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 <title>open Democracy News Analysis - Medvedev the Apprentice,  - Comments</title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/blog/hugh_barnes/medvedev_kgb_gazprom</link>
 <description>Comments for &quot;Medvedev the Apprentice, &quot;</description>
 <language>en</language>
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 <title>Sean G on &quot;Medvedev the Apprentice&quot;</title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/blog/hugh_barnes/medvedev_kgb_gazprom#comment-439617</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;However, it&#039;s certainly a measure of Medvedev&#039;s blank unknowability that, depending on your point of view, he can seem to be a KGB apprentice or a gas baron.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Or neither.  Medvedev, Sechin or any of the other Putingarchs aren&#039;t involved in the day to day operations of their companies.   I wonder how much they are involved beyond being state reps and skimming who knows how much off the profits.  But you are correct that both Medvedev&#039;s and Sechin&#039;s position is part of an effort to renationalize oil and gas.  Now whether Putin still has the power to sack Sechin if he desired is another issue.  I happen to think that the distribution of power among the elite is somewhat reciprocal in that Putin runs things at the elite&#039;s behest to make sure everyone plays by the rules as long as he doesn&#039;t move to strong against them.  I think we saw Putin&#039;s role in the latest &quot;siloviki war.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also appears that Medvedev&#039;s tenure as Gazprom head is ending. The position will be handed over to current PM Viktor Zubkov.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I happen to think that the reason why Medvedev was chosen is similar to why Gorbachev was chosen.  His loyalty is to Putin only and has no direct connections to the siloviki (as opposed to say Ivanov).  This makes Medvedev a perfect choice because he has enough room to act both as arbiter between the Kremlin factions and also, like Putin, as a possible agent of reform. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sean&#039;s Russia Blog&lt;br /&gt;
seansrussiablog.org&lt;/p&gt;
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 <pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 17:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Sean G</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">comment 439617 at http://www.opendemocracy.net</guid>
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<item>
 <title>Medvedev the Apprentice, </title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/blog/hugh_barnes/medvedev_kgb_gazprom</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;
A commonplace among Russia-watchers in the West is to see Putin&amp;#39;s eight-year presidency as a retreat into autocracy after Yeltsin&amp;#39;s chaotic experiment with freedom in the 1990s. Some hardliners even depict Putin, with his &lt;em&gt;siloviki&lt;/em&gt; cronies (i.e. former or still serving members of the security services) as heir to the late &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/pacepa200409200814.asp&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; title=&quot;National Review - Pacepa on Putin&quot;&gt;Yuri Andropov&lt;/a&gt;, a KGB spymaster who went on to become Soviet leader.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The question is, how do you factor in Dmitry Medvedev to the scaremongering analysis? The president-to-be is not a &lt;em&gt;silovik&lt;/em&gt; from the Soviet era, but a 42-year-old lawyer who first worked for Putin in the mayor&amp;#39;s office in St Petersburg.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Unable to see the president as anything but a power-hungry autocrat, some Russophobes have interpreted the choice of Medvedev as a ploy by Putin to stay in power indefinitely through his &amp;quot;apprentice&amp;quot;. A different view is expressed on the Our Kingdom blog by Clive Matthews, who points to deputy prime minister &lt;a href=&quot;http://ourkingdom.opendemocracy.net/2008/01/29/the-year-ahead-eu-awaits-two-new-presidents/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; title=&quot;Our Kingdom - Clive Matthews post&quot;&gt;Medvedev&amp;#39;s other role&lt;/a&gt; as the chairman of Gazprom, and warns that his inevitable election will exacerbate the European Union&amp;#39;s dependency on Russian gas:
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
		When Medvedev takes over as president, the interests of Russia and those of Gazprom will become even more closely entwined. You thought Dick Cheney&amp;#39;s links with Haliburton in the US were bad? Russia will soon be headed by a man who&amp;#39;s a combination of Cheney, Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi and Richard Branson - and in the process it will become the world&amp;#39;s first true corporate plutocracy. It&amp;#39;s a development the impact of which can be neither predicted nor underestimated.
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
I don&amp;#39;t agree with his analysis - yes, Medvedev is chair of Gazprom, just as his deputy Igor Sechin is chair of Rosneft, but only because Putin installed them as part of a plan to renationalise in the energy sector. However, it&amp;#39;s certainly a measure of Medvedev&amp;#39;s blank unknowability that, depending on your point of view, he can seem to be a KGB apprentice or a gas baron.
&lt;/p&gt;
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 <comments>http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/blog/hugh_barnes/medvedev_kgb_gazprom#comment</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog_terms/elections">elections</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/authors/hugh_barnes">Hugh Barnes</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog_terms/putin">Putin</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/russia">Russia</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/blog_terms/russia">Russia</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jan 2008 14:19:02 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Hugh Barnes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">35690 at http://www.opendemocracy.net</guid>
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