<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xml:base="http://www.opendemocracy.net" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<channel>
 <title>open Democracy News Analysis - Bolivia’s political ferment, John Crabtree  - Comments</title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/bolivia-s-political-ferment-revolution-and-recall</link>
 <description>Comments for &quot;Bolivia’s political ferment, John Crabtree &quot;</description>
 <language>en</language>
<item>
 <title>Bolivia’s political ferment, John Crabtree </title>
 <link>http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/bolivia-s-political-ferment-revolution-and-recall</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;
The results of Bolivia&amp;#39;s &amp;quot;recall referenda&amp;quot; on 10
August 2008 - which passed judgment both on President Evo Morales and on a
number of local prefects opposed to his rule and in favour of regional autonomy
- gave some satisfaction to all sides. The &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.presidencia.gov.bo/presidente/perfil.asp&quot;&gt;president&lt;/a&gt; himself (and his vice-president, Alvaro
García Linera) according to preliminary figures received 67% of the vote -
considerably more than the 54% who had helped them to a landslide victory in
December 2005. Moreover, two prefects were &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096417956&quot;&gt;voted down&lt;/a&gt; (in La Paz and Cochabamba)
who had identified themselves with the opposition. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;pullquote_new&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;John Crabtree&lt;/strong&gt; is a research associate at Oxford University&amp;#39;s
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/index.htm&quot;&gt;Centre for
Latin American Studies&lt;/a&gt;. He is the author of &lt;em&gt;Peru under Garcia: Opportunity Lost&lt;/em&gt; (Macmillan, 1992), &lt;em&gt;Fujimori&amp;#39;s Peru&lt;/em&gt; (ILAS, 1998), and &lt;em&gt;Patterns of Protest: Politics and Social
Movements in Bolivia&lt;/em&gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.latinamericabureau.org/?lid=3121&quot;&gt;Latin America Bureau, 2005&lt;/a&gt;). He is the
editor of &lt;em&gt;Making Institutions Work in
Peru: Democracy, Development and Inequality since 1980&lt;/em&gt; (Institute of the study of the Americas, London University /&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/clientpr/isa/makinginstitutionsworkinperu.htm&quot;&gt; Brookings
Institution, 2006&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among John Crabtree&amp;#39;s articles in &lt;strong&gt;openDemocracy&lt;/strong&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/3210&quot;&gt;Evo Morales&amp;#39;s
challenge&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (25 January 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/3417&quot;&gt;Peruvians prepare to bite back&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (4 April
2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/3457&quot;&gt;Peru&amp;#39;s chessboard&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (18 April
2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/3575&quot;&gt;Peru: the institutional
deficit&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (23 May 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/3614&quot;&gt;The return of Alan García&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (6 June
2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/garcia_second_3773.jsp&quot;&gt;Alan García&amp;#39;s
second coming&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (28 July 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/bolivia_twothirds_3910.jsp&quot;&gt;Bolivia: the
battle for two-thirds&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (18 September 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/peru_ngos_4117.jsp&quot;&gt;Peru: outing
the NGOs&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (22 November 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/experiment_4575.jsp&quot;&gt;Latin American democracy:
time to experiment&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (30 April 2007)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy_power/south_america/peru_dilemmas&quot;&gt;Peru: dilemmas
of power&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (8 June 2007) &lt;strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/strong&gt;&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_three_cities&quot;&gt;Bolivia: a
tale of two (or rather three) cities&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (18 September 2007)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/Peru_political_timebomb&quot;&gt;Alberto
Fujimori&amp;#39;s return: a political timebomb&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (28 September 2007)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_constitution&quot;&gt;Bolivia&amp;#39;s
controversial constitution&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (10 December 2007)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/santa_cruzs_referendum_farewell_bolivia&quot;&gt;Santa Cruz&amp;#39;s referendum,
Bolivia&amp;#39;s choice&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;
(30 April 2008)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/bolivia-s-democratic-tides&quot;&gt;Bolivia&amp;#39;s democratic tides&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (1 July 2008&lt;/span&gt; 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
However, the results also show that the
prefects of the lowland departments who had previously spearheaded a campaign
for autonomy in defiance of the central government in La Paz also increased (at least marginally)
the numbers on which they too were elected in 2005. The opposition victory was
clearest in the eastern department of Santa
Cruz where the prefect, Rubén Costas - who now calls
himself &amp;quot;governor&amp;quot; - was ratified in office by nearly 67% of the vote.  Santa Cruz has
taken the lead in asserting its autonomy from La Paz
and in rejecting the text of the new &lt;a href=&quot;http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia.html&quot;&gt;constitution&lt;/a&gt;, drafted by a constituent assembly in 2006-07
(see &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/santa_cruzs_referendum_farewell_bolivia&quot;&gt;Santa Cruz&amp;#39;s referendum,
Bolivia&amp;#39;s choice&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;,
30 April 2008). Some 60% of &lt;em&gt;cruceños&lt;/em&gt;
also voted &amp;quot;no&amp;quot; to Morales continuing as president; as did 60% of those in the
small but gas-rich department of Tarija close to the frontier with Argentina.  
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This mixed outcome is not quite what the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/31489/morales_still_draws_high_support_in_bolivia&quot;&gt;supporters&lt;/a&gt; of Evo Morales and his ruling &lt;em&gt;Movimiento al Socialismo&lt;/em&gt; (MAS) had
anticipated as recently as May 2008. At that point, opposition members of
Bolivia&amp;#39;s (upper-house) senate &lt;a href=&quot;http://as.americas-society.org/article.php?id=1185&amp;amp;nav=res&amp;amp;subid=47&quot;&gt;passed&lt;/a&gt; a bill that had been approved in the
(lower-house) chamber of deputies in December 2007; under its terms, the
president and vice-president would submit themselves to the judgment of the
electorate even before their terms of office expired - but at the same time,
the bill required Bolivia&amp;#39;s recalcitrant prefects to do the same. In the
calculation of Bolivia&amp;#39;s leaders, the senators&amp;#39; decision provided Evo Morales
with the opportunity he needed to rally his supporters against those who stood
(and stand) in the way of approving the country&amp;#39;s new constitution (see &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_constitution&quot;&gt;Bolivia&amp;#39;s controversial
constitution&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;,
10 December 2007). 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Thus the events of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.wtop.com/?nid=389&amp;amp;sid=1402506&quot;&gt;10 August&lt;/a&gt; mean that the main lines of polarisation that
have dominated Bolivian politics since Morales&amp;#39;s election are left entrenched;
and the long stalemate over implementation of a new constitution, among other
reforms, seems set to continue.  
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;An
ascendant regionalism&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The regional divide between &lt;a href=&quot;http://photo.goliathus.com/bolivia/pictures/map-of-bolivia.jpg&quot;&gt;Bolivia&amp;#39;s&lt;/a&gt; highland west and lowland east has a long
history, but previous governments in La Paz have consistently maintaining a
centralised administrative system and refused to cede to pressure for
devolution. Before 2005, the office of prefect was a presidential appointment,
charged mainly with upholding law and order at the local level.  The &lt;em&gt;Movimiento
Revolucionario Nacionalista&lt;/em&gt; (MNR) - traditionally the country&amp;#39;s main party
- fiercely resisted decentralisation, fearing that the country&amp;#39;s already
fragile unity would be placed at risk.   
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
In 2005, faced by Morales&amp;#39;s victory at the
national level, opposition leaders - including, in a twist of history, those of
the now much-diminished MNR - were swift to realise that local politics could
be fruitful terrain for &lt;a href=&quot;http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/1/71&quot;&gt;acquiring&lt;/a&gt; the political initiative. The election of
prefects turned a bureaucratic post into a springboard for regional leadership.
By contrast, the now ruling MAS was slow to realise this potential. When
selecting its candidates for the 2005 elections, it gave little importance to
the prefectures, and chose to select its best people for ostensibly more
important posts in the senate and chamber of deputies. In part-result, it won a
mere three of the country&amp;#39;s nine prefectures. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This cost the MAS dear. The most potent source
of opposition to Morales has come not from national parties or their leaders
but from those prefects who have managed to identify themselves as champions of
local interests. This much became &lt;a href=&quot;http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/06/bolivia-autonomy-referendum-approved-by.php&quot;&gt;clear&lt;/a&gt; in May-June 2008 when the prefects of the
so-called &lt;em&gt;media luna&lt;/em&gt; (half-moon)
departments - the lowland departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando - held
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0603/p06s01-woam.html&quot;&gt;referenda&lt;/a&gt; to approve &amp;quot;statutes of autonomy&amp;quot; (see &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/article/bolivia-s-democratic-tides&quot;&gt;Bolivia&amp;#39;s democratic tides&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, 2 July 2008).  These were first unveiled in December 2007 as
a defiant response to the new draft constitution, which the opposition minority
in the constituent assembly refused to ratify (a stance exemplified by its
boycott of the assembly&amp;#39;s final sessions). The statutes adopted an extreme form
of devolution, deliberately designed to gainsay the constitutional text as
approved by MAS members and their allies. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A
contested constitution&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The constitution seeks to redraw the political
map of Bolivia,
giving greater powers to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.apcob.org.bo/pagina.php?page=etnicos&amp;amp;cont=perf_etnicos&quot;&gt;indigenous&lt;/a&gt; organisations that have always tended to be
marginalised politically (see Jon Bright, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fride.org/publication/475/bolivia-a-national-clash-over-multiple-worlds&quot;&gt;Bolivia: a national clash over multiple worlds&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fride.org/homepage_english&quot;&gt;Fride&lt;/a&gt; [Madrid], 4 August 2008). Evo Morales, as Bolivia&amp;#39;s first fully indigenous
leader, is particularly identified with the drive towards building a more
inclusive society.  Constitutional reform
formed a key point of the so-called &amp;quot;October agenda&amp;quot;, a list of social demands
that accompanied the popular uprising in October 2003 that ended with ousting
of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/bolivia.htm&quot;&gt;then-president&lt;/a&gt; Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Among the many changes &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32730&quot;&gt;anticipated&lt;/a&gt; by the draft constitution is the creation of
a system of local autonomies that provides for indigenous self-rule in those
parts of the country where indigenous groupings form a majority (see &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/bolivia_twothirds_3910.jsp&quot;&gt;Bolivia: the battle for
two-thirds&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;,
18 September 2006). This is a particularly sensitive point in areas like Santa Cruz where the
structure of landowning pays little heed to ethnic rights. Such autonomies, as
well as stronger municipalities, threaten to challenge the traditional
dominance of regional elites. The MAS government also has promised to introduce
land reform into lowland parts of Bolivia, at least for those areas
where private landowners fail to use their land for productive purposes.   
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The wording of the new constitution also
reflects its authors&amp;#39; stern critique of neo-liberal political economy, in that
it confers more powers to the state at the expense of the private sector. For
example, the state is given powers to regulate the use of natural resources
(particularly in hydrocarbons extraction, mining and agriculture) in
contravention of the pro-business ethic of the lowland elites. These elites
also resent government plans to use economic rents to finance social programmes
elsewhere in the country. Before the referendum, the prefects of Santa Cruz and elsewhere
in the &lt;em&gt;media luna&lt;/em&gt; even went on
hunger-strike in protest against the government&amp;#39;s use of gas-rents to finance
an old-age pension at the expense of their own local spending plans.   
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Perhaps most important of all, the opposition
fears that the new constitution will enable Morales to remain in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=27&quot;&gt;power&lt;/a&gt; for years to come. Once approved in a (yet to
be scheduled or held) referendum, a promulgation of the new constitution would
be followed by the holding of fresh presidential elections. The draft
constitution removes the existing barrier on immediate re-election (a change
that has already been implemented in several Latin American countries in recent
years). This would allow Morales to stand for a second consecutive term, which
in the event of victory would extend his mandate (which currently lasts until
December 2010), potentially for another ten years. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A
regional scorecard&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The process of reform in Bolivia is being followed with close attention
in the rest of Latin America, as well as
further afield. Bolivia
may be exceptional in some ways, but in others it shares problems common among
its regional neighbours.  Bolivia is one
of the region&amp;#39;s poorest countries, as well as one of its least &lt;a href=&quot;http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BOL.html&quot;&gt;developed&lt;/a&gt; and most unequal. In all these respects, the
country&amp;#39;s predicament has echoes elsewhere in Latin
America. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Bolivia&amp;#39;s outright rejection of neo-liberal formulae
sends a strong message to those countries adopting more conventional policies.
Its experiments in constitutional reform are being closely watched, as are the
problems facing the government in dealing with regional pressure-groups. The
interest expressed by the Organisation of American States (OAS) in trying to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.pr-inside.com/oas-chief-worried-by-political-violence-r742035.htm&quot;&gt;broker&lt;/a&gt; a consensual solution in Bolivia
reflects the real concerns of other states. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The countries most immediately concerned about
Bolivia&amp;#39;s economic and political
instability are probably Argentina
and Brazil.
They currently rely on the supply of Bolivian natural gas to meet their
domestic energy requirements.  In the
past, &lt;a href=&quot;/article/argentina-a-crisis-of-riches&quot;&gt;Argentina&lt;/a&gt; and Brazil
have vied with one another for influence over Bolivia, though under the current
respective and left-leaning (albeit with different emphases) presidents - Luiz
Inácio &amp;quot;Lula&amp;quot; da Silva and Cristina Kirchner -  the two countries have both sought to
overcome policy differences with the Morales administration and collaborate.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Elsewhere in the southern cone, the Morales government has come closer than any
of its predecessors to restoring normal &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.portstrategy.com/archive101/2008/september/news_americas/port_outlet_mooted_for_land-locked_bolivians&quot;&gt;relations&lt;/a&gt; with Bolivia&amp;#39;s traditional adversary, Chile;
the longstanding dispute over Bolivia&amp;#39;s access to the sea (lost in the &amp;quot;war of
the Pacific&amp;quot; of &lt;a href=&quot;http://1879-84/&quot;&gt;1879-84&lt;/a&gt;) has been eased, and the resumption of
diplomatic links after a break at ambassadorial level in 1978 is no longer
unimaginable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Evo Morales&amp;#39;s closest ideological ally - the
ailing Fidel Castro in Cuba
excepted - is President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela,
who has provided Bolivia
with significant economic and military backing. Bolivia
is a key member of the  Chávez-inspired &lt;em&gt;Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América&lt;/em&gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/a&gt;)
grouping of Bolivarian states, and thus has a particular &lt;a href=&quot;http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/08/12/en_pol_art_chavez-celebrates-ev_12A1902207.shtml&quot;&gt;importance&lt;/a&gt; for Caracas.
But this does not mean that - as Morales&amp;#39;s opponents like to affirm - that Bolivia has simply become a pawn in Venezuela&amp;#39;s strategy of confrontation with the
soon-departing George W Bush administration in Washington. True, Morales repeatedly
criticises the activities of the United States;
but nationalistic responses in Bolivia
are hardly a cause of surprise in light of the country&amp;#39;s history and especially
from a president who was (and still is) a leader of the country&amp;#39;s coca farmers.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A
negotiated solution? &lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pullquote_new&quot;&gt;
Also in &lt;strong&gt;openDemocracy&lt;/strong&gt; on Bolivian politics and
social struggles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nick Buxton, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/gas_2584.jsp&quot;&gt;Bolivia in
revolt&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (8 June 2005) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nick
Buxton, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/bolivia_3131.jsp&quot;&gt;Revolutionary
times in Bolivia?&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (16 December 2005)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Andreas A Tsolakis, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/morales_nationalism_3645.jsp&quot;&gt;Evo Morales&amp;#39;s
project: the limits of nationalism&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (14 June 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Isabel
Moreno &amp;amp; Mariano Aguirre, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/bolivia_reform_3908.jsp&quot;&gt;Bolivia: the
challenges to state reform&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (15 September 2006)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ivan Briscoe, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/democracy-protest/evo_unauthorised_4250.jsp&quot;&gt;Evo Morales: the unauthorised
version&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot; (16 January
2007)
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The post-referenda fallout presents Bolivia&amp;#39;s
leaders with testing challenges. Both the government and opposition leaders say
they are &lt;a href=&quot;http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5icZrFuWnQi36L3-KJnSKwKf-9Y5gD92GGEK81&quot;&gt;interested&lt;/a&gt; in negotiation to reach a settlement of the
unresolved &lt;a href=&quot;http://as.americas-society.org/article.php?id=1120&amp;amp;nav=res&amp;amp;subid=47&quot;&gt;disputes&lt;/a&gt;. Their actions tend to belie their words, but
the referenda pose anew the question of whether a negotiated solution to Bolivia&amp;#39;s
constitutional impasse is possible (see &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11914316&quot;&gt;Divided we rule&lt;/a&gt;&amp;quot;, &lt;em&gt;Economist&lt;/em&gt;,
11 August 2008). 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
For its part, the Morales government emerges
from the recall referendum strengthened. The president, with 63% of the
electorate behind him, will feel that he has a powerful mandate to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848460&quot;&gt;continue&lt;/a&gt; to press for approval of the constitution. The
next step would be to hold the referendum on which final approval of the text
hinges. On the basis of the 10 August results, it seems likely that the
majority of electors would vote &amp;quot;yes&amp;quot; in as much as the constitution is closely
identified with the figure of the president. In an interview published on 9
August, &lt;a href=&quot;http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2008/06/alvaro-garcia-linera-catastrophic.html&quot;&gt;Alvaro García Linera&lt;/a&gt; refused to be drawn on the constitutional-
referendum issue, but made it clear that the government would pursue its
mandate and would seek to sanction any who used illegal means to oppose it. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
But the opposition has its own cards to play.
The ratification of the four &lt;em&gt;media luna&lt;/em&gt;
prefects, plus the &lt;a href=&quot;http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN2935885120080630&quot;&gt;election&lt;/a&gt; in the department of Chuquisaca on 29 June
2008 of the opposition prefect Savina Cuellar (who was not subject to a recall
referendum), will give the opposition added confidence to try to block the
constitution and to push ahead with their own autonomy agenda. The fact that
the law as it stands permits referenda only once a year gives the opposition a
ready legal argument to that end; and the opposition majority in the senate
will surely seek to block any attempt by the government to change the law in
this respect. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The tussle is therefore set to continue,
effectively preventing the Evo Morales government from activating its overhaul
of the Bolivian political system. The patience of both sides will be sorely
tested over the next few months, but neither side will want to be accused -
internationally or domestically - of overtly breaching Bolivia&amp;#39;s
already stretched legal norms.    
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;rating-item&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;rating&quot; id=&quot;rating_mean_45801&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;rating-intro&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;rating-intro-text&quot;&gt;Average rating&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;star avg on&quot;&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;width: 100%;&quot; onclick=&quot;return false;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;star avg on&quot;&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;width: 100%;&quot; onclick=&quot;return false;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;star avg on&quot;&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;width: 100%;&quot; onclick=&quot;return false;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;star avg on&quot;&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;width: 100%;&quot; onclick=&quot;return false;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;star avg on&quot;&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;width: 100%;&quot; onclick=&quot;return false;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;num-votes&quot;&gt;(&lt;span id=&quot;rating_num_votes_45801&quot;&gt;1&lt;/span&gt; vote)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;form action=&quot;/crss/node/45801&quot;  method=&quot;post&quot; id=&quot;rating_form_45801&quot; class=&quot;rating&quot; title=&quot;Rating: 5.0&quot;&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;form-item&quot;&gt;
 &lt;label for=&quot;rating_options_45801&quot;&gt;Rate this: &lt;/label&gt;
 &lt;select name=&quot;edit[rating]&quot; class=&quot;form-select rating-options&quot; title=&quot;Rate this&quot; id=&quot;rating_options_45801&quot; &gt;&lt;option value=&quot;0&quot;&gt;---&lt;/option&gt;&lt;option value=&quot;100&quot; selected=&quot;selected&quot;&gt;Excellent!&lt;/option&gt;&lt;option value=&quot;80&quot;&gt;Great!&lt;/option&gt;&lt;option value=&quot;60&quot;&gt;Good&lt;/option&gt;&lt;option value=&quot;40&quot;&gt;Quite good&lt;/option&gt;&lt;option value=&quot;20&quot;&gt;Not so great&lt;/option&gt;&lt;/select&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;edit[nid]&quot; id=&quot;edit-nid&quot; value=&quot;45801&quot;  /&gt;
&lt;input type=&quot;submit&quot; name=&quot;op&quot; value=&quot;Submit&quot;  class=&quot;form-submit&quot; /&gt;
&lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;edit[form_id]&quot; id=&quot;edit-rating-form-45801&quot; value=&quot;rating_form_45801&quot;  /&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/form&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/bolivia-s-political-ferment-revolution-and-recall#comment</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/editorial_tags/latin_america_caribbean">latin america</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/editorial_tags/democracy_power">democracy &amp;amp; power</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/taxonomy/term/51">Creative Commons normal</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/taxonomy/term/1191">John Crabtree</category>
 <category domain="http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/debate.jsp">politics of protest</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 12:15:31 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator />
 <guid isPermaLink="false">45801 at http://www.opendemocracy.net</guid>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
