aneesto on "The internet smokescreen"

aneesto — Sat, 23 Aug 2008 12:09:21 +0000

The internet shouldn't be the focus of the British government? I agree to this point but only to some extent because it was said somewhere that we failed many times to prevent the terrorists attacks (like the 9/11 at least) i. ex. because the terrorist communications hasn't been efficiently monitored. Despite such oppinions I understand it's very difficult to grasp all the data transfers all over the world, but sometimes time of many employees and money from taxpayers are simply waisted on let's say different tasks. AT the same time i'm not in favour of launching any extreme surveillance campaign, since it would violate our right to freedom of speech and access to information, but at least a minimum level of survillence is necessary. What about creating a software analysing the messages sent, and searching for key words? I bet the government already have something like that in operation. It's necessary to admit that increased communications surveillance is a tricky thing. However,as a matter of fact, the last sentence of the author's article couldn't be more true.

The internet smokescreen, Tim Stevens

Tim Stevens — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 13:48:30 +0000

The convictions this week of three men from the north of England on terrorism charges has once again highlighted the role of the internet in facilitating militancy and its ability to speed the radicalisation of young men like 18-year old Hammaad Munshi, the youngest ever Briton found guilty of terrorism crimes.

As the British government seeks to strengthen its stance on stamping out home-grown terrorism, it has zeroed in on the internet as a target for regulation and interdiction. Such an approach suggests both a misunderstanding of the internet itself and of the role that online behaviour plays in radicalisation and, ultimately, the creation of dangerously violent individuals. Wrong moves against wrong targets will eventually prove counter-productive.

Online jihad

Munshi, Aabid Hussain Khan and Sultan Muhammad disseminated terrorist material, including explosives manuals, weapons handling advice, training documents and al-Qaeda propaganda videos, through online channels. Khan was described by a member of the CPS Counter-Terrorism Division as the "Mr Fix-it" of the group. He played a vigorous role as a recruiting agent for extremists, using both internet chatrooms and face-to-face meetings to build a following. He also maintained links to a broader network of militants. Khan had previously conspired with Younes Tsouli, the infamous "irhabi007" - terrorist 007 in Arabic - a lynchpin in al-Qaeda's internet propaganda and recruitment campaigns, as well as a crucial element in al-Qaeda's global logistic program. Tim Stevens is a Researcher at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King's College London.

Scotsman Mohammed Atif Siddique was recruited by Khan and convicted in 2006 on similar charges to his mentor. Khan met and corresponded with the Washington and Toronto plotters, and also arranged for several people, including himself, to travel to training camps in Pakistan, from where he was returning when arrested in June 2006.

It is unlikely that much of Khan's activity in the thick of an international jihadi network could have taken place without the global reach, relative anonymity and rapidity afforded by the internet. It is this efficiency and opacity of communication that worries governments, which feel the understandable need to act swiftly and decisively in limiting how easily extremists can organise.

Virtual policies

A legal tide is rising, however, against close regulation of the material citizens collect from and place on the internet. Last week, the United Nations warned Britain that it should consider amending Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 lest it "lead to a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression". In June the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of Samina Malik, the "lyrical terrorist", for possession of information useful for terrorist purposes under Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Indeed, despite Munshi's conviction this week, he was cleared of a related possession charge. Both Malik and Munshi were in possession of material easily and freely obtained on the internet. Follow openDemocracy's effervescent discussion of British politics at OurKingdom.

Parliament still places the internet underneath its cross-hairs. In January 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith warned in a speech to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence: "Let me be clear: the internet is not a no-go area for government". It seems the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee agrees. It recently recommended that social networking sites and internet service providers establish regimes of self-regulation and proactive monitoring of material and traffic. Although couched in terms of protecting children from predators, such recommendations will doubtlessly stretch to include other "undesirable" material. Also on terrorism and the internet in openDemocracy:

Johnny Ryan,
"Europe, terrorism and the internet"
(6 November 2007)

Johnny Ryan,
"iWar: pirates, states and the internet"
(2 June 2008)

A stand-off looms. Internet service providers and web hosting services are keen to assist the government, but are deeply aware of the sheer impossibility of implementing such policies. Given the huge quantity of user-generated material uploaded to the internet every second, sites like MySpace and YouTube would require armies of thousands to filter material in the manner the select committee suggests.

The government, on the other hand, is desperate to be seen doing something and is offering self-regulation as an alternative to sterner regulation by the state. This is set against a backdrop of increasingly draconian regulation and monitoring of the internet around the world, as described in the authoritative OpenNet Initiative report earlier this year. It is not just China and Saudi Arabia that maintain strict regulatory regimes; over three dozen countries also filter various types of web content. Sweden's recent decision to force its telecommunications providers to provide logs of all cross-border phone and internet communications to the national intelligence service is a warning that extreme surveillance, if not yet censorship, may already have arrived in Europe.

The internet may be a tool for terrorists and extremists of all stripes but it is not the problem. Neither radicalisation, nor recruitment, nor indeed training and preparation are the result of the internet alone. All occur within social contexts, and are amplified by face-to-face interactions as well as those online. It may be unwise to ignore the role websites and chatrooms play in the spread of violent extremism, but attacking the internet is not the answer. Not only will such policies be deeply divisive in the public and private sectors, but, on a logistical level, internet censorship is easily circumvented by the tech-savvy. Regulatory policies of this nature only act as smokescreens to mask the inability of states to address deeper issues about their own behaviour, and the behaviour of their citizens.

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aneesto on "The internet smokescreen"

The internet smokescreen, Tim Stevens