open Democracy News Analysis - Iran's post-election balance, H Graham Underwood Ali Afshari - Comments

HGUnderwood on "Iran's post-election balance"

HGUnderwood — Wed, 24 Jan 2007 06:58:57 +0000

Not a problem at all. Economic issues, especially amongst the youth--and in particular unemployment or underemployment among educated youth--will most likely become more of an issue as time goes on. Iran has a huge youth population that has recently begun to enter the workforce, and which will only get more frustrated as the economy worsens. Importantly, these are people born after the revolution so all they know is the Islamic Republic and not the Shah's reign for comparison. Still, the Islamic Republic is still very young (not even three decades old), so what is really important is when exactly people will start to blame not just those in power but the structure of the state itself. One of the biggest challenges of the Iranian democracy movement is finding a way to frame democracy not just as an elitist concept, but as something that benefits everyone, including those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder who are more concerned with bread than abstract rights. And the biggest problem with the nuclear issue, especially for Western policy makers, is trying to decide who in the regime is in the driver's seat. Despite Ahmadinejad's best efforts he clearly is not, and never was, in control. The lead nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, who appointed by the Supreme Leader, is no Ahmadinejad supporter, and in fact ran against Ahmadinejad for president in 2005. Just yesterday the reformist cleric Ayatollah Montazeri criticized Ahmadinejad's handling of the nuclear issue, and most telling of all, last week there was an article in a newspaper closely aligned with the Supreme Leader that basically told the president to stop using the bully pulpit to talk about uranium enrichment. (Since the president has only limited formal power over this issue, the bully pulpit is really his best weapon). Still, it will be interesting to see how the nuclear issue plays out over the next few months. You probably read that Iran decided to have 3 days of war games in the Persian Gulf and kicked out 38 IAEA inspectors, but on the other hand there was a decidely muted response to the arrest of 5 Iranian liason office employees in Irbil last week. To be a fly on the wall at one of Khamenei's meetings...

janforrester on "Iran's post-election balance"

janforrester — Wed, 24 Jan 2007 01:24:42 +0000

And thank you for your clear and expansive response. When does the issue of unemployment, especially amongst the young, and lack of a broad-based economy become internally combustible? Also makes you wonder about Khamenei confronting the world over uranium enrichment, in which case Ahmadinejad has just been the warm-up act. Phew. Given Fred Halliday's and other analyses reporting on Iran's widening influence in the Middle East I look forward to more internal analysis like this on Iran.

HGUnderwood on "Iran's post-election balance"

HGUnderwood — Tue, 23 Jan 2007 20:27:15 +0000

Thanks so much for your comments and the thoughtful questions you raised. To answer your questions in order, first, it is not actually true that Ahmadinejad has been cleaning up corruption in business. He may have campaigned promising to bring oil money to the tables of ordinary Iranians and cleaning up business, but all any of the so-called privatization processes have benefited his cronies, particularly through large contracts given to the business parts of the Revolutionary Guards. Secondly, I don�t know of any specific policies introduced that Ahmadinejad has done to gain support of minority groups, but he has been trying to travel to every province in Iran, including the ones on the border regions where minorities are concentrated (e.g. Arabs in the Southwest, Azeris and Kurds in the Northwest, Balochi in the Southeast, etc). All I can really comment on regarding this is that somewhat recently he had to cancel a scheduled appearance in Balochistan due to continuing unrest and attacks against police there, and also that one of the regions that is being hard hit, and will continue to suffer more, due to Iran�s deteriorating economic situation is the Arab Southwest. I would expect ethnic overtures to be far less effective in garnering support than economic ones. As for some of Ahmadinejad�s economic initiaves being opposed by the Supreme Leader, the president�s ideas may be creative but unfortunately they don�t make good economic sense. There is increasing worry that his economic policies are going to lead to (even worse) widespread inflation, there are factory workers that have not been paid for ten months, and the price of common goods like tomatoes or bread have gone up so much that many families can no longer afford these. The budget that was just introduced (one month past its original deadline) does not bode well for the economy either, as it is the biggest in Iranian history, and relies on unrealistic revenue projections, particularly with sanctions looming. It is important, though, not to look at issues like the economy as Ahmadinejad vs. the Supreme Leader, but rather Ahmadinejad vs. the Supreme Leader�s economic advisors and other regime insiders. Hopefully these are of some help to answer your questions.

janforrester on "Iran's post-election balance"

janforrester — Tue, 23 Jan 2007 00:01:58 +0000

Thanks for this. May I ask the authors three questions: I hear from Iran that Ahmadinejad has been busy cleaning up corruption in business. Whilst I am not sure what this in fact means if he has ruffled the feathers of the bazaaris would this bother Khamanei? AND I have hear other unconfirmed reports that the President is trying to build alliances with minority groups. If so is this an attempt to outflank traditional sources of power? Third why was Ahmadinejad's attempts to throw some money at housing some time ago knocked back by the Supreme Leader? Not economic creativity but maybe some creative welfare.

Iran's post-election balance, H Graham Underwood Ali Afshari

Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000

On 15 December 2006, as the world focused on Iran's nuclear sabre-rattling and holocaust-denying president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic quietly held simultaneous elections for the Assembly of Experts and city councils throughout the country. The official results of the contest offer several important lessons that provide a glimpse into the complex, opaque internal politics of the regime's power-brokers.

The big winner of these two elections - even though his own seat was not up for election - was supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The eighty-six-member Assembly of Experts is officially tasked with the responsibility of overseeing and checking the power of the supreme leader (as well as choosing a new one, should the situation arise) but historically it has uncritically obeyed that leader's commands.

The newly-elected assembly will be no different. Of the 496 candidates who initially registered to compete for the clerical body, only 149 were approved; reformists, independents, and candidates critical of the regime were disqualified. Competition, where there was any, was between fundamentalists and traditionalists equally loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei.

Among openDemocracy's recent articles on Iranian politics in a period of crisis:

Nazenin Ansari, "An ayatollah under siege … in Tehran"
(4 October 2006)

Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran and the international community: roots of perpetual crisis"
(24 November 2006)

Nasrin Alavi, "Iran: cracks in the façade"
(11 December 2006)

Nasrin Alavi, "Iran's election backlash"
(19 December 2006)

Dariush Zahedi & Omid Memarian, "Ahmadinejad, Iran and America"
(15 January 2007)

Another winner of the December elections is former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani. In one of the few competitive races in the assembly race, Rafsanjani successfully defended his own seat, finishing first among Tehran province's sixteen elected candidates. Groups affiliated with him also fended off strong challenges and maintained their majority in the institution. Rafsanjani is now well positioned to be the next supreme leader should the 67-year old Khamenei, rumoured to be ailing, die during the assembly's eight-year term.

At the same time, Rafsanjani's victory should not be overstated. The 1,600,000 votes he received in December is fewer than the 1,900,000 he was awarded in Tehran province during the second round of his presidential election campaign in June 2005. Most importantly, the Rafsanjani who retained his seat in the Assembly of Experts is different from the Rafsanjani who ran for president almost two years ago. During this election he positioned himself to obtain the support of the supreme leader, in contrast to 2005 when Khamenei endorsed and mobilised forces against Rafsanjani.

A president under pressure

The clear loser of these elections was current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The coalition his supporters ran under failed in its primary goal of defeating Rafsanjani and his allies. In fact, not a single candidate whose name appeared only on this list won a seat in the assembly. Ahmadinejad's spiritual mentor, the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, was able to capture a seat in the Assembly of Experts only by aligning himself with traditionalists like Rafsanjani.

Ahmadinejad fared just as poorly in the city-council elections. Of the sixteen seats in Tehran, his supporters captured only two, one of which was won by his sister. Tehran's current mayor (and a personal enemy of Ahmadinejad), Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, is likely to be renominated for his position by two-thirds of the council members.

Meanwhile, reformists managed to capture four seats in Tehran's city council, but their performance was still far from successful. They were able to cut their losses and strengthen their position inside the regime relative to earlier elections - in 2003 they did not win a single seat - but their success was due more to better coalition-building than increased popular support.

For example, reformists gained 28% of the votes for city councils throughout the country, while during the presidential election of 2005 the three reformist candidates gained a combined 35% of the vote. Within the Assembly of Experts their failure was more significant. Their numbers decreased from sixteen to eight, and they now hold only 9% of seats in this body.

Democracy's greatest success came from those candidates who did not, or could not, run for office. With all candidates who could potentially challenge the power structure disqualified, the low turnout was a vote of no confidence in the regime. A turnout of above 60% across the country sounds impressive, but this number is artificially high as it includes numbers from smaller villages where tribalism is more important than political affiliation, and city councils and mayors play an important role in daily life. In larger cities where city councils play an unimportant role turnout was significantly lower. In Tehran, for example - the most politically active and high-profile city - turnout was only 30%.

Ali Afshari is an Iranian political activist and analyst

H Graham Underwood is a researcher and freelance writer living in Washington, DC

Khamenei, the supreme

What, then, are the implications of these elections for the current and future political development of Iran? First, these elections were merely a competition amongst groups inside the current regime. Independent political groups and civil society were entirely absent from this picture, and the results of the election will have little direct impact on the democratisation of Iran.

Second, the elections show that Iran's transformation from an Islamic theocracy to a military autocracy has been suspended. The paramilitary Basij forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that brought Ahmadinejad to power were conspicuously absent from these elections. This shows that it is not Ahmadinejad who controls these forces, but rather the supreme leader.

The most pressing question is why Khamenei did not use these forces to support and mobilise for Ahmadinejad. The supreme leader may have felt threatened by the rising power of Ahmadinejad and his allies, or Khamenei may have been pushed by others within the regime not to support the president. With Ahmadinejad's economic policies leading the country towards failure, Khamenei may be distancing himself from Ahmadinejad so Iranians blame Ahmadinejad and not the Islamic Republic for their economic woes.

The most sinister explanation for this is that the supreme leader might be gearing up for a challenge with the world over Iran's uranium enrichment, following the imposition of limited sanctions by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 2006.

Khamenei, by checking the power of Ahmadinejad and gaining the support of groups like Rafsanjani's that may have felt marginalised during the past two years, could be unifying all groups under his command. Today, all members of the Assembly of Experts - whether they are fundamentalist, conservative, traditional or reformist - pledge their allegiance to the supreme leader. The reasons for Khamenei's political manoeuvring may not be fully known right now, but it is clear that his grip on power is as strong as ever.

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