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 <title>Necessary but futile, Philip Jakeman </title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/article/afghanistan_taliban_negotiations</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;
According to sources inside Afghanistan,
Taliban leader ‘Mullah&amp;#39; Mohammed Omar sent a secret envoy to President Hamid
Karzai earlier this year to discuss his &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/06/news/kabul.php&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;possible entrance&lt;/a&gt; into the Afghan
government. This remarkable move culminated in Karzai&amp;#39;s recent offer of talks
with the elusive cleric, followed by a Taliban announcement that the group
would consider speaking with Kabul.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The moment is ripe for negotiations;
diplomacy promises benefits to both Kabul
and the Taliban&amp;#39;s political leadership. Unfortunately, this window of
opportunity will most likely be squandered. For talks to succeed, Mullah Omar
must play a central role in discussions between the Taliban and the Karzai
government. But it is his centrality to any peace deal that sets a number of
key external and internal actors against talking with the Taliban, making
negotiations impossible. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;No
justice, but peace? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;pullquote_new&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Philip Jakeman&lt;/strong&gt; is the Afghanistan and Bangladesh researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi.&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
In a country where many elected officials
are documented &lt;a href=&quot;http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/11/afghan14826.htm&quot;&gt;human
rights violators&lt;/a&gt;, adding Taliban politicians to parliament provides further
cause for concern. Afghanistan&amp;#39;s recent history of accommodating criminals in
its politics makes bad reading for many human rights activists, who have
consistently opposed legislation such as the notorious &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/10/AR2007031001263.html&quot;&gt;&amp;quot;amnesty
bill&amp;quot;&lt;/a&gt;. Bringing in members of the Taliban will do little to repair the
sense that justice remains a distant prospect in Afghanistan.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Nevertheless, a sustainable political
system cannot permanently exclude perhaps the country&amp;#39;s third largest political
force. According to the head of the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.aihrc.org.af/&quot;&gt;Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission&lt;/a&gt;, Abdul Qadar Noorzai, &amp;quot;The Taliban
were a part of this country... &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/070930/w093032A.html&quot;&gt;they must be brought
back&lt;/a&gt; for there to be peace.&amp;quot; And with a military solution to the
conflict looking increasingly unlikely, there is little to be lost in
negotiations, providing they adhere to the constitution and maintain clear
objectives, including the cessation of violence as a political tool. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Prevailing conditions allow both sides to
benefit from talks. From the perspective of Kabul and Karzai - a consistent advocate of
Taliban involvement in the political process since 2002 - the gains are clear.
Military efforts to eliminate the ‘Taliban&amp;#39; have demonstrably failed (see Paul
Rogers on openDemocracy, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/conflicts/global_security/afghanistan_six_years&quot;&gt;Afghanistan:
Six Years of War&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;) while the repercussions of violence nourish a
vicious circle that undermines the government, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/&quot;&gt;disenfranchises and
endangers&lt;/a&gt; significant sections of the population, and slows the arduous
task development and reconstruction. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Re-centralising
the Taliban &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;pullquote_new&quot;&gt;Also on Afghanistan in &lt;strong&gt;toD&lt;/strong&gt;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marcus Skinner, &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/terrorism/afghanistan_culture_100707&quot;&gt;Treading softly in Afghanistan&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, &lt;br /&gt;
10 July, 2007 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philip Jakeman, &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/terrorism/soft_power_250607&quot;&gt;India&amp;#39;s soft allure&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, &lt;br /&gt;
25 June, 2007 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ahmed Rashid, &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/terrorism/articles/rashid201206&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Tackling the Taliban&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, &lt;br /&gt;
12 December, 2006&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Negotiations are now also in the interest
of certain influential Taliban leaders. Their enforced exile, the evolution of
the group from an organised governing entity into a dispersed guerrilla force,
and the concomitant decentralisation of responsibilities and strategy have all
led to the disempowerment of the original, non-military leadership, of which
Mullah Omar is the head. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This fragmenting of control is evident in
the growing importance of suicide and kidnapping strategies, in the apparently
autonomous &amp;quot;Taliban&amp;quot; activity in the north and west of the country,
and in the extraordinary latitude afforded field commanders - most famously evidenced
in the actions of the late &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6650755.stm&quot;&gt;Mullah Dadullah&lt;/a&gt; -
all of which undermine the authority of the organisation&amp;#39;s political wing. A
role in government could therefore help to wrest the animating force of the
Taliban movement away from pan-Islamist and apocalyptic forces such as &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.spikemagazine.com/0205alquaeda.php&quot;&gt;al-Qaida&lt;/a&gt; and back towards
original Taliban &amp;quot;values&amp;quot; - namely, the consolidation of what they
consider to be traditional Islamic and local &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.afghanan.net/pashto/pashtunwali/pashtunwali.htm&quot;&gt;Pashtunwali&lt;/a&gt;
tribal codes. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
While the designation &amp;quot;Taliban&amp;quot;
is used in the media with apparent conceptual clarity, in reality it is a
catch-all term for a diverse number of groups working towards similar ends with
quite different means. The &amp;quot;Taliban&amp;quot; insurgency &lt;a href=&quot;/conflict/iran_3463.jsp&quot;&gt;includes&lt;/a&gt; foreign
jihadis, Afghan warlords, Pakistani militants and narcotics criminals. &amp;quot;Official&amp;quot;
statements by self-proclaimed spokespeople like &lt;a href=&quot;http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/conor_foley/2007/10/the_return_of_the_taliban.html&quot;&gt;Qari
Yousef Ahmadi&lt;/a&gt; rejecting negotiations should not necessarily be seen as
representative. That many Taliban fighters continue to use brutal military
tactics should not preclude discussions with other, more moderate factions of
the Taliban.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Man
of the moment&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
However, the sheer diversity of individuals
and factions identified as Taliban suggests that a heavyweight authority figure
needs to be involved for the talks to have any impact. The only person who could
plausibly fit this profile is Mullah Omar himself. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Not simply the Taliban&amp;#39;s spiritual founder
and leader, he is revered by many as the personal embodiment of the movement.
During the late 1990s, the 46 year old effectively ruled by fiat, drawing legitimacy
from an interpretation of the concept of &lt;em&gt;bay&amp;#39;ah&lt;/em&gt;,
an oath of allegiance that carries with it the Prophet&amp;#39;s authority. This was
most famously enacted by his emergence on a Kandahar rooftop in 1996 enveloped in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/mobilization/features/2002/jan/cloak/020110.cloak.html&quot;&gt;Cloak
of the Prophet Mohammed&lt;/a&gt; while hundreds of mullahs shouted &amp;quot;Amir al
Mu&amp;#39;minin!&amp;quot; (Commander of the Faithful). 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Most importantly, he also has the respect of
many local, non-Taliban people in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban
movement enjoys a large degree of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec06/Afghanistan_Dec06_rpt.pdf&quot;&gt;popular
support&lt;/a&gt;. And unlike Osama bin Laden, who has little operational influence
over the group he heads, Mullah Omar is still a crucial driving force behind
the Taliban, despite numerous attempts to undermine him. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
It is in this context that Mullah Omar&amp;#39;s
secret offer of talks with Karzai is extremely significant. Unfortunately, his centrality
to successful negotiations is also their biggest stumbling block. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Opponents
to negotiation&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
While some US officials and their allies have
suggested that they&amp;#39;re &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071002/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunrestusgermany_071002113254;_ylt=Aupc3qosQwzbfCkBOI2J6ljOVooA&quot;&gt;warming&lt;/a&gt;
to the idea of negotiation, there is still a $10 million bounty for the capture
or assassination of Mullah Omar. It is unlikely that the Bush administration
will allow the Karzai government to embrace a fugitive leader who American
officials have vilified almost on the same level as Osama bin Laden al-Qaida.
Indeed, many officials in Afghanistan
privately express deep scepticism that US policy-makers would ever countenance
negotiations with the Taliban, let alone Mullah Omar. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
For its part, and currently enjoying a
resurgence of &lt;a href=&quot;/terrorism/soft_power_250607&quot;&gt;good
relations&lt;/a&gt; with Afghanistan,
India has no wish to empower
what it considers a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.newkerala.com/oct.php?action=fullnews&amp;amp;id=5601&quot;&gt;proxy of
Pakistan&lt;/a&gt;. New Delhi is happy to support the US
position. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
While Iran
may benefit from the difficulties that Taliban fighters are causing the US in the region, it is also keen to preserve
the influence of its allies in western Afghanistan. Tehran has always had a stormy and suspicious
relationship with the movement. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Some argue that Pakistan
would benefit from an increase in Taliban political power, especially if former
sponsor Benazir Bhutto again regains control in Islamabad. However, it is also likely that Pakistan would
be unwilling to cede the control that it is currently able to exert over the movement&amp;#39;s
political leadership in exile. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Finally, the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/04/d0dfc5f9-e7de-4027-a98b-022e279abbe3.html&quot;&gt;United
Front&lt;/a&gt;, an Afghan political party formed earlier this year and mainly
composed of senior members of the Northern Alliance,
has no desire to welcome their former enemies into parliament. In the
increasingly ethnic politics of the country, they consider it a ploy by Pashtun-speaking
Karzai to shore up his shaky power-base ahead of the 2009 elections.  
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Unless these various actors prioritise the
future of Afghanistan
above their own interests, meaningful negotiations between the Taliban and the
Afghan government remain only a distant possibility. Geopolitics, in spite of
local realities, will prevent any peace-deal with the Taliban from taking
place.
&lt;/p&gt;
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