open Democracy News Analysis - America's world in 2009, Paul Rogers - Comments

Tribunus Plebis on "America's world in 2009: change and continuity"

Tribunus Plebis — Fri, 02 Jan 2009 19:48:40 +0000

Paul Rogers' forecast that Barack Obama's international policies will reflect little change from the Bush Administration is based largely on speculation, derived from a few appointments thus far and the reality that withdrawal from Afghanistan would be impossible for any American administration before Bush's disastrous management of that conflict had been reversed, so as to prevent the reconstitution of a terrorist Taliban state. That in itself represents a change from Bush, who was effectively dithering in Afghanistan. This hardly represents "old thinking", unless any and all uses of millitary power are "old" and diplomacy is somehow comparatively "new". Yet there is no evidence that the Taliban would yield to the sweet intimacies of an emissary such as Richard Holbrooke or Thomas Pickering.

It is hard to understand why Mr. Rogers is predicting that Barack Obama's engagement with the world will resemble George W. Bush's, after an election campaign in which Mr. Bush's political allies attacked Obama relentlessly for his interest in new talks with the Iranian government, new diplomatic energy in achieving a fresh modus vivendi with Russia, new emphasis on lending American support to fragile democracies in Africa, and other new initiatives such as a more robust effort in curbing nuclear proliferation. These commitments were not an indication of "more of the same." It is highly unlikely that a man whose father was African, who lived in Indonesia and speaks that country's language, and whose cousins and in-laws live on three continents will maintain the international policies of man who rarely left Texas before he became president. "Widespread views" in Washington, apparently one of Mr. Rogers's chief sources for this article, were wrong about what would happen politically in the United States in 2008, and they are wrong now about what the new American president will do in 2009.

Lawrence Efana on "America's world in 2009: change and continuity"

Lawrence Efana — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 14:44:37 +0000

A summarising end-of-the-year piece: important indeed for those who might care to reflect. My opinion is that people should care and reflect in the hope of contributing to the mental support and simple or professional advice, which could be useful for the new team and president-elect soon to assume the mantle of power at one of the most challenging times in human evolution and history.

Rogers tells about how saddled with problems the incoming administration might find itself and where it has already made a difference in transition plans and above all, where it could make "more" such a difference in the area of its security policy plans. The latter is a part of the reason for the thesis that as a new administration, its Chief Executive's style "may be less of a departure from that of the predecessor than many hope".

Departure thus, is underlined by outlines of what appear to be the "hot spots" of Rogers' paper - reasonably familiar also to those in frequent contact with oD. It might not be necessary to overflog the realities and challenges of the hot spots. They must be managed anyhow!

Alongside all that the paper stands for, its "implicit" thesis is the focus of my comment. Let me start this way. A debate is underway about the outgoing President "..Intelligence 2....", according to the BBC. No matter much of what will be argued or debated, it will only be truly left to certain people, who due to professional ability may or not inform the others objectively or otherwise. Governing under shifting environmental, social, economic, cultural and stressing religious conditions is one of the most strategic challenges statesmen of today appear to face. Whether it was so or not in past histories, these melt into a new reality to cause nervousness, induce information overloads, alter established mind-patterns and incite biases: why reflections and quick judgements have to be relatively tamed!

Where to locate "PERSONALITY TYPES" in all these is not easy to point at, simultaneously as the truth or falsification of above thesis might also rest on it. Personality type approach has been applied on many - including President Nixon: it may be 'ante' or 'ex-post', always with results offering people a lot to learn from. Here too, the 'analyst' and the 'statesman' are both 'objects' and 'subjects' of its psychological dive: into (a) our interaction with others and physical environment; (b) why we accept certain pieces of information or evidence and reject others; (c) the mental processes making us judge motivations and actions of others; etc.

This is a whole bunch of thing in which we find "instincts", "motivations", and no less "preferences", etc., interplay with the way we predict or estimate actions and reactions to most situtations/facts/data. We are indeed all personality type materials, differently tinted - so relative and unique in the way we combine choices telling about variations, evident in ways that decisions are made, problems are configured or solved.

The new President hopefully is "a personality type" aware that He will interact with many, including personality types within his cabinet. He and His Vice were elected on the basis of an election promise to bring about change. Thus their authority vis-a-vis the cabinet setting, hopefully will be managed in a way that those who voted them in and the world still watching at large will have no reason to think claims of the thesis "ever" full-blown! On this both the American and World intelligence communities face a challenge of producing good intelligence: not causing chaos and downfalls. Help Obama make 2009 a year for building confidence, trust, faith, hope and love as the base for conquering protests and conflicts and progressing at our paces, but together!

America's world in 2009, Paul Rogers

admin — Mon, 29 Dec 2008 15:38:12 +0000

Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001.

The Barack Obama administration which will take effect after the new United States president’s inauguration on 20 January 2009 looks likely to be very different to George W Bush’s in two major areas: economic policy and the environment. In its response to a great economic crisis, much of the programmes of public spending will be geared to infrastructural renovation, while the bailout of industries in trouble will be rigorous and demanding. In the area of environmental policy, the appointment of a notably science-literate team suggests a radical change of direction on climate change; this could include large-scale investment in renewable-energy projects underpinned by a clear recognition that this is one of the defining global issues of the 21st century.

In the area of national and international security, however, the Obama team as yet shows far fewer signs of innovative thinking. The actual formulation of policy may still be some way off, but the continuity both of rhetoric and of some personnel (such as the defence secretary, Robert M Gates) may be a foretaste of what is to come. Even on Iraq, there are indications that the process of withdrawal of American forces may not be speeded up, as was expected in the event of an Obama presidency; rather, the tasks of the substantial numbers of troops remaining may be redefined (see Elisabeth Bumiller, “Redefining the Role of the U.S Military in Iraq”, New York Times, 22 December 2008).

In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click here Paul Rogers’s most recent book is Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm is needed

The stated aim may still be to withdraw all United States combat-troops from Iraqi cities by the middle of 2009, but that leaves room for a change of designation of many to “trainers” and “advisers”. In the same way, the formal commitment is to withdraw all US troops from Iraq by 2011, but this is already slipping; senior Iraqi security sources argue that their own army will not be ready by that time and there will be a need for US military support for another decade (see Robert Reed, “US troops to stay in Iraqi cities after June”, Associated Press, 13 December 2008).

An Afghan pledge

All this suggests that two major military programmes are likely to be followed through with very little change; and that they will help define the security policies of Barack Obama’s first term.

The first of these concerns President Bush’s plan to expand the US army by 74,200 troops. This is accompanied by a growth in the US marine corps; together these measures will lead to an overall increase in US ground forces of around 90,000 (almost as many as are in the entire British army). The cost of the proposed increase in the five years to 2013 is estimated at $80 billion, with a subsequent yearly additional cost of around $30 billion (see John T Bennet, “$40B Price Tag for Larger Army”, Defense News, 15 December 2008).

These plans have been approved by Congress, though the severe economic downturn might have been expected to offer the incoming Obama administration an opportunity to postpone or modify the proposal. This looks highly unlikely, especially in light of the second programme – a substantial growth in US forces in Afghanistan.

There have already been many reports of planned increases over and above the 2,800-strong combat-aviation brigade being deployed there in January 2009, and an additional brigade intended to join the 31,000-strong US force in the summer. It is now clear that an altogether larger reinforcement is being scheduled: possibly as many as 30,000 more troops in five combat-brigades, all to be sent to Afghanistan during 2009.

This would give a total combat strength in the country of about 75,000, overwhelmingly American (when combined with some Nato forces that are primarily engaged in counterinsurgency operations). At least another 15,000 Nato troops would be engaged in low-profile roles in Afghanistan’s north and west. This will mean that the level of foreign intervention - close to 100,000 foreign troops - will by the end of 2009 be starting to get close to that of Iraq.

Barack Obama has been consistent in saying that he would concentrate on the war in Afghanistan. His determination may have been reinforced by the serious problems that foreign troops are having in securing their supply-lines (see “Afghanistan: on the cliff-edge”, 28 August 2008). The attacks on the long route from Karachi through Pakistan and Afghanistan to Kabul, Bagram and Kandahar have become more frequent and serious since mid-2008, and there are few alternative routes given the huge quantities of supplies needed to keep the forces operational (see Anna Mulrine, “U.S. Military Eyes Alarming Spike in Attacks on Key Supply Convoys Into Afghanistan”, U.S. News & World Report, 22 December 2008)

Any channels that might involve China, Russia or Iran are politically difficult (see MK Bhradakumar, “All roads lead out of Afghanistan”, Asia Times, 19 December 2008); while attempts to open up a new route eastwards from the Black Sea through Georgia could cause major problems, as Russia would see its sphere of influence in the Caucasus constrained.

This reinforces the calculation that more troops in Afghanistan will make it easier to guard supply-lines, while at the same time allowing more forces to be available in an effort to curb the extension of Taliban influence.

An African dilemma

There is a widespread view in Washington that negotiations with influential elements of the Taliban may well be necessary but will only succeed from a position of military superiority. It is an attitude that has two basic flaws. The first is that the evidence so far indicates that the more American and European forces are put into Afghanistan, the more there is a stronger reaction against what is seen as a foreign occupation (see “Iraq’s gift to Afghanistan”, 20 November 2008). The second is that increased forces just means that the extensive safe havens in Pakistan become more significant, increasing the pressure to intervene on that side of the border, no matter what the risk to Pakistan’s internal stability.

All this is very much a case of “old thinking”, where the emphasis is on seeing military force as the primary response to security problems. It may come to a head in a potential crisis far away from Afghanistan, with Hillary Clinton at the state department and Robert M Gates at the Pentagon having to face an issue with its roots in Bill Clinton’s early years.

This is Somalia, where the Ethiopians have announced the withdrawal of their forces by the end of the year (see “Somali president fears militia rule”, AlJazeera, 21 December 2008). These forces have been propping up the weak transitional government of Abdullahi Yusuf, making it highly likely that the powerful al-Shabab Islamist militia will gain control of Mogadishu. It already holds power in much of southern Somalia and taking over Mogadishu will be a major step to control of the country (see Georg-Sebastian Holzer, “Somalia: ends and beginnings”, 18 December 2008).

In broad terms, al-Shabab is more radical than the Islamic Courts movement that brought some brief stability to Somalia in 2006. That movement was unacceptable to Washington, so al-Shabab will be viewed with even more antagonism, especially as there are indications that foreign paramilitaries have joined the fighting.

How the Obama administration responds to an al-Shabab takeover may indicate its more general approach to security in the arc of tensions from Somalia right through to Pakistan. The early indications are that it will be far closer to the Bush administration than many of its supporters had hoped. The Obama administration may well be adventurous and radical in matters economic and environmental, but its weakness could turn out to be that same attitude to international security that left its predecessor so castigated.

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