open Democracy News Analysis - ukraine: the orange revolution - Comments

Jeff Mowatt on "Ukraine: beyond the orange coalition "

Jeff Mowatt — Tue, 14 Oct 2008 15:51:32 +0000

On corruption. I wrote recently of "Billionaires and Breadcard" describing the chasm between wealth and poverty in the country where not long ago bread card were reported to have been handed out to the impoverished of Kyiv.

5 years earlier, my colleague had railed against Ukraine's self serving politicians in the Kyiv post and later on the influence of US economic hit men, determined to unsettle Ukraine's democratic evolution. for fear of Tymoshenko's "socialist" inclination to place that which had been acquired dishonestly back under state control. Imagine that now, 3 years later as we do precisely what Anders Aslund was so critical of on a global scale.

http://eng.maidanua.org/node/331

http://eng.maidanua.org/node/295

There's no getting away from the "sphere of influence" which Russia and it's oligarchs have over Ukraine, as Stephen Velychenko of the
University of Toronto writes recently, but who'd have imagined that US Presidential candidate, John McCain had ties with state sponsored terrorism through his campaign manager, working against US foreign policy in their promotion of the Russian backed Party of Regions..

http://eng.maidanua.org/node/905

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/10/13/02155/519

Vitaliy on "Ukraine: beyond the orange coalition "

Vitaliy — Fri, 10 Oct 2008 19:16:17 +0000

Note that Kuzio's "Ukraine Analyst" is a bi-monthly report, not bi-weekly. Also the link to the report is broken:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/www.taraskuzio.ne

Instead it should be: http://www.taraskuzio.net/subscriptions.php

ianniscarras on ""Virtual politics" in the ex-Soviet bloc"

ianniscarras — Wed, 18 Jul 2007 09:07:25 +0000

As always Andrew Wilson is spot on. Still it is important to point out that external democratic formsthe are still in place, something that is important in the medium term. In this context, it is divisions within the elite that have to be watched. After all it was such divisions that led the otherwise defeated Kleisthenes all those thousands of years ago to turn towards the people and found the first democracy. I.C., Athens, Greece.

max_bougriy on "Ukraine’s crisis of governance"

max_bougriy — Tue, 12 Jun 2007 11:57:19 +0000

Sir, Regarding your argument that there should have been fair prosecution, I doubt it would have succeeded. Quoting the article: "A few key prosecutions, involving at a minimum the perpetrators of the election fraud, the killers of journalist Heorhii (Georgii) Gongadze whose headless corpse was found in November 2000, and Yushchenko's own mysteriously under-investigated poisoning, would have changed the rules of the game - and were definitely expected at the time by the panicky old guard." In my opinion, most courts and law enforcement bodies are highly corrupt. The vicious circle began when the judicial employees salaries were very low in early 90s (so were those of government officials and I was always wondering who would want to work for the government for $100 per month in those days). I have recently spoken on some personal matters with a young police officer who told me their job is mostly to 'cover up' businesses' minor legal violations and this is how they really make their money. I guess there had been attempts to prosecute, but they ended up in nothing eventually and part of it is probably with the questionability of the prosecutors.

ianniscarras on "Ukraine’s crisis of governance"

ianniscarras — Tue, 01 May 2007 22:26:58 +0000

Reading through Andrew Wilson's article it is hard to avoid the conclusion that that we are witnessing the toothing problems associated with the development of a democratic polity in the Ukraine. Given the cirumstances, it would be peculiar indeed if such common syptoms as corruption and clientism were not omnipresent. The most important thing would seem to be for the two 'sides', the first with support mainly in the West and the North the second based in the East and the South, to continue exchanging control of the executive organs of state. Only after they have successfully exchanged this prerogative on a number of occaision will the unity and democracy of the Ukrainian state seem secure.

Iannis Carras.

nikolavj on "Two years after the Orange revolution: Ukraine in a funk"

nikolavj — Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:09:31 +0000

Hei, what happened with the World Championship? Ukraine scored well! Coming from an ex-comm country myself I really hope the best for the Ukrainians. Optimism is very important but social and health insurances are even more important. NATO and EU help moslty by pushing reforms. Who is going to push reforms in Ukraine? I have a long experience with civil society - nowhere in New Europe civil society is able to stand on its own feet (represent constituencies and because of that control the government). Once again - good luck Ukraine!

wiwa on "Two years after the Orange revolution: Ukraine in a funk"

wiwa — Thu, 28 Dec 2006 18:34:13 +0000

Alexander Motyl is misquoted in Comment No. 257. Motyl states that "[Yanukovych's] speeches, statements, and interviews say all the right things and studiously avoid President Vladimir Putin's predilection for alarming [NOT 'alarmist'] rhetoric.

An outstanding example of such rhetoric is Putin's assault on the Baltic states at the May 9, 2005, anniversary celebrations in Moscow, described by Vladimir Socor of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation in the Eurasia Daily Monitor on May 12, 2005:

"Putin made calculated use of insult and vulgarity in this exercise. Russia is ready to sign border agreements with Latvia and Estonia, he said, 'provided they do not involve stupid (duratskiye) territorial demands.' Falsely accusing Latvia's government of demanding the retrocession of the Abrene/Pytalovo district, Putin called on 'Latvian politicians to stop engaging in demagoguery.' He then opined, 'Estonia's leadership took the wrong decision in not attending the [Moscow] celebrations.'

Answering a female Estonian journalist who asked her question in Russian, Putin mockingly imitated her Estonian accent, then put on a show of anger: 'What else are we supposed to do, maybe condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact every year? We consider this topic closed, and will not return to it. We [condemned] it once, and that was enough.'

Putin then proceeded to give a breathtaking version of Russia-Baltic relations: Under the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918, he said, 'Russia turned over some of its territories to Germany,' including the territories of what became the Baltic states. 'In 1939, Germany returned them to us, and these territories joined (voshli v sostav) the Soviet Union.' Consequently, 'in 1941 [sic] we could not possibly have occupied them, inasmuch as they were already a part of the USSR.' 'Whether this was good or bad, such was history. It was a secret deal, the small states being a currency of exchange. Such were the realities of life, regrettably,' Putin concluded, though not before citing 'Europe's past colonial policies' and slavery in America (Russian TV Channel One, Interfax, May 9, 10).

Putin's version implies that the Baltic states were never independent countries, but mere territories passing from hand to hand, and that they 'joined' the USSR by consent. More broadly, it demonstrates a completely value-free approach to issues of crime of aggression, war crimes, and Soviet totalitarianism. While also displaying ignorance of history, Putin's version is partly informed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of May 5, which similarly claimed that the Soviet Union could not possibly have occupied what it already possessed (Interfax, May 5).

(...)

According to Lithuania's Parliamentary Chair, Arturas Paulauskas, the most significant aspect of Putin's and other Russian official statements is not ignorance, but the unwillingness to recognize the Baltic states' independence during the period between the two world wars and their subsequent annexation. Putin's position 'demonstrates Russia's refusal to shed its imperial attitudes. If such attitudes persist, instead of being condemned, there is reason for serious concern' (ELTA, May 11; Interfax, May 10)."

t90su30 on "Two years after the Orange revolution: Ukraine in a funk"

t90su30 — Thu, 28 Dec 2006 07:03:56 +0000

Not sure what the author means by "Putin's predilection for alarmist rhetoric", what I do remember is the sponsored paranoia during the late 2005 disturbances (Orange revolution) that claimed Russian special forces were landing in Ukraine! And not only some neanderthal nationalist Ukrainians ligving in the Carpathian forests believed it, but even the gullible, or deeply biased western press did too. The west made a political bet on the proto-fascist Ukrainian nationalist organizations, the same crowd that supplied SS troops in W.W.II and still have deeply anti-semitic and russophobic biases.

Regarding Ukraine's true interests - well, subsidized gas from Russia - still, at $130/1000 cubic meters it is only 1/2 of the market price for foreign states, Russian markets for Ukraine's pipes, consumer products, and aviation is probably in Ukraine's interests. As for NATO membership, well over 60% are against it. Will Yushchenko and his NATO backers drag the country into NATO against its will and forego real economic advantages in Russia for a cold war relic? As of right now, let's just say Yushchenko is at best the 3rd most popular politician, and one suspects he was no more than 2nd most popular in late 2005.

Some strange assertions have been going around in western media and sometimes backed by some Ukrainian writers who want to prove something about their country - but what? - and only end up revealing an inferiority complex regarding their great slavic neighbor. For one I do not see how Ukraine is anymore democratic now than it was earlier. When you have foreigners financing your parties, organizing them, and even flooding the streets of Kiev to protest what should be Ukrainian elections, there is much to be sad about. Poles, Georgians, Serbians, and Czechs are not Ukrainian citizens and retired German diplomats should not be Yushchenko's advisers. Ignoring the wishes of the majority regarding NATO, for example, but also ignoring their basic and real economic interests in cooperation with Russia is not very democratic. Kowtowing to the wishes of the NATO leaders is not very democratic.

The 1932-33 "genocide" was not Ukrainian - it also took place in Russia and Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan and Ukraine it took place in regions settled by Russians - i.e. most of the victims in both republics were not natives, but Russians. South and Eastern Ukraine was settled during the late 18th-19th century with Russian peasants.