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Hungary's 1956, central Europe's 2006: beyond illusion

Krzysztof Bobinski, 27 - 10 - 2006
A new history of Hungary's uprising against the Soviet Union in 1956 shows how close its people came to freedom. The lesson is for Hungarians and their neighbours to use today, says Krzysztof Bobinski.

Hungary has been providing a double spectacle this week, as commemorations of the anniversary of the 1956 uprising against the Soviets collide with ongoing opposition protests against the governing social-democrat-led coalition. Amazingly the two events ran into one when several Hungarian-flag-waving demonstrators, under pressure from the riot police, drove off a T-34 tank from a display of arms used by the Soviets to crush the 1956 revolt.

The past and present, in their minds and surely in the minds of many other Hungarians, had run together. But what are the real links?

The current wave of opposition demonstrations has lasted ever since tapes of a party meeting addressed by prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány were broadcast on 17 September 2006. The recording (made in May, a few days after his Magyar Szocialista Párt [Hungarian Socialist Party] was re-elected) admitting that the government had consistently lied about the true state of the Hungarian economy. The opposition led by Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party cried foul and called for Gyurcsány's and the government's resignation.

Gyurcsány has resisted the demands, mindful of the fact that Fidesz's inflationary pre-election promises had also ignored the dire state of the budget and current-account deficits. Indeed his admission of political mendacity had been designed to shock his supporters into supporting the tough measures needed to rectify Hungary's dire macroeconomic situation.

But Hungarians also explain that the reason for the ferocious antagonism between the two sides - the ex-communists and the anti-communists - is that responsibility for the pre-1989 period has never really been admitted by the social democrats (the inheritors of the ruling party of the Soviet-era, the Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party]. It is felt that they have not been blamed and shamed but rather have, thanks to the democratic changes, returned to power themselves, thus managing to survive the transition as well as anyone.
Krzysztof Bobinski works at the Unia & Polska Foundation, a pro-European NGO in Warsaw. He was the Financial Times's correspondent in Warsaw.

Also by Krzysztof Bobinski in openDemocracy:

"A stork's eye view from Poland" (May 2001)

"Poland's nervous 'return' to Europe"
(April 2004 )

"Poland's letter to France: please say oui! (May 2005)

"Democracy in the European Union, more or less" (July 2005)

"The European Union's Turkish dilemma" (December 2005)

"Belarus's message to Europe" (March 2006)

"Poland's populist caravan" (14 July 2006)

The limits of freedom

The flag-waving tank-hijackers rightly recall that in 1956 their grandparents were fighting for freedom against the communists backed by a Soviet Union bent on suppressing that freedom. The parallel ends there. Then the communists were imposed on Hungary by Stalin. The present government was freely elected. Then the Hungarians were not free to choose.

But it is worth noting that there were - both in 1956 and in 2006 - other options. The chances are that if a different route had been taken on both occasions, Hungary and indeed the other new European Union member-states in central Europe could have faced - and be facing now - a better future.

A recently published book by Charles Gati, (Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt), argues cogently that if the Hungarians had been more circumspect in 1956 they would have gained more in the medium term instead of suffering the tragedy that befell them.

There was a precedent. Poland, also in October 1956 (though a critical few days earlier than Hungary), had seen a mass protest movement return the imprisoned communist Wladysław Gomułka to power and to free Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, the head of the Catholic church. These two had been able to stand up to Nikita Khrushchev when the Soviet leader flew into Warsaw to browbeat the Polish communist leaders for going too far in a reformist direction, especially when they sacked the Soviet nominee Konstantin Rokossovski (head of the Polish army, and hero of the defence of Moscow in 1941-42). As a result, the Polish government won a measure of freedom of manoeuvre while the internal situation was brought under control.

In Budapest the leadership of the country under Imre Nagy, a long-serving communist loyalist (and as Gati shows a Soviet secret-service veteran) failed to bring the situation under control. Even so the Soviet leadership decided at one point not to intervene, only to change their minds the next day - probably, as Gati suspects, under the influence of reports that their local communist and secret-police allies were being lynched in the streets of Budapest.

Meanwhile the Hungarian section of Radio Free Europe was inciting the demonstrators even against the now reformist Nagy, in contrast to the Poles in the same building who were counselling restraint and support for Gomułka to their listeners. In both cases the Americans did nothing (even though, as Charles Gati writes of Hungary, "[there] were actions short of war that Washington might have taken").

A peaceful solution to the Hungarian crisis with a limited liberalisation on Polish lines would have had important implications for the region. A year before, Austria had been neutralised with the Soviet army withdrawing. Moscow was normalising relations with Yugoslavia. China wanted political diversity in the Soviet camp. Liberal communist regimes in Warsaw and Budapest would have strengthened the hand of the reformers in Moscow, where demands for liberalisation had been fuelled by Khrushchev's anti-Stalin "secret speech" in February 1956. Pressure would have grown for a settlement of the German question.

In the event Budapest was crushed, and while the liberal policies survived for a time in Poland and in Moscow, the fate of the reforms was sealed. When the Czechs and the Slovaks were to test the limits of freedom in 1968 they found that the only Soviet response was to send the tanks in.
Also in openDemocracy on Hungary in 1956 and 2006:

Gabriel Partos, "Hungary: change via continuity"
(8 May 2006)

George Schőpflin, "Hungary: country without consequences" (22 September 2006)

Patrice de Beer, "Budapest 1956-2006" (2 October 2006)

The Irish precedent

Despite the differences between 1956 and 2006, much is also at stake in Hungary today. The prize is better governance and faster economic growth - if only the Hungarians were to show some restraint and establish a consensus on the policies needed to make progress in achieving them. A World Bank report in September 2006 suggests rapid current growth in Hungary (but also in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) could be much faster if public spending were brought down and welfare systems reformed.

There is a precedent. In Ireland in 1987 Alan Dukes, then leader of the opposition Fine Gael party, declared that he would support radical moves by the governing Fianna Fàil to get the macroeconomic situation into balance. A consensus was established, the right steps were taken and the Irish economy roared ahead to become the "Celtic tiger" (see "Hungary needs to put aside the politics of conflict", Financial Times, 22 September 2006).

The politics of confrontation are in the ascendant in central Europe. Political systems are struggling to produce viable majorities and reaching more often than not for fringe parties populated by rightwing nationalists to bolster frail majorities. In Hungary the opposition knows that it would have to adopt the same unpopular policies as Ferenc Gyurcsány if the prime minister fails to put them through. A switch to the politics of consensus around macroeconomic reforms would strengthen support for the measures and increase their chances of success.

Similar challenges face the Poles, the Czechs and the Slovaks. To meet them would be both a success story for European Union enlargement and a true overcoming of the painful legacy of the past. This after all was what the Hungarians were fighting for in 1956 - freedom with security and prosperity.

Charles Gati writes:

Two weeks after Moscow crushed the revolution, I left Hungary, going first to Austria and then in a few weeks to the United States. I became one of some 182,000 refugees from Soviet-dominated Hungary. My parents, though I was their only child, did not discourage me from leaving. They stayed up all night before I left, watching me as I wrote a few notes of farewell to relatives and friends and put a few belongings together for my escape from uncertainty to uncertainty. Emerging from the kitchen, my mother came around to stuff her freshly baked sweets - the best in the world - into my small backpack. "Look up Uncle Sanyi in New York," she said. At dawn, when it was time to say goodbye, my father tried to hold back his tears but he could not. "Write often," he said, his voice quavering with emotion. We embraced. We kissed. As I left, they stood on the small balcony of our Barcsay Street apartment and waved. I walked backwards as long as I could see them, hoping they could also see me for another few seconds. (As I recall this scene some fifty years later, holding back my tears as my father once tried to do, I still see them waving on the balcony, and I always will.)

I did not fully appreciate until much later - when I had my own children in America - how unselfish my parents were to let go of me.

[This is an extract – (c) 2006 by Charles Gati - from Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2006)]

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Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2006) US, UK

 
Copyright © Krzysztof Bobinski. Published by openDemocracy Ltd. You may download and print extracts from this article for your own personal and non-commercial use only. For all re-print, syndication and educational use please see read our republishing guidelines or contact us. Some articles on this site are published under different terms. No images on the site or in articles may be re-used without permission unless specifically licensed under Creative Commons.
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www.marcusferrar.org said:



Thu, 2006-11-09 09:21
A valid point by kis-geza (comment 62). Freedom movements in the East bloc satellite countries did influence Western opinion against the Soviet Union, and this was important. Perhaps I was a bit categorical.

I don't see much sign of the Soviets being bothered by these setbacks to their image in the West however. Their ability to influence the world remained considerable. In most of the 1970s, they outdid the West in the battle for the allegiance of African leaders, and established strong positions on that continent. In the early 1980s, they had quite some success in swaying public opinion in West Germany over nuclear missiles.

Reagan won in the end, by taking on the Soviets directly. He recognised that is where he needed to achieve change.

This should not detract from admiration for those who rose up against Soviet domination in the satellite countries. That their opposition was, in hindsight, doomed at the time makes their courage more noble. Many had to pay a severe personal price for being on the weaker side.

kis-geza said:



Wed, 2006-11-08 09:18
I have a point to the comment of Marcus Ferrar on 3-11-2006. He wrotes: "History shows that the decisive move for the change had to take place in the Soviet Union itself. Whatever happened in the satellites was of little consequence." I agree with his first sentence, but do not completely agree with his second one. Do not forget that even in the Western World after the 2nd World War many intellectuals were pro Stalin and the far left movements (including terrorists) were quite strong. As far as I understand, among others the revolution in 1956 and the democratic movements in 1968 (Checz) and in 1981 (Poland) opened the eyes of many people in the Western World and thus strengthened the coalition against the stalinistic dictatures.

kis-geza said:



Wed, 2006-11-08 09:05
Many comments of roger.gen posted on 2.11.2006 are reasonable. However, I do not complete agree with his following point: "Discussions of the 1956 counterrevolution should have regard to the carefully ignored fact that Hungary was one of the most aggressive Axis satellites during the Hitler War."

1. Most of the historians in Hungary and in the Western World agree that the uprising in Hungary at 1956 was a revolution (and a war of freedom).

2. It is not an argument for oppression and dictature by the Sowiet that Hungary was agressive during the 2nd World War. Germany was also agressive during the 2nd World War, and in spite of this there was an economic and democratic wunder in Western Germany within 15-20 years after the War led by Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard and the Christian Democracts (CDU).

3. A party very similar to the Christian Democrats (Independent Smallholders' Party, in Hungarian FKGP) in Western Germany after 1945 (see above about CDU) won the free elections of 1945 in Hungary with absolute majority in the Hungarian Parliament. The communist supported by the stalinistic Sowietunion destroyed the young democracy in Hungary in the years after the free elections in 1945. If FKGP could have ruled Hungary for 20 years like the CDU in Western Germany, Hungary had been on the level of Germany today in terms of economy and society.

hfakos said:



Sun, 2006-11-05 18:19
The description of the events in 1956 contains some novel elements in this article. In particular, the reference to Charles Gati's new work has to be hailed. Events in 1956 were much less black and white than Westerners like to think. The "revolution" was led by a hardline communist (Imre Nagy) who, in Hungary's stalinist-type government in the 1950's, was responsible for the forced creation of large state-run farms from individual landowners. That process was brutal and violent. He was probably more of a turncoat and opportunist than a true hero. Second, if the 1956 revolution happened today, Mr Bobinski's friends at the Financial Times would be the first ones to call for crushing it. The events in 1956 constituted a very socialist people's revolution. Factories were taken over and run by workers' councils, to mention just one example; hardly something the capitalists at Financial Times would appreciate. The West only picked up the revolution because they could use it as propaganda against the Soviets in the cold war.

The parallels with 2006 are very weak. Hungary is supposedly a democracy now, where deliberate manipulation of public! economic data is not allowed in order to win elections. I would argue that the current millionaire "socialist" prime minister committed criminal acts by withholding true economic information from the electorate. If any of us were to cheat in our tax forms to the IRS, we would go to jail. The standards should be just as high for an oligarch masquerading as a socialist. The fact is, he has absolutely zero credibility to manage what the West calls "reforms". What these "reforms" means are simply squeezing the population even more: privatizing public services, health care, the energy grid. Eastern Europe is a big laboratory for the international financial maffia to see, how far they can go squeezing money out of the population before it explodes. Beware Western Europe, the same fate will befall upon you if they succeed here. The present of Eastern Europe represents the future of Western Europe.

www.marcusferrar.org said:



Fri, 2006-11-03 09:41
If only ... the Hungarians had been more circumspect in 1956, following the Polish example, this would have strengthened liberal Communists elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including in Moscow ... and history would have been different.

Hmmm ... the "circumspect" course did not prevent the Poles from cruel martial law in 1981. Nor did it save the Czechoslovak liberal Communists, carefully trying to avoid offending Moscow, from being swept away by Soviet tanks in 1968. In the end, the lethal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising led to a degree of liberalism under the K�d�r regime. That may seem paradoxical, but in the eyes of the Soviets it had a certain logic: keep them firmly down but try to win a few hearts and minds once painful memories fade.

The weakness of totalitarian systems is that once you open a chink of freedom, the whole structure risks collapse. The Soviets, after some hesitation, correctly diagnosed this phenomenon in 1956 and acted with according brutality.

When I was a Reuters correspondent in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, I thought: all this can't last. In the end liberalism would revive among the satellites and eventually infect the Russians. I was right that it could not last, but wrong on the second assumption. History shows that the decisive move for the change had to take place in the Soviet Union itself. Whatever happened in the satellites was of little consequence.

roger.gen said:



Thu, 2006-11-02 22:09
To quote from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/, the National Security Archive,:

"From declassified documents, it is now clear that several factors influenced [the Politburo to suddenly reverse their] decision [not to intervene], including:

* the belief that the rebellion directly threatened Communist rule in Hungary (unlike the challenge posed by Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Polish Communists just days before, which had targeted Kremlin rule but not the Communist system);

* that the West would see a lack of response by Moscow as a sign of weakness, especially after the British, French and Israeli strike against Suez that had begun on October 29;

* that the spread of anti-Communist feelings in Hungary threatened the rule of neighbouring satellite leaders; and

* that members of the Soviet party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary."

People may disagree with those positions, but there was logic behind them. Having started a war of aggression against Egypt in support of Israel (which itself recently committed crimes against humanity in Lebanon), the West could hardly be portrayed as non-interventionist pacifists.

Discussions of the 1956 counterrevolution should have regard to the carefully ignored fact that Hungary was one of the most aggressive Axis satellites during the Hitler War. As a signatory of the anti-Comintern Pact, it was in every respect an active enemy of the Soviet Union and the other Allies. Like reactionary Western circles, supporters of the 1956 uprising appear to deny that liability.

Hungary's Second Army was largely destroyed at the Battle of Stalingrad - we in the West would have rejoiced at the destruction of an enemy army by our Soviet allies. A reconstituted Second, with the First and Third Armies fought with Nazi forces until Nazi Germany's surrender.

While that was partly due to a pro-Nazi coup late in the war, it was clearly the choice of the dominant political forces. It is worth noting that the various Eastern European governments-in-exile invariably seem to have uniformly adopted a deeply conservative and anti-Soviet position, that generally sought a return to the pre-war ruling cliques and military dictatorships. We should particularly remember that, as with Iraq today, they did not yield power, it had to be taken from them by force.

In contrast, Bulgaria offered no opposition to the entry of Soviet forces onto its territory, although it was allied with Germany. Bulgaria had sent troops to occupy parts of Yugoslavia, though not to the Soviet Union. Rumania had, like Hungary, sent armies to fight in the USSR; like Finland later, in August 1944 it switched from being at war with the USSR to being at war with Nazi Germany.

There is also the issue of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet casualties arising from the taking of Hungary, particularly Buda and Pest. No nation that suffers such losses occupying an enemy nation will feel inclined to let nationalist and reactionary forces triumph.

The website http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/hungary_europe_4038.jsp presents a more moderate view:

"A recently published book by Charles Gati, (Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt), argues cogently that if the Hungarians had been more circumspect in 1956 they would have gained more in the medium term instead of suffering the tragedy that befell them.

Meanwhile the Hungarian section of Radio Free Europe was inciting the demonstrators even against the now reformist Nagy, in contrast to the Poles in the same building who were counselling restraint and support for Gomułka to their listeners. In both cases the Americans did nothing (even though, as Charles Gati writes of Hungary, "[there] were actions short of war that Washington might have taken")."

kis-geza said:



Mon, 2006-10-30 09:13
Krzysztof Bobinski' article is more or less balanced although a bit partial toward the currently ruling coalition. He wrotes: "In Hungary the opposition knows that it would have to adopt the same unpopular policies as Ferenc Gyurcs�ny if the prime minister fails to put them through." I have a problem with the word "same". To repair the crisis the socalist/free democrat coalition caused since 2002, there is certainly need for unpopular policies, but you cannot say that there is always only one single way of doing this.

The main message of the article is very positive and I fully support it: "switch to the politics of consensus around macroeconomic reforms". The basis of consensus is always a compromise, a real compromise. A police terror ordered by the ruling coalition that is not only against violent attackers, but also againts peaceful demonstators, against Hungarian and foreign visitors on the streets and in the restaurants is clearly not a basis for compromise.

kis-geza said:



Mon, 2006-10-30 08:43
Please remove the article about Viktor Orb�n written by Mikl�s Haraszti, because as I wrote before, this article is not only a little bit partial against Orb�n, but extremely partial. This is clearly a stalinistic article the communist used to write in the Sowietunion and in the occupied Eastern European countries including Hungary againts their policital opposition when Stalin was alive.

p.todd said:



Sat, 2006-10-28 17:31
To have some visual impression about

the technique the hungarian police uses to

disperse masses of rioters:

(the videos contain explicit violence)

http://youtube.com/watch?v=TNsib28r43g

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8EOsgc60XrY

kis-geza said:



Mon, 2006-10-30 08:39
Dear Sir,

I have 3 comments:

- The current financial and economic crisis in Hungary was caused by the current coalition which rules Hungary since 2002. Before this catastrophic coalition, Fidesz was ruled the country between 1998 and 2002 with Viktor Orb�n as prime minister, and during that time the economy and the society were on the rigth track.

- In 2002, the former communist who currently rule the country won the elections with extreme populistic and right wing propaganda: they promised 50% salary increase for all emloyees in the public state sector and they scared the voters with 23 million Romanians who would come to Hungary to take away jobs, pensions, everything from the Hungarian citizens. I hope I do not have to further explain that the current ruling coalition how antidemocratis and rassistic is since 2002.

- I clicked on the link you provided for Viktor Orb�n. I was shocked to see that the author of the memo about Viktor Orb�n is Mikl�s Haraszti. His writing is extremely partial against Orb�n and there is no a single sentence that is true. From all of his writing comes nothing else than hate and stupidity. Just one example from his hundreds of lies: he cite what most voters think of him. THIS IS COMPLETE NONSENCE. 1. How would Haraszti know what voters THINK? In particular, how would Haraszti know what the MOST voters do think? 2. Voters of Fidesz say than Orb�n and the Fidesz are the only really democratic person and parties in Hungary.

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