hmm, the attempt to draw fine distinctions between the frying pan and the fire strikes me as a bit dishonest. perhaps in 10 years time we'll be able to do the counterfactual analysis in a more dispassionate manner. for now i think it might be better to concentrate on dealing with the mess we have created.

Matt, Kamm seems to offer a variation on one of Christopher Hitchens’ main points about the war. It casts the situation with Iraq as insupportable, both long and short term, both within and without Iraq, compelling the actions taken. But it makes the case by assertion which, on examination does not come close to holding up. <“Containment of his regime would have meant continuous military deployment in neighbouring states and the no-fly zones; intensified economic sanctions; inspections coercive enough to withstand Saddam's intimidation and fraud; and the support of France and Russia. Even with personalities of greater competence than Hans Blix and higher morals than Jacques Chirac, that commitment would have been inconceivable.”> How inconceivable? Given what we, in fact, chose to do! No one proposed doing nothing. The question was finding something better. How ‘inconceivable’ would that be? To begin with, Cobra II, the new book on the Iraq military campaign by the Gordon and Trainor, shows Saddam to be a classic power obsessed dictator: Rule 1 - I rule! Rule 2 - See rule 1 There are no other rules! Rather than a foaming at the mouth loony, he was ‘but mad north north-west’, mad to stay in power. As such, he was fairly predictable. Cobra II has him following a quite rational strategy: leave some doubt on Weapons of Mass Destruction, and you have deterrence by doubt. The reality - well attested to in the event - was that nearly all Iraqis - including Sunnis - were quite ready to do away with Saddam. With some care and some smarts, we might well have slipped the country out from under him. What Sunni Iraqis were not prepared to do, of course, was to yield up their traditional dominance in Iraq. But given the ‘carrot’ of eliminating Saddam, and approached by broad international coalition, including Arab/Muslim countries, who could provide an international force to stabilize transition, I think it considerably more likely than it is now, that they might have come to a constructive accommodation. <“But had we allowed Saddam's regime to persist, in defiance of its obligations under 17 UN security council resolutions, the consequences would have been an unalloyed catastrophe. The Uday-Qusay dynasty would have ensured further extreme oppression, unless and until the regime collapsed in chaos.”> This is the particular bogeyman Hitchens has been selling. Given that Sunni Iraqi tribes, in the aftermath of Gulf War I, had been armed by Saddam, and that they were hardly likely to simply accede, post Saddam, to succession by more of the same (Uday and Qusay), turmoil rather than any smooth transition was indeed likely – as would an early exit by Uday and Qusay. That, however, would have been a opening for overwhelming forces, both local Arab and Muslim, and distant developed world, to move in with a genuinely broad coalition to stabilize Iraq. I would argue these scenarios, rather than the nightmare ones of Kamm and Hitchens, are far, far more plausible. Or at least they would be given even a modicum of good sense on the part of the international community. <“My guess is that if the US pulls out then the insurgency/al Qaeda/whoever will view it as a victory and gain the ascendancy that they might not otherwise have had, thus destabilizing the whole region including the US stranglehold on Saudi Arabia and ME oil supplies.”> I think you are right to a point. Al Qaeda et al are highly unlikely to come to power should we leave. If Sunni and Shia come to an agreement, neither will have any use for al Zarqwai and crowd. The Qaeda element in the insurgency has been surviving on a significant degree of Sunni tolerance, as the Sunnis see an advantage in keeping the situation from settling out into anything well defined, since they understand – rightly – that 'defined' thing would not likely be to their advantage. If there should be a civil war, the Sunni cannot derive anything like the help they need from Al Qaeda. That could only come from the immediate surrounding Sunni Muslim countries, and they are the sworn foes of the al Qaeda terrorists. Whether Sunni/Shia agreement or civil war, the likely fate of the terrorist element will be to be driven underground, but, in a state held either in precarious balance or lost in civil war, it will be relatively unharried, and thus relatively free to pursue its designs from within the heart of the Arab/Muslim world. Not good. Message was edited by: ronr327

["Why do so many avoid discussing the possible outcomes for Iraq? Is it too challenging?"] Well, set an example and make a start. I think most here haven't a clue as to what will happen other than to be extremely pessimistic as a result of what is happening now. It is probably more sensible to discuss the Turin Winter Olympics than to speculate on something that the coalition with all its forces, advisers and diplomats can do little to determiine. I would doubt that you have anything of real consequence to add, like most of us others, who simply don't know enough and rely on a lot of misinformation and spin. Perhaps that's why we talk about the past rather than the future. Message was edited by: brolly3