open Democracy News Analysis - Iraq: the dissonance effect, Paul Rogers - Comments

tonycurzonprice on "Iraq: the dissonance effect"

tonycurzonprice — Sun, 02 Sep 2007 00:51:06 +0100

nadim, yes, I was thinking as a naive free-trader here. so the argument, if it were to work, would have to say: "the official West becomes sole buyer of the crop; the Taliban is sufficiently financially weakened for it not to be able to exact revenge on local farmers ..." I agree this sounds a little implausible. Tony

nadim-fazlani on "Iraq: the dissonance effect"

nadim-fazlani — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 20:17:10 +0100

But Taliban control these provinces this is not a Free trade area if farmers sell their crops to foreign buyers they will face the vengeance of Taliban.So no easy answers if Americans or UK troops control these provinces they could cut off the financial life line of the drug trade.

tonycurzonprice on "Iraq: the dissonance effect"

tonycurzonprice — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 17:25:37 +0100

I sympathise with the view, Oliver, but I feel it needs some facts and figures. How much does an Afghan grower compared to a "street price"? and how does that amount compare to the medical price? The high street price that results from illegality is thought to be agood thing in reducing consumption, but a bad thing in creating the environment for organised crime to thrive. One option would be to keep prices to producers and consumers more or less as they are today, but simply have the government rather than the criminals and smugglers become the only buyer and seller. But how much would that cost? And this, I think, would still leave room for undercutting by organised crime - the government in the UK, for example, cannot even control the supply of cigarettes behind the very high excise duty barriers that it tries to maintain. In some ways, the "best case" would be if the Afghan farmer does not currently get a very high price for the crop. Consumption could then be regulated, but prices kept low enough not to encourage parallel trade. At the same time, the Afghan farmer could be made materially better off by selling through official routes. I think that as long as prices in the West remain high, a black market will develop, and it will be hard to limit the incentives for farmers to produce for that market. The final step in this argument, not quite clear to me, is how the drugs trade is related to insurgency. It could be that, paid for an opium crop at a good price by western nations, there would still be just the same appetite for insurgency.

Oliver Postgate on "Iraq: the dissonance effect"

Oliver Postgate — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 15:00:01 +0100

An outrageous proposition: The drugs trade is a fact of life. Rather than deplore it the coalition should use it. The army should buy the poppy-crop, offering the Afghan farmers a 'deal they can't refuse'. The heroin etc. thus purchased should not simply be destroyed. It should be used by the medical establishments of the civilised world to undercut the drug pedlars and, in a controlled way, gradually wean the druggies from their habit. This could have the effect of putting the criminal establishments, which rely on the extortionate price of drugs for their capital, out of business and also help to remove from the unfortunate Afghan farmers the obligation to return to the Teleban dealers each time the coalition forces have left.

tonycurzonprice on "Iraq: the dissonance effect"

tonycurzonprice — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 11:49:04 +0100

Is the link between poppies and insurgency in Afghanistan an argument for or against drug heroin decriminalisation in the West? Decriminlaisation might lead to lower producer prices, and so empoverish those Afghan provinces further and ready to seek the next underground good to supply. Or it might bring a practice essentially at odds with lawful nations into a more ordered relationship. Is there expert opinion on which way it would go? Tony

Iraq: the dissonance effect, Paul Rogers

Paul Rogers — Thu, 30 Aug 2007 20:25:05 +0100

The approaching submission of General David Petraeus's report on the progress of the United States's military "surge" strategy in Iraq refocuses attention on American options there after a summer of conflicting signals and assessments. The report, due to be presented by mid-September 2007, is already surrounded by politically charged speculation in a Washington gearing up for a new, post-Labor Day phase in the electoral cycle. What then is happening on the ground in Iraq that might make its way into the final draft?

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