open Democracy News Analysis - The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter, Joseph Curtin Johnny Ryan - Comments

Not logged in on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

Not logged in — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 21:40:43 +0100

As the Chair of the Peace & Neutrality Alliance(www.pana.ie) and a Convenor of the Campaign Against the EU Constitution, a broad based and progressive alliance that campaigned against the Renamed EU Constitution(the Lisbon Treaty) I can only say that the original article was very misleading. The Irish Times commissioned the TSNmrbi polling company to ask why the Irish people were voting no, and while they could and did give multiple reasons for voting no, the three major reasons were that they would not vote for something they did not understand, they were concerned about the lose of Irish power and identity and they wished to safeguard Irish Neutrality. The domestic issues did not feature to any great extent. The treaty is now dead.

maestrojon on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

maestrojon — Sun, 29 Jun 2008 14:02:37 +0100

While of course it is undoubtedly true that domestic issues played a part in the rejection of the Lisbon treaty in Ireland it is by no means certain that they were as significant as the authors here suggest. The unlikely coalition on the "no" side, which contained proponents of completely oppositional ideologies, nevertheless orchestrated a highly effective campaign that "got off the blocks" while the yes side were still "lacing their boots" as it were. Indeed, most of the party politicians were still busy with misty-eyed reflections of Bertie Ahern, and History's judgement of him, rather than working on what was always going to be a hard sell to the Irish electorate.

However, both of these aspects of the treaty's defeat ultimately rests on the nature of the treaty itself. It is, as anyone who has tried to read it will attest, inscrutable. Let me stress: this is not an explanation in terms of the "ignorance of the rabble" variety. The document, as it stands, is effectively illegible. By anyone. Anyone, at least, unfamiliar with the 50 or so other documents that it refers to, regardless of standard of education. I know accountants, political scientists, economists and lawyers-all politically engaged, all (basically) pro Europe-who voted no because of this alone. The Irish are conservative, cagey and shrewd-they would never sign a contract which they could not read-would you?

Ironically, I would conjecture that had the Irish been presented with the original constitution that the French and Dutch rejected, they would have been far more likely to ratify it. Had this treaty been legible it would have taken the wind out of the sails of the no campaign-the non-issues such as conscription and so on would have been unable to come to the fore. And the yes side would not have been left on the back foot for the whole campaign.

The "blame game" continues this week in Ireland over who is responsible for this so called "crisis". Government and Opposition each attacking the other while united in their blame of the media. To my mind the answer is simple: who ever suggested that such a technical, illegible document could be passed by popular mandate, anywhere, is to blame in the last analysis. This is not to say that the other factors that Ryan and Curtin mention which contributed to the negative outcome are not relevant, but rather that the apparatchik's within the Commission and elsewhere who drafted this monstrosity should engage in a "period of reflection" as well.

Jonathan G Heaney

padav on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

padav — Tue, 24 Jun 2008 20:53:22 +0100

Maybe I am just being naive but why is nobody posing the rather simple solution to this ongoing debacle; namely a real test of European democratic credentials in the form of a Europe-wide simultaneous plebiscite.

Please, before somone responds citing the non-existence of a European demos, that is precisely my point. A sense of European affinity and purpose cannot emerge overnight or be created out of nothing. Even a vague notion of "Europeaness" must surely coalesce over time and I cannot coceive a more relevant vehicle for precipitating this process than allowing a European electorate to deliberate upon the merits of documents with purportedly European resonance?

Seems straightforward enough to me so why are respective National administrations running scared of this concept?

Peter Davidson, Alderley Edge, NW.England

irine52 on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

irine52 — Thu, 19 Jun 2008 20:34:49 +0100

Maybe the Lisbon-Treaty should be scrapped. The EU as a commercial union, a free trade area, has more appeal than a political union where the members do not want to give up their individuality, their own governments and constitutions. Besides, the EU is becoming such a bureaucratic behemoth, side by side with the burgeoning member bureaucraties.

The new Russian president, Dimitry Medvedev, has a better idea. He wants a free trade area, or a common market, starting in Vancouver going east all the way to Vladivostok. It makes much more sense since it will include all the major economic players. Let's no talk about political unions - after all, the Irish may have the right idea, trade without politics, politics without religion (originated in Mongolia 1500 years ago).

Luna on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

Luna — Thu, 19 Jun 2008 16:59:05 +0100

If one asks: But who on earth wanted this treaty?? Well, it's not some dull eurocrats, but rather our elected governments who come together, all want something different, although saying they want the same, and in a higgledy-piggledy out comes: ... the squaring of the circle or a European Constitution/Lisbon Treaty.

When the blame game starts, all say that of course they had wanted this or that but couldn't get because of the others. The same happens when European legislation is made. Naturally, fear and suspicion arise that with a new treaty we get more of that what those "others" want but we cannot control anymore.

So what really is overdue is finding out what the common denominator is - and may be this doesn't exist with 27 members so it's time to make a choice. And then go out and say what we stand for and where we want to go, meaning "we" not as a European bureaucracy but rather as the people and those elected by them. Europe and its politicians have forgotten that it is about leadership, ideas and the future.

terryhere on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

terryhere — Wed, 18 Jun 2008 10:34:15 +0100

I am proud to have voted no to Lison and I am proud to be part of a group of people who have said to the Eurocrats your treaty is not good enough. At no time during the campaign did I see anyone from the European Parliament come to Ireland to explain to us why they felt that it was important for us to say yes. By their absence they said to us "Do as I say" .

We are now told that we are ungrateful for not voting yes, all the money that Europe pumped into Ireland. However Ireland has played an active, if conservative role, in this European project.

We are not alone in voting no, but such is our fragile democracy we at least are given the opportunity to vote on such a treaty.

teames on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

teames — Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:03:35 +0100

Poujadisme - 1

Europe - 0

spamgreg on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

spamgreg — Sun, 15 Jun 2008 18:49:25 +0100

Aha ! So, the Irish, and probably also the Dutch and the Frrench, did not vote NO because they are against that european reform, but only because of domestic reasons. We are a little dumb, you know, we the ordinary people. So, one doesn't have to bother to understand WHY EU is fearsome for its citizens and looks like Bolkesteen's monster - with the bolts and the scars.

Also, you say that this treaty is too technical for ordinary people to understand it, and deciding should be left to Knowledgeable Intelligent Specialist - perhaps like those who fed dead animals to cows, or those who advocated a war against Iraq ?!

But, let me remember you that the first version of the Treaty WAS quite understandable by any normal people like me, and it gave way to very animated and passionate debates of ordinary people all around Dutchland and France. And the NO won. So, the Knowledgeable Intelligent Specialist have purposefully hatched a version Quite Not Undersandable By Ordinary People so that they would mind their business and let the Specialists decide What Is Really Good for Ordinary People Even Against Their Will.

This article illustrates once more the horrible and deepening rift between the EU people and the EU technocrats. Also the extremely baleful menace against democracy that technocratic EU threats. Already, 2 democratic referenda were just... treated as if nothing had happened... by the Great EU Elites. This did not happen in Zimbabwe or North Korea, but in Europe. No doubt the Irish answer will also be... lost en route...

No, the one real reason why we voted 3 times against their treaties is, we just dislike the way they have already taken most of our decision power from us. We are against GMO ? GMO si forced into our mouth, under menace of retribution. We won't accept any change before they first GO BACK and start by what they should have started : democracy.

SpamGreg

Flaneur on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

Flaneur — Sun, 15 Jun 2008 11:29:27 +0100

The referendum result is very likely to spell the end of a single, evenly integrated Europe and launch the corresponding emergence of a core Europe of states that want tighter integration. British and, seemingly Irish, opinion finds it extraordinarily difficult to understand that, yes, in some states both leaders and the wider public actually want to pool sovereignty. The problem with a core Europe, if/when it comes about, is that it will exclude the periphery and this excluded periphery will have to accept the dictates of the core, but without much influence over the decisions taken, much as Norway has to implement the acquis without a voice. Listen out for comments along the lines of "it's impossible to integrate 27 states". Sentiments of this kind can already be heard, thoughly quietly, but they will get louder.

britologywatch on "The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter: democratic deficits "

britologywatch — Sat, 14 Jun 2008 08:21:47 +0100

I accept that there are many Ireland-specific reasons for the 'no' vote; but to say that the Treaty-specific reasons boil down to ignorance and indifference on the part of ordinary voters is arrogant and smug.

Your conclusion is appalling and contradictory: that "future institutional overhauls of a highly technical nature such as the
Lisbon treaty are subject to parliamentary vote rather than national
referenda", and that - together with reform of parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation - this would actually enhance the democratic deficit. In other words, it's technical and institutional, not constitutional; the political class knows best; and if you don't get the right result from referenda, then just don't have them.

Have you not considered the possibility that a large part of the no vote was a well-informed rejection of the treaty on its own merits, or de-merits?

The Lisbon treaty and the Irish voter, Joseph Curtin Johnny Ryan

Fri, 13 Jun 2008 17:22:59 +0100

"The people have spoken." The pithy comment of the Republic of Ireland's justice minister Dermot Ahern as the votes were being counted from the country's referendum on the European Union's "reform treaty" on 12 June 2008 acknowledges both the victory of the "no" camp and the fact that the outcome (by a decisive margin of 54%-46%) poses anew questions about the way the EU and its twenty-seven member-states relate to their citizens. Ireland may have been obliged by its national constitution to hold a referendum on the treaty agreed at the Lisbon summit in October 2007 - whereas other states could rely on a parliamentary majority to secure acceptance - but the entire union shares the weight of the result from Dublin.

The third edition of the openDemocracy Quarterly contains a selection of our articles since 2001 on Europe's politics, identity, and future. For details and how to buy, click here

The aftermath of the referendum will be protracted and painful, as the union struggles to respond to a third popular rejection of the constitutional treaty in its original or revised manifestation (the first two being in the French and Dutch referenda of May-June 2005). There will be renewed talk of the union's "democratic deficit" and proposals to correct it. But the inquest will also have to take account of the particular, Irish circumstances of the latest verdict. For the referendum campaign and its result have indeed exposed a "democratic deficit", but it lies also in Dublin and it is here too that it must be addressed.

The road to rejection

The failure of the Lisbon treaty - it can only be ratified if all member-states agree to do so - means that at some point yet another piece of legislation will become necessary to allow the current, unprecedented range of European Union institutions and systems of operation a basis on which to function. The EU's institutional structures were originally established for a small union; twenty-seven member-states and an expanding set of responsibilities require a new legal foundation. Europe as a whole, but also its individual components, has to think harder than ever about how such measures can meet a proper democratic test. In this sense the Irish referendum could yet become both a landmark event in the EU's history, and one that offers valuable lessons for the union's future.

Johnny Ryan works at the Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin. He is the author of Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the Internet: A User Driven Strategy to Recover the Web (Institute of European Affairs, 2007). His blog is here

Also by Johnny Ryan in openDemocracy:

"The militant Islamist call and its echo" (1 August 2007)

"Europe, terrorism and the internet" (6 November 2007)

"iWar: pirates, states and the internet" (6 February 2008)

Joseph Curtin works at the Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin

The Institute of European and International Affairs holds no corporate opinions of its own; the opinions expressed here are solely those of the authors The treaty campaign ran aground on at least three issues relating to domestic Irish politics, as well as one relating to the content of the treaty itself. First, polls reveal that voters felt uninformed. An Irish Times/MRBI opinion poll released a week before the referendum found that 35% of respondents chose the category "do not know/have no opinion" and that of the further 35% who would vote "no", most said that they would do so because they did not understand the treaty. Even among the remaining 30% of respondents who answered "yes", many would not be entirely conversant with the details of the treaty.

The reason for this may lie, in part, in a lacklustre information campaign and a combination of inaccuracy and sloganeering on both sides. Yet, second, there is the tendency of voters in Ireland (and elsewhere) to use referenda to bloody the nose of incumbent governments. Ireland's rising unemployment and slowing economy provided the electorate with reasons to exercise a protest vote. The fact that opposition party voters - whose leaders (with the exception of the nationalist Sinn Féin) supported the government's pro-treaty position - were more likely to vote "no" demonstrates the decisive role of domestic political sentiment. By contrast, supporters of parties inside the governing coalition were much more likely to vote "yes".

A third issue is that trust between voter and government is particularly low in Ireland at present. The recently retired taoiseach (prime minister) Bertie Ahern has been giving evidence before a tribunal of inquiry that - following months of denials and stonewalling responses - appears to contradict earlier accounts of his curious financial affairs. It is little wonder that Ahern's former colleagues who now lead the government find it difficult to convince the public that they, and not the "no" side, are telling the truth when they respond to charges that (for example) Lisbon will result in conscription into a standing European army, harmonised corporation taxes, euthanasia, or abortion on demand.

But the nature of the reform treaty itself is also to blame: it is complex and immune to simple explanation. The Lisbon treaty is essentially a series of amendments to the rules governing the technocratic structures of the European Union. It is understandable that this requires a script of some complexity, but this in turn puts the legislation at a further remove from the voter.

The path to renewal

These considerations lead us to the conclusion that, for Ireland, the supposed European "democratic deficit" is alive and well - but that its main source is the Dáil Éireann (the national parliament) rather than European Union institutions or decisions.

Three steps would help to address this domestic, Irish democratic deficit. The first is to enhance parliamentary scrutiny of European measures, large and small. If passed, the Lisbon treaty itself would have enhanced national parliaments' ability in this respect. With or without it, radical reform of domestic political institutions remains an urgent necessity.

At present, the Irish parliament is characterised by a strong executive, a highly disciplined whip, a weak committee system, and domination by representatives who focus on local and regional issues to the detriment of national and international concerns. The Dáil has no real input into the government's positions in EU negotiations, and directives are implemented with a minimum of debate and virtually no media attention. So, again, it is no real surprise that the Irish electorate views EU regulations, initiatives, and elections, as distant and confusing. EU policies must become national debates if national politics is to encompass the union.

Among openDemocracy's articles on the European Union's constitutional argument:

Simon Berlaymont, "What the European Union is" (23 June 2005)

Aurore Wanlin, "The European Union at fifty: a second life" (15 March 2007)

Frank Vibert, "The European Union in 2057" (22 March 2007)

George Schőpflin, "The European Union's troubled birthday" (23 March 2007)

Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Philippe Herzog, "Europe at fifty: towards a new single act" (21 June 2007) If EU legislation and government negotiating positions were subject to more vigorous scrutiny - preferably at the Dáil's committee level - the result would be to attract media attention and bring European Union issues directly into the lives of politically engaged citizens.

The second step is to overhaul the rules governing standards in public office in Ireland and the funding of the country's political parties. Much progress has been made here in light of numerous financial scandals (and resulting inquiries) in recent years; but more needs to be done to restore the confidence of a cynical and disinterested public in their elected representatives. A good start would be the public funding of political parties.

A third step might be considered if, but only if, the above two steps are successful in creating public confidence in domestic institutions and public representatives. This is that future institutional overhauls of a highly technical nature such as the Lisbon treaty are subject to parliamentary vote rather than national referenda. Irish citizens - like their counterparts across Europe - are unlikely to vote for something they do not understand, and are rightly disinterested in a treaty that is, undeniably, uninteresting. The status quo absolves the national parliament from the duty of scrutinising EU legislation, and places the duty in the hands of a public that cares little - and, for the moment at least, cares to know less.

The result of this third measure could in principle be an enhancement rather than a diminishment of democratic engagement. For if Ireland's parliament were in a public and even dramatic fashion to expand its capability to exercise oversight of European Union laws and directives - leading in turn to more heated political discussion of EU issues in the media and political worlds - there is no reason to doubt that voters will prove as well equipped and motivated to decide on EU matters as on national ones. As David Beetham has said in another context, the "democratic deficit" starts at home.

Average rating

(2 votes)