Nato currently has 32,000 troops in Afghanistan, in addition to around 8,000 mainly American forces that are not under Nato command. Its military commanders want more than this, but some contributing countries such as Britain are already overstretched and others, such as France and Germany, are deeply reluctant to get involved in the fighting in southern Afghanistan, given that their troops are engaged in lower-impact operations elsewhere in the country. Indeed, the small non-Isaf group of 200 French special forces that had been deployed with the Americans in southeast Afghanistan is now to be withdrawn.

The Riga summit appeared to agree to a small increase of 2,500 troops for Isaf but none of the member-countries seemed ready to provide them; most of the attention ended up being focussed on equipment improvements, especially the critical need for more helicopters.

The second problem was similarly evaded at the summit. Isaf commanders wanted to be able to deploy some of the Isaf forces from the quieter parts of Afghanistan down to the south, but the countries concerned would not agree to this, given that their rules of engagement were broadly concerned with aiding reconstruction rather than counter-guerrilla warfare.

In January 2006, the then British defence secretary, John Reid announced an increase in troop deployments to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, with the confidence that they would be aiding development and even a suggestion that not a shot would be fired. Instead, Helmand has been one of the most conflict-prone provinces, with Taliban elements taking control of much of the countryside and the poppy harvest (for the manufacture of opium) the largest on record.

By the end of the Riga summit there had emerged a vague consensus that some of the Isaf forces in other areas of Afghanistan might be redeployed in emergencies, but this was a minor concession from the French, Germans and Italians, with the reality being that there would be no substantive and routine change.

At least for now, the indications are that Nato will seek to reinforce its units during the course of the winter, scrabbling together what troops and equipment it can. The development of a radically different policy - engaging with Taliban and other elements and trying to bring them into the political process, is simply ruled out - although an increasing number of analysts inside and outside Afghanistan now believe that this is the only realistic way forward (see the interview in Madridi11.net with Ahmed Rashid, "Tackling the Taliban", 20 December 2006).

A one-eyed policy

This alternative policy may seem objectionable in itself, as well as a repudiation of George W Bush's vaunted "war on terror"; but related developments in Pakistan make it increasingly likely that Nato will have to engage in just this kind of compromise.

In two of the key border districts, North and South Waziristan, the Pakistani government is virtually absent, with Taliban elements now effectively controlling much of the territory and establishing what amounts to a Taliban rule. This was already true of South Waziristan, and it now also applies to its neighbour to the north; a peace deal in September resulted in a withdrawal of most Pakistani army units, but not the parallel assumption of control of the district by local elders.

Instead, Taliban and other jihadi elements are training and working with foreign fighters, feeding suicide-bombers through into Afghanistan, developing and enhancing supply lines and otherwise getting ready for a major offensive in spring 2007 (see Carlotta Gall & Ismail Khan, "Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in North of Pakistan", International Herald Tribune, 11 December 2006) There are even indications that the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, might base himself in Afghanistan in the spring as the demonstrable figurehead and a rallying call for supports.

There now seems to be a hard-headed view among the Taliban leadership that sufficient paramilitary units can be brought together to take control of Kandahar city itself, in spite of the Nato presence and a large US air base nearby. There is a recognition that Nato's Isaf forces could not contain such an offensive without the use of sustained air power, but Taliban planners may not regard this as a problem.

A few months ago, US and British strike aircraft were used almost continually against Taliban units threatening isolated Isaf forces. This has often happened out in open country, sometimes causing heavy Taliban casualties as well as some civilian casualties, although not on the scale of Iraq. What has occurred more recently is that paramilitary groups have slowly but surely increased their presence in towns and villages, embedded in communities that may have many blood ties with them.

If US and British strike aircraft have to use their extensive air power against Taliban units operating in urban areas in the next eight or nine months, this will result in far higher civilian casualties. This, in turn, will tend to increase support for the Taliban and other paramilitary groups allied with them.

The problem for Nato is that the Riga summit simply did not supply the Isaf units with sufficient combat forces to engage with the Taliban without having to resort to air power. In one respect this was a sensible decision, in that a major increase in foreign troops would probably have increased a Pashtun perception of a country under foreign occupation.

Although the situation is too diffuse to say for certain, what now looks likely to happen is an upsurge in fighting from around March/April 2007 onwards, with the Taliban seeking to seize command of more territory, including even Kandahar. A very heavy Nato/Isaf response will involve frequent recourse to airpower to protect its own troops, killing many more civilians in the process.

The alternative is to accept the need to bring in some Taliban leaders and other elements into the political process, and there is some evidence that local British commanders did this in northern Helmand province in the summer. That would be Nato's decision and it is radically different from current approaches. For the moment the US seems to be going for the military option, taking Nato with it, but there is just time to change before the fighting intensifies.

For Washington, though, that would mean a tacit and embarrassing recognition of the continuing power and influence of the Taliban and of public-enemy-number-two (after Osama bin Laden), Mullah Omar. That is something that Washington is highly unlikely to countenance; for it would also imply the need for a root-and-branch assessment of current policy that would examine existing approaches and find them bankrupt. As a result, violence in southern Afghanistan is set to rise even further during the coming year.