Boris Dolgin on "Russia-China: Axis of Convenience"

Boris Dolgin — Wed, 21 May 2008 13:54:20 +0100

Mistakes and disagreements: a Russian response to Russia-China: Axis of ConvenienceThe editors of Polit.ru take issue with some of Bobo Lo’s views on the post-Soviet relationship with China

Russia-China relations are certainly an important aspect of international relations, both for Asia and globally. They began to improve as China turned away from more radical forms of Maoism in its domestic and foreign policy. This process was somewhat hindered by a difference of opinion over Indochina, particularly the Soviet Union's support for Vietnam in overthrowing the Khmer Rouge dictatorship in Cambodia, and the direct military conflict in the People's Republic of China (PRC). But even by the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, a kind of cold peace had been established.

During perestroika relations with China became much more amicable. The Communist Party of neither country was still making claims that there was only one way to build socialism. In some respects liberalisation strengthened relations between the countries. They did not even deteriorate after the Tiananmen Square massacre: Mikhail Gorbachev did not cut short his visit to China, and the USSR did not join the international condemnation.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan also boosted bilateral relations. More equal relations with Vietnam, together with the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was in progressively less of a position to play on disagreements between China and the Soviet Union helped improve the situation too.

So the policy of the new Russia was in many ways a continuation of the Soviet policy during perestroika. Towards the end of Yeltsin's rule there were exceptions: there was a certain divergence in rhetoric and in various Asian alliance involving Russia and China. However, the post-Soviet relationship with China hardly constitutes an achievement in foreign policy terms. The main thing was not to do anything stupid, as the interests of the leadership in both countries coincided more often than not (We are specifically not referring to the interests of the countries, as that is another subject altogether.) ‘Yellow Peril’?

It is hard to agree with Bobo Lo’s notion that ‘traditionally, the Russians have felt acutely threatened by China’. On the contrary: throughout most of their history, Russia and the Soviet Union did not take their Eastern neighbour seriously enough. From the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s there was a surge of anti-Chinese rhetoric (in the political, not the ethnic sense.) But even the 1969 conflict was more a reason to be on the alert than fearful. Phobias of China and the Chinese among the wider population - and, to certain extent, among elite circles - are a more recent phenomenon.

Irrational fears and entirely rational concerns take a variety of forms, including

· The fear that the Russian Far East is being depopulated while the population on the other side of the border continues to multiply

· The fear that a heavyweight player - which not so long ago called for the ‘return’ of Siberia, the Far East and parts of Central Asia – has suddenly appeared on the border without much warning

· The fear that Russia’s role will be just to export raw materials to China (the dynamics of the bilateral trade system give grounds for this fear)

· The fear that China will be destabilised: a situation in which Beijing will no longer be able to regulate migration or the activities of individual warlords (as has happened before in China's recent history).

Bobo Lo mentions some of these fears, which are part of a more general rise in the level of xenophobia. Leading Russian demographers, political analysts and international jurists try and play down the irrational aspect of these fears. But even they have to admit that bilateral trade has deteriorated, and that if the People’s Republic were destabilised, it would pose a threat to Russia.

At the moment, these fears have little bearing on the relationship between the countries. But in the decades before that the ideas and interests of the leadership did, of course, diverge significantly.

The relationship since President Putin

At the start of the millennium, Russia lent full support to US efforts to combat global terrorism, particularly when it came to implementing UN sanctions operations in Afghanistan. China's position on Islamists in that country was always more ambiguous (although it had its own problems in eastern Turkmenistan). Was it a mistake to support the military presence of NATO countries in Central Asia? I think not. Russia's leaders, and the country as a whole, were keen to squeeze the Taliban and Al-Qaida out of the underbelly of Central Asia. It was far more urgent to resolve that issue than to be in complete agreement with the Chinese leadership. Without bases near Afghanistan, it would have been much more difficult to solve the problem. Somewhat more puzzling are the recent joint attempts by China and Russia to withdraw swiftly from these bases even though the Afghanistan issue has not yet been resolved.

Bobo Lo suggests China was unhappy about Russia’s ‘tame reaction’ to the US withdrawal from the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. We disagree that Russia's reaction to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was tame, for a start. It was simply based on the principles of practical politics. Russia did not have the leverage to force the US to change its mind, and microphone diplomacy had not yet come into fashion. Furthermore, China was more likely than Russia to have problems as a result of the abrogation of the Treaty. The Chinese government was understandably disappointed, but that was hardly enough adversely to affect Russian-American relations.

As for the construction of an oil pipeline in the East, the Chinese government’s disappointment is understandable. But building an oil pipeline to China alone, rather than an East Siberian-Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO) with a branch in China, would have meant Russia being too heavily dependent on China, at least in economic terms. More recently, it has been possible to avoid creating a buyers' market and balance the interests of the supplier against those of the consumer. As a supplier of goods, Russia is keen to diversify its oil clients (in both western and eastern Siberia, as a matter of fact) rather than being tied to one of them. Yet again, this is not an example of a mistake having been made: the interests of the countries simply diverge.

You could call the above mistakes if the main aim of Russian foreign policy was to work in total harmony with China at the expense of any other interests. While relations with China are certainly important, it is to be hoped that such a situation will never come about.

The presidential transition

What perplexed the editors of Polit.ru most, however, was Bobo Lo’s response to the final question about the recent transition in power. ‘Putin left the presidency because he likes the appearance of legalism’ says Bobo Lo. We disagree that this is merely a matter of creating the appearance of legitimacy.

The phrase ‘he has chosen the weakest possible candidate for his successor’ therefore seems particularly unfortunate. ‘The weakest’ in terms of what? What criteria of ‘strength’ is the expert applying in making this judgment? Does he mean the weakest in the power struggle? Even if there had been such a struggle, the outcome demonstrates that Dmitri Medvedev has won. Does he mean the lack of managerial experience? How many serious presidential candidates have been able to boast brilliant credentials in this respect? Does Bobo Lo mean the least independent by this phrase ‘the weakest’? Again, it would be interesting to see his list of more independent candidates and to know what his criteria are for this judgment. Perhaps he means Medvedev’s popularity ratings? But they seem to be fine.

Perhaps Bobo Lo is talking about experience of managing the political machinery. There certainly were strong candidates who had twice as much bureaucratic experience as Medvedev. If he means candidates who have made radical statements, you also wouldn’t have to look far to find ‘stronger candidates’ Is that what the expert means?

It would have made more sense for Bobo Lo to assess the new President's ‘strength’ in relation to his ability to cope with the particular challenges he faces. But Bobo Lo chose only to focuses on Putin’s supposed desire ‘to create the illusion of law and democracy’

How, we wonder, does his view of Medvedev relate to his opinion that China is slightly worried by Russia's change of president?

Russia-China: Axis of Convenience, Bobo Lo

Bobo Lo — Tue, 20 May 2008 11:17:46 +0100

oD: Russia's relations with China were surprisingly good under President Putin...

Bobo Lo: It is probably the major success of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period, both under Yeltsin and Putin. Putin, in particular, has committed himself to improving Russia-China relations. And he has done very well.

oD: So will the Chinese worry now that he's going?

Read the rest of this post...

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Boris Dolgin on "Russia-China: Axis of Convenience"

Russia-China: Axis of Convenience, Bobo Lo