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 <title>open Democracy News Analysis - 98.5% of Chechens support Putin, Hugh Barnes  - Comments</title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term</link>
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 <title>ianniscarras on &quot;98.5% of Chechens support Putin&quot;</title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term#comment-438463</link>
 <description>Following on from Hugh Barn&#039;s articles on the Russian elections and Putin:

But is it all about Putin? A number of features of the current situation suggest otherwise. 

One of the characteristics of Russia&#039;s ruling elite is their self-perceived vulnerability. The wealth of a significant percentage of Russia&#039;s elite depends on their ability to receive what are in effect rents from the export of raw materials, above all gas and oil, and on their access to government contracts. 

Rent dependency however has consequences: elite groups have to play the patronage game, passing wealth up and down the political and social ladder in order to maintain their privileged position. And they have to be careful. There are dangers in amassing too much personal wealth and running foul of other patronage groups eager to usurp key positions. 

Patronage networks thus hold the ruling elite together in a precarious embrace. In this context the ruling elite&#039;s self perceived vulnerability is not in itself surprising, especially given the vast and frequent transfers of wealth that have characterised the transition from Soviet to Russian realities over the last two decades. This vulnerability (or should we say fear) provides ample explanation for continued elite support for the Putin status quo, smothering all the possible alternatives. 

The fascinating, and thus far largely unanswered question in all of this, is the role of the FSB. To what extent can one speak of the FSB as a unitary organisation promoting its members to key positions of patronage and power where they can usefully access rents? Or is the FSB itself subject to the same sort of patronage politics and internal competition for key positions as the rest of society? The answer is probably some combination of the above.

Though Putin would seem to be the clear victor in the last election (fraud or no fraud), the emphasis must be on &quot;seem&quot;. Constraints on his power come not so much from the institutions of the Russian state, and certainly not from opposition parties, as from the patronage networks of which he is a part and which he too has to cultivate to maintain his precarious position. Patronage (like corruption) cuts both ways. In the absence of functioning institutions, it provides the ruling elite with its power base but also forces that same elite to address the needs of considerable segments of society. 

If this analysis is accepted, it might be wiser not to concentrate on the person of Putin alone. The power structures that support his continued control of high office would not seem to be to be those of a personal dictatorship, but rather those of an loose and flexible oligarchy, struggling to maintain its privileged position. 

Oligarchic government and not dictatorship then? The oligarchic model, with all its negatives, might permit a clearer explanation as to why, despite many limitations, Russian citizens under the current regime enjoy many of the freedoms that they have been denied in the past. 

Iannis Carras, Athens, Greece.</description>
 <pubDate>Wed, 05 Dec 2007 10:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>ianniscarras</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">comment 438463 at http://www.opendemocracy.net</guid>
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 <title>98.5% of Chechens support Putin, Hugh Barnes </title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term</link>
 <description>No surprises, then, about the outcome of yesterday&amp;#39;s parliamentary elections in Russia. Vladimir Putin&amp;#39;s United Russia party duly won a landslide victory that was never in doubt. &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2221157,00.htm&quot;&gt;Western observers cried foul &lt;/a&gt;, and the governments of France and Germany joined the United States in calling for a probe into allegations of election fraud. We&amp;#39;ll have to wait until Friday for the official results from the Central Election Commission, but it looks like United Russia will end up with 315 seats in the new Duma after securing 64.1% of the vote. The Communists limped over the finish line with about 11.5%, with the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic party taking 8.2%, which means that Andrei Lugovoi, the alleged murderer of Alexander Litvinenko, now has a seat in the lower house - and the parliamentary immunity from prosecution that goes with it! The only other party to get over the new 7% threshold to ensure representation in the new parliament was A Just Russia (7.8), but nobody believes that grouping is anything but a fake dreamed up by the Kremlin as a decoy for opposition votes.&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term&quot; class=&quot;read-more&quot; title=&quot;Read the rest of this posting.&quot;&gt;Read the rest of this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term&quot;&gt;read more&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/third-term#comment</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/authors/hugh_barnes">Hugh Barnes</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/russia">Russia</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog_terms/russia">Russia</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2007 20:11:45 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Hugh Barnes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">35231 at http://www.opendemocracy.net</guid>
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