The young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has often been dismissed by observers of Iraq as a firebrand and an unstable junior member of the Shi’a religious hierarchy. The head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, calls him “an outlaw”. Yet al-Sadr’s influence among the Iraqi people and the impact of the current “uprising” he is inspiring, are more far-reaching and penetrating than these judgments imply.
The al-Sadr strategy
Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army” - comprised of former members of the Iraqi army, disgruntled youth, and several Iraqis who have returned from refugee status in Iran (where they fled during Iraq-Iran and the first Gulf war) - has in the past week been mobilised by religious invective and a rejection of the American-led occupation of Iraq to launch a series of attacks on US and other coalition forces.
In an escalating crisis sparked by the coalition’s closure of the al-Sadr newspaper al-Hawza on 28 March, around 190 Iraqis have died as Shi’a militants have taken to the streets. Despite the increasing numbers of casualties, it is unlikely the Shi’a will back down unless they are directly told to do so by al-Sadr. Furthermore, more Shi’a clerics seem to be lending their vocal support to al-Sadr and reports have emerged indicating that the Shi’a and Sunni for the first time are coordinating tactics and discussing the creation of a joint Sunni-Shi’a Islamic army.
“I will be the striking hand of Ayatollah al-Sistani and will help liberate my Iraqi brothers and sisters. I call on my Sunna (sic) brothers to continue their valiant resistance against the brutal occupiers,” al-Sadr said in a statement released late on 6 April.
This statement speaks volumes about what al-Sadr is attempting to do. First, he is acknowledging that he is a junior member of the Shi’a hierarchy and that he owes allegiance to Iraq’s leading Shi’a cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. By doing so, he is both appealing to higher authorities and also increasing his pool of support among the almost 12 million Iraqi Shi’a. Second, he is reaching out and acknowledging the Sunni resistance – the first time that any Shi’a cleric has publicly done so.
It is a dangerous precept to discount al-Sadr simply because his hardcore fighters number fewer than 1,000 and only tens of thousands support him. The power he wields is an inspirational one. Iraqis are a passionate people and are moved by acts of heroism and defiance. The “David and Goliath” story of Biblical times is not lost on the Muslims of Iraq. When David (al-Sadr) stands up to Goliath (US forces) and openly declares he is ready for martyrdom, Iraqis throughout the country are ready to be moved.
It is then no surprise that thousands of pamphlets were distributed in Baghdad this week indicating that the Sunni resistance is standing together with the Shi’a uprising. “We are with you,” the pamphlets said. Moreover, when Shi’a revolted in Hilla, Kut, Basra, Nasiriya, Karbala, and Najaf, the Sunni youth of the Athamiya district of Baghdad took up arms and attacked American troops on patrol.
After four days of al-Sadr’s men taking to the streets – with reports that they have taken power in Najaf and forcing Ukrainian soldiers to retreat from Kut – Sunni youth have found in him a symbol of resistance with which they too can identify. On 7 April, al-Sadr’s spokesperson made the unprecedented move of equating an attack on Fallujah as an attack on Baghdad’s Shi’a-populated Sadr City. This marks the first time both religious sects have endorsed, supported, and encouraged each other in the resistance, let alone merged certain fighting forces.
No wonder that some US commentators are calling the prospect of Sunni and Shi’a unity in fighting the US occupation a nightmare scenario for the coalition.
The United States’s impossible choice
Muqtada al-Sadr has sensed nationalism, as well as religious fervor, resonating among all Iraqis. He has issued a statement calling on all Iraqis to resist the occupation, to think of themselves as Iraqi Muslims, to put aside their differences and sacrifice themselves for Iraq.
The coalition regards this as a cause for concern, but seems less sure about how to address the challenge. Although US forces announced that they were seeking to execute a month-old arrest warrant for al-Sadr in the early stages of his uprising, more recent reports from Iraq indicate that the US is in no rush to arrest the fiery cleric. Iraqi Governing Council sources have hinted that they were seeking to negotiate with al-Sadr to back down from arresting him in return for his reining in of the Mahdi Army.
Muqtada al-Sadr is also clever enough to issue more secular-flavoured statements in the hope of appealing to a wider spectrum of disenchanted Iraqis. In these circumstances, other Shi’a clerics are beginning to feel squeezed into an uncomfortable obligation to choose between existing sides. The senior Shi’a cleric Ali al-Sistani gave al-Sadr a miniature endorsement when he issued afatwalate on 7 April condemning the manner in which US forces responded to the Mahdi Army. He also called for calm and for both sides not to provoke conflict.
The political and emotional dynamic among Iraqis creates intense difficulty for the United States. Al-Sadr has ensured that his destiny is a catalyst for further anti-US sentiment and resistance. If he is killed, he will be considered a martyr, in the same way as his father and uncle were under Saddam’s regime. This will set off a wave of revenge attacks against the coalition and all seen to collaborate with the “foreign occupiers”.
If al-Sadr is arrested, a prospect that currently looks feasible only after a bloody fight with hundreds of his supporters, Shi’a Iraqis will feel yet another in a long series of humiliations . However, for each day that al-Sadr’s forces retain control of the towns they have “liberated from the US occupation”, he will be seen as the centre of resistance to the occupation. The United States is then likely to be caught in a trap of its own making.
