There is an old Lebanese saying that translates roughly as: "Repetition teaches the donkey". The moral is that even an animal as stubborn as a donkey will eventually learn if the lesson is constantly repeated. The events of the past two weeks in Lebanon suggest that neither of the protagonists in the current, deadly round of violence have paid much heed to that old peasant saying. Hizbollah may have shown extreme recklessness in the killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers but the sheer brutality of the Israeli response simply beggars belief.
The past history of conflict between Hizbollah and Israel had suggested that having locked horns over the past two decades – to Israel's decided disadvantage – both sides had begrudgingly and unofficially accepted the status quo. The circumstances of Israel's retreat from southern Lebanon after twenty years of occupation in 2000 and the growing threat it faced from Palestinian militants in Gaza and the West Bank meant that a stalemate on its northern borders was perhaps the least worst option for Israel; in giving Hizbollah a totally free run of southern Lebanon, it was not such a bad option for the "party of God" either.
The odd skirmish over the still disputed Shebaa farms aside, Hizbollah had, by and large, observed an unofficial truce by refraining from firing rockets into northern Israel, and Israel - despite repeatedly calling for the implementation of United Nations resolution 1559 (relating to the disarming of Hizbollah) - was content to keep a watchful, if rather nervous, eye across its northern borders.
Anwar Raza Rizvi is a translator, interpreter and writer. In 1991 he became trustee of a charity clandestinely delivering medicines and financial aid to Shi'a in southern Iraq following the failed uprising
Also by Anwar Rizvi in openDemocracy:
"Shi'a rising in Iraq" (February 2005)
"Iraq united: Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim interviewed" (March 2005)
"Iraq: civil war or no civil war? " (April 2006)
The power in the east
The dynamics have changed suddenly and with devastating consequences for the innocent civilians who have been caught in the conflict on both sides. Hizbollah is a very well-organised outfit, run by extremely clever people. It is improbable that a decision to launch that fateful cross-border raid on 12 July 2006 would have been taken without much deliberation and acute awareness of what could follow. Perhaps Hizbollah just took a gamble on the simple assumption that the Israelis would (perhaps with the help of the Egyptians and the Jordanians) cut a deal and release Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldiers. If that was indeed the case then for the moment the gamble seems to have spectacularly backfired.
The response from the west, and particularly the United States, has been as expected. Apart from blaming Hizbollah itself for the latest episode in this tragic saga, fingers of blame are also being pointed at Syria and Iran for their alleged support and sponsorship of the Hizbollah.
The Syrian/Iranian connection cannot be totally discounted. Both countries have cordial relations with Hizbollah and both have a vested interest in the region. Syria is still smarting from its ignominious departure from Lebanon in spring 2005 following a wave of popular protest, but it is unlikely that it would have gone as far as giving Hizbollah the green light for such an action, knowing full well that it was already under severe pressure from the US vis-a-vis the situation in Iraq. The Iranian connection is a lot more complex and needs to be looked at in some detail.
Syed Ali Abbas, a former Cambridge scholar, has a particular insight into the Iran/Hizbollah link. He currently divides his time between London and the Iranian holy city of Qom, where he is studying Islamic jurisprudence. Abbas's sojourns into Qom have given him unique access to senior Shi'a scholars, some of whom act as unofficial policy advisors to the Iranian regime. He has also met many leading Hizbollah figures during their regular visits to Qom.
Abbas's views shed some light into the nature of Hizbollah's relationship with Iran and might provide some food for thought for policymakers in the west. He takes the view that the west is being over-simplistic in its demands for Iran's withdrawal of support for Hizbollah. "The Hizbollah do not take their orders from the Iranian government, full stop. The relationship goes far deeper than that and has religious, cultural and spiritual connotations going back centuries."
The basic principle of the philosophy that drives Hizbollah is a belief in the Shi'a doctrine of the vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). This means that the only living being that can lead the Shi'a in their worldly and spiritual affairs is the one who represents the twelfth Shi'a imam in this world.
Currently, for a substantial number of the world's Shi'a population and particularly for Hizbollah, that person is the Iranian spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He is known simply as Rahbar (in Farsi, "the leader" or "the one who shows the way"). Khamenei does not hold any official position, but he is the ultimate source of religious-political authority in Iran and by definition the one person that all Shi'a who believe in him as the jurisprudent must obey and follow.
Also in openDemocracy on Hizbollah and Lebanon:
Thomas O'Dwyer, "Did Hizbollah miscalculate? The view from Israel" (14 July 2006)
Fred Halliday, "A Lebanese fragment: two days with Hizbollah"
(20 July 2006)
Roger Scruton, "Lebanon: the missing perspective"
(20 July 2006)
Abbas tells me that for those who believe in him, the word of the faqih carries more weight than any laws passed by an elected government:
"You have a situation where Hizbollah simply refuses to accept the authority of the state, whether it be Lebanese, Iranian or anyone else, because the state is run by people who are not the true representatives of the twelfth imam (the ultimate jurisprudent in Shi'a theology). Therefore, even if there was a regime change in Iran, or in the unlikely event of the present Iranian regime somehow withdrawing its support for Hizbollah, the group would simply bypass the state and seek guidance directly from whomsoever they consider to be the 'jurisprudent' of the day."
As for financial support, Abbas is similarly forthright. "If Iran as a state were to withdraw material support for Hizbollah, this would not mean the collapse of Hizbollah as an organisation. Hizbollah gets most of its funding through the Shi'a taxation system of khums. This is a unique form of tax, quite separate from the mainstream Islamic tax (zakat).
According to the khums tax system, it is incumbent upon every Shi'a adult to pay a certain percentage of their income to a marj'a (Shi'a religious leader) of their choice. Most of the money collected through the khums system ends up with the ayatollahs in the two major Shi'a seats of power: Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. The actual sums have never been made public but are believed to be in the region of hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Once the khums is collected it is up to the Shi'a clergy to spend on any worthy cause they deem fit. It is Syed Ali Abbas's view that so long as income is being generated through the khums system, Hizbollah will continue to survive and thrive.
The implication is that the roots of the Hizbollah / Iran relationship go far deeper than the rather simplistic view of Iran as a state sponsoring a "terrorist" outfit in Lebanon. Thus it is difficult to see what can be achieved by putting pressure on the Iranian regime to withdraw its support for Hizbollah. Iran has a definite role to play in this tragic drama, but it would be totally wrong to suggest that it can just turn up the heat and turn it off as and when it pleases.
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