As Turkey's ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party / AKP) prepares to lay out its defence today against the Turkish constitutional court's attempts to shut it down, Ipek Kuran argues that the court case is a chance for the AKP to prove its secular credentials. Much of the western press has painted the ongoing legal wrangle as one pitting the politically-motivated secularist judiciary against the democratically-elected Islamists of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's party. But in the eyes of many Turks, Erdogan's party has dallied too long in the controversial arena of symbols, playing majoritarian politics in spite of the law.
A simplistic view of the modern Turkish politics sees secularism as a containment of Islam, reproducing the binary distance between "secular Kemalists" and "traditional Islamists". There is, in truth, no such polarisation; both the state and the traditionalists don each other's values to gain popularity. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP won 47% vote in last year's elections through the successful integration of religion and modern "western" values. During his first term as the prime minister, Erdogan remained loyal to EU reforms, put the economy on a stable track and kept a moderate tone in his speeches.
His clever politics gained him the support of those who would not normally vote for a political party that maintains an Islamist profile. The secular public were eventually prepared to accept a president (Abdullah Gul) who had a wife wearing a headscarf or a prime minister with radical Islamism in his background. Erdogan was the promise of an end to the superficial dichotomy between the "Kemalist state" and "Islamists". After his election for a second term, he made a speech embracing all factions of society; "we regard your differences as part of our pluralist democracy," he said, "our promise is to Turkey as a whole without discriminating."
But Erdogan did place too much emphasis on difference. During the last six months, Erdogan has made the "headscarf issue" the centre of his agenda. Little else appeared in newspapers or on TV for months but a series of debates over a piece of cloth. It's been amazing to watch how dress code can be the subject of the entire quarrel, how suddenly every other discussion, be it the EU reforms or the economy or even the Kurdish issue, evaporates in the face of repealing the ban on headscarves in universities. The "headscarf issue" is of course symbolic, and would have never been an issue if all parties of the parliament agreed to remove its ban - in other words, if the issue was discussed, rather than dictated from above.
How - not whether - the ban on the headscarf should have been removed is important. Erdogan relied on the 47% vote won last year, and with the supposed mandate bestowed upon him by the electorate, which he calls the "national will", set out to do whatever he wants in whichever way he wants. But is this really our contemporary understanding of democracy?
Counting only on the elections is a rather Schumpeterian understanding of democracy, where people give their vote to the representative and then disappear from the political scene. The prime minister does represent the public, but where then goes the role of the opposition? Where and how are those differences - that Erdogan mentioned as essential to democracy - debated? Democracy means equal participation in decision-making and in a Muslim country that can only be guaranteed through secularism that respects religion but keeps public life removed from it. Ninety-five percent of Turkish citizens belong to the Muslim faith by birth and have it inscribed on their ID cards, but they are also free not to practice Islam. Secularism, as the second article of the constitution, guarantees that women and men, regardless of their societal status and religious orientation, keep that freedom.
The case against AKP is an opportunity for Erdogan to prove that he is in fact secular. Rather than trying to change the constitution after facing charges (which seems the likely strategy), he and his party should prepare a solid defence. Erdogan first reacted furiously to the indictment, but a couple of weeks later, he has now struck a milder tone. He brought the EU reforms back on his agenda, starting with Article 301 (the article that criminalises insults on "Turkishness") this week and often reaffirms his respect for the law and the courts when pressed about the case. There are talks of a possible reconciliation with the opposing party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) and AKP; the two party leaders met in person last week for the first time since 2006. The court's decision seems to depend on AKP's defence and the party's overall attitude towards the law, which will not be helped if Erdogan insists on circumventing the courts.
