open Democracy News Analysis - The de Borda Experiment - Results, - Comments

Paula Allen on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Paula Allen — Thu, 10 Apr 2008 16:11:00 +0100

Unfortunately I was unable to vote as none of the options really reflected my views on the issues. As a creature of conscience when faced with a situation of "the lesser evil" I am forced to abstain completely. The option "none of the above" not being available.
I suspect a large number of the non voters also fall into this category.

This omission seems to be the largest failing in Western so called democracies. The lack of facility for the electorate to express dissatisfaction with all the options/candidates. Maybe I'm cynical, but. I think the lack of this option is because the systems feel that to allow the public to express anger openly by returning "none of the above" in a large number of elections may just rock the boat too much for the liking of the vested interests who pay off the parties for corporate influence.

Overall it has been an interesting experiment, and with a few concerns addressed (as others have raised earlier about the possible abuse of the system by pressure groups) I look forward to participating in any further trials.. Work and time permitting of course..

PPA

{Ed. With a full slate of nine options, there is no 'lesser evil'. Now admittedly, a "none of the above" option is used in some electoral systems, while the best form was used in Norway, for people could then add in the name of someone new. "Adding in something new" was also used in Guam which currently holds the world record for plurality: they had a 6/7-option ballot in 1982, with 6 options and 1 blank, ready to be filled in by any who thought of something better.
One of the lessons from Weimar Germany led to the introduction of what is now called "the constructive vote of no confidence". It's no good saying just 'no' to everything, as Mr. Paisley did for so many years! It is much better if the procedures ask the critic to put forward an alternative.
And this is what we did here. The consensors collated all the ideas, or we tried to, so as it were by definition, and especially if you played your part during the debate, one of the nine options was bound to be less evil than the others. Peter Emerson}

Mary Taylor on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Mary Taylor — Thu, 03 Apr 2008 23:34:00 +0100

This experiment highlighted the need for extensive, in-depth debate before decisions are made. Debate over something as fundamental as funding the electoral process should begin with debate about the principles we want the electoral process to reflect. This phase is likely to be lengthy, difficult, and unpopular, but it is essential if our genuine views - rooted in our philosophical and ethical assumptions - are to be expressed. Rigorous debate is a forging process for our own individual views, preparatory to decision-making.

Without such debate, I do not think the result can be held to represent in any meaningful way the participants’ views on electoral funding. It might be used as a demonstration model for a voting system, though it would be clearer if function were separated from content. To show a voting system at work, it is not necessary to vote about voting systems. The procedure could be shown just as well by a trivial problem, such as the design for an insurance broker’s window display.

{Ed. True. Consensus voting has been used in such easy cases. But, as noted in the comment above, it can also be used on complicated and/or controversial subjects. Suffice to say that one very distinctive feature of consensus voting is that the procedure allows the participants to participate, not only in casting their preferences, but also in choosing the options upon which they will cast their preferences. Which is why we chose a relatively complex topic. Peter Emerson.}

Stuart Boothman on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Stuart Boothman — Thu, 03 Apr 2008 23:07:00 +0100

Thanks for that - are you suggesting that MPs work through such a "preferendum", or the population?
Once the questions are worked out, possibly via focus groups or a working group of MPs, it could be done well, couldn't it?

{Ed. Absolutely. Basically, consensus voting could - and should - be used, wherever and whenever the subject under debate is contentious. For if it is contentious, and if we do enjoy a plural democracy, then doubtless there will be more than two options 'on the table'.

So consensus voting could be used either when the House is meeting in plenary, or when a committee of the House is in debate, or whatever. The options could be determined in plenary, in which case you would have a rule to suggest that any one party could only put forward one option; or the list could be drafted in committee or even, as you suggest, via focus groups... as long as the list of options were, as I say, a draft: the final decision-makers must have the final say as to the options.

You could even have a consensus vote in the country as a whole. Take, for example, the Jenkins Commission on the UK's Westminster electoral system. If he had been instructed to draw up a short list of electoral systems (as happened with the Royal Commission in New Zealand), the entire electorate could have been presented with, let us say, a five option ballot (which again is what happened down under) and then we could all have cast our preferences (whereas, in New Zealand, the voters only had one preference - they used a funny version of the two-round system).

There are exceptions to consensus voting, of course. Not least when ratifying treaties, as with the EU Constitution. Though even here, to take the French example, they should have voted "EU comme ci (d'Estaing) or EU comme ca (Maastricht)"; by asking "d'Estaing, oui-ou-non?" the vote was an absolute nonsense, with people voting 'non!' if they didn't like the EU comme ci, or if they didn't like it at all, or if they didn't like Chirac, Macdonalds, Turkish accession, or je ne sais quoi!

The whole thing was handled very badly, for it was all very top-down. Whereas, if Giscard d'Estaing had been asked, via public hearings and so on, to draw up a list of options... OK, it gets a bit complicated, but where there's a will, and at least we (Europeans) could have had a short list of five, say, constitutions, as opposed to being told, comme ci, take it or leave it.

OK, I think that will do for one comment! Peter Emerson.}

Oliver Tringham on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Oliver Tringham — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 11:29:40 +0100

I did not find the process overly complex.
I did find myself looking for a sort of menu of choices from all the different possibilities - rather than the grouped alternatives of aggregated choices (A - M).
It is helpful having someone to make sense of the different alternatives.

Oliver Tringham on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Oliver Tringham — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 11:23:33 +0100

I enjoyed the process.
I particularly like the Dull/Bright vs. Small/Big aspect - although I find it difficult to find the explanation: one refers to the importance of the point; the other to how much you agree. Which is which?
(And with the points above, the S/B aspect was not functioning)
It surely would not be impossible to make this clear?

Stuart Boothman on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Stuart Boothman — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 00:01:00 +0100

I do agree with a number of the comments already posted - an existing interest in democracy increased my motivation to take part, and yes it was a little long winded. However, I am not sure that the process could have been streamlined very much more - the fact that the proposals had to be refined as part of the process increased both the complexity and effectiveness of the process.

The next question is about its widespread use...
- the complexity suggests that it is not really suitable for use with an entire population;
- the fact that only highly motivated people manage to complete the voting process suggests a risk of a ballot being dominated by interest or pressure groups;
- perhaps the dreaded focus groups would be able to make highly effective use of the process, improving their effectiveness;
- it would be a good way to engage interest groups in exploring opinions and approaches.

{Ed. In many instances, the preferendum would be very appropriate. Take, for example, the 2003 debate on reforming the House of Lords when there were five options 'on the table': all elected, 80/20, 50/50, 20/80 and all appointed.
Or take the infamous debate on poll tax when again there were (probably) five options 'on the (non-existant) table': the Tory (poll tax), the (Labour) property tax, the (Lib-Dem) local income tax, the (Green) land tax, and the status quo.
Or the 1997 Scottish and Welsh referendums, when the independence option might also have been on the ballot papers.
Or to-day's (1st April) debate on detention powers: it does not have to be 90 days yes-or-no, or 42 days, or 28 days, or whatever, yes-or-no. This too is obviously a multi-option question. So, have the debate, draw up a short list of options, and then vote.
Our own exercise was indeed pretty complex. In real life, however, there are numerous occasions when a form of multi-option voting would actually be the sensible way to proceed. Peter Emerson.}

Robbie Hoque on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Robbie Hoque — Fri, 28 Mar 2008 19:26:37 +0000

Opendemocracy didn't load kindly on my home connection, so didn't make the time to participate in debate but did intend to submit a ballot. But I found that the ballot didn't do what it said on the tin. Perhaps because I didn't partipate in debate, I found picking apart that many multiple options required a measure of analysis. 2 to 5 minutes was not enough time to register meaningful preferences.

I would have found voting on less multiple options, 5 or 6 say, or a dozen or so single options (so that the options with the top three aggregate scores could be combined into a policy set) more convenient.

Convenience would be my expectation of any voting procedure.

Phil Booth on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Phil Booth — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 15:48:26 +0000

...are two distinctly different things. I was one of those who pointed out that the insecurity and non-secrecy of the ballot might have an effect. Almost by definition, anyone who took part in this exercise would be more-than-averagely concerned about democracy, and therefore more attuned to such concerns. Glad to see this picked up in your PS, not entirely sure that it doesn't inform your footnote [1].

In practical/presentational terms, were pictures/graphical 'icons' for the common features (or absence of them) ever considered for the 'voting paper'? I'm afraid I can't imagine the Electoral Commission ever signing off on something so complex, but there are quite a few things that could be done to make it more comprehensible.

Iain Scott on "The de Borda Experiment - Results"

Iain Scott — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 15:15:23 +0000

Seemed very long and drawn out. Would have prefered a faster moving process, as I lost intrest somewhare around the second phase (which also seemed very complicated).

The de Borda Experiment - Results,

jon.bright — Wed, 26 Mar 2008 10:42:39 +0000

Home ¦ About ¦ University Signup (closed) ¦ Public Signup (closed) ¦ Guidlines & Schedule ¦ Contact

The experiment:

Phase 1: "Ideas" forum (closed) ¦ Phase 2: "Debate" forum (closed) ¦ Phase 3: "Ballot" forum (closed) ¦ Vote (closed) ¦ The results

An experiment in consensus voting and e-democracy

The de Borda Institute, the New Economics Foundation (nef) and OurKingdom (openDemocracy's UK politics section) are collaborating in an innovative experiment in online consensus decision making. This is the project's homepage.

THE ANALYSIS

Peter Emerson

Abbreviations

AV = alternative vote (which is the same as STV)

BC = Borda count

MBC = Modified Borda Count (the technical name for a consensus vote).

NGO = non-governmental organisation

STV = single transferable vote (or AV)

Contents

The Results

The Turnouts

Further Comments and the Process

A Second Analysis

A More Mathematical Approachtin

The Results

There were two constituencies, the first of university students, the second of members of the public. The results were as follows:

Option	Universities	Public
B	8^th	8^th
C/E1	7	4^th
C/E2	4^th	3^rd
D/F	3^rd	5^th
G/H	2^nd	2^nd
H2	1^st	6^th
I/J	5^th	1^st
L	6^th	7^th
M	9^th	9^th

Both constituencies agreed that the options of M and B were the worst; and both accepted option L was also not good.

On the positive side, H2 was the students' favourite, I/J was the public's choice, and both constituencies gave option G/H their 2^nd preference.

The Turnouts

Only 16 students voted, from a voters' list of 90. That's a 17.8% turnout. On the public side, 60 out of 170 persons voted, a turnout of 35.3%. In comparison with other votes taken over the internet, both of these figures are above average. It must nevertheless be said that a sample of 16 is far too small for any definite scientific conclusions, and even a vote of 60 persons is not the best of bases. It is still possible, however, to do an analysis.

Of the 16 students who voted, 12 submitted a fall ballot of 9 preferences, 1 a partial ballot of 6 preferences, 2 of 5 preferences, and 1 of 4 preferences.

In the public constituency of 60 voters, 34 submitted a full ballot, 2 of 8 preferences, 3 of 7, 4 of 6, 2 of 5, 2 of 4, 8 of 3, 2 of 2, 1 of 1, 1 of 0 [1] and 1 was garbled.

On the whole, therefore, even if the process was "just too complicated," to quote one participant, most people managed to state some if not all of their preferences. Furthermore, as another voter noted, "none of the options listed capture[d] my preferences. In selecting options I tried to pick those which, if implemented, would cause the least harm."

The level of comprehension, then, was actually quite high. One person made a mistake in that he/she cast two 3^rd preferences and voted 9-4-3-2-3-7-6-1-8, obviously casting a 3 for a 5. The computer program reads a vote like this as a valid partial vote: 0-0-0-2-0-0-0-1-0. A second person forgot to say ‘6' and voted 3-8-7-5-1-4-2-8-9, so the computer said

3-0-0-5-1-4-2-0-0. And a third person voted 9-2-2-9-1-9-2-2-9 and said that the 1 was his/her 1^st preference, a 2 was "ok" and a 9 was "those I oppose";[2] the computer read this as 0-0-0-0-1-0-0-0-0.[3]

Further Comments and the Process

Certainly, many participants found the process complex. And it was complicated. It would have been much easier, for example, to have had a multi-option debate, (admittedly two years ago), on the venue for the 2012 Olympics, for in that situation, there were just the five options ‘on the table'. In our debate on party funding, however, as everyone (now) knows, there were lots of factors to be considered, and umpteen permutations and combinations of these which could be combined into any one option.

The theory of consensus decision-making is as follows. We start with a problem: how do we fund the political process? The question, then, concerns funding, but of course the answer depends on what sort of political process is envisaged. And many comments bemoaned the fact that the UK still uses a most simplistic and adversarial electoral system, to name just one aspect. Nevertheless, we are where we are, and the question still has to be dealt with.

Now in theory, at the beginning of a decision-making process, one starts with as many opinions as there are participants. (If not, indeed, with a few more!) The purpose of a consensus debate, having accepted that there are many possibilities at the beginning (stage 1), is to gradually whittle these down to a more manageable number (stage 2), before coming to short list (stage 3), and finally, via a vote on this list, (stage 4), to arrive at the outcome of just one fully coherent option.

In stage 1 of the process, then, when participants were asked for their ideas and suggestions, many points were raised on a wide spectrum of thoughts. The consensors tried to put these into some sort of order, (stage 2), in what became a draft list of 13 options. Given the complexity of it all, we tried to simplify matters by categorising these options into groups or ‘families', and we also presented a summary. Alas, many participants still thought the process was far too convoluted, and one even resorted to the wet towel!

Some pointed out that the human mind is best able to deal with about half-a-dozen options. This was therefore our goal when we set about producing the draft ballot paper, (stage 3). Despite our best efforts, however, it was over 6 options long. Even then, some pointed out that it did not cover all the points raised and so, as you know, we finished up with a ballot paper of 9 options.

Now in some consensus debates, the consensors draw up the list of options and then, before producing the actual ballot paper, put these options into random order. Given the nature of our own debate, however, we decided to leave them in the order used during the earlier stages and, as you also know, the ballot paper was presented with the summary as shown below.

The consensors also endeavoured to ensure that each option was of about the same length. In our own example, the number of characters in each option was as follows:

	Options
Option	B	C/E1	C/E2	D/F	G/H	H2	I/J	L	M
Length	360	372	344	313	424	354	441	330	357

Option I/J was the longest (and it is hoped the sheer size of it did not make it look more important). This longer than average volume was partly because, in the light of quite a few comments, it was considered necessary to explain just how the two vote system would work.

THE SUMMARY

Family	Option	INCOME				EXPENDITURE
		State funding, to be paid to national party (P) or local constituency (C)		Non-state funding		Activities: (what do parties do with their funds?) are activities to be further restricted?
				individual	corporate
A/B - state + corporate funding	B	state funds those parties/candidates with a minimum number of elected reps	P	yes	yes	no more than at present
C/D/E/F state funding but no corporate funding	C/E1	as per number of local members	C	yes	no	yes, nationally
	C/E2	as per number of local members	C	members' fees only	no	yes, both locally and nationally
	D/F	all (above a fixed votes threshold) equally	C	yes	no	no more than at present
G/H state funds democratic process	G/H	state + corporate funding goes into a democracy fund	C	yes	yes, but pooled	yes, both locally and nationally
G/H state funds democratic process	H2	state funding in kind only	C	yes	yes	yes, both locally and nationally
I/J - state funding /votes	I/J	each voter votes twice: state funds parties /candidates as per their share of second votes	C	yes	no	yes, nationally
K/L/M state funding banned	L	no state or corporate funding	n/a	members' fees only	no	yes, nationally
K/L/M state funding banned	M	no state funding	n/a	yes	yes	yes, nationally

A Second Analysis

In consensus decision-making, a preference vote can be used either as a straw poll and/or as the final decision-making process. In our own exercise, if it had been decided prior to the debate that the outcome had to achieve a minimum consensus coefficient (of which, see below) and if the outcome in the vote failed to pass that threshold, the vote could have been used as a straw poll. On this basis, the consensors could have declared that there was indeed a consensus that options M, B and L were definitely not the answer, and that the debate was now reduced to the following:

THE REFINED SUMMARY

Family	Option	INCOME			EXPENDITURE
		State funding, to be paid to local constituency	Non-state funding		Activities: (what do parties do with their funds?) are activities to be further restricted?
		State funding, to be paid to local constituency	Individual	Corporate
C/D/E/F state funding but no corporate funding	C/E1	as per number of local members	yes	no	yes, nationally
	C/E2	as per number of local members	members' fees only	no	yes, both locally and nationally
	D/F	all (above a fixed votes threshold) equally	yes	no	no more than at present
G/H state funds democratic process	G/H	state + corporate funding goes into a democracy fund	yes	yes, but pooled	yes, both locally and nationally
G/H state funds democratic process	H2	state funding in kind only	yes	yes	yes, both locally and nationally
I/J - state funding /votes	I/J	each voter votes twice: state funds parties/candidates as per their share of second votes	yes	no	yes, nationally

Because our own exercise consisted of only one debate-plus-vote, the answer (in the public constituency) remains as option I/J.

A More Mathematical Approach (analysing the public vote only)

In consensus voting, every option gets a certain overall score, and one can calculate the consensus coefficient of all the options according to the following formula:

If S_A is the MBC score of option A, if V is the valid vote, and if n is the number of options to be voted on, the consensus coefficient C_A is defined as S_A/V.n In other words, an option's consensus coefficient is its MBC score divided by the maximum possible score; and the coefficient varies from good to bad, from 1 to zero.[4]

In the public debate, the social rankings were as shown:

Public
Option	MBC	rankings
B	112	8^th
C/E1	224	4^th
C/E2	231	3^rd
D/F	212	5^th
G/H	248	2^nd
H2	195	6^th
I/J	272	1^st
L	183	7^th
M	106	9^th

The maximum possible score, for a consensus co-efficient of 1, would consist of a 1^st preference on a full ballot from everybody, i.e., 9 points from everyone, which is 9 x 59 = 531. Accordingly, the consensus coefficients of all nine options are as shown below:

Public
Option	MBC	rankings	consensus coefficient
B	112	8^th	0.21
C/E1	224	4^th	0.42
C/E2	231	3^rd	0.44
D/F	212	5^th	0.40
G/H	248	2^nd	0.48
H2	195	6^th	0.37
I/J	272	1^st	0.51
L	183	7^th	0.34
M	106	9^th	0.20

The winning option, then, I/J, has a consensus coefficient of 0.51. In a consensus democracy, such a level might well be regarded, constitutionally, as insufficient. In which case, the vote would indeed be regarded as a straw poll, and as already implied, the debate would be resumed on the basis of an agenda requiring further discussion on options C/E1, C/E2, D/F, G/H, H2 and I/J.

A Composite?

In a very simple debate on, say, dog licences, with let us say options £1, £2, £5, £10 and £20 on the ballot paper, if there is no clear winner but rather two most popular options, £10 and £20, the consensors may well decide to form a composite and declare the outcome to be £15.[5]

In our own debate, again in the public constituency, 17 voters considered the two leading options - I/J and G/H - to be, as it were, adjacent, and a further 7 voters regarded them as being only one step removed. So maybe the consensors could have considered the possibility of a composite.

They did not, but let us nevertheless consider the possibility. The two options were as follows and, of course, it must be remembered that I/J was the more popular of the two:

G/H State and corporate funding pooled into a "democracy fund" to finance innovative, democratic activities by individual political parties and/or ngos. Administered by Electoral Commission.

Donations/membership fees to parties/candidates to be from individuals only.

Political activities at both constituency and national level to be under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities, ads etc, banned).

and

I/J Each voter has two votes, one elects a candidate, the other funds a political organisation. State funding to parties/candidates in proportion to the number of second votes cast.

Parties/candidates may also receive donations/membership fees but from individuals only.

Political activities in the constituency subject to current expenditure limits; nation-wide party activities to be under tighter fiscal controls during election campaigns.

In forming a composite, the consensors would take I/J as read, and add anything from G/H which they considered to be compatible. The combined outcome, then, could well have been as follows:

I/J/G/H Each voter has two votes, one elects a candidate, the other funds a political organisation. State funding to parties/candidates in proportion to the number of second votes cast. In addition, the Electoral Commission shall administer a "democracy fund", to finance innovative, democratic activities by individual political parties and/or ngos.

Parties/candidates may also receive donations/membership fees but from individuals only.

Political activities in the constituency subject to current expenditure limits; nation-wide party activities to be under tighter fiscal controls during election campaigns.

But all this is for the day when consensus decision-making is both more properly understood and more widely practiced.

A Comparison

Just out of interest, it was also decided to analyse the vote on the basis of one joint constituency: the full analysis, then, is shown here under ‘Both':

Options	Universities	Public	Both
B	8^th	8^th	8^th
C/E1	7^th	4^th	5^th =
C/E2	4^th	3^rd	3^rd
D/F	3^rd	5^th	4^th
G/H	2^nd	2^nd	2^nd
H2	1^st	6^th	5^th =
I/J	5^th	1^st	1^st
L	6^th	7^th	7^th
M	9^th	9^th	9^th

Given the relative size of the public constituency, we should not be surprised to note that the social rankings in the ‘both' constituency are very similar to those achieved in the public one.

It is also interesting to compare the outcome under the MBC with what would have happened under other decision-making voting systems.

Option	VOTING SYSTEMS
Option	Plurality Vote	Two-round voting	AV/STV	BC	MBC	Condorcet
B	9^th	9^th	9^th	8^th	8^th	8^th
C/E1	7^th =	7^th =	7^th =	5^th	4^th	4^th
C/E2	5^th	5^th	4^th	3^rd	3^rd	3^rd
D/F	7^th =	7^th =	7^th =	4^th	5^th	5^th
G/H	2^nd	2^nd	2^nd	2^nd	2^nd	2^nd
H2	6^th	6^th	6^th	6^th	6^th	7^th
I/J	1^st	1^st	1^st	1^st	1^st	1^st
L	3^rd	3^rd	4^th	7^th	7^th	6^th
M	4^th	4^th	5^th	9^th	9^th	9^th

As was noted during the seminar in Oxford,[6] "There are two defensible procedures for aggregating votes: the Condorcet rule and the Borda rule. The Condorcet rule selects the option (if one exists) that beats each other option in exhaustive pairwise comparisons. The Borda rule selects the option that on average stands highest in the voters' rankings."[7] And here it is, in practice: in the table above, both the MBC and the Condorcet give very similar social rankings, the only differences between the two being in connection with options H2 and L, where instead of being 6^th or 7^th, they are the other way round.

There is also not a lot of difference between the BC and MBC, but that is because so many people cast a full set, or a nearly full set, of preferences.

While all the voting methodologies give the same 1^st and 2^nd social rankings, there is considerable difference in the overall rankings between the rest.

Nothing, of course, is perfect. The MBC has some weaknesses, a Cordorcet count has others. They are, nevertheless, the two best voting procedures, and many social choice scientists have devised methodologies which take both into account.[8] Furthermore, if the outcomes from both counts are the same or very similar, one can rest assured that the procedure has worked: that the participants have engaged in a broad-ranging debate; that the consensors have drawn up a balanced list of options; that the voters have taken the exercise seriously, expressing that which are, if but in their own minds, single-peaked preferences;[9] and that the outcome represents "the will of the people"!

Conclusions

It works.

Consensus voting can and does produce an outcome and, on many occasions, the outcome may be taken as a definite result. In other situations, as was said above, the consensus vote might act like a straw poll. But in nearly every circumstance, the information gleaned from a consensus vote will always be useful.

An important part of any transparent process is an impartial and independent "electoral office". Our own teller reported that some voters used unregistered e-mail addresses, while others voted in the ‘wrong' constituency. In any future exercise, more effort must be made to ensure the security of the vote, all of which is perfectly feasible.

Peter Emerson, Belfast, 25.3.2008

Annex - THE OPTIONS

B State funding to be in direct proportion to the number of elected representatives, if that number is above a certain minimum.

Parties'/candidates' donations/membership/affiliation fees may be obtained from either corporate and/or individual sources.

Political activities not to be limited in scope, but only to current financial restraints in election campaigns.

C/E1 State funding to constituency parties to be dependent on number of local paid-up members.

Donations/membership fees to parties/candidates to be from individuals only.

Political activities in the constituency subject to current expenditure limits; nation-wide party activities to be under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities, ads etc, banned).

C/E2 State funding to constituency parties to be dependent on local paid-up members.

Only membership fees (without any additional contributions) to parties/candidates, and only from individuals.

Political activities at both constituency and national level to be under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities, ads etc, banned).

D/F State funding to constituency candidates (to those who pass a certain threshold of votes gained in the subsequent election).

Donations/membership fees to parties/candidates to be from individuals only.

Political activities not to be limited in scope, but only to current financial restraints in election campaigns.

G/H State and corporate funding pooled into a "democracy fund" to finance innovative, democratic activities by individual political parties and/or NGOs. Administered by Electoral Commission.

Donations/membership fees to parties/candidates to be from individuals only.

Political activities at both constituency and national level to be under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities, ads etc, banned).

H2 State funding to be in kind only, as administered by Electoral Commission.

Parties'/candidates' donations/membership/affiliation fees may be obtained from either corporate and/or individual sources.

Political activities at both constituency and national level to be under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities, ads etc, banned).

I/J Each voter has two votes, one elects a candidate, the other funds a political organisation. State funding to parties/candidates in proportion to the number of second votes cast.

Parties/candidates may also receive donations/membership fees but from individuals only.

Political activities in the constituency subject to current expenditure limits; nation-wide party activities to be under tighter fiscal controls during election campaigns.

L. State funding and corporate funding to be banned.

Only membership fees (without any additional contributions) to parties/candidates, and only from individuals.

Political activities in the constituency subject to current expenditure limits; nation-wide party activities to be under tighter fiscal controls during election campaigns.

M. State funding to be banned.

Parties/candidates may receive donations and/or membership/affiliation fees from either corporate and/or individual sources.

[1] The person who submitted this blank ballot participated at length in the debate and was "happy to support [this] intellectual exercise" by talking... but not by voting.

[2] It was just a pity, therefore, that he/she thought four options were all equally ok, and the other four all equally bad.

[3] A case could be made for reading this as 7½-3½-3½-7½-1-7½-3½-3½-7½.

[4] During the transition stage in South Africa, they used the term ‘sufficient consensus', but it was never defined. Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela, Abacus, 1994, p 714.

[5] In such a debate, voters may well be expected to have what are called ‘single peaked preferences'. If someone's 1^st preference is £1, then presumably his 2^nd preference is £2, his 3^rd preference is £5, and so on. If another voter has a 1^st preference of £5, then her 2^nd preference will be either £2 or £10; and if she does vote 1^st-2^nd, £5-£10, then her 3^rd preference will be either £2 or £20. It would be very odd if someone voted £1-£10-£2-£20-£5, i.e., with two ‘peaks'. And even odder if someone voted £5-£1-£20-£2-£10, with three ‘peaks'.

Well, if (nearly) everyone does vote with single-peaked preferences, then it is perfectly reasonable for the consensors to form a composite.

[6] Prior to this particular pilot, two seminars were held in Oct. 2007: one in Oxford to discuss the theory of voting, and a second in London to talk with the practitioners.

[7] A program to implement the Borda and Condorcet rules... Iain Mclean and Neil Shepherd, Nuffield College Politics Working Paper 2004 -W11, University of Oxford.

[8] Designing an All-inclusive Democracy, Emerson (Ed.), Springer-Verlag, 2007, p 19.

[9] Admittedly, some voters tended to do a bit of simple stuff, just going down the ballot, 6-7-8-9. This is another reason why, in ideal circumstances, the ballot paper should be in random order.

Feedback

We would welcome any feedback from participants on what they thought of the process (though many people have already fed back as it went on). If you'd like to add more thoughts, you can do so by leaving a comment below (you will need to be logged in to see the comment form).