An old Czech proverb maintains that with one back you cannot sit on two chairs. This might be applied to the Czech government’s posture with regard to the EU split over the military action in Iraq. More graphically, the situation could be compared to a man standing astride two boats that start going in different directions – with him unable to decide which way to jump.
In taking a clearly anti-military stand and refusing any action without a UN Security Council mandate, the Czech government feels it has been forced to choose between the coalition camp (mainly the US and the UK, but including neighbouring Poland) and the Franco-German axis.
Public opinion – as in most European countries – has largely been anti-war. Political parties and other groups have been rather undecided. The US is still viewed as the most reliable Czech ally in defence terms and the only one able to act in case of urgent need. It should not be forgotten that the US was also the strongest advocate of the Czech Republic’s membership of Nato. Even though it is not exactly what is at stake here, the government feels that the Czech Republic’s reputation in Nato could be damaged by a strongly anti-American stance. Nato is still a new phenomenon for the Czechs and its alliance identity still at the formative stage.
Looking in two directions at once
As expected, the newly-elected president (and ex-prime minister) Vaclav Klaus took a clearly anti-war stance, rejecting the military strike as an inappropriate way of solving the crisis. The Nato campaign over Kosovo in 1999 – a far less controversial issue at the European Union level – elicited a similar reaction from him, and surprised many EU leaders at the time.
Recently, Klaus even asked Craig Stapleton, the American ambassador in Prague, to intervene with the US administration to take the Czech Republic off the list of coalition supporters. The president (unlike in France, for instance) does not really determine foreign policy; but the imprint given to this office by previous incumbent Vaclav Havel, makes it difficult to ignore what the president says.
The government’s position on the war is inconsistent. It is significant that the present government is a coalition (led by the Social Democrats, along with the Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union) – a typical feature of Czech politics. The Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union have tended to support the coalition action, while the Social Democrats were not so keen, although they were also split internally about how to respond – and at their party congress two weeks ago a large number of delegates adopted the so-called “anti-declaration” or anti-war declaration, insisting on a UN Security Council mandate.
The general inconsistency is further underlined by the fact that current prime minister Vladimir Spidla and foreign minister Cyril Svoboda come from different parties, again a typical feature of Czech coalition governments.
The possibility of deep divisions in a fragile government relying on a majority of one in the parliament (101 out of 200 deputies in the lower chamber, including ex-foreign minister Jan Kavan who is currently presiding over the UN General Assembly) has meant that most of the discussion has focused on technical matters rather than broad political and moral issues – especially the principle of whether the Czechs actually support the military campaign in Iraq.
In the event, the government position was never made too explicit, but could probably be read as follows: ‘we don’t actually think the military strike is necessary, but if the US decides to go for it, we will support them’. (Vaclav Havel signed the letter of eight to the Wall Street Journal only two days before he stepped down as president, but this was an act more in a personal than a political capacity).
Instead of making any strong political statements in support of the allies once the strike was launched, there was discussion about the mandate of the Czech chemical unit in Kuwait – whether it should be allowed to operate in Iraq or not. Its deployment in the eventuality of chemical attack on the coalition forces in Iraqi territory was finally approved by Parliament – but the whole thing was seen as more of a necessary evil than an occasion for enthusiasm. Parliament also assented to sending a field hospital to Iraq; this was viewed by most people as a gesture too little and too late, hardly likely to enhance the image of the Czech Republic as a reliable ally.
Getting on with the big boys
In terms of relations with the major EU players, we should not forget Jacques Chirac’s comments after the European Council meeting in Brussels in February. These stirred up public opinion quite strongly. The deputies had to deal with many complaints from citizens who viewed this as an assault on Czech sovereignty, with experts fearing that this could damage the popular mood before the 13-14 June referendum on European Union membership.
At present, opinion polls suggest that support for EU membership has not in fact fallen dramatically. There were, surprisingly, even some comments in the Czech press supportive of Chirac. Although the latter was not speaking in any EU capacity, his comments were still largely perceived as an EU-related problem. It left huge doubts in the minds of the Czech population as to how much the Czech Republic will really be able to influence EU foreign policy as a member. In the end, the whole issue disappeared quite quickly from the domestic media gaze. As a consequence, bilateral Czech-French relations have not been much disturbed, far less than their French-Polish equivalent.
As to relations with Germany, there does not seem to be any particular problem in connection with this crisis that will harm relations here either. This was further highlighted by Klaus’s recent visit to Germany (one of his first official visits as the new president) and by the fact that his views on the matter are very close to those of Chancellor Schröder.
Meanwhile, the Czechs still view Britain as quite a reliable ally in defence terms, especially as the Czech anti-chemical unit deployed in the Gulf since the 1991 Gulf war has been under British command – a smooth collaboration, it seems. There is also a prevailing idea, among expert observers as well as politicians, that it is impossible to build a strong European defence policy without Britain. Bilateral relations are very good on many other (largely economic) fronts – including social policy, European employment strategy, the Lisbon agenda and the open method of economic coordination – which might also be attributed to both governments sharing the same broad political character.
From the Czech perspective, the most likely development now is that the completion of military action in Iraq will be followed by a concentration of efforts on the reconstruction of the country. But as the military situation in the wider region is still uncertain, the government might face further problems and divisions.
Sitting comfortably?
So the Czech government actually did manage to “sit with one back on two chairs”, to some extent endorsing the allies without aggravating the anti-military axis too much. Still, the country found itself uncomfortably torn between the US and Europe – trying to maintain strong transatlantic links but also to build up strong intra-community relations with a view to its upcoming EU accession.
The apparently irreconcilable polarisation of the problem, with the US on one side and a Franco-German bloc on the other, goes against the traditional idea of multilateral diplomacy on which the Czech political community, especially Vaclav Havel himself, has strongly relied since the 1990s. This reliance on multilateral international organisations and on conciliatory postures within the transatlantic community is certainly not something that any Czech government would give up lightly – rather it would look to build on this approach as an asset after EU accession. From this perspective, Scandinavian countries can be considered as our best allies for the future.
The question posed here not only concerns the voice of the Czech Republic in any future EU foreign and defence policy, but the very future of this policy as such. A lot will depend on future developments in transatlantic relations: but also on whether the Convention manages to come up with any viable and acceptable suggestions as to how to run a foreign and defence policy – for a Europe of twenty-five nation states.
This article first appeared in the European Policy Institutes Network – EPIN Comment.
