Modern Iraq is still just
barely discernable as ancient Mesopotamia. You can see the tablets on which
Hammurabi inscribed the first code of laws nearly 4000 years ago, you can visit
the Ishtar
gate into Babylon, you can climb the Ziggurat which held the seven hanging
gardens. You can gasp at the beauty of Queen Shebad, who reigned there many
hundreds of years before Christ, and whose cool looks could put her on the
cover of Vogue today.
Yet tomorrow, all this
could literally be bombed back to the stone age. Saddam Hussein says that if
the US and the UK invade, Iraqis will fight to the last man. Whether or not he
is right, we know that Hussein himself is a high risk-taker, a man who if
cornered will hardly hesitate to use the weapons we insist that he has.
The most likely place he
will send them is Israel, as he did in 1991. Then Israel was dissuaded by the
US from retaliating. This time a more lethal leadership may not be prevented
from sending at least one of Israels 200 nuclear weapons to Baghdad. Each
warhead is almost certainly a boosted fission weapon with an explosive yield of
40 kilotons, three times as powerful as the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.
That is why I was in
Baghdad (see an
earlier article) ten days ago. I have spent the past 20 years talking and
listening to scientists who design nuclear warheads, to military who strategise
with them, to officials who commission them, to contractors who make money out
of them, and to politicians who have the unenviable responsibility of a finger
on the button. I did this because I wanted to understand not only how the whole
system works - in Moscow and Beijing, as well as in London, Paris, Washington,
New Delhi, Islamabad and Tel Aviv but also to understand the thinking of
those who make decisions on nuclear weapons.
My motive - to help find ways
out of the nuclear arms race and establish with the help of Quaker funds, an
organisation to host quiet behind the scenes high level meetings between these
policy-makers and their critics to try to overcome the obstacles to
disarmament.
Thus when I went to
Baghdad and talked with the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister and the
oil minister, I went as an experienced specialist not a gullible westerner. I
questioned them hard, and I picked up from them, and from subsequent
conversations in London and Washington, a few threads which could I believe
lead to a way out of the current crisis without the enormous risks inherent in
an attack.
Peaceing
together the jigsaw
The current crisis
requires lateral thinking to enable the best possible win-win situation to be
achieved, and to avoid the potentially catastrophic risks inherent in military
intervention.
A useful way in would be
to examine the situation from the perspective of the interests of the
key protagonists, rather than their positions.
Even more importantly, if we can uncover the needs that underlie those interests and develop a way forward
that addresses those needs, we stand a chance of coming up a lasting solution.
So here follows an estimate of those interests and needs.
A possible solution to these needs and interests could lie in some version of the following; while it would not meet all of the needs of all the protagonists, it is a start and can certainly be improved.
Constructing a settlement
Saddam Hussein is being
strongly pushed towards retirement outside Iraq in one of a number of
countries, but is unlikely to accept it. What he might accept would be to
retire with his family within Iraq, perhaps to the vacation city 130km north of
Baghdad known as Saddamiat Al-Tharthar, into which he has poured money
and care. This option would require adequate policing and security guarantees,
possibly to be provided by the UN. Some form of indictments would be put in place to
detain members of the current Iraqi regime guilty of human rights violations.
Saddam himself would know that if he left his refuge or manipulated politics in
Baghdad he would immediately be arrested and tried for war crimes.
Saddam Husseins
retirement would make room for an interim government possibly a UN
protectorate or trusteeship that would build on the civil rights reforms the
Iraqis say they have already begun, namely to introduce a multi-party system
and continue to abolish the laws restricting civil and political rights. [The
Iraqi government has already reduced exit visa fees from $200 to $10, has
abolished the special courts on security violations, and has given amnesty to
political prisoners. There are therefore foundations to build on.]
Under this arrangement
sanctions and the oil-for-food programme
would be removed, enabling ordinary Iraqis to get enough to eat and build up
their infrastructure, especially medical services. The Iraqi diaspora,
consisting of hundreds of thousands of professionals, could return to Iraq with
guarantees for their safety, possibly provided by an agreement whereby any
violations of their security would entail the arrest of Saddam and the
immediate sequestering of oil revenues.
Commercial arrangements
for the extraction and export of Iraqi oil would return to an open tender and
bidding basis when an elected government was in place. In the meantime,
negotiations with oil companies would be overseen by the UN, in an extension of
present arrangements and including joint ventures with the Iraqi National Oil
Company. OPEC could continue.
Such an agreement would
not include the establishment of US military bases in Iraq, but it would offer
increased security for the people of the United States, in terms of respect
rather than increased hatred from the Muslim world. It would imply the final
dismantling of any remaining chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, a residual
UN inspection force, and a UN resolution making clear that any return to the
development or deployment of weapons of mass destruction was prohibited and
that this prohibition would be enforced. This could be the prelude to
negotiations for the establishment of a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of
mass destruction.


