open Democracy News Analysis - My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice, Martin Shaw - Comments

903-977-843-146-548 on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

903-977-843-146-548 — Tue, 15 Apr 2008 18:02:12 +0100

I would not quite call Prof. Shaw a "hack" though his work is very poorly researched and essentially wrong on a number of points, so much so that whatever good points he makes (and some is OK) must be called into question. It would seem that all he looks at is pacifist or anti-war literature. Yet another politically correct professor with an axe to grind.

As to Morty, it is pretty clear he is a fake, though a well read one since he has some of the lingo down. The common name "Nguyen" is a family name, like Smith in the US, not a given name. The Vietnamese like many Asians reverse th eorder, family name first so Robert Bruce Jones would become Jones Bruce Robert. And to compound things, he would be known as Mr. (or General or Dr or even President) Robert. No one would look for Nguyen's house, not a vietnamese person nor an American with five minutes experience in-country. Clearly Morty does not have that experience. And there are a lot of other mistakes. The PRU are not Provisional Reconnaissance Units (Morty can't even spell, by the way), they are Provincial RCs. There are a number of other mistakes that no one who was there would make. Perhaps they seem minor but let me tell you that it is like mis-remembering you were under sniper fire, you don't foget this stuff, ever.

Lirelou on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Lirelou — Mon, 24 Mar 2008 15:58:36 +0000

"What many believe to the the truth..." The same can be said of UFOs, Site 51, Chupacabras, etc. I do not deny that U.S. forces committed occasional atrocities, but the difference is that U.S. atrocities, large and small, were the exception. For the Viet Cong, they were policy. That is not a minor quibbled point, but underscores the very nature of their insurgency. They were out to make the Republic of Vietnam ungovernable down to its lowest level, and terror was a major tool. The long war paradigm cited is interesting, but underscores a major difference between Vietnam and Iraq. The (single) opposing side in Vietnam had a clear military and political strategy. The U.S. did not, and what it did have could best be summed up as: Do whatever it takes to keep the RVN from going under and the conflict from spreading. I view Iraq as a war involving several opponents, each of which is pursuing differing aims. This reinforces points made by other commenters that while there may be similiarities, there is no single paradigm. That is not to say that lessons from the earlier war cannot apply to Iraq. Certainly the clowns at Abu Ghraib (and up higher) would have benefitted from reading Stewart (sp?) Herrington's "Silence was a Weapon". Herrington was a Phoenix advisor down at the lowest level, and found the mistreatment of prisoners to be a major problem inhibiting results. But, a again noted by others, that is a problem separate from the unjustified killing of noncombattants.

Morty3 on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Morty3 — Mon, 24 Mar 2008 15:04:41 +0000

The Winter Soldier exposes of the early 1970s reinforced what many believe to be nearer the truth that atrocities were common on both sides throughout the Vietnam War. Veteran John Kerry confirmed this in his statements to Congress. He was subsequently undermined by Nixon and his henchmen who even went to the lengths of creating their own Vets propganda group to argue the exact opposite. It is an agrument only fit for the school playground to argue about who started it. The simple fact is this. The longer a war goes on with no clear military, moral or political strategy in sight then the more cynical and callous its participants become. The longer we stay in Iraq and Afghanistan the more this will become apparent.

afarrugia on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

afarrugia — Fri, 21 Mar 2008 17:23:28 +0000

Lirelou is right to point out that there were even more victims at Hue than at My Lai, and no justice at all for them.
I sympathise with victims of both atrocities, and I recognise that the Communist government of Vietnam is a dictatorship.

Lirelou on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Lirelou — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 22:51:45 +0000

Morty3's comment confuses me. I assume he (or she) is excerpting the Phoenix account from some published account. As someone who only went along for a few PRU operations, I can only say that trying to apprehend a VC infrastructure member was fraught with risk. You didn't need to "intend" to kill the enemy to quickly find yourself in a fire fight.
As regards the article, while speaking of context, why no mention of the Hue massacres of 1968? Justice is supposedly for all. And as far as justice is concerned, the last time I was in Hue (2005), the surviving murderers of some 3,000 to 5,000 Vietnamese were walking around with medals on their chest.

Morty3 on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Morty3 — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 17:43:36 +0000

Early in the New Year, I was informed I was being reassigned to Saigon, to monitor the Phoenix Program, while my boss was to take over a parallel operation in Laos. These covert snatch and snuff missions were presumably being escalated in response to the Vietcong’s execution of South Vietnamese villagers who’d refused to collaborate with their Tet offensive. And because the Vietcong had to come out of their tunnels during their attacks, the intelligence services now had a growing list of names of those loyal to the communist cause and those suspected of helping to train and arm insurgents from the North. The remit of the operation was now to eradicate the Vietcong infrastructure in the villages and hamlets by kidnap, imprisonment or execution.
I had now been briefed on the large number of covert operations, involving Navy Seals and Green Berets operating under the aegis of ICEX, Intelligence coordination and exploitation that had already been conducted in Laos and Vietnam. As early as ‘64, Military Intelligence had concluded that to beat the Vietcong we would have to match fire with fire and had launched their own terror campaign using the macabre image of the “Eye of God.” This was a set of playing cards with a large white eye in the centre of a black background. After a kill, a card was placed on the victim’s forehead, a pictorial representation of an all seeing third eye, a warning to the enemy that we were watching them.
But were the Vietcong death squads during the Tet offensive, merely reacting to earlier American snuff and snatch operations? I was concerned about these tit for tat raids and how important it was to hold proper trials of suspects, otherwise it would be easy for innocent villagers to find themselves imprisoned or killed, leading to a further erosion of US popularity.
But it was only when I arrived in Quang Ngai province to oversee the operation that I realised what an act of desperation this program really was. I was quickly introduced to his South Vietnamese colleagues, military intelligence officers seconded to the program, who described to him the primary aim of the provisional reconnascence units or PRU’s. This was to identify a Vietcong infrastructure [VCI] in a village or hamlet, via a network of paid informants. They were then to follow the peasants at the bottom of the food chain until they revealed who was at the top, eliminate them and then go in by helicopter, kidnap the sympathisers and imprison them.
I quickly realised the plan was wide open to abuse as informants could simply rat on their opponents and rely on us to eliminate them. I was also concerned about the atmosphere these raids were being conducted in. There was a definite feeling of revenge after the blood letting of the Tet offensive and we noticed that on the map of the province we had been given, vast numbers of villages were now in an area sarcastically nicknamed “Pinkville.” This region encompassed any settlement harbouring VCS’s, Vietcong sympathisers, and if the villagers wouldn’t cooperate in identifying them, they too would have their homes destroyed.
But it wasn’t only our death squads concerning us. President Johnson had authorised the recruitment of South Koreans to serve as mercenaries, supposedly on our side. But unfortunately their modus operandi proved similar to that of the Nazi SS, in that any threat or proposed attack against their men was greeted with terror reprisals on the civilian population. Women would be raped and men, especially the elderly, beaten and shot. And as nobody in command seemed to punish them for these atrocities they were effectively a law unto themselves.
But what we hadn’t realised was that while we’d been stationed in Laos, Pinkville had already been designated a free fire zone, so many dwellings within the area had already been obliterated, leaving thousands homeless and a long lasting legacy of bitterness towards US platoons patrolling the area.
A few weeks later we got our first taste of the finer points of the operation when he went out with a patrol looking for names on a blacklist. The mission filled us with dread, as there were no clear addresses and obviously no telephone numbers on the list. A lot of the names also closely resembled one another, especially the first name to come up, Nguyen. Ernest noticed there were at least five others on the list with the same name.
The next day the platoon went into Nguyen’s supposed village, grabbed the first person they saw and asked where this man was. Their would be informant looked terrified, especially when his tormentors cut two eye holes in a sandbag and placed it over his head, before leading the unfortunate “animal” round the village with a length of commo wire round his neck. The plan was whenever their “dog” nodded we had just passed Nguyen’s house, the position of which would be noted and handed to the snuff squad.
That evening the boys from Phoenix would rise, go to the village, knock on the appropriate door, and who ever answered would be greeted with “Trick or Treat Motherfucker,” and then wasted, often along with their entire family if they started to scream. Hits would sometimes be confirmed by cutting off the ears of the victims and displaying them as trophies.
But it wasn’t only the ear count that quantified the success of a mission as there was also the number of CD’s [civil detainees] to be taken into consideration. Most units could hit their quota by rounding up as many as they could, often woman and children, and as none of them ever admitted to being part of a VCI cadre, most had to be kept in prison and tortured.
Meanwhile, Private Paul Meadlo was treading very carefully along the forest trail. He was keeping a careful lookout for anti-personnel devices; trip wires or other booby traps laid by the enemy. He and the rest of Charlie Company had just alighted from their chopper and were on their way to the village of Mai Lai in a search and destroy mission aimed at eliminating Vietcong insurgents. The night before, his commanding officer, 24 yr. old Lieutenant William Calley, informed them that the genuine villagers would all be at market the next morning, so those remaining could logically be construed as “gooks,” especially as the 48th battalion of Vietcong was known to be in the vicinity.
During his first few months in Nam, Meadlo has already witnessed several brutal acts. Discipline amongst the platoon has been slack and Calley’s contempt for the inhabitants of the “Pinkville,” the villages supposedly loyal to the NLF, visceral. This has already led to ugly scenes of rape and other sadistic acts on the civilian population in this area. And by turning a blind eye, his superiors seem to be encouraging these barbaric acts.
On this bright morning, Private Meadlo was not allowing his mind to wander; as he didn’t want to repeat the mistake of two days before, when a popular Sergeant was blown up after his lookout failed to spot a trip wire.
He relaxed a little as the red and yellow roofs of the village come into view, as his platoon slowly approached via the drainage ditch, marking the settlement’s boundary. They quietly entered to find a calm, rural scene with women cooking rice in front of their dwellings. The platoon then went into search mode, rapidly moving from house to house, pulling men and women out and ordering them to identify Vietcong sympathisers. After receiving a surly silence, the bloodletting began. One man was bayoneted in the back; another is thrown down a well and a grenade thrown in after him. A group of fifteen elderly women, who are praying round a makeshift temple, are systematically executed in their kneeling position, each receiving a bullet to the back of the head.
Eighty or so civilians are then herded into a central Plaza area, where Lieutenant Calley is heard to say to Meadlo,

“You know what I want you to do with them don’t you?”

A few minutes later he returned to see his private still standing guard and shouted,

”Haven’t you got rid of them yet? Waste them!”

The two men started firing and didn’t stop until there was no more movement from the mound of bodies in front of them. The carnage continued even when a US army photographer appeared on the scene and choppers begin circling overhead.

Calley was now standing by the drainage ditch herding scores of men, women and children into it. Satisfied it’s full, he ordered his men to open fire. Some complied, some refused. Private Meadlo did as he was told, later confiding whilst sobbing,

“We huddled those villagers up. We made them squat down. I fired about four clips worth of bullets into the group. The mothers were hugging their children. Well we kept on firing.”

A two year old then tried to run away, he was promptly shot in the back and his body dumped back in the ditch.
Up above in a circling helicopter, US pilot, Hugh Thompson and his door gunner, Lawrence Colburn, witness the carnage. Realising there were still people alive in the ditch, Thompson landed his helicopter gunship in between Calley’s men and the survivors and started to carry them on board. Colburn, his gunner, threatens to open fire on any GI attempting to shoot any remaining unarmed civilians. They eventually took away nine survivors to hospital, later returning to pick up a baby still clinging to its dead mother.
Calley was the scapegoat. The people behind the Phoenix Program were the real villains. Read "Play it Again Uncle Sam," at www.playitagainunclesam.com

Ttrryosborn on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Ttrryosborn — Wed, 19 Mar 2008 19:21:24 +0000

You want the truth uncovered? It was.

The "well known and well-documented atrocity" at My Lai was put together by US military investigators and prosecuted under the US Military Justice. The commanding officer at My Lai, Lt John Calley, was only a few days away from discharge which would have put him out of reach of military prosecution. Prosecutors could easily have let those few days lapse if they wanted to hide the truth you so desperately call for here.

Lt Calley was convicted and sentenced to 20 years. President Nixon as was his right gave him a pardon after a few years. The pardon was controversial, yet legal. On his last day in office, in 2001, President Clinton issued 300 pardons. They were also controversial, but as they don't fit the profile of conspiracy buffs, they are ignored.

A crime was discoverd and prosecuted under well-establish rules. It was not swept under the rug and forgotten. That is more than can be said for other countries including the UK. If the punishment for My Lai did not satisfy your yen for VENGEANCE, that is too bad.

afarrugia on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

afarrugia — Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:43:58 +0000

The previous post said that "US Justice worked again."
One person doing less than 4 years in jail isn't justice for the rape and murder of 504 civilians at My Lai.

Incidentally, Hugh Thompson Jnr, a helicopter pilot who tried to stop the killing, was shunned for years by fellow soldiers, received death threats, and was once told by a congressman that he was the only American who should be punished over My Lai. This is the sort of cover-up and denial that existed in the U.S. about this well-known and well-documented atrocity. I feel angry reading a statement that justice was done in that case.

I want the focus to be on uncovering the truth, and doing justice for the victims, not presenting an acceptable picture of the events.

Ttrryosborn on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

Ttrryosborn — Tue, 18 Mar 2008 23:14:43 +0000

I noticed a lack of research in Mr Shaw's article. Was it written after exhaustive research, or at a laptop during lunch? Mr. Shaw writes with the broad strokes of a high school rebel. Making comparison of Haditha with My Lai and Abu Ghraib is quite a stretch when there is nothing to back it up. My Lai was brought to attention by other US soldiers who felt it should not be forgotten. The US persued the matter, made indictments and convicted the guilty. That is more than can be said of English barbarity in Northern Ireland. Abu Ghraib was a case of National Guardsmen on a prison grave yard shift using prisoners to play out sexual fantasies. Again, fellow guardsmen made accusations, charges were filed and the guilty prosecuted. US Justice worked again. Not one of these incidents is indicative of stated US policy. Rather they are cases of conduct unbecoming US soldiers who are accused and tried.

In the Haditha case, charges have been made and the accused stand trial. Defense lawyers maintain the innocence of their clients yet those words are ignored on OD and elsewhere where is suits the fancy of hacks with an axe to grind toward the US.

DeanOR on "My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice"

DeanOR — Mon, 17 Mar 2008 21:27:23 +0000

"The atrocity is the war" - Winter Soldier testimony, 2008

My Lai to Haditha: war, massacre and justice, Martin Shaw

Mon, 17 Mar 2008 16:16:06 +0000

Forty years ago, on 16 March 1968, United States armed forces committed their most notorious massacre. In the course of one morning in My Lai, a hamlet in Vietnam, approximately 504 civilians - men, women and children - were slaughtered by Charlie Company of the 1st battallion, 20th infantry. A number of the victims were raped before they were murdered; the thatch-roofed huts and red-brick homes of the village were burned; livestock was killed, wells were poisoned. It took over three days for survivors to bury the dead.
Martin Shaw is professor of international relations and politics at the University of Sussex. A historical sociologist of war and global politics, his books include War and Genocide (Polity, 2003), The New Western Way of War (Polity, 2005), and What is Genocide? (Polity, 2007). He is editor of the global site

Also by Martin Shaw in openDemocracy:

"The myth of progressive war" (11 October 2006)

"Genocide: rethinking the concept" (1 February 2007)

"The International Court of Justice: Serbia, Bosnia, and genocide" (28 February 2007)

"The genocide file: reply to Anthony Dworkin" (6 March 2007)

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