open Democracy News Analysis - Gaza: hope after attack, Paul Rogers - Comments

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Thu, 08 Jan 2009 09:37:00 +0000

1. Northern Ireland. (dealing with several fundamentalisms, and Tony Blair should know better in his current role)

2. The historical naivety is to think that ideology -- including in its religious form -- stands still. The claim is not that ideology has no causal role.

3. I rest my case on the confusion here.

Tony

Jake Belman on "Gaza: hope after attack"

Jake Belman — Wed, 07 Jan 2009 21:05:36 +0000

Cite an example where the abandonment of extremist claims has been the "outcome" of the negotiation process when dealing with Islamic fundamentalism.

To dismiss the religious element from the Palestinian-Israeli question as "historically naive" is unfair, and I notice that, as is typical with your argumentation, you offer no facts to support your position. Only idealistic generalities. In point of fact, it is almost always historically naive to dismiss religion, as it is one of the most dominant forces in the course of history. However odd this may seem to the Western "rational" mind, history is replete with religious testimony - and never more so than in this part of the world.

Is it your contention that religion and theology play no role in the current Middle-Eastern crisis?

Your original response about consequences implied that one should rethink their actions if they are likely to cause more harm than good. I agree. But again, this is a general principle that needs to be qualified.

Your exact statement was: "And what makes you so sure that an attempt to destroy the miliary wings of Hamas will not lead to the creation of powerful bodies intent on destroying peace?"

It is difficult to see how this can be interpreted in any manner other than that it is your position that Israel shouldn't attack Hamas because it will create more enemies for the Jewish State as well as to the entire peace process. In light of Hamas' repeated rocket attacks, which prompted the counter-response, what is this if not a statement denying or at the very least strongly discouraging Israel's right to defend itself?

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Tue, 06 Jan 2009 21:16:45 +0000

There are a small number of successful peace processes. It is very safe to say that none of them has been successful through shock and awe. Instead, the abandonment of extremist claims has been the _outcome_ of the negotiation process, not its precondition.

Your confident resort to essentialist opinions about theology sounds very empty and historically naive.

Your resort to talk of "rights to self-defense" in the face of a prediction of consequences makes me despair. Rights live in the world of value; judgements of consequence do not. How a prediction of consequence can "abrogate a right" is quite beyond comprehension.

Tony

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Tue, 06 Jan 2009 21:08:26 +0000

this thread continues, out of order, below

Jake Belman on "Gaza: hope after attack"

Jake Belman — Tue, 06 Jan 2009 03:52:55 +0000

It is the position of the United States government, the European Union, Japan and Canada, that Hamas - in its entirety - is a terrorist organization. The U.K. and Australia, while perhaps reflecting some of the nuance and multi-faceted analysis of Hamas reflected in Sara Roy's polemic, have nevertheless listed its military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as a terrorist entity. Indeed, even Israel's immediate eastern neighbor, Jordan, has banned Hamas from its territory.

Repeated attempts to paint a more flattering picture of Hamas - as that of a complex organization undergoing a state of "evolutionary change," and one that is becoming more amenable to legitimate political dialogue and willing to repudiate its nascent ideology of waging war through terror - cannot be substantiated.

For example, Hamas apologists often point to Hamas' acceptance of the Arab Peace Initiative as proof of the organization's ability to "negotiate" differences with Israel in addition to its willingness to reconcile grievances with the Jewish State in a manner that doesn't involve, as its inevitable endgame, its annihilation.

But such conciliatory words - and, indeed, that's all they are: words - are actually more ominous in nature than they are open. To cite just one example, consider the proposal made by Hamas' leadership of a 10-year truce (or hudna) conditioned on Israel's complete withdrawal from the territories it captured during the Six Day war. Even the most optimistic Jew living within the borders of Israel, one favoring intense political engagement, negotiation and hard compromise with Hamas, would be compelled to ask: "And after the 10 years . . .then what?"

Indeed, the very notion of an indefinite truce (i.e., lasting peace) with Israel is eliminated from the discussion because of Hamas' strict interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law, which forbids the reliquishment of lands - including all of Palestine - once entrusted to Allah. All such lands are deemed as inalienable trust (Waqf), forever consecrated to future generations of Muslim believers until the Day of Judgement. To dismiss the religious significance of the struggle, which Hamas leadership has tried to do in recent years in an attempt to repudiate charges of antisemitism and gain political legitimacy for their agenda, is impossible. At its core, the struggle is about religion and a fundamentalist Islamic worldview, which is irrevocably tied to the land of Israel, whether pre-1967 borders or post.

Regarding your second objection, the argument that Israel's military campaign to wipe out Hamas, even if successful, will likely result in the creation of more enemies and therefore shouldn't be implemented - this is specious reasoning, as the conclusion effectively abrogates the right to self-defense, an inalienable right embodied within the charter of the United Nations and recognized under international law. Using similar reasoning, we might conclude that it would be wrong for an individual to defend themselves if by doing so they engendered the creation of others who likewise wished them harm.

L E Mitchell on "Gaza: hope after attack"

L E Mitchell — Mon, 05 Jan 2009 12:38:47 +0000

I agree with RosRoss' post. Several decades of Israeli occupation cannot be simply and conveniently left out or set aside from analyses of the current situation.

As regards the blaming of victims, the term 'scapegoating' is particularly relevant here - when the Palestinians and particularly the people of Gaza are being blamed for the excessive use of force against them by the Israeli Air Force.

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 20:46:00 +0000

So ... you ended your first comment with the thought that "the Arabs must lay down their arms for peace." You start this one with "Hamas cannot lay down their arms" and this comforts you in the view that "Peace can only come through the destruction of Hamas."

Let's agree on the logical steps here: it is true that you cannot have peace if there exists a powerful body intent on destroying peace. It follows also that avoiding outcomes that create such bodies should be an aim of peace-makers.

What makes you so sure about the nature of Hamas? Did you read Sara Roy on "What is Hamas?"

And what makes you so sure that an attempt to destroy the miliary wings of Hamas will not lead to the creation of powerful bodies intent on destroying peace?

Tony

Barry R on "Gaza: hope after attack"

Barry R — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 04:27:31 +0000

Isn't this like the Medusa's head. Cut off one and ten grow in its place. In this way, Israel creates its own enemies.

Mutual trade might be the only way that these warring factions might say forget the past, how do we work together?

Joe Panzica on "Gaza: hope after attack"

Joe Panzica — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 00:47:11 +0000

Continued reliance on warfare is an eventual death sentence for Israel whose firepower can destabilize and destroy, but cannot build or organize.

Destruction and destabilization in the Arab world are the dragon's teeth breeding the kind of fanaticism that launches rockets or propels human bombs.

Does Israel really believe it has the firepower or terror capacity to occupy millions of Palestinians forever?

Any apparent "victory" of the latest Israeli invasion will be short-lived with only more VERY tragic long term consequences for both Israelis and Arabs.

Jake Belman on "Gaza: hope after attack"

Jake Belman — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 00:37:55 +0000

Hamas' covenant states that "there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad."

Hence, "laying down their arms" is not an option for Hamas. Whether Israel "lays down their arms" or defends is academic: Hamas' militants will lay down their arms when (and only when) Israel is effaced off the map.

When Jihad has accomplished its goal.

Since the threat is existential (and impervious to compromise or any type of "negotiation" that doesn't involve the destruction of the Jewish State), Israel has few options. It can either defend, albeit imperfectly with imperfect results . . . or die.

Which would you choose?

pmatassa on "Gaza: hope after attack"

pmatassa — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 00:21:31 +0000

Thissituation has gone on a long time. Both sides have had more than their share ofsuffering and both sides can honestly point to horrendous activities by theother side.

Thereality is that if there is not a different approach taken this war will go on indefinitelyor until it ignites World War III, at which point the whole Middle East will bedestroyed as part of the conflict/

Fortunatelyit doesn't have to be this way. Both sides can start to realize the truefolly of the current situation and take steps to realistically change what'shappening here. Michael Laitman, has pretty accurately described what it willtake to turn this situation around go to http://www.laitman.com/2008/07/a-society-of-life-surrounded-by-a-society-of-death/ forfurther details.

Youmay think I'm being a dreamer to suggest this, that may be true but continuing downthe current path is simply insanity. Take your choice, dreamer or insanity, theanswer seems obvious!

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 21:58:00 +0000

Can you explain, Jake, exactly how the current attack will lead to Hamas militants "laying down their arms"?

Tony

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 21:55:02 +0000

JFox - I don't _think_ rross was objecting to Paul Rogers - surely his comment is only comprehensible as a response to the first comment? Tony

opendemocracy on "Gaza: hope after attack"

opendemocracy — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 21:49:20 +0000

Daniel, It is a pity you can't hold your anger to read to the end of an artilce. You might otherwise have seen a carefully constructed build-up to this conclusion:

[The] fundamental mistake [of many Israelis] is to believe this is a problem with a military answer.

Tony

YDavidson on "Gaza: hope after attack"

YDavidson — Sat, 03 Jan 2009 19:14:23 +0000

I am an Israeli (yes, one of those evil, despicable, horrible people). I publicly supported Israel's withdrawal from Gaza not because I thought it would bring greater near-term security, since I didn't think it would, but because a) it was the morally right thing to do b) in the long run Israel will not survive if it continues to hold on to the territories.
As it turns out, the present Israeli government was elected on a platform of unilateral withdrawal along the Gaza model.
Practically from the day Israel left Gaza, Hamas has been firing rockets, first as a mere insurgency and now as the elected government of Gaza. And has given no indication that it will ever stop. I still support Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, for the reasons stated above.
Which is why I support what Israel is doing now, notwithstnding all the legitimate criticisms one can make, and they are legitimate. Until Hamas stops murdering Israeli civilians at will as a matter of high policy the Palestinians are doomed, along with all of us.

Gaza: hope after attack, Paul Rogers

Paul Rogers — Thu, 01 Jan 2009 13:23:44 +0000

The Israeli operation in Gaza that began on 27 December 2008 is uncannily similar to the military offensives conducted in the West Bank in the first months of 2002 in response to suicide-bombings in Israel. An earlier column in this series provided an analysis pointing to the “… systematic process of dismantling [of] the apparatus of the Palestine National Authority (PNA)” (see "Israel's strategy: the impotence of arms", 10 April 2002).

The article continued:

“Much of the military action has been directed against the police and security forces of the PNA, with substantial numbers having been killed and many more hundreds taken into custody. Police stations and barracks have been destroyed, as have intelligence and security centres. Moreover, and in some ways much more significant, there has been the destruction of the PNA’s administrative infrastructure.

“Information on this remains incomplete but is sufficient to show that there has been widespread destruction of offices and facilities of PNA ministries and Palestinian non-government organisations. The ministry of local government and the ministry of education in Ramallah have been ransacked by Israeli troops as has the Palestinian bureau of statistics.”

At that time, some analysts anticipated that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) would extend their actions into Gaza, but international opposition to the casualties and destruction in the West Bank, and internal concern over the consequences of such an escalation, prevented that. Instead, the emphasis remained on the West Bank, with the construction of the massive security “wall” and forceful control over the Palestinian population movements within its confines. Both of these policies fuelled a burning resentment.

The firing-range

The first five days of the military assault in Gaza have been focused almost entirely on air attacks and naval bombardment. The stated aim is to bring to an end the firing by the Islamist movement Hamas of crude unguided rockets, often home-made, onto those areas of Israel close to Gaza. In practice, however, the attacks have - as in the West Bank in 2002 - been directed mainly at the official buildings administred by Hamas since its election victory in Palestine in January 2006. Many government offices as well as buildings of the Islamic University have been demolished, and the Gaza police have been a particular target; one of the earliest attacks killing around sixty cadets attending a graduation ceremony at the police academy.

Yet by 31 December, Israel's campaign appears to have had a minimal impact on the rockets being fired from Gaza. At least sixty were launched that day; three reached as far as the Negev city of Beersheba (forty-six kilometres from Gaza), others landed on Ashkelon (which has an oil terminal) and Ashdod (Israel's fifth-largest city, and a major port). Informed Israeli sources indicate that Hamas still has 2,000 available for use, some of them able to reach deep into Israel. Most are rudimentary, but some of those smuggled in through tunnels under the border with Egypt may include missiles with a far longer range.

Most international opinion has been critical of the sheer scale of the Israeli military action, especially in terms of the number of civilian casualties. There is little sign though of this having any impact on Israel’s conduct of the war. The factors which motivate Israel to press on may include political consideratiions related to the forthcoming Israeli election, and the opportunity provided by the fact that the departing George W Bush administration - with its record of support for Israeli actions - remains in office. But there are broader issues that also help explain Israel's motivations.

The conventional view is that Israel is a singularly powerful state possessed of some of the world’s most advanced military forces. This gives it clear superiority over the armies of its Arab neighbours, and an overwhelming advantage over Hamas militias. In a superficial sense this is unquestionably true, but the characterisation also masks a reality that has come to have an increasing impact over the last generation: that Israel is more and more vulnerable to forms of irregular and asymmetrical warfare, and does not know how to handle them except by responding with massive force.

The problem of force

The first indications of this trend were visible as early as Operation Peace for Galilee - the official title of Israel's invasion of Lebanon launched in 1982. The ostensible purpose of the attack was to counter unguided rockets being fired by Palestinian militias into northern Israel, but its real motive was to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a functioning paramilitary organisation.

In a matter of days, the powerful IDF ground-forces advanced to the fringes of west Beirut. A lengthy bombardment and siege followed, which culminated in massacres in mid-September by rightwing Phalangist militias of Palestinian civilians Sabra and Shatila refugee-camps. In the horrified aftermath, Israeli forces withdrew from the immediately vicinity, but they but remained entrenched in occupation of much of southern Lebanon. The occupation gradually became untenable in the face of guerrilla actions by Hizbollah paramilitaries, which by 1985 had killed 300 soldiers of the IDF. Israel withdrew from all but a twenty-five-kilometre security-zone on Lebanese territory north of its border, which it in turn evacuated in May 2000.

From the mid-1980s onwards, Israel's defence strategy focused on the homeland itself, underpinned by a commitment to use considerable force against any direct threat. This approach in turn received a rude awakening on the second night of the war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq over Kuwait in January 1991, when Iraq's Scud missiles landed on Israel's territory. The winter nights that followed were far more traumatic than most outside observers appreciated.

The memories of that period were significant in motivating Israel's assault on Hizbollah in the war July-August 2006; in part because the rockets then being launched from Lebanon - far more numerous and deadly than the Scuds - were stark reminders of the vulnerabilities exposed fifteen years earlier.

Israel's great military superiority was not enough to defeat Hizbollah in 2006; indeed, by many estimates the Lebanese movement itself emerged as the victor (see Zaid Al-Ali, "'Whatever happens, Hizbollah has already won'", 9 August 2006). The uneasy peace established in the aftermath, which still persists, reflects the new balance of power: for Hizbollah is now even more heavily armed than before, with longer-range missiles that could threaten Israel right down to Tel Aviv and beyond. Now, in Gaza, Israel also faces increasingly sophisticated irregular warfare - especially rocket-attacks - from Hamas, and believes that it is essential to bring this to an end. The problem is that the use of overwhelming force which is its preferred option simply "has" to work. This is a reason for thinking that after five days the conflict may still be in its early stages.

The Israeli imperative

Israel's strategy in Gaza has to work for three reasons:

* Hamas itself must be so weakened that the rocket-attacks will cease or be reduced to an absolute minimum

* there must be no risk whatsoever of any paramilitary group developing similar tactics in the West Bank. A nightmare for the more thoughtful Israeli military planners is that any perception of success for Hamas stemming from the use of the rockets could well lead to groups on the West Bank developing the same tactics. The proximity of the occupied territories means that that would put all the heavily populated areas of Israel at risk

* the massive use of force in Gaza must send a message to Hizbollah that Israel has learned from its failure in 2006 and will never tolerate a further shower of rockets from southern Lebanon (see "Lebanon: the war after the war", 11 October 2006).

The problem is that although Operation Cast Lead "has" to work, the chances of it doing so are remote. For unless Israel reoccupies the whole of the Gaza strip and maintains rigid control over a deeply antagonistic population of nearly 1.5 million Palestinians, the rocket-attacks will almost certainly continue. What must be appreciated is that there is now widespread knowledge of how to construct crude but deadly devices from quite basic materials using equally rudimentary machinery. Moreover, the very intensity of the Israeli military action demonstrates how effective in their political impact these rockets can be.

Indeed, the way these rockets have developed in Gaza since 2007 is far more significant than most people realise. It is at least as important as the rapid evolution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, with all the effects that they have had and continue to have. The consequence of not countering these crude Gaza rockets is that Israel's security will deteriorate still further. Many Israelis understand the predicament, while making the fundamental mistake of believing that this is a problem with a military answer.

The early indications are that public opinion in Israel is supportive of the operation in Gaza. It may take time, but at some point time in the coming years there more and more Israelis will come to realise that there is no alternative to a negotiated and fair settlement with the Palestinians, both in the West Bank and Gaza. It is just possible that the disaster that is now unfolding, for Israelis as well as Palestinians, will actually hasten that process.

Average rating

(10 votes)