The military outcome of any war between the US and Iraq is not in doubt. But if war cannot be prevented – a question acutely in the balance in this week of Nato, European Union and trans-Atlantic division – the key issue becomes: what kind of Iraq will emerge from the rubble?
Afghanistan offers both an echo and a distraction. The same question was posed there, and has not yet been properly answered. But with all respect to its suffering people, the stakes are much higher in Iraq, the implications more far-reaching, the prospects for a post-Saddam country more uncertain, both in terms of a workable peace in the country and the strategic stability of the region.
In
addition, there is the sad but familiar truth that the people whose lives are
most endangered are also the least likely to be heard: the oppressed Iraqis
themselves. The intentions, loyalties and aspirations of those whom the
US would ‘liberate’ remain to be discovered.
In
their absence, politicians, military planners, diplomats, corporations and
intelligence services are engaged in an intense game of shadow boxing for the
rewards of victory – in power, money and influence. Much of the struggle is
beneath the radar screen even of the most informed observers.
But
a close encounter with many of the key players in the game suggests that the
immediate future and the security of Iraq depends on the interaction between
three key interest groups: the Iraqi opposition, who are vitally concerned with
establishing a position at the core of the rebuilding of Iraq; the US
administration, backed by Republican think-tanks, who have long been
considering what a stable Iraq should and could look like; and Iraq’s
neighbours – principally Turkey, Syria and Iran – who are now positioning
themselves to secure an advantageous result from an unwelcome war.
A fragmented
country?
The
exiled Iraqi opposition – unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly – mirrors many
of the problems that are faced by the country as a whole. Iraq,
an arbitrary construct of the British empire, faces the same ethnic, religious
and political divides that are the legacy of many of the countries who share
this historical experience. The Kurds in the north, the majority Shi’a
and the ruling Sunni constitute three defined groupings with
historically different and frequently conflicting ambitions.
Their
division is compounded by further small but important groups such as the
Turcomans and Assyrians – both sharing at least the semblance of a name with a
neighbouring country. Marrying these different interests into one cohesive and stable entity
eluded the Persians, the Ottomans and more recently the British – even when the
latter initially ‘offered’ a democratic solution that quickly reverted to
central control after a series of revolts in the 1920s.
Front-line
peacemakers
What
has Saddam’s rule done to this historical legacy of fragmentation?
The
Iraqi
opposition favours a strong federal structure – leaving current
administrative zones unchanged. They propose to set up a transitional
government (which they would lead), draft a new federal constitution, and put
it to the vote.
The
transitional period will be key. Even the opposition admit, in their
post-Saddam paper, that: ‘a political vacuum will arise during the period of
disintegration and following the downfall of the regime. Many groups and
individuals will eventually emerge and compete for power.’ It should be filled,
prior to the war, with a Transitional Authority, which could then assume
control.
The
problem here is that while the opposition is determined to avoid any period of
international or US ‘administration’, its own legitimacy will be seen to have
emanated from the US invasion and its initial future secured by a US military
presence.
But
Iraq is not Afghanistan, as Saddam himself has said. It has an established
administration, an educated middle class, and an operational structure across
the country. These institutions, while currently serving the oppressive Ba’ath
regime, will become an important mechanism of the transitional period. If the
majority of Iraqis do indeed crave a change of regime, there should be less of
a problem in turning these institutions from weapons of oppression into agents
for change.
Furthermore,
the period of Saddam’s rule has changed the national landscape from the times
of the Persians, Ottomans and British. The experience of suppression, war,
torture and dictatorship has arguably intensified the shared sense of being
Iraqi. If national cohesion has in the past been hard to achieve, it may be
that the Ba’ath
dictatorship itself has helped to create it, thus passing on to any new
administration the hope of being able to ‘hold it together’.
Yet
Iraqi identity – its
capacity to overcome regional, religious and ethnic division – is still
untested, and the proposed federal structure is drawn along these fault lines.
Once Saddam’s brutal enforcement of Iraqi-hood is broken, will these fragmented
groups merely revert to their historical pattern?
A
key part of the answer will lie in whether the Iraqi opposition can rely on the
consent of many oppressed Iraqis. A large part of the administrative, middle
classes belong to the minority, but privileged, Sunni population.
Will
the Shi’a majority continue to tolerate this?
Will the Sunni-dominated military relinquish their power without a
guaranteed longer-term role in the future of the country? And can the
combative, irrepressible Kurds
overcome their dedication to in-fighting to join a peaceful settlement once the
world’s attention has moved away from Iraq?
The
opposition’s plans are worthy in aim and well thought through. But they have
been conceived in the safety of conference rooms in London and Washington. The
reality on the ground may reveal that Saddam’s years of oppression have
accentuated division rather than brought these oppressed peoples together.
The Americans’
catch-22
Americans
appear to want it both ways. They, or at least some of them, want to implement
a clear political strategy in which Iraq emerges as a democratic beacon in the region,
heralding a new Middle East era.
But
apparently the Iraqis themselves are supposed to lead this. Such policies have
so far turned into the nebulous, pleasing-all-camps approaches that have eroded
trust between the Iraqis and the US in the last decade, from the 1991 southern
and Kurdish uprisings to the abandoned coup attempt of 1996.
The
legacy of US unreliability leaves the US needing to decide what its role is –
the distant godparent hoping that the child makes the right decision, or the
cruel-to-be-kind parent? The first is unlikely to be successful, while the
second will attract accusations of imperialism.
The
US administration (and its UK ally) needs also to be very careful about playing
the democracy card. True democracy in Iraq, one not confined by federal
constructs, would probably deliver a Shi’a president. Yet even a federal
structure will need to deliver a national majority leader, and an Iraqi
democracy with strong links to Iran could (at worst) result in a fundamentalist
regime, and (at best) increase Iran’s power in the Arab world – thus
strengthening one part of the ‘axis of evil’ while destroying another.
As
a ‘beacon’ in the region, a democracy in Iraq could have a dramatic impact,
raising the possibility of legitimate leaders elsewhere. But historical
experience in the Middle
East offers complicated lessons to any effort to nurture democratic
institutions.
The
Algerian and Iranian experience shows that majorities can turn to
fundamentalism and are more likely to do so the more western influence is
perceived. For the US and UK seeking to re-shape the region, a hands-off
approach is not tenable while a hands-on commitment is not desirable.
A tough
neighbourhood
Iraq’s
neighbours could be served by a weakened Iraq and are keenly alert to the
possibilities offered them by regime change in Baghdad. Iran aspires to
exercise influence over the new Iraq; Syria anticipates an increase in its own
international status; Turkey seeks to secure order on its southern border but
also covets territory and resources in northern Iraq.
Iran
has much to gain and not much to lose. Whatever the new Iraq looks like, Iran will gain
greater influence over the internal affairs of Iraq through its long-standing
support of the soon-to-be-empowered Iraqi Shi’a. Its regional power will
be enhanced without the counterbalance of a strong and militarised Iraq. And
the modernisers are aiming to use this conflict to broaden their influence and
contact with the US and Europe by helping the opposition.
Syria also can gain from the
denuding of Iraq’s regime. Its strictly secular order will give it a distinct
role and influence in the region. It will be an important counterbalance to an
empowered Iran and its economic reforms will offer it opportunities to share in
any future economic revitalisation of the region. However, more importantly,
its Lebanon policy shows Syria’s readiness to be actively involved in its
neighbours’ affairs, and a new Iraqi regime will not find Syria an easy
partner.
Turkey
also gains from a weakened Iraq. The country will present itself as the honest
brokers in the region, coupling this with extensive deal-making with the US in
exchange for its compliance with the war. Moreover, sections of the Turkish
elite also harbour territorial claims over the northern Iraqi oil fields – which
may come to appear less unrealistic in the face of civil war in Iraq.
The
Beirut Daily Star
reported in August 2002: ‘Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu …
characterised the Mosul and Kirkuk districts of Iraq as parts of Turkey that
were forcibly taken away from it after World War I, and northern Iraq in its
entirety as a “trust” under Turkey’s “safekeeping”, which it will do its utmost
to retain.’
The
Iraqi opposition are very concerned about Turkey’s intentions and feel most
vulnerable on their northern flank. Turkey’s freedom of movement will be one of
the pivotal negotiating points currently at issue as Washington seeks to gain
Ankara’s acceptance for war.
In
addition, the opposition’s desire for a federal structure in Iraq will threaten
Turkey and could be thwarted by the ongoing US–Turkish discussions. A
neighbouring federal state with Kurds
having regional autonomy would set an uncomfortable precedent for a Turkey
beset by its own Kurdish problems.
A dangerous
path
The
passionate arguments over
Iraq within Nato and between the US and its putative allies reflect the acute
danger of this moment in Middle East affairs. The prime objective of any
large-scale intervention in the region can only be to help ensure its future
peace and stability. Yet, in the event of forced regime change, the fate of
Iraq will initially be in the hands the US who will then pass on the baton to
the Iraqi opposition – and only then will the people of Iraq be offered a
chance to decide their own future.
If
the country does not implode before that tortuous process has been worked out,
the Iraqi identity – the most important precursor to long-term stability in the
country – may be safely said to exist. Even then, however, Iraq would remain
very vulnerable to outside influences, and a weakened Iraq might end up merely
transferring the focus of fear from one country in the region to another.
