open Democracy News Analysis - Kosovo: the hour of Europe, John O'Brennan - Comments

johnobrennan on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

johnobrennan — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:52:49 +0000

Dr. John O' Brennan,
Lecturer in European Politics and Socity,
Department of Sociology,
National University of Ireland, Maynooth,
Ireland

Dear Pathon,

I am sorry I miscontrued the point you were making. I hear many of the same sentiments from young lbanian people I meet . All these things point to the great fragility of the state structures that have evolved since 1989. State building remains an extraordinary challenge and is further complicated by 'events' such as the Kosovan declaration of independence. And you are absolutely right that the model of 'managed' or 'supervised' independence represents an acknowledgment that the new state of Kosovo is simply unable for the immediate future to manage the new institutions of state. It lacks capacity in every department. The key point, I think, is that the challenge facing Albanian elites in Kosovo and in Albania itself is no different to that which we find in Belgrade or Skopje or Sofia. Deep and pervasive corruption, state capture by criminal elites sometimes posing as nationalist saviours, bureaucratic stasis, lack of local capacities...all these things complicatethe search for stability and the effort to integrate with the EU. I am an optimist, however. I have seen in Ireland how European integration provided a hugely important vehicle to improve state capacity over time and encourage investment and prosperity. The Ireland of the 1970s was not that different to the Balkans of today. But the EU is no panacea for local problems. Local capacity building is the only effective instrument for resurgence and integration.

johnobrennan on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

johnobrennan — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:43:21 +0000

Dr. John O' Brennan,
Lecturer in European Politics and Socity,
Department of Sociology,
National University of Ireland, Maynooth,
Ireland

miguelrbp on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

miguelrbp — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:39:19 +0000

Europe's reluctancy to recognise Serbia as an inter pares nation ows a great deal to the new dominant politically-correct ideology that those who have done wrong in the past are to be punished and should be given no rights whatsoever. Besides being narrow-minded, this is politically dangerous, as it ignores the natural dynamics of societies that are not usually rather sensitive to "correctness" considerations. Political enginnering has been Europe's only modus operandi. Until now, there hasn't been any challenging situation to this practice. However, I fear that the next months will show the complete inadequacy of this attitude towards foreign policy.

Pathon on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

Pathon — Sun, 03 Feb 2008 02:34:16 +0000

Dr O'Brennan

Thank you very much for your comment.

It is unfortunate that you concluded from my comment that my views on Albanian political elite are stereotypical, if not racist. Firstly, I have Albanians in my own family and many Albanian friends who I talk openly about Kosovo. I was never perceived as someone who belittles them, hence my surprise with your observations. To suggest that I am an advocate of horrendous prejudice some people in the region hold against Albanians is unfair. I simply disagree with today's Albanian militant nationalism and the blatant denial of a need to make a historic compromise with Serbia. Similarly, some twenty years ago, Serbian political leaders triumphantly stripped the autonomy of Kosovo and deployed scores of troops to guard the presence of the Serbian state in the province. They believed at the time that they ruled the world. A small minority of liberal minded Serbs warned the nation of the consequences of such treatment of Albanians in Kosovo, but great majority saw no problems coming. This is why Serbia of today is the least progressive country in the Balkans, massively responsible for the violent break up of Yugoslavia and still capable of bringing Seselj's chauvinists to power. But then, this is something for Serbia and its people to address and to carefully reflect on. I am afraid that Albanians are equally blinded by the support they currently enjoy from Washington and by the belief that their nationalism (chauvinism) is flawless.

Secondly, in my daily interactions with young and educated Albanians from the region I keep hearing complaints about present Albanian political elite accused of being incapable of running a state in a way one would expect the political elite to do. No one disputes the progress Albania as a country has made since the fall of communism. However, if young people who originate from this country cannot find one good word for their homeland as it is today, then I have no reason to take any of my words back. I am pleased that Albania is doing well, but I am concerned that many young Albanians who were educated in the West do not want to be part of that country and are desperate to look for their fortune in other parts of Europe. This to me is not a sign of a promising progress. In addition, my British and other European friends who happened to live and work in Kosovo since the withdrawal of Serbian troops from the province have all come back disillusioned and largely pessimistic about the province's future (independent or not).

Thirdly, am I not right in observing that the European Union and the United Nations insist on conditional independence for the province and on deploying foreign led administration which would supervise the functioning of this future state? If Albanian political elite in the province is that capable of running the country's affairs, then why do we need this massive international presence? I do understand your frustration with some my views, but I am just saying what many people inside and outside the region think. Let us hope that we are all proved wrong and that your view prevails.

Kind Regards

Pathon

johnobrennan on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

johnobrennan — Fri, 25 Jan 2008 15:18:39 +0000

Dr. John O' Brennan,
Lecturer in European Politics and Socity,
Department of Sociology,
National University of Ireland, Maynooth,
Ireland

Thank you for your comments. Specifically to address those of Pathon: Although you agree with my analysis that Serbia, post-Milosevic, has continued on a very destructive path, you also betray in your comments, the chauvinism and ethnic exclusivism which has done so much damage in the region. When you refer to Albania as a 'pariah state', and state that 'today's Albanian political elite is incapable of running a state' you are engaging in the habitual practice of 'negative othering', long a staple in the region, and familiar to me from the Northern Ireland conflict and elsewhere.

Albanians are considered inferior in every respect, a throwback to pre-modern tribal groupings, who cannot get to grips with the fundamentals of modern administration, economic change, and civic life.

Well, it may surprise you to find out that Albania is a long way ahead of Serbia in its relationship with the European Union, having signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in June 2006. Albania's economic growth ranks amongst the highest in Europe over the past 5 years, with World Bank projections that this will continue for many years to come. The Tirana administration in January introduced a 10% flat tax rate for both individual taxpayers and corporations, one of the lowest in Europe, and certainly a measure which should help to tackle corruption and improve competitiveness. January 2008 also saw international contracts signed for important infrastructural works such as hydro-electrical power and renewable energy.

Nobody doubts that Albania still has significant problems to deal with. These include pervasive corruption, continuing emigration, and the damaging politicisation of public life. But the important point is that Albania, since 2005, seems decisively to have turned a corner. Serbia certainly has not. Moreover, Albania has behaved in the most responsible way throughout the various crises over Kosovo - it has been a model of restraint in fact , and helped develop a robust regional dialogue on many issues.

Unfortunately your view of Albania and the Albanians is rooted in a xenophobic and stereotypical mindset, and completely at odds with the reality to be found in Tirana and beyond. And, let's not labour under the illusion that the old Yugoslav state represented some sort of utopian entity: Albanians constituted a mere 'nationality' and not a 'nation' which is why they were deemed unworthy of a constituient republic of their own. Clearly, the inherent racism which infomed that sort of thinking is alive and well across the Balkans.

Pathon on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

Pathon — Sat, 19 Jan 2008 22:55:29 +0000

It is tragic to see that Serbs are the only Yugoslav nation that has been denied the right to self-determination. The Yugoslav constitution was transparent in that sense. The right to self-determination was given to all constitutive Yugoslav nations and it was not given to Yugoslav republics and provinces as we know them nowadays. But then, the Serbs were unfortunate to be led by Slobodan Milosevic who dismally failed to win the backing of powerful nations in early 1990s with its chauvinistic, anti-democratic and anti-western politics. The methods the Serbs used to achieve their national(istic) goals during the break up of Yugoslavia were often barbaric and mainly pointless. For the first time in their history the Serbs were more powerful than any other nation in that unfortunate country, and, instead of using that power wisely, the Serbs stupidly unleashed all their frustrations and anger at many innocent non-Serbs who until then had no problems with Serbia and its history. This made them "the little authoritarian Russians" in the eyes of liberal European citizens thrilled by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Serbs should have listened to what the West was advising them when they rebelled against new Croatia's and Bosnia's leadership. The Serbs should have avoided brutal conflicts with Croats and Bosnian Muslims (or with "Catholic and Muslim Serbs" according to Seselj). Had there not been Srebrenica, Ovcara, or the siege of Sarajevo, the Serbs would have been the masters of today's Kosovo with much better chances of achieving a historic compromise with Kosovo Albanians.

I am saddened to see the creation of another Albanian state in the Balkans, when one such state has been an international pariah for almost a century. There is nothing to suggest that today's Albanian political elite is capable of running a state, let alone two or three of them adjacent to each other. Kosovo should be granted some form of autonomy short of independence, so the citizens of the province could look after themselves without having to ask Belgrade for anything. Nevertheless, the province should formally remain part of Serbia.

AgilisLux on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

AgilisLux — Tue, 15 Jan 2008 12:51:08 +0000

when the Balkans will join EU anyway? The Albanians are nice and kind people but for what actually do they need such little tiny Nation? And then joining EU anyway.

In 2008 the situation is tense in Serbia but pretty loose in Kosovo. The Albanians have everything they want altho they may lose North Kosovo, but then they can stir up the pot and claim Presovo valley and Bujanovac in Serbia. They'll also go after Tetova in Macedonia.

The budget for the "Reintegration of former KLA members" that are useless in KPS because their involvement in ethnic cleansing is recorded. This former "Freedomfighter" will receive a pension that is breathtaking from EU funds.

The first time I visited the province was during the summer 1989 after this tragic speech of the Milosevic in which he appealed to all Serbs in Yugoslavia. This appeal ended in the bombing of Serbia and Montenegro, after all other Republics seceded from the federal republic of Yugoslavia. It is easy to bomb a country that does not have nuclear weapons to defend itself. However, Kosovo is a province of Serbia, not a republic. So, if changing border through violence is possible we are on a wrong way for more democracy.

Where is democracy in todays Kosovo? More then 250.000 people (Serbs, Roma, Ashkalia and other minorities. have been chased out of this province in an "ethnic cleansing" operation during the presence of NATO lead troops. Now NATO is harvesting, building up one of its largest bases in South-East Europe, in a province that is run by arm-smuggler, human traffickers and drug courier's as Richard Holbrook's successor, US envoy Robert Gelbart 1998 said, Gelbart was called back to Washington after this remarks.

Far from being an insignificant Balkan airfield - as British General Sir Michael Jackson has portrayed Pristina airport - the military airbase is one of the most sophisticated in the former Yugoslavia with an underground runway and nuclear bunkers. At least six Yugoslav MiG-21 jets spent the war there - undamaged by NATO bombing - and flew out of the airbase before NATO troops arrived in Pristina.

A unilateral declearance of independence will give a lot of work for experts, but certainly not bring democracy to the people in Kosovo. The EU would be better of to realize this ASAP before it lowers it standards even more. What pressure was made on Croatia to allow Serbs to come back to their homes. Why are this demands not being made to the leadership in Pristina?

life matters...

ianniscarras on "Kosovo: the hour of Europe"

ianniscarras — Tue, 15 Jan 2008 09:21:09 +0000

There is an inconsistency implicit in EU policies towards the Balkans.

In recognising ever more parts of the Balkans as ever smaller independent countries, the EU reduces the urge between communities and countries in the region to cooperate with each other towards a common EU vocation. With one hand the EU seems to announce to Balkan countries "you're all in this together", and with the other to reduce their predicament to a zero sum game of who controls what territory, with the democratic majority fully in charge, a return to the worst of 19th century Balkan nationalism.

What can the EU do? Above all change its view of the sovereignty of states in the region. Independence in the Balkans should no longer be seen as a zero sum game but a way to more effectively tie various parts of the region into common structures. Freedom of movement and cross voting between communities (and perhaps even between countries?) are essential elements if such policies are to work. Kosovan independence should be negotiated with Serbia, but without complete sovereignty for the newly independent Kosovan state. Perhaps there should be a road map for Kosovan independence to be fully realised the day Kosovo and Serbia join the EU (simultaneously).

Beyond such concerns, there is one undeniable criteria by which to judge the justice of EU policies in the region. And that is consistency. If EU countries were to recognise Kosovo as an independent state without mutual agreement and a UN resolution, there should be no complaints if Russia should choose to act similarly either in Bosnia or elsewhere.

I hope it does not come to that, but I fear the omens are not good.

Iannis Carras, Athens, Greece.

Kosovo: the hour of Europe, John O'Brennan

Mon, 14 Jan 2008 11:08:06 +0000

In 1991, as Yugoslavia was on the point of imploding, the Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques Poos spoke for many prominent Europeans when he proclaimed that "the hour of Europe has struck". The implication was clear - the then twelve-member European Community had a moral responsibility to intervene so as to prevent an escalation of conflict.

John O' Brennan is a lecturer in European politics and society at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM). Among his books are The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (Routledge, 2006) and (forthcoming) The EU and the Western Balkans: Stabilization and Democratization through Enlargement (Routledge, 2008)Tragically, no substantive EU political engagement was attempted and Yugoslavia descended into an abyss of fratricidal ethnic cleansing which cost upwards of 250,000 lives. Today, as the government of Hashim Thaci formed after the November 2007 elections in Kosovo prepares to declare independence from Serbia, the future of the western Balkans looms as the most serious geopolitical issue facing the enlarged EU of twenty-seven member-states. How should the EU respond?

The question is sharpened by the political mood in Serbia, where campaigning for its own presidential election on 20 January 2008 is underway. The incumbent Boris Tadic, a liberal and pro-European, remains favourite to win re-election, but opinion polls suggest his lead over Tomislav Nikolic of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party has narrowed and is within the margin of error.

The increasingly nationalist and uncompromising rhetoric of the administration of prime minister Vojislav Kostunica, supported by increasingly assertive Russian diplomacy, declares that Serbia will not yield sovereignty over Kosovo and cannot be compelled to do so. The "top state secret" action plan agreed at an emergency meeting of Serbia's cabinet on 14 January does nothing to allay the gathering tension.

Serbia's volatile political situation is exacerbated by security worries, related partly to the presence of significant (and unsettled) ethnic Albanian populations in the Presevo valley in southern Serbia and across the border in Macedonia. In such circumstances, Pristina's declaration of independence will almost inevitably further destabilise an already fragile region.

A stalled momentum

Among openDemocracy's articles on the future of Kosovo:

TK Vogel, "Kosovo: a break in the ice" (2 February 2007)

Marko Attila Hoare, "Kosovo: the Balkans' last independent state" (12 February 2007)

Vicken Cheterian, "Serbia after Kosovo" (18 April 2007)

Neven Andjelic, "Serbia and Eurovision: whose victory?" (25 May 2007)

Eric Gordy, "Serbia's Kosovo claim: much ado about..." (2 October 2007)

Paul Hockenos, "Kosovo's contested future" (16 November 2007)

Juan Garrigues, "Kosovo's troubled victory" (7 December 2007)

Ginanne Brownell, "Kosovo's Serbs in suspension"(10 December 2007)

Mary Kaldor, "The Balkans-Caucasus tangle: states and citizens"(9 January 2008)Why do these events matter so much for the European Union? The reason is partly that the EU cannot disclaim its great share of responsibility for the region: the EU has moved closer to the centre of events in the Balkans over the past five years, notably assuming a more active role in Bosnia's internal security. The European council summit in December 2007 agreed to the deployment of a 1,800-strong EU police and civilian mission in Kosovo itself.

At the same time, the EU is far from unified on a resolution to the Kosovo question. Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain are among the member-states most reluctant to recognise the putative new state, even if the EU plays a lead role in supervising its independence. Spain, in particular, worries about the precedent Kosovo would set for the Basque country, where aspirations for an independent state remain to the fore.

This internal EU impasse remains unresolved. Yet the union's collective responsibility remains, even as its leaders are aware that a Kosovo-generated political crisis in the Balkans would increase pressure on them from a variety of sources: among them the further entrenchment of Balkan organised-crime groups in European life, new waves of refugees fleeing upheaval, and a further fracturing in relations with Russia. In short, Brussels is acutely conscious of how much is at stake surrounding Kosovo, including the EU's credibility in the region and beyond.

The Kosovo-Serbia endgame is unfolding in the wake of the European commission's publication in November 2007 of its annual "report cards" on progress made by the western Balkan states in their efforts to secure membership of the EU. The reports delivered an unequivocally negative verdict. Bosnia and Serbia came in for particular criticism as both countries have regressed to a politics dominated by narrowly defined ethnic nationalism (though the judgment may have helped jolt Bosnia at least into a timely change of direction; see Peter Lippman, "Crisis and reform: a turnaround in Bosnia", 18 December 2007). Across the region corruption is, according to the reports, still deeply rooted in both public and private life and efforts undertaken to combat it "are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem". At the very least there exists a shady nexus between the political classes and criminality. With the exception of Croatia, 2007 was a year when the momentum toward meeting accession-related reforms slowed considerably.

A time to lead

So what can the European Union do to avert a so-called "Balkan enlargement train- wreck"? Three things. First, and irrespective of what follows from a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, it needs to engage much more seriously and consistently with local political actors in the region. In practice, this means moving toward a partnership model of governance which delivers much more substantive local ownership over the political process. The commission reports stress the importance of state-building and better governance across the region. But the only way to realise that ambition is to allow it to happen from within - by empowering local actors and encouraging the development of substantive citizen participation in politics (see Mary Kaldor, "The Balkans-Caucasus tangle: states and citizens", 9 January 2008).

A second key shift in policy that is required involves an increase in the provision of enlargement-related pre-accession aid. The amount of aid being channelled toward the western Balkans is paltry in comparison to that provided to states like Ireland, Greece and Portugal in the past, and is also far less than recent entrants such as Poland and Bulgaria currently receive. The EU should move quickly to at least double the amount of subvention distributed across the region in a renewed effort to support capacity-building and economic development.

The third EU change is to acknowledge the important truth at the heart of this story: that enlargement has been central to the success of the European integration process over the past thirty years. The process has contributed incalculably to the stabilisation and democratisation of southern and eastern Europe. It remains the only game in town for the incorporation of the western Balkans into European institutional and political structures.

The conundrum facing the European Union is that the very success of previous enlargement rounds now calls into question the viability of future expansion. After the accession of twelve new member-states in 2004 and 2007, the EU has often been diagnosed as suffering from "enlargement fatigue". And there is little doubt that the gloomier rhetoric emanating from many European capitals has played a part in the slowdown in the reform process across the Balkans. Today, under the presidency of one of the 2004 entrants, with close ties to the region - Slovenia - the EU should insist that key conditions for progress of accession negotiations are satisfied. But the Kosovo crisis also highlights the evident need for the EU to embrace a more pro-active and engaged strategy for bringing the western Balkans closer to Europe.

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