Tom,

A couple of quotes which may further bring out the curious disjunction from reality characteristic of the Times article by Lord Owen et al.

One sets out the grounds why Colonel-General Gareev has abandoned his resistance to strategies of first-use. It comes from his keynote address to a conference held in January last year by the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, of which he is president. (Gareev incidentally has an interesting background, as his name suggests. Born in a Tatar family in Chelyabinsk, he joined the Red Army as a cavalryman in the late Thirties.)

'The keynote speaker, General (ret.) Mahmoud Gareev, offered a somewhat different perspective on future threats. He predicted that “in the next 10-15 years, ecological and the energy factors will become the main cause of political and military conflicts.” Apparently referring to the U.S. presence in Iraq, he stated that some states will seek to control energy resources, while others will have little choice except to perish or resist. In Gareev’s assessment, competition for energy sources will pit Russia first and foremost against the United States and other developed countries, but will also spur nuclear proliferation, as other energy-rich countries seek nuclear weapons to defend their resources from the United States. This could lead to a “war of everyone against everyone.”

'Given these conditions, Gareev asserted that nuclear weapons will remain the “central, most reliable means for the strategic deterrence of external aggression.” He predicted that although future wars will primarily be conventional, the threat of nuclear use will always be present. Thus, Russia needs to rely on its nuclear arsenal given the unfavorable balance of conventional forces in all theaters. The role of nuclear weapons will be all the more important, Gareev asserted, because the nuclear armaments of almost all other nuclear weapons states are aimed at Russia; therefore, he concluded, Russia must maintain a credible and robust strategic nuclear deterrent. He noted, however, that due to the deterioration of Russia’s space-based observation capabilities, ground-based early warning systems, and offensive weapons, Russia’s “ability to launch a strike on warning, much less a second strike is becoming problematic.”

This brings me back to a key point. For Lord Owen et al, and Henry Kissinger et al, belatedly to embrace an agenda for nuclear abolition which they treated with contempt when it was put forward by Gorbachev two decades ago, is likely to be interpreted as a way of depriving those Britain and the United States may wish to attack of the means of defence. So far from being at an end, the Strangelove era is more likely to entering on a new and potentially extremely dangerous phase.

A key aspect of this is well brought out in an article by Alexander Zaitchik which appeared in March last year in the now lamentably defunct magazine The Exile:

'Short-range tactical nukes. You may remember these European Continent-frying weapons from the early-80s, when the U.S. placed Pershings in West Germany, triggering a mass peace movement in Europe. Moscow already had its own short and medium range missiles in place, the SS-20. Both were scrapped with the 1987 signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), a major landmark in the history of arms control.

'Then the cold war became black-and-white footage and we forgot all about nuclear weapons, unless they had North Korean, Iraqi, or Iranian flags painted on them.

'Well, someone cue the Devo, because it's looking like New Wave night at cafe Europa. Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy has said Russia will unilaterally withdraw from INF if the U.S. proceeds with its missile defense plans in Russia's backyard. Doing his Bush impersonation, top presidential candidate and first vice premier Sergei Ivanov has already called the INF "a relic of the Cold War." If Russia does abandon the treaty, it will likely revive the Oka, a very fast and easily targeted short-range weapon known as the "Kalashnikov of missiles." You really wouldn't want a nuclear-tipped Oka to get commandeered by the wrong sort of people. Even a drooling Qaeda-tard like Richard Reid could probably launch one. Among the serious downsides of any new arms race will be a world awash in more assembled nuclear weapons and material in an age of nuclear terror.

'All of which is not to say that Russia is some poor little cuddle-bear that just wants to buy the world a Kvas. Far from it. Yet it is not the one leading this new nuclear waltz. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Steve Hadley can downplay missile defense until they actually believe their own words, but the difference between "defensive" or "offensive" weapons is in the eye of the beholder. And the only beholder that matters is Russia, which can wipe us all off the map a lot faster and easier than Iran or North Korea.'

So far the threat to withdraw from the INF Treaty has not been carried out.  But a key point Zaitchik makes needs to be born in mind.  It is possible for Russia to develop means to counter American nuclear superiority -- as also can other countries. But such means are, of their nature, likely greatly to increase the dangers of nuclear weapons being used in anger.

Tom,

I have looked at the Times article by Owen, Hurd, Rifkind and Robertson -- and can only register deep disappointment.

It is not much use calling for a nuclear free world, if you are not prepared to think seriously about what would have to be sacrificed to make it possible.

The authors write that John McCain has endorsed the analysis of Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn, who embraced the vision of a nuclear-free world early last year.

In an attempt to set out the problems standing in the way of the United States becoming an effective champion of nuclear abolition two months ago on the blog run by the former chief of Middle East intelligence at the Pentagon, Colonel W. Patrick Lang, I wrote as follows:

'If there is a single figure who best exemplifies the sheer lack of sense of reality which stands as an obstacle to the United States assuming such a role, it is Senator John McCain. On the one hand, he makes speeches citing the 'special responsibility' of the United States and Russia to cooperate to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons. On the other, he champions NATO membership for the Ukraine and Georgia -- and explains that when he looked into Putin's eyes 'I saw three things -- a K and a G and a B.'

'One can have an effective non-proliferation strategy, or one can regard it as a major priority to assist Georgia in subjugating secessionist tendencies in South Ossetia and Ahkhazia, and think it clever gratuitously to insult a man who -- like it or not -- is likely to be a major power-broker in Russia for the foreseeable future. One cannot do both.'

The same lack of sense of reality quite patently afflicts Dr Owen and his colleagues. In the Times article, they write:

'The US proposal to make Poland and the Czech Republic part of their missile defence shield has upset the Kremlin. It has been a divisive issue, but it need not be. Any missile threat to Europe or the United States would also be a threat to Russia. Furthermore, Russia and the West share a strong common interest in preventing proliferation.'

The Russian suspicion has been that plans for antimissile deployments in Eastern Europe are involved with a coherent strategy, whose purpose is effectively to neutralise the Russian nuclear deterrent. By so doing, the Americans could gain an unquestioned 'escalation dominance'.

If the Georgian government had decided to attempt to reincorporate a reluctant South Ossetia in such a situation, the Russians could be inhibited from responding by the proven capability of the U.S. military to destroy the infrastructure of adversary states by conventional methods. They do not want to be in this position.

If people are seriously interested in a nuclear-free world, they must take the security concerns of countries who perceive themselves at potential risk from U.S. military power seriously. Otherwise this is just pious woffle.

It might also be helpful if large elements of the British elite were not working in cahoots with Boris Berezovsky, who champions 'regime change' in Russia.  In particular it would help if British officials and the vast bulk of the British and broadcast media did not uncritically recycle the products of the Berezovsky disinformation machine: in particular in putting forward a wholly incredible version of how Alexander Litvinenko met his end.

As you know, I have posted some 'fevered imaginings' (to hark back to John Jackson's posts on BAE) on this subject at Russia Blog and at the European Tribune site.

The responses of a lady posting under the name 'timelythoughts' to the Mark Urban piece to which I have linked are extremely interesting. She is a former business partner of one of the principal figures in the Berezovsky disinformation circus -- and provides graphic descriptions of British gullibility and cynicism.

David,

Today's events in South Ossetia are certainly pretty sobering.

I suppose the corollary of your point is that a key issue is whether the next US administration has any appetite for a broader conventional de-escalation.

Owen went out of his way to dismiss suggestions that there was any justification for a 'new cold war' with Russia, which I thought was interesting given some of the hype in recent months about the Alex Allan episode etc.

A major problem here is that we have successfully converted the Russians to our familiar strategies of 'nuclear deterrence'.

They adopted a strategy of no-first use in 1974-5. Its reversal in the Yeltsin leaders was, incidentally, resisted by one of the leading Soviet-era military theorists, the former Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff Colonel-General Mahkmut Gareev (the kind of figure that many Western commentators dismissed as an ignorant 'hard-liner'.)

From a 1995 paper by the current head of the Foreign Military Studies Office of the U.S. Army, Dr Jakob Kipp.

'Gareev strongly disagrees with the new Russian military doctrine's open proclamation of possible first-use of nuclear weapons and points out the serious political dangers associated with such a declaratory policy. Dismissing the need for such actions against a wide range of states and noting the terrible risks associated in the use of such weapons against another nuclear power, Gareev concludes that a defensive military doctrine and first use of nuclear weapons amount to a dangerous contradiction. It can lead to confusion in times of crisis that could result in dangerous miscalculations.'

Such reservations have now been effectively dispelled. As in other matters, our Western ideas have triumphed.

When I was making programmes on the so-called Soviet 'new thinking' for the BBC back at the end of 1988, we talked to the resident Sandhurst expert on the Soviet military, Chris Donnelly. He told us that if the United States applied new developments in information technology to weaponry -- as it was already doing -- the Russians would have 'the biggest collection of military antiques at the turn of the century the world has ever seen.'

It occurred to me then that given that the United States was in the process of acquiring the overwhelming preponderance of conventional power whose supposed possession by the Soviets had been held to justify Western reliance on strategies of first-use, it was becoming the natural target of such strategies.

What I however also discovered at this time was that some leading Western experts on Soviet military thinking -- in particular the American scholar-diplomat Raymond Garthoff and the British naval intelligence analyst turned academic Michael MccGwire -- had come to have profound doubts about 'deterrence' theory. And in important respects, they thought the scepticism about such ideas among Russian theorists warranted.

But although the abolitionist agenda was embraced by a range of very distinguished Western military figures -- notably the former Strategic Air Command head General Lee Butler -- majority opinion in Western security establishments saw no reason whatsoever to call into question their enthusiasm for strategies of 'deterrence': and indeed habitually attributed the failure of the Cold War to become a hot one to them.

It will be difficult enough to counter the entrenched power of received ideas about nuclear weapons in the United States and Britain. But it may be even more difficult to persuade others that this sudden upsurge of anti-nuclear sentiments among establishment figures is anything more than an opportunistic attempt to prevent others developing an effective counter to NATO military power.

And it may not very easy to reconvert the Russians to their earlier scepticism about 'deterence' -- particularly when the Georgian government is engaged in an attempt forcibly to reabsorb South Ossetia, having been encouraged to do so by the prospect held out to it of NATO membership.

Owen suggested that the Saudis have got a call on the Pakistani nuclear programme, in return for having funded it over the years.

He also mentioned that McCain is quite sympathetic to this initiative, let alone Obama. It will be interesting to see if that translates into any pressure on Britain after November, especially with a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty coming up in 2010.

It's an important development. I think the Kissinger group realise that they can't stop proliferation. In the next fifty years or so, what if the Saudi's decide they need a bomb in case the Iranians do get one, we can't have Israel bombing them now, can we? The opportunity still exists to prohibit such weapons altogether, which will then also have the effect of preserving the current balance of forces - which is now threatened more by smaller countries getting them. The Lib Dems seem to have understood this whereas Cameron has boasted of his support for Trident.

Yes, difficult. But attainable and well worthy of their efforts on all our behalfs.

I can't see a free England going for Trident either.