Adams leadership of Sinn Féin, even going back to 1986 and the entry into the Dail, yet it still seems to surprise a lot of people whenever he does something that Ruairí Ó Brádaigh would not have done.
The cry of sell-out does seem to resonate with SF's opponents within nationalism, even those who urged them on their present course, so perhaps it's not surprising that unionists persist with it, rather than attempt the kind of deeper analysis you've done.
I think the strategy of aiming for government north and south made sense at a time when the success of the Celtic Tiger was putting pressure on the union in Scotland and Wales, as well as in Northern Ireland.
In the short term, SF are probably lucky that it didn't quite come off and they are not now in the same position as the Irish Greens. So they are having to readjust to a post-credit crunch world, but that is hardly a unique predicament.
The Southern Irish government would have no part in Irish unity. It's notable that during the 70s Harold Wilson drew up a plan with Robert Armstrong, his principal private secretary, which proposed complete withdrawal from the province, but stopped when the Southern Irish government pleaded with them to stay (their reaction would be “very saddened and critical" they noted). Garret Fitzgerald also made similar representations. British public opinion was mostly in favour of withdrawal (May 1969, Gallup). In that same poll the British public were asked "Would you approve or disapprove if our Government encour-aged Northern Ireland to join up with Southern Ireland (Eire)?". Most said they approved; Only 24% disapproved with the idea. In December 1975, 64% of people polled agreed with the assertion "we should begin to withdraw our troops" from Northern Ireland. By 1989 77% agreed to the question "After 20 years, is it time to pull the troops out of Northern Ireland?". In 1980 a poll for the Sunday Times showed only 29% backed Northern Ireland's continued inclusion in the UK. Exactly the same percentage backed NI remaining part of the UK in a poll for the Daily Express in 1987. In 1983 Merlyn Rees, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland revealed that the Irish Government had actually sought assurances from the British Government that Britain would NOT withdraw from Northern Ireland. Clearly a united Ireland could have been readily realized had the southern authorities wanted it. A poll for the Guardian in 2001 showed only 26% backed Northern Ireland staying in the UK. The Guardian made the comment that the high number of 'Dont Knows' suggested that a lot of British people were completely apathetic about Northern Ireland's constitutional position, and this was detrimental to unionist aspirations. Surprisingly when asked who they blame for the problems in the Northern Ireland peace process, 3% named unionists, only 5% said republicans, while 64% blamed both sides equally. Given the Republican terrorist campaigns in Britain, the disproportionate imputation of guilt to unionists patently exhibits their disaffective co-existence with 'the Mainland'.
This scepticism of a United Ireland on the part of southern governments is historically entrenched. During World War II, when the Irish Free State was a juridicial dominion of Great Britain, de Valera decided to stay neutral as a means of national assertion. Churchill offered a united Ireland to de Valera ('it's now or never') in return for Irish co-operation in the War, but de Valera still refused. Lord Brookeborough was even prepared to accept this, however grudgingly. In the 1930s the British government established an Irish Convention with a view to uniting both jurisdictions, and although the Northern Ireland parliament sent 2 delegates, the Irish Free State refused to send any and the proposed Convention was wound up.
America has always supported a united Ireland, both because of its huge and powerful Irish descendant population but also because she herself is founded on independence from Britain and can appreciate nationalist aspirations more readily than unionist sentiments. The neo-conservatives and intelligence agencies have also always supported an independent United Ireland but for considerably different reasons. A US State Department Policy Statement from 15 August 1950 where the US government said that the 'agitation' caused by partition in Ireland "lessens the usefulness of Ireland in international organisations and complicates strategic planning for Europe". "It is desirable", the document continued, "that Ireland should be integrated into the defense planning of the North Atlantic area, for its strategic position and present lack of defensive capacity are matters of significance". The Republic of Ireland owing to its geographical situation is of great strategic importance to both the UK and the rest of Europe. She is the baldest face of the Atlantic, but is constitutionally committed to a policy of neutrality and deliberately maintains a weak defence forces. A prospective change of policy has induced 'hawks' even in Britain to believe if that Irish neutrality is the impediment to an effective military defence, nationalist aspirations ought to be indulged. Fiscal conservatives are more tractable to the proposal also. Northern Ireland is a socialist basketcase (Wilson aroused much anger by calling Northern Irish spongers), and is a net cost of £5 Bn on the British taxpayer. In the 1920s the economic case for partition was more compelling. Belfast's industries were the envy of Europe, particular its ship-building yard Harland and Wollf. Deindustralization since the 1950s has destroyed its traditional industries (which usually only ever employed unionists anyway) and this caused massive social deprivation in unionist areas, leading to a great dependency on state handouts. 70% of Northern Ireland's GDP comes from the state. The much lower corporation taxes south of the border have drained away international investment. As the recession increases, and public borrowing starts to hit hard, NI's comparatively well-sheltered economic situation could engender great resentment among the British public.
To me it would seem like Gerry Adams is engaging in a futile effort. By endeavouring to realize a British inducement of Irish unity, he is simply preaching to the converted. Most Brits would love for Dublin to take Northern Ireland off their hands. IMHO a transfer of soverienty would be a security nightmare, you only need look back at the formation of the UVF to see how convicted Ulster Protestants are of their British nationality and how ardent they are to assert it. If Britain withdrew from Northern Ireland it would result in a civil war so acute it would make the Yugoslavian genocide look like the prelude to the Eurovision Song Contest.
Shane,
Wilson certainly did consider withdrawal, but I don't think it was ever treated as anything more than an abstract contingency scenario by the Civil Service. He was already losing control of events by that stage in the face of the reaction that produced Thatcherism.
This was the period of the Ulster Workers Council strike, which had considerable tacit support from within the British establishment, just as the original UVF had during the Home Rule Crisis.
It would be wrong to under-estimate the agency of unionists, but it also can't be seen in isolation from the unionist ethos of the British state itself, something which Gerry Adams alluded to in his speech.
British public opinion is one thing, British policy can easily be something else. That's probably true for any democracy more often we like to think.
The debate about a united Ireland has to happen in Ireland itself, but it would be a mistake to think that the British Government has nothing at stake in that conversation. An honest accounting of the Troubles would have significant implications for Afghanistan and the War on Terror, for example.
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