It is tempting to join the crowd of journalists and pundits who viewed Iran’s presidential election according to a “poor-versus-rich” paradigm. After all, it is very hard not to talk about the real effects of poverty on politics in a country where people living in poverty (both absolute and relative) number 10-12 million.
Economic inequality has been an enduring feature of Iran since the day oil was discovered and its revenue began to be distributed unevenly along both class and geographical lines. The “urban poor” has been a persistent reality in Iran since the 1970s, and throughout the twenty-six years of the Islamic Republic. The neglect of this class by the administrations of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) administrations must have been a factor in the election result.
But a closer look suggests that economics, though clearly part of the politics of this election, was not the decisive factor. This becomes clear if voting results are correlated with social factors: regional income and educational level, ethnic composition of voting districts, past voting patterns, religiosity, and the class composition of voters.
The available data on the election’s two rounds do not provide enough detail for meaningful correlations, but they do indicate seven conclusions:
- ethnicity is the most important variable in explaining votes in poorer, border provinces and regions like Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Ahwaz
- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s poor performance in Ardebil, where he had served as provincial governor, dispelled his reputation as a real friend of the lower classes and a reputable manager
- Ahmadinejad received all the conservative votes, from all classes (though most poor are religious and usually identify with the conservatives, not all conservatives are poor; wealthy bazaar merchants are the most important conservative constituency)
- Ahmadinejad received many votes from higher social classes in provinces with above-average income; he also won the votes of one-third of voting Iranians living abroad, an affluent group
- class, gender, and even family lines overlapped in major cities. Post-election reports and interviews (Iran’s substitute for United States exit polls) indicate voting splits between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad within the same family (with, in Tehran, more husbands voting for Mahmoud and wives for Hashemi)
- the result of several mid-term parliamentary elections that coincided with the presidential election was revealing: in Tehran, a male reformist candidate soundly defeated a female conservative affiliated with Ahmadinejad’s faction, and won close to half a million votes more than Ahmadinejad received on the same day in the first presidential round.
These factors add complexity to the simple “poor-versus-rich” model. The poor did help Ahmadinejad to win, but they were not his sole supporters; and Ahmadinejad’s victory is not evidence that he has a good record of taking care of the poor or eliminating poverty.
The conservatives, after all, are as guilty as the reformists of ignoring the poor. Since 1997, reformists have held the executive branch of government, but the real economy was run by the bazaar merchants, conservative foundations (bonyad), centrist technocrats, and the newly-rich class who are mostly sons (Aghazadeh-ha) and relatives of conservative ayatollahs.
Since the early 1990s, the conservatives have been much more vocal and effective in talking about the mostazafin (oppressed) and edalat-e ejtema-i (social justice) than the reformists have. The reformists broadly ignored the poor and surrendered the issue to the conservatives without a real fight. Reformist discourse has been dominated by talk of modernity, development, democracy, and religious modernisation; its proponents looked to the educated middle class as a social constituency, and regarded the poor as culturally distanced from their cause. That was their Achilles’ heel.
Also in openDemocracy on Iran’s election and the democratic prospects:
Fred Halliday puts the Iran election in the context of Iran’s own modern history and a century of world revolutions
IranScan 1384 – Hossein Derakhshan, Farideh Nicknazar, Laura Rozen, Afshin Molavi and others report and discuss Iran’s democratic process and potential
Iran’s road to democracy – a debate opened by Mohsen Sazegara’s proposal of a referendum on a new constitution for Iran; Mehrangiz Kar, Mansour Farhang, Roya Boroumand, Farideh Farhi, Kaveh Ehsani and others respond
Ardashir Tehrani, Hossein Derakhshan, Trita Parsi, Ramin Jahanbegloo, Abbas Milani and other Iranians assess the reasons for Mahmoud Ahmadinejan’s victory, and the post-election mood in Iran
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Five winds in Ahmadinejad’s sail
Five political factors contributed to Ahmadinejad’s rise.
First, ensuring that he did not disappear in the first round required a great deal of machination. The organised vote by the basiji, the pasdaran, and numerous other organs controlled by the conservatives, helped him gain enough votes on 17 June to reach the run-off. Apparently, he was still a bit short when his primary challenger, Mehdi Karroubi), “went to sleep”; Ahmadinejad’s hidden support then went to work to guarantee that he would be the candidate competing with Rafsanjani.
Second, before the decisive 24 June vote Ahmadinejad was an unknown running against a universally known member of the old guard (and a figure tarnished by many of the problems within the Islamic Republic). The fact that Ahmadinejad was part of the same establishment was neither raised by his opponent nor registered by voters focusing on Rafsanjani’s record and reputation.
The difference was one of visibility: Ahmadinejad, as an invisible part of the establishment, could complain about “bad management” in a way that former president Rafsanjani could not, without rejecting his own and the Islamic Republic’s past. Ahmadinejad’s invisibility afforded him the opportunity to portray himself as a non-establishment “man of the people”. Voters saw him as a young man against an old one, an outsider worth trying after more than twenty-four years of clerical rule. A large majority of voters felt less comfortable with the “devil they knew” and went for the one they did not.
Third, Ahmadinejad’s campaign – apart from receiving the organised support of the conservative establishment – showed great skill in exploiting his humble past and simple lifestyle, especially in the run-off when he was competing with a man perceived to be at the centre of an international financial empire.
Fourth, there is a broad and often overlooked perception among Iranian voters of widespread “corruption” in the country. As current mayor of Tehran and previous governor of a northern province, Ahmadinejad has a reputation for eliminating “wasteful” bureaucracy and esraf (unnecessary spending). The huge and corrupt administrative structures in Iran make this extremely appealing to the Iranian public. It may explain the sizeable number of reformist votes that shifted to Ahmadinejad in the second round, especially in the wealthier part of major cities where middle-class and upper-middle class voters reside.
Fifth, the fact that Rafsanjani could count on only part of the reformist vote in the run-off gave Ahmadinejad an advantage. Ahmadinejad was assured of continuing conservative support, and easily acquired all votes previously distributed among other conservative candidates. Rafsanjani’s campaign style – using young, stylish women and roller-skating youth with posters of the candidate’s name in English pinned all over their bodies – also helped Ahmadinejad’s image as a prudent observant of social norms.
All this meant Ahmadinejad had only to secure part of the reformist vote from Rafsanjani’s limited constituency. He certainly did this well – and a little behind-the-scenes “help” from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and his cadre made it all the more glorious!
What difference will the president make?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represents the Islamic Republic’s model of an ideal layperson. He has gained all the necessary credentials to be trusted with a leadership job: participation in Islamic associations, assistance with hostage-taking, participation in the Revolutionary Guards, fighting in the Iraq war, studying modern sciences to doctoral level, being a university professor and part of the scientific elite, serving the country and regime in various posts, living a simple Muslim life, and maintaining an unwavering loyalty to the Vali-e Faqih (supreme leader).
As far as the ruling conservatives are concerned, things could not have turned out better. Ahmadinejad’s election (as the conservative cleric Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi has indicated) reflects God’s blessing, and the Islamic Republic has gained a new lease of life. If his election causes any concern or problem, it is for those who do not accept the vision of the ruling conservatives.
During the run-off, reformist papers described Ahmadinejad’s possible win as a sign of rising fascism and a return to dark days of the past. But this “dark past” was precisely the “good society” these same people – in their own revolutionary youth – had constructed. It just turned dark when they were asked to leave the seats of power. Still, the reformists’ concerns are justified and they are not alone in worrying about the conservatives’ authoritarian agenda; most secular intellectuals share these anxieties.
Ahmadinejad’s opponents believe that he will consolidate conservatives’ control and return Iran to the political, economic, and cultural atmosphere of the early 1980s. While there is a grain of truth in these charges, they do not relate well to the context within which Ahmadinejad will be operating.
This can be illustrated by looking at the cultural, institutional and international frameworks of Iran that the president is inheriting.
The cultural framework
Ahmadinejad will certainly be a lot less friendly to the religious-national-reformist alliance and a lot more exacting on the secular opposition. The cultural atmosphere will be less open, but also more subject to give-and-take, pull-and-push, and trial-and-error. Conservative newspapers, magazines, and media outlets will have increased support and reformist ones will become pressed financially; critical reporting of Ahmadinejad’s administration, and closeness to the “opposition” may lead to cuts in their subsidies.
There will be more policing of morality, seeking to curtail what its agents perceive as “moral laxity”. They will succeed up to a point, but when people’s resistance becomes collective and enough to generate public tension, the moral agents will retreat. So, the country will experience a rough ride but it will not go back to the 1980s, as Ahmadinejad’s opponents predict. The overwhelming presence of global media and the increasing interaction between people, countries, and resources will make it impossible for the government to effectively control information flow, block the spread of cultural products, and deny citizens the chance to participate in global processes.
In any case, conservatives’ definition of “moral laxity” today is itself much more liberal than in the 1980s. The kind of people who enforce it have also changed from the early days of the revolution, with their dirty collars and wrinkled shirts; they have become a lot more chic.
The institutional framework
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will try to consolidate conservative domination over all branches of the state machinery, and to replace many middle and senior managers by modiran arzeshi (loyal and value-oriented ones). Whether he succeeds is another matter.
Throughout the campaign, he criticised the leadership in the oil ministry for “waste” and implicit “corruption” and in the foreign ministry for “not representing Iran from a position of strength”. The oil ministry spokesman has asked him politely to produce evidence of corruption or shut up.
Such defiance will continue after Ahmadinejad takes the oath of office in early August. If the people of Iran were able to compel the closed system of the 1980s to open up, they will also be able to resist disadvantageous changes imposed on them in the coming years. The various layers of Iranian society (workers, farmers, teachers, bureaucrats, politicians, women, youth, political activists) are much more informed about world affairs and better equipped to confront fanaticism and repression than they were two decades ago.
These developments will unsettle the various political factions inside the establishment, and – initially – roughen the conditions for democratic forces outside the system. They will also make Ahmadinejad’s predicament more severe.
Many of Ahmadinejad’s election promises will remain just that: promises. He will find it hard to reconcile his simplistic, populist campaign slogans of meritocratic management with the ideological loyalty required for success in the Islamic Republic, for these slogans do not correspond either to the economics or the demographics of the country.
Ahmadinejad’s detailed promises seem impossible to achieve – cutting interest rates to zero (in an economy suffering from a low savings rate), increasing foreign investment (in a clotted economy burdened by a cumbersome legal system and a low investment security), and eradicating poverty (the current government is late in paying teachers and other state employees). The vision of a heavily subsidised economy is unrealistic in a country with such a large and young population. Oil revenue has done wonders for the clerics, but it has reached its limits. A radical, Hugo Chàvez-type turn of the Iranian economy would suit neither a religious establishment that considers private property sacred nor the bazaar merchants (who opposed Mir Hossein Mossavi’s statist policies in the 1980s).
The international framework
Moreover, the international environment within which the Islamic Republic must operate today is quite different from the one it confronted in the 1980s. Ahmadinejad cannot isolate himself from the conflict with the United States. The Bush administration will continue to be a major challenge for the Islamic Republic, especially regarding Iran’s nuclear capability and its political stance relative to US interests in the region.
This is a major challenge for both the Islamic Republic and democratic forces in Iran. So far, the Islamic Republic has succeeded in turning the Bush administration’s hostility to its advantage. This will not last forever. If the United States’s problems in Iraq lighten, it will be able to place more pressure on Iran to respond to US “charges” and “demands.” How the Islamic Republic will respond is hard to predict, but Ahmadinejad’s possible isolationist or rejectionist policies will not resolve the situation.
What can the democratic opposition do?
The June election result is a major blow to Iran’s secular and religious opposition. If many of these opposition groups truly wish to see the Islamic Republic transformed into a democratic state (whether through reform or revolution), the question is: where do they go from here?
People inside Iran who want democracy are united neither in their perception of democracy nor in its pursuit. One major divide among them is between those who work with the system and those who do not; another is between secular and religious forces; and seculars are further divided between those inside and outside Iran. Furthermore, all these groups are divided on how to go about changing things: to democratise the current system gradually or to overthrow it violently.
As long as these groups fail to coalesce against the conservative forces in the country, they will not pose a major threat to the regime. The most urgent task for Iran’s opposition is to form a cohesive leadership that represents all democratic forces, rather than just one or two.
A primary lesson opposition groups can learn from this election is that no single group should assume that it represents “Iranian people.” The first round of the election shows that the Iranian public includes different constituencies. Each opposition group must identify which of those constituencies closely relate to its own ideology, strategy, and vision of a future for the country.
Democratic forces need to recognise the diversity and complexity of Iranian society by searching for their own social bases and building institutions that represent their vision and strength. Two such constituencies, women and young people, have received a lot of attention, though such broad categories contain within them many diverse elements.
Other possible elements of a future democratic alliance include workers, teachers, public officials, and even elements within the clerical establishment interested in an inclusive, participatory democratic system. In my view, if this election has one major lesson for the democratic forces, it is this: find your constituency, share your view of the reality with them, develop a common vision of an alternative, build support and institutions, and do not miss small gains in the big battle for your ideals.
Ahmadinejad’s administration provides the outgoing state reformists with a real opportunity to join secular forces outside the state. This development would be a step forward, especially if these forces can expand civil organisations and strengthen NGOs.
Mehdi Karroubi has already started the process of establishing the independent Hezb-e Etemad-e Melli (National Trust Party); Hashemi Rafsanjani has supported the establishment of a new Jebhe-ye Etedal-e Eslami (Islamic Moderation Front). Two weeks before the election, Mostafa Moin, the reformist presidential candidate of the Hezb-e Mosharekat-e Eslami (Islamic Participation Party), along with religious nationalists who include members of the Nahzat-e Azadi-e Iran (Iran Freedom Movement), announced the formation of the Jebhe Demokrasi va Hoquqe Bashar (Front for Democracy and Human Rights).
It is still unclear whether the flurry of activity leading to the creation of the Front for Democracy and Human Rights can lay the foundation for a wide, lasting coalition of democratic forces. To do so, it must address the typical problem Iranian democratic forces have had in the past century, namely that they are too parochial and self-centred.
The usual approach in Iran is that each group – rather than asking different groups to come together and develop a common platform – establishes its own front, then asks others to join. Others, equally egocentric, find no incentive to join a coalition founded on others’ terms. The time has come for Iran’s democratic forces to combine their energy, while preserving their own ideology, and focus on the broader picture, by creating the widest alliance of democratic groups in the country.
These new efforts may prove inadequate to this historic need yet still help to crystallise opposition to anti-democratic forces. If so, it would be a mistake for secular democratic forces to undermine them out of revenge for reformists’ past affiliation with the system. Rather, they should push for the establishment of political parties and grassroots organisations representing their own interests inside the country.
Every effective opposition must have a healthy organisation on the ground. Women and young people have already created numerous civil-society initiatives representing their diverse interests. The broader political forces are no less capable of doing so. Much of the Tudeh party’s successes in the pre-1953 coup d’état era were the result of its efforts in helping Iranian industrial workers to set up their own trade unions.
Reaching the people at the bottom of society has often been a real challenge for forces aspiring for democratic change in Iran. The fact that these forces are urbanised, educated, and secular makes it easy for them to concentrate on issues important to them in an urban environment, while ignoring those relevant to people from small towns and rural areas.
This election proved once more that politics is about resources, organisation, network, and mobilisation. Merely having democratic ideals is not enough to gain the support of people who may never have a chance to hear them. If these democratic ideals cannot be expressed in a language accessible to the majority of people outside the big cities, they will not generate support there.
The Iranian regime and democracy
The Islamic Republic faces international challenges with serious consequences for both the regime and Iranian sovereignty. Iran’s “undemocratic opposition” has identified itself unconditionally with the Bush administration’s causes, while its democratic opposition has not even tried to think about ways of taking advantage of the regime’s international vulnerability to enhance its democratic project.
This will not be easy. Western interests in controlling middle-eastern oil, and Iranian historical suspicion of foreign powers, do not leave much room for international collaboration around democratic issues in Iran. But in the modern globalised world, much of the local politics has become global and international factors play an important role in politics at the national level.
The Iranian democratic forces have to learn how to utilise international pressure to promote their domestic agenda. Every legitimate opposition has done so, including Ayatollah Khomeini in the late 1970s. The real challenge for the Iranian democratic opposition is to balance national interests with international opportunities to pursue twin objectives: exert pressure on the undemocratic forces ruling Iran, and remove external threats to Iran and its sovereignty.
