The truth does not win; the truth is just what is left when everything else is wasted
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The fat lady ain't sung; the Allies can win the Iraq warI'd loosely accept your
I'd loosely accept your definition with one qualification, that a secured and sovereign Iraq is a pro-American/Western Iraq, which for me is a critical requirement.
Though it may be too early to be claiming some form of victory, as you may be eating crow come this time September, Yours truly, The American hater extraordinaire
Submitted on Tue, 2007-07-24 16:59
reply 
 Victory within reach--not yet achieved.
[quote]Though it may be too early to be claiming some form of victory, as you may be eating crow come this time September...[/quote] While I've dined on a few crow in my lifetime, I'm not claiming victory yet...only acknowledging that a change in tactics is now making victory possible by providing the security necessary to grow political reform. Without significant political reform, oil revenue-sharing, representation for all Iraqis, no meaningful victory is achievable. Political progress is not a military objective and not achievable by US forces. It remains to be seen whether or not Iraqis have the will to make it happen.
IM
Submitted on Tue, 2007-07-24 19:09
reply The Fat Lady singing?
iron Mike, To begin with a far more detailed argument with regard to where the Iraq War is now can be at the New York Review of Books: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20470It is by Peter Galbraith, a former ambassador to Croatia, a fellow at the Center for Arms Control, and a principle at the Windham Resources Group. He takes a position more or less like my own, that the Iraq war is already lost in any meaningful sense. Here are but a few bits from the article: [quote]<i>The Iraq war is lost. Of course, neither the president nor the war's intellectual architects are prepared to admit this. Nonetheless, the specter of defeat shapes their thinking in telling ways. The case for the war is no longer defined by the benefits of winning -- a stable Iraq, democracy on the march in the Middle East, the collapse of the evil Iranian and Syrian regimes -- but by the consequences of defeat. As President Bush put it, "The consequences of failure in Iraq would be death and destruction in the Middle East and here in America."</i>[/quote] And [quote]<i>Defeat is defined by America's failure to accomplish its objective of a self-sustaining, democratic and unified Iraq. And that failure has already taken place . . . </i>[/quote] And finally (referring to remarks made by Senator Richard Lugar on the floor of the Senate on June 25, 2007): [quote]<i>He observed that political fragmentation in Iraq, the stress suffered by the U.S. military, and growing antiwar sentiment at home "make it almost impossible for the United States to engineer a stable, multi-sectarian government in Iraq in a reasonable time frame." Lugar noted that agreements reached with Iraqi leaders are most often not implemented, partly, as Lugar observed, because the leaders do not control their followers but also because Iraqi leaders have also discovered that telling the Bush administration what it wants to hear is a fully acceptable substitute for action.</i>[/quote] The last line of that quote is wonderfully ironic: Bush and Co. having conducted the Iraq affair for so long as if they only had to say something was true for it to be true. Or at least for to be accepted as true. [And how dare you question them!] And so to the piece you quote from. [And yes, I have read it all.] It is a superior example of what is, nevertheless, current boilerplate spewed out by the (Neo)Conservative right. The burden of it all remains an old refrain: ‘we’re winning’. I would ask you to investigate this from Glenn Greenwald’s blog on Salon: http://salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/19/petraeus/print.html It is a compendium of ‘we’re winning’ statements on Iraq made over the past four years. It would be possible to fill a tome with the like, but these particular ones are from none other than General David Petraeus. Don’t you at least recognize some reason to be dubious at this latest ‘blue skies and pretty balloons, straight on to morning’ effluvia. I, of course, am highly dubious. With all of the previous incarnations of such, my attitude has been, I doubt it, but I hope they are right. I will wait and see. And, of course, I have seen; we all have. And so to work on the realities of the current situation in Iraq. Dunn, in the piece you cite, alleges that successes in Anbar are unreported: [quote]<i>Anbar is close to being secured, thanks to the long-ridiculed strategy of recruiting local sheiks. A capsule history of war coverage could be put together from stories on this topic alone - beginning with sneers, moving on to "evidence" that it would never work, to the puzzled pieces of the past few months admitting that something was happening, and finally the recent stories expressing concern that the central government might be "offended" by the attention being paid former Sunni rebels. (Try to find another story in the legacy media worrying about the feelings of the Iraqi government.) What you will not find is any mention of the easily-grasped fact that Anbar acts as a blueprint for the rest of the country. If the process works there, it will work elsewhere. If it works in other areas, that means the destruction of the Jihadis in detail.</i>[/quote] Contrary to Dunn, I heard of the turn around in Anbar all over the place. As you might imagine I do not frequent right wing media outlets, but I heard the Anbar story everywhere. It was nearly ubiquitous from all sectors of the media. First, on the utter duplicity of citing the successes in Anbar: From John Burns [whom Dunn takes pains to cite approvingly] “Showcase and Chimera” http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F2091EF9385A0C7B8CDDAE0894DF404482 It led the NY Times ‘Week in Review section on July 8, 2007: [quote]<i>In a speech 10 days ago to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., President Bush cited the turnaround here and elsewhere in Anbar Province, a vast desert hinterland that accounts for nearly a third of Iraq, as a reason to resist demands from Democrats in Congress for an early withdrawal of United States troops. But Mr. Bush's pitch masked some of the crucial questions that still confront American commanders. Two factors that have led to the astonishing success in Anbar -- the Sunnis' dominance of the province and the nature of their foe here -- could have the opposite effect elsewhere, especially in Baghdad. There the population is an explosive mix of sects, rather than largely Sunni. And the Sunnis' fight -- explicitly so, in the case of many of the new volunteers -- is not just against Al Qaeda-linked extremists, but ultimately against the American presence here, and beyond the Americans, the new power of the majority Shiites. The key to turning that [Anbar] around was the shift in allegiance by tribal sheiks. But the sheiks turned only after a prolonged offensive by American and Iraqi forces, starting in November, that put Al Qaeda groups on the run, in Ramadi and elsewhere across western Anbar. Not for the first time, the Americans learned a basic lesson of warfare here: that Iraqis, bludgeoned for 24 years by Saddam Hussein's terror, are wary of rising against any force, however brutal, until it is in retreat. In Anbar, Sunni extremists were the dominant force, with near-total popular support or acquiescence, until the offensive broke their power.</i>[/quote] Note the date: November – before the surge. The success in Anbar is unique to Anbar. While an American sweep kicked it off, we had conducted such sweeps before and they had come to nothing. This time the locals came over to our side. Why? A couple of reasons. The first is something I heard mentioned a while ago and have heard nothing since, but I take it to be of particular significance. Oil has been discovered in Anbar! [Apparently a fairly substantial amount of it] Suddenly it became rather more critical as to who would be calling the shots in Anbar. The local sheiks could be expected to attempt to re- exert an absolute control where before they had been content to let Al Qaeda in Iraq have at least some sway. Secondly, and likely more consequential in the short run, where Al Qaeda had become settled in it began to impose its fundamentalist social miasma, and the local Sunnis did not take to it. (As the Afghans had not). The Sheiks had plenty of reason, in this moment, to decide that co-operating with the Americans held more benefits than opposing them, and so we have garnered a measure of success in Anbar. Success we enjoyed because we attempted one more sweep, and then got lucky. The locals decided to join us (for the moment). In the words of General Petraeus: ''Local security is helped incalculably by local support and local involvement . . .” I couldn’t say it better myself! To repeat, Anbar was initially separate from the surge, is unique unto itself, and does not appear to be readily repeatable. Now let’s cut to the chase. No mere surge can work, and no strategy we can command in the present reality can either. Tragically for all concerned. I have argued from January of 2005 on that the elections as designed offered no realistic hope for success. The political reality had not matured to a point where elections could function constructively. They were then, and all subsequent elections have been, set up on a basis of ‘Vote for me, I’m Sunni’, Vote for me, I’m Shia’, ‘Vote for me, I’m Kurd’. They produced exactly what could be expected: a body of individuals who understood their purpose to be protecting the interests of their respective factions. Nothing more and nothing less. They did not embody, and thus were unlikely ever to express, a unified pluralistic Iraq. That incapacity has spawned our tragic reality. Related to this, but extending arguably more deeply, is something that is all but intractable. No government can be effective if it cannot command civil order/civil peace. What we have to have, in order to obtain anything resembling ‘success’ in Iraq, is an at least marginally representative (and respectable) regime, capable of commanding such coercive force as can assure civil order/civil peace. The body of young Iraqi men from whom such a force will have to be realized, however, identifies as Muslim first, and then as Sunni, Shia and Kurd. The government for whom they will be expected – no required – to fight and die is seen to be little more than an avatar of sectarian division. By and large, before people are ready to fight and die for a government, they have to believe in its worth and capacities. Our hope - a democratic, stable, prosperous, pluralistic Iraq - however infinitely to be desired, is no more than a faint glimmer on a far too distant horizon. Over time these young Iraqis are overwhelmingly likely act out of their strong close identifications as Muslims, Sunni, Shia and Kurd. Identification as Muslim sees us as an alien, i.e. non Islamic, presence, and identification as Sunni, Shia or Kurd leaves them all too likely to become partisan adherents to their respective sides in a civil war. In short, a population of young Iraqis from whom we might recruit the force we need does not exist. Perhaps it did at one time, but that time is long past. We have dealt ourselves a losing hand. We had best recognize this and work from there. For a broader perspective on the larger questions alluded to in the above you might consult material I posted here a while ago, but can also be found, in a somewhat more coherent form, as ‘The Problem’, on my blog site: http://blogs.salon.com/0001185/ P.S. I am a classical music nut (I assure you, a clinically accurate description). The quintessential, and prototypical, ‘fat lady singing’ is Brunhilde at the conclusion of Wagner’s epic tetralogy Der Ring des Nibelungen. When she finishes, she goes to her death - and takes the whole world with her. With that reference, I don’t know if any of us wants to hear ‘the fat lady singing’. P.P.S. The edit protocols while initially posting seem to be changed, and so what you see is not what quite what I intended. The edit funcition after posting leaves me with a nearly unmanageable soup of formating instructions + text, and I am not inclined to hack my way through this.
Submitted on Wed, 2007-07-25 17:17
reply
Worth waiting for!
Thanks Ron for a thoughtful and well-documented post with lots of food for thought. With regard to Part 1 of your post, I am unclear how making the case for the consequences of defeat is any less important than making the case for a stable and sovereign Iraq. Galbraith suggests the Bush administration has abandoned the positive and embraced the negative and I don't concur. Both arguments are important and valid justification for the surge. [quote] The success in Anbar is unique to Anbar. While an American sweep kicked it off, we had conducted such sweeps before and they had come to nothing. This time the locals came over to our side. Why?[/quote] The additional manpower of the surge provides the ability to take and HOLD ground. I think you are right that Iraqis are pragmatic enough not to commit to either side when the outcome may be in doubt. Holding ground and collaborating with informal power structure (local sheiks) is fundamendal to building trust. [quote]The Jihadis broke (and more than likely never knew) the cardinal rule of insurgency warfare, that of being a good guest. As Mao put it, "The revolutionary must be as a fish among the water of the peasantry." The Jihadis have been lampreys to the Iraqi people. Proselytizing, forcing adaptation of their reactionary creed, engaging in torture, kidnapping, and looting. Arabic culture is one in which open dealings, personal loyalty, and honor are at a premium. Violate any of them, and there is no way back. The Jihadis violated them all. The towns and cities of Iraq are no longer sanctuaries. [/quote] THIS is the big difference. THIS is the reason I see light at the end of the tunnel. Because ultimately, tribal loyalties will rule and if tribal loyalties are aligned against the insurgency, they will have no safe haven, no resupply, and no future. The point about Baghdad being a mixed bag of tribes is well-taken, but does not mean the Anbar success could not be repeated. [quote]... likely more consequential in the short run, where Al Qaeda had become settled in it began to impose its fundamentalist social miasma, and the local Sunnis did not take to it. [/quote] And you somehow think the Kurds are likely to take to it...or the Shia? The insurgency, led by outsiders kills all tribes indiscriminately. They are being manipulated and as they come to realize this, they turn against those killing them...the insurgents themselves. The same John Burns article seems to agree... [quote]Many recruits, U.S. officers acknowledge, were previously insurgents. "There's a lot of guys wearing blue shirts out there who were shooting at us last year," Charlton said. The trend has spread to other areas where U.S. and Iraqi troops are fighting extremists, including the Sunni district of Amariya in Baghdad, where former insurgents have been given arms and ammunition to fight Qaeda-linked groups. Other areas are in Diyala Province, parts of the so-called Triangle of Death south of Baghdad in Babil Province, and parts of Salahuddin and Nineveh, provinces with large Sunni populations north of Baghdad. [/quote] Ultimately, I agree that a western style democracy may be far in Iraq's future...if ever. But if we are talking about "victory in a meaningful way," I don't think western democracy needs to be on the checklist at this point. Stability, sovereignty, and western-friendly (hat tip to Chris) are enough for now and constitute achievable goals provided security is maintained and unilateral political reform is achieved.
IM P.s. Your right--it's impossible to re-edit the "format soup" once you hit the preview button. Clearly there's still work to be done to make it more user friendly.
Submitted on Wed, 2007-07-25 19:43
reply Worth waiting for?
Iron Mike
Perhaps you see fear of loosing as merely the flip side of triumphalist assertion, but I observe a vast gulf between a minimalist ‘scraping by’ and ‘transformation of the entire Middle East’.
For the rest, your reply seems to cherry pick those elements that support your position, ignoring the rest.
For example, while the (Dunn approved) John Burns’ observations on Anbar do document success, they also make my point that Anbar is likely unique. You make no attempt to deal with either Burns’ or my own arguments supporting Anbar’s status as unique. In fact you employ one of my arguments while eliminating a critical qualifier. Given the centrality of the ‘locals’ to enduring success [Yes ‘THIS is the big difference’], the revulsion documented in Anbar arose because a ‘settled in’ Al Qaeda in Iraq.overplayed their hand, and began to impose their cultural agenda. There is no reason to believe they are likewise ‘settled in’ in many other places, or they will not correct an obvious mistake. Recall, as well, our new ‘allies’ of the moment don’t much take to us either. It remains to be seen how effective our ‘hold’ component will turn out as a general endeavor, absent support of the ‘locals’.
It has always been my contention that, once we leave, and if they can sort out their differences, none of the Iraqi factions will have much use for foreign jihadis. So long as we remain, and the ‘close in’ surrounding conditions involve a complex set of overlapping contentions, the ‘locals’ are at least as likely to remain equivocal on Al Qaeda in Iraq, using them (or abusing them) as immediate concerns suggest.
The Dunn article makes much of Anbar, but the critical point is the generality of this strategy, which he simply assumes. You, on the other hand, I take to claim only that it is a ‘good bet’.
The assumption that ‘support of the locals’ will prove to be readily exported throughout Iraq is, I judge, overwhelmingly likely to be more administration ‘pie in the sky’. This is opposed to Dunn’s insistence that we accept it as a nearly accomplished reality. (I would be curious as to what Dunn’s position a few years ago was relative to all previous invitations to count our chickens before they’re hatched.) Can you defend that against my arguments that the government is not set up to be, nor has - as yet - functioned, as a unifying force, or that the government must command coercive force it cannot assemble, since a body of young Iraqis, from whom such a force can be recruited, does not exist?
I propose a modified partition in ‘The Problem’ partly to address just that. I think it at least a marginally better bet that, secure in their own areas, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd will be able to recruit, from their own, a force to achieve civil order/civil peace.
Oh yes, since I just saw it. Lind’s contention that a government, virtually ‘any government’ is a ‘victory’ is curious to say the least. He obviously cannot mean a ‘failed government’. Leaving behind a coherent government which is more amenable to American interests, but is also more or less as repressive as those of the surrounding Arab states, would serve Al Qaeda’s propaganda and recruiting interests quite well. Victory?
Two parenthetical matters with Dunn. What’s with the Kasserine Pass paragraph? He conflates (confuses?) battlefield tactics with theatre strategy. Then there is the assertion that a ‘use the sheiks’ approach was a much considered (and derisively dismissed) matter. I proposed we might explore engaging tribal leaders as far back as 2003, around the time of George’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ moment. Until this present situation, I encountered NO discussion of this option. I read widely and was looking for it.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 22:59
reply Call it victory if you have to
How do you win a war if in fighting it, you further the goals of the enemy? The answer, in a word, is that you don´t. Such a war was best avoided, as victory in any meaningful sense is not possible. By removing Saddam, Americans have handed Iran a glorious victory. Overseeing the installation of Shia Islamists in the Iraqi government, and fighting to defeat Baathist, nationalist and anti-Shia opposition only compounds the initial folly. General Bill Odom has written scads along these lines. America´s great hope, al Sistani, was born and raised in Iran, speaks Arabic with a Persian accent, and doesn´t even have an Iraqi passport. You can bet your bottom dollar that for him friendly relations with Iran trump friendship with the US. I see two ways out of this deadlock. Either America comes to terms with Iran, or annihilates Iran. Some hopeful signs recently that America is tilting towards the former. Call it victory if you have to.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 09:31
reply I wouldn't get too excited
I wouldn't get too excited IM, 'the fat lady' was most likely murdered in Iraq a few years ago.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 16:49
reply
Thanks for sharing
Candace, I'm sure you had a point in there somewhere (not just a flippant, smart a** remark), but since I don't see it, I won't get too excited. I am encouraged that a meaningful victory is possible, when even an ardent critic of the war, William S. Lind begins to entertain the possibility. [quote]But if, as President Bush repeatedly says, we are fighting to defeat al Qaeda and other "terrorists" — meaning the non-state forces of the Fourth Generation – then victory can realistically be defined as seeing the re-creation of a state in Iraq. Our invasion and subsequent blunders, such as sending home the Iraqi army and civil service, destroyed the state in Iraq. Iraq currently has a government of sorts, cowering in the Green Zone, but it is a Potemkin government because there is no state. A stateless Mesopotamia is a huge win for Fourth Generation, non-state forces such as al Qaeda, because they flourish in such statelessness. Conversely, were a state to be re-created in Iraq, they would lose. That is true almost regardless of the nature and orientation of a new Iraqi state. States do not like competition, and any real Iraqi state would quickly roll up the non-state forces on its territory. The fact that an Iraqi state would almost certainly be Shiite-dominated while al Qaeda is poisonously Salafist makes that all the more certain. ...if we define winning correctly, as defeating Islamic 4GW elements including al Qaeda, and if for once we can accept the fact that America's power is limited and we need an indirect approach, I think we might yet snatch a few chestnuts from the fire. After almost 4000 dead, tens of thousands of wounded and a couple trillion bucks down the drain, it would be nice to leave old Osama, like Snidely Whiplash, having to say, "Rats! Foiled Again!"[/quote] William S. Lind He is most widely known as one of the originators of Fourth Generation War (4GW) theory. This theory states that the state has effectively lost its monopoly on warfare, and seeks to address the new challenges posed by this situation. The root of this new phenomenon is the "State's Crisis of Legitimacy," which is also linked to Lind's work at the Center for Cultural Conservatism Lind served as a legislative aide for the armed services for Senator Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio from 1973 through 1976 and held a similar position with Senator Gary Hart of Colorado from 1977 through 1986. He is the author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985) and co-author, with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 17:35
reply IM
How you could see my comment as disrespectful stuns me. My post was merely reflecting my own feeling about the situation in Iraq. As in even the fat lady aint safe in Iraq. Pretty ridiculous, don't you think so? Personally, I think we should withdraw to the borders of Iraq, and let whomever is the strongest win. And then no matter what anti-American rhetoric comes from them, we should make positive public statements how we hope to be a friend to the new Iraqi government. Yes, shower them with compliments. Then behind the cameras have the important discussions, and- no, I am not kidding. We could have a lot more go in our favor, which hopefully means no need for extended war, if we used the power of flattery in that section of the world. The idea would be that they are not having to publicly choose between their honor, and surrendering to our demands. This is an extension of my idea behind the oasis thread. There is no need to approve of every aspect of a different cultures way of life in order to find something admirable or worthy of respect. That should be our focus in our public diplomatic efforts towards the middle east, not whether we can accept Islam. Please dont read any personal offense into this post; defensive guys make me nervous. It is just one comment out of many, and hopefully my last here for awhile.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 19:42
reply
Candace
I did not find your comment disrespectful; merely flippant, shallow and pointless. Frankly, I know you're capable of more and your latter post proves it. The problem I have with your plan is you seem to believe in withdrawl and letting the country sink into anarchy; let Darwin sort it out and negotiate with the survivors. Yeah, that plan work out well in southeast asia. What kind of bodycount are you willing to accept in your plan? No rational plan for a post-conflict endstate envisions intentional anarchy--well, except maybe those plans hatched on the Daily KOS. It's been a long day and I have Ronr to answer in the morning. I leave you with the recent Europen terror bulletin that I received via e-mail. I cannot verify it's veracity, but it seems plausible to me. [quote] The English are feeling the pinch in relation to recent terrorist threats and have raised their security level from "Miffed" to "Peeved." Soon, though, security levels may be raised yet again to "Irritated" or even "A Bit Cross." Londoners have not been "A Bit Cross" since the blitz in 1940 when tea supplies all but ran out. Terrorists themselves have been re-categorized from "Tiresome" to "A Bloody Nuisance." The last time the British issued a "Bloody Nuisance" warning level was during the great fire of 1666.
Submitted on Thu, 2007-07-26 22:40
reply I Have a Dream
Sometimes, after quaffing a few beers, I have a dream, always the same:
That's when I wake up: The dream has become a nightmare.
Submitted on Fri, 2007-07-27 14:24
reply
Back at you Ron
Ron, My only fear (as you call it) surrounds the consequences to US and Europe of a failed US policy in the Middle East, not the loss of an argument here. There are a number of authors (including you) with whom I may partially agree. I suppose you can call that “cherry picking” if you want. I see it as synthesizing a position based upon diverse points of view. That diversity of perspective is a reason I come her in the first place. Nor have I made any triumphant assertion—merely one that acknowledges recent US successes as a window to an achievable, meaningful victory. Re-read the title of the thread. Bottom line: Victory is possible, but by no means assured. [quote]John Burns’ observations on Anbar do document success, they also make my point that Anbar is likely unique. You make no attempt to deal with either Burns’ or my own arguments supporting Anbar’s status as unique.[/quote] Can Anbar’s success be generalized to the rest of Iraq? Perhaps—that’s the subject of much debate without any clear evidence either way—only speculation. Burns demonstrated that Anbar-like successes have already taken place in Baghdad—primarily in Sunni dominated areas. [quote]The trend has spread to other areas where U.S. and Iraqi troops are fighting extremists, including the Sunni district of Amariya in Baghdad, where former insurgents have been given arms and ammunition to fight Qaeda-linked groups. Other areas are in Diyala Province, parts of the so-called Triangle of Death south of Baghdad in Babil Province, and parts of Salahuddin and Nineveh, provinces with large Sunni populations north of Baghdad.[/quote] I suggest that recent lessons in pragmatism—Iraqis not making a commitment until they are confident of an outcome—suggests that same pragmatism crosses sectarian lines and is not merely a Sunni phenomenon.
[quote] Can you defend that against my arguments that the government is not set up to be, nor has - as yet - functioned, as a unifying force, or that the government must command coercive force it cannot assemble, since a body of young Iraqis, from whom such a force can be recruited, does not exist?[/quote]
I agree with you the Iraqi government has not functioned as a unifying force. No argument; that’s obvious. Nor will any military successes that create security result in any permanent stability until the Iraqi government gets their act together and achieves political reform; equally obvious. I just don’t buy the latter part of your argument that a body of Iraqis cannot be recruited into a government force since it does not exist. There is evidence to the contrary. Despite horrendous police and military losses, there seems to be no shortage of recruits. I think there is a lack of training and leadership--pointing out once a gain the mistake of disbanding the armed forces. [quote] Many recruits, U.S. officers acknowledge, were previously insurgents. "There's a lot of guys wearing blue shirts out there who were shooting at us last year," Charlton said.[/quote] I don’t buy the partition plan because I don’t think Turkey will support an independent Kurdistan on it’s borders. There is LOTS of evidence to support that position. The only way it could conceivably work would be to model it similar to the United Arab Emirates which maintains sovereignty of individual states, but a central government and defense structure. I’m not sure where you are getting the leap of logic that Lind would support any government is better than no government. Nor would a repressive government be friendly to the West.
Submitted on Fri, 2007-07-27 18:09
reply
Levels of warfare
[quote]A cursory glance at 1943 would have given the impression of disaster. Kasserine, in which the German Wehrmacht nearly split Allied forces in Tunisia and sent American GIs running.--Dunn[/quote] [quote] What’s with the Kasserine Pass paragraph? He conflates (confuses?) battlefield tactics with theatre strategy. -- Ron[/quote] Disagree--this is not tactical. Lind is making a point that casual operational level observations may not reflect their immediate true impact on strategy. [quote] Operational warfare functions to implement the overall strategy of an armed force by giving direction to tactical forces and providing them with the support needed to do their job. Operational formations contain sufficient assets to perform most or all military roles. They have logistics, medical, armor, infantry, artillery and often air arms independent from the overall military force and hence are fully capable of independent operation.[/quote]
Submitted on Fri, 2007-07-27 17:04
reply Levels of Warefare?
iron Mike, Gobbledegook!
Offering lessons learned relative to discovering better battlefield tactics as an analogy for eventually discovering a correct theatre strategy, is a bit like offering correction of blocking and tackling techniques for corrections in game strategy. The eventual ‘discovery’ of something useful is all they have in common. Correcting a technique is generally obvious and easier to effect than finding a strategy that will work. The things related are so distant in kind that one wonders why bring it up at all. Far more effective, and meaningful, would have been historical analogies in arriving at successful theatre strategies after a string of failures. The Battle of Borodino gave way to ‘patience and time’ in the vastness of Russia.
Submitted on Fri, 2007-07-27 17:15
reply
Ok...let's try this one more time
Ron, I think this discussion is a distraction from the topic at hand. But my take-away from Dunn's example was that a prima facia "snap-shot" assessment of current battlefield failure may not accurately suggest failure of the strategy driving them. I don't think his point was any deeper than that. Perhaps you are reading too much into his point. [quote]Far more effective, and meaningful, would have been historical analogies in arriving at successful theatre strategies after a string of failures. The Battle of Borodino gave way to ‘patience and time’ in the vastness of Russia.[/quote] Wrong, my friend. You have just confused strategy with "doctrine." Strategy precedes tactics--tactics implement operational warfare. Doctrine is the result of lessons learned.
Submitted on Fri, 2007-07-27 17:49
reply First time second time, whatever!
iron Mike, I agree it's a side show (I did describe it as parenthetical). However, I still find 'gobbledegook' the best description of what you have provided. As Lind would have been better advised to skip the Kasserine Pass paragraph, I think you would have been better advised to just leave the 'parenthetical' where it lay. More to come on your follow up post.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-07-28 00:55
reply Meaningful Victory
iron Mike, [quote]There are a number of authors (including you) with whom I may partially agree. I suppose you can call that “cherry picking” if you want. I see it as synthesizing a position based upon diverse points of view[/quote]. Actually I saw it as an evasion of arguments you chose not to engage. That, however, has now been remedied (at least in part). [quote] I suggest that recent lessons in pragmatism—Iraqis not making a commitment until they are confident of an outcome—suggests that same pragmatism crosses sectarian lines and is not merely a Sunni phenomenon.[/quote]I did not, and do not, suppose that the phenomenon of Al Qaeda rejection would be exclusive to Sunnis, I do believe, however, that the situation vis a vis the Shia is more complex – there are at least two basic (and likely more) sources of contention within the Shia population [You might check out the piece on Anthony Shadid’s Night Draws Near at my blog site.] One critical part of both Burn’s and my own position is that complex overlapping contentions can, and I believe more likely than not, will stand in the way of a simple repetition of the Anbar experience.
P.S. more formatting problems. It appears I can post directly from MS Word, but the opendemocracy window, which honors many Word functions, also programs some paragraph breaks. The version of the text I have after hitting 'preview' is the nearly impenetrable soup we have both seen, and I don't know,as yet, how to inteface to correct the line and paragraph breaks. Apologies all around in advance for any diffculties this may have caused in reading the above. [quote]I just don’t buy the latter part of your argument that a body of Iraqis cannot be recruited into a government force since it does not exist. There is evidence to the contrary. Despite horrendous police and military losses, there seems to be no shortage of recruits. I think there is a lack of training and leadership--pointing out once a gain the mistake of disbanding the armed forces.[/quote] You have separated my assertion from the logic that underlies it. That was in the previous post to the one to which you replied, so I did not think it was necessary to repeat it. Here it is again: “Related to this, but extending arguably more deeply, is something that is all but intractable. No government can be effective if it cannot command civil order/civil peace. What we have to have, in order to obtain anything resembling ‘success’ in Iraq, is an at least marginally representative (and respectable) regime, capable of commanding such coercive force as can assure civil order/civil peace. The body of young Iraqi men from whom such a force will have to be realized, however, identifies as Muslim first, and then as Sunni, Shia and Kurd. The government for whom they will be expected – no required(!) – to fight and die is seen to be little more than an avatar of sectarian division. By and large, before people are ready to fight and die for a government, they have to believe in its worth and capacities.Our hope - a democratic, stable, prosperous, pluralistic Iraq - however infinitely to be desired, is no more than a faint glimmer on a far too distant horizon. Over time these young Iraqis are overwhelmingly likely act out of their strong close identifications as Muslims, Sunni, Shia and Kurd. Identification as Muslim sees us as an alien, i.e. non Islamic, presence, and identification as Sunni, Shia or Kurd leaves them all too likely to become partisan adherents to their respective sides in a civil war. In short, a population of young Iraqis from whom we might recruit the force we need does not exist. Perhaps it did at one time, but that time is long past.” That is the argument in total for the ‘does not exist’ assertion, and I would ask you to address it.[quote]Nor would a repressive government be friendly to the West.[/quote]Egypt? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? Pakistan?And so the matter of ‘Victory’. I take the principle discussion to turn on what would constitute a ‘meaningful’ victory. Sorry but, I judge both yours and Lind’s position to be little more than limiting our losses to an acceptable minimum. It may be the best we can do, but I certainly don’t see Osama bin Laden believing his movement has lost in the encounter. Given the relative positions at the inception of the Iraq War, we have lost and they have gained. The gains of Islamic radicalism have been significant, even if they fail of their greatest ambition.Very early on in this business I concluded that the only thing we could understand as ‘victory’ would be a stable, democratic, pluralistic, prosperous Iraq in a time frame appropriate to significantly diminishing the appeal of Islamic Radicalism within the larger Muslim world. Anything less would be a net victory for Al Qaeda. I understood that we had embarked on a ‘running the table’ effort, and believed any likelihood of success to be very small. As it became clear what the nature of our effort would be, essentially unilateral - alienating old, traditional, and important allies - I concluded the chances for the ‘big stakes’ outcome we would really have to have dropped to virtually zero. The most likely outcome would be a reasonably stable state, neither more or less repressive than surrounding Arab Muslim states, e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. [Exactly what Al Qaeda propaganda would project, and exploit(!)] And all of this was before the administration proceeded to botch, and botch horrendously, nearly all aspects of the post war effort. That, of course served to open all sorts of additional opportunities for Al Qaeda.From the beginning, the administration proclaimed its certainty that the only consequences would be the ones we intended, neglecting the far more likely (not to say obvious) unintended ones all too many others saw. Its current enthusiasm for such as the ‘Anbar accomplishment’ smacks too much of a similarly blinkered understanding of the situation and its possibilities.[quote] I don’t buy the partition plan because I don’t think Turkey will support an independent Kurdistan on its borders. There is LOTS of evidence to support that position.[/quote].You appear to have investigated ‘The Problem’ at my blog site, and I thank you for it. I do not propose a modified partition as anything like a certain answer. It appears to me to offer a better chance than anything else I have seen. If I had to put a probability on it, it would be no higher than 25%. I admit the Kurd vs Turk confrontation would be a very significant problem. I don’t project the partition to be anything like a permanent arrangement. I hope the desire to regain control over the oil and Baghdad will be a magnet to pull Iraq back together. In the meantime, with each entity in a self ordered, stable region - and beginning to prosper(?) – I anticipate strenuous and difficult diplomacy would be brought to bear to keep the situation in hand and on target. I am currently reading Dennis Ross’ Statecraft – eminently worthwhile – and it encourages me that such is possible.
Submitted on Sun, 2007-07-29 01:13
reply
Quote:The body of young
[quote]The body of young Iraqi men from whom such a force will have to be realized, however, identifies as Muslim first, and then as Sunni, Shia and Kurd.[/quote]
I understand your argment better now, but would suggest your contention above is critical to your conclusion. It's also the part with which I disagree. I would suggest young Iraqi men need to identify as Iraqis first, then Muslim, then Sunni, Shi, Kurd, etc. Impossible? Not really--national identity take time and has been generally subverted by sectarian violence. However, iraqi reactions to the recent victory by the iraqi soccer team crossed all sectarian lines with Sunni, Shia, and Kurd celebrating in the streets
[quote]The Iraq team's win dripped with symbolism, not least in the makeup of its front-line strikers: one Kurd, one Shiite, one Sunni.
State television said Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was on the phone in seconds talking to the victors. The dour, hard-line Shiite leader announced only minutes into the game that each team member had been awarded $10,000.
And the leader's office quickly cranked out a note of congratulations:
"There is a big difference between The Lions of the Two Rivers who struggle to put a smile on the faces of their people and those who work in dark corners strewing death and sorrow in the paths of innocent people. We are proud of you. You deserve all our love and respect."[/quote]
I think it's a mistake to overlook the importance of this occasion. This small victory is a glimpse into what is possible in iraq.
This is hope.
IM
PS. No comment on my suggestion for a UAE-modeled partition?
Submitted on Mon, 2007-07-30 12:55
reply IM
[quote=Iron Mike]I did not find your comment disrespectful; merely flippant, shallow and pointless.[/quote]
Goodness, ok then. I probably read too much into your adjective-combo about my first post, but maybe you didn't read enough into mine? :-) [quote=Iron Mike]The problem I have with your plan is you seem to believe in withdrawl and letting the country sink into anarchy; let Darwin sort it out and negotiate with the survivors.[/quote] Yes, actually. That was my 'lets not waste time with minimal forces fighting the dominant social dynamic of those who are fighting for power' plan. Its not a matter of who has the most popular ideas in Iraq that will take over, that would be whomever is the most brutal, as we all know. I dont see how we could change that. USually the people with the best ideas for changes are the least willing to use insane violence to achieve them. I believe that would be the majority. So the views of the people are not represented by the people who are fighting, and due to the nature of a strict socially conservative society, a good person will obey the rules.Its only the people who are willing and have the ability to inflict their own more severe punishment will cause change and currently the ante is set very high, so to speak. I suppose we could find whomever has the best ideas and help them be stronger, (OperationTai Chi..;-)) or use our strength to force the current government to have better ideas and be stronger, but that would involve us being a lot more brutal and far reaching; there isn't any support for that. Btw, please.. no need to respond, I am just trying to clarify why I said what I did earlier.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-07-28 19:47
reply Piling on?
iron Mike, I just watched Bill Moyer's Journal from July 27, 2007. The second half dealt with the current situation in Iraq. Featured were Fawaz a Gerges, he teaches "international affairs and Middle Eastern studies at Sarah Lawrence and is currently a Carnegie scholar and visiting professor at the American University in Cairo"; and Brian Fishman, who "is part of a team at the U.S. Military Academy whose mission is to train young officers who may find themselves up against those Muslim militants. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, where Brian Fishman is a senior associate, does just what its name implies." The transcript is here: http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/transcript4.html?print Between them they present a signficantly different perspective; one that would, seemingly, lead to a far different course of action from that championed by Dunn.
Submitted on Sun, 2007-07-29 22:01
reply formatting
Ron, I believe the < p > is at the beginning of a paragraph, and the < / p > is at the end. (no spaces) You'll see in the preview the 'p code' at the end of a paragraph and one at the beginning of a new paragraph right next to eachother. I imagine that you could add additional paragraphs using that code when editing. There is a code for ' in the preview as well as one for smilies that looks a little bizarre; there are img tags at the beginning and end of that to indicate when it is completed. Incidentally if you want to add someones name to a quote, add an = their name and ] in the first tag. No quotations are needed. I had meant to edit this earlier, but I was unable to access the site immediately after posting this. I think their new security module randomly blocks different ips- temporarily. Buggy business.
Submitted on Mon, 2007-07-30 04:18
reply Formatting
iron Mike, Thanks for the tips, however, when I went to try it in the long post where I complained about the foramtting in a P.S., the edit button had dissappeared! It appears to remain in place on my other posts. Ahh well, Thanks anyway. More later Beating you to the punch a bit, you will undoubtedly urge this Op-Ed in today's NY Times on me: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/opinion/30pollack.html?_r=1&oref=slogin Will comment on it in the 'More later'
Submitted on Mon, 2007-07-30 13:31
reply ronr327
[quote=ronr327]iron Mike,
Thanks for the tips, however, when I went to try it in the long post where I complained about the foramtting in a P.S., the edit button had dissappeared! It appears to remain in place on my other posts.
Ahh well, Thanks anyway.[/quote]
You're welcome, Iron Mike.. I mean Ronr :-)
Submitted on Fri, 2007-08-03 15:06
reply The body of young men
iron Mike, [quote]I understand your argment better now, but would suggest your contention above is critical to your conclusion.[/quote] Well, Yes! [quote]I would suggest young Iraqi men need to identify as Iraqis first, then Muslim, then Sunni, Shi, Kurd, etc. Impossible? [/quote] Iraqis first - Agreed! I cannot contend that it is impossible for individual Iraqis to identify with Iraq first, or that it is impossible that a genuine sentiment exits in Iraq for 'Iraq' per se - In fact, I expect it does. My contention is that it is impossible for a substantial body of Iraqi young men with such an identification to exist. To begin with, they see no goverment that credibly expresses that identification. Then, I asserted as far back as the first Iraqi elections in 2005 that far stronger, more immediate identifications as Muslim, Sunni, Shia and Kurd will dominate the counsciousness out of which the people of Iraq, and especially its young men, would act. That has proven to be the reality, as the sad evolution of events from then to now attests. The Hanlon/Pollack NY Times Op-ED of July 30,2007 has been assailed in liberal blogs on the grounds that its authors have been all too enthusiastic (and wrong!) very many times in the past in re the course of occupation in Iraq. A past record of poor analysis does not guarantee they are wrong this time, but it should certainly lead to reservations. My own contention is that, where the 'local' situation involves tightly interwoven factions, outcomes will be determined by overlapping and shifting alliances that will not necessarily lead to stability. I will admit there are more hopeful elements present now than has been true for a long, long time. I will not concede, however, that we are anywhere near 'blue skies, pretty balloons and straight on to morning'. To their credit, Hanlon/Pollack do not support 'counting our chickens before they're hatched'. That will be the line I am certain Bush et al, abetted by their trusty right wing media megaphone, will aggressively urge upon us in the wake of the Op-Ed. I still contend the absence of any entity that effectively embodies 'IRAQ' is fatal in the short term. Any governance must be able to deliver civil order/civil peace. Any unitary Iraqi governance, in this reality, will need to command such coercive force as will assure civil order/civil peace and, for reasons already given, such a force cannot now be assembled. Such 'integration' as Hanlon/Pollack report has yet to be proven over time, or tried in the fires of sharp internecine conflict. The reality Hanlon/Pollack describe as emerging, I am afraid, is all too likely to amount to a hatchery for new Iraqi strongmen.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-08-04 12:06
reply
Outstanding article!
OK...I admit it. You beat me to the punch with the Hanlon/Pollack article. While the news is good, I found it more extraordainary that two writers from the Brookings Institute wrote such a hopeful article and no less than the New York Times published it! The devil must be ice-skating, because hell has clearly frozen over. It will be interesting to see how the Bush administration communicates the message. I share your caution, but I'm more hopeful this suggests a potential course change in Iraq. Hanlon/Pollack still describe the fragile security situation in Iraq as "grave" and I concur. [quote] I still contend the absence of any entity that effectively embodies 'IRAQ' is fatal in the short term. Any governance must be able to deliver civil order/civil peace. Any unitary Iraqi governance, in this reality, will need to command such coercive force as will assure civil order/civil peace and, for reasons already given, such a force cannot now be assembled.[/quote] Fully concur....right up to the last line. In the absence of a strong central authority, young men are likely to identify with sect and tribe first. Reactions to the Iraqi soccer victory and examples of multi-sectarian cooperation in the H/P article suggest that pool of young men willing to commit to a sovereign Iraq might be larger and closer than you think. What are you...a glass half-empty kind of guy?
IM
Submitted on Tue, 2007-07-31 12:04
reply Half full/Half empty
irin Mike, [quote]In the absence of a strong central authority, young men are likely to identify with sect and tribe first.[/quote] More or less, that's what I have been arguing. [quote]What are you...a glass half-empty kind of guy?[/quote] I am generally optimistic, as I expect most Americans tend to be. [Leading to no little gnashing of teeth by our European confreres] Although I felt the war was strategically a disaster, and we had little chance to pull off the outcome we would 'have to have', I confess, in the early days after the statue came down, to some hope that 'good old American know how', and improvisations by some good professionals on the ground, might pull at least some irons from the fire, limiting the damage. Unfortunately . . . . . . I see the level of liquid in that glass at about 1/8th, up just a tick from where it was before the 'Anbar turnaround'.
Submitted on Tue, 2007-07-31 18:32
reply Once more into the breach
iron Mike, Here's a reply to Hanlon/Pollack. It is from Chris Durnang in the Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-durang/war-correspondent-respond_b_58769.html This is a link to the Anderson Cooper interview with Michael Ware that Durang references ( the relevent portion is about half way down the page): http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0707/31/acd.01.html Here is a sample: [quote]On the other hand, we have got Michael Ware, who has been there in Baghdad and all across Iraq almost nonstop since the fighting began. Right now, he's embedded with American forces in Diyala Province, coming to us through a nightscope camera. Because of the danger there, they're not allowed to turn on any camera lights. Michael, you just heard the vice president saying he expects General Petraeus to report significant progress when he gives his assessment come September. I'm afraid it is all rather more in my camp than yours. Not a good thing, but in line with my dreary expectations.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-08-04 03:15
reply hint #2
oh man..dissed twice by the ronr327. ANd I ask myself why do I slave over a hot stove daily for this treatment? I work and I work some more..its not like I have the time to help people with their formatting problems.. Sure the kids werent too disappointed when their dinnner was overcooked, due to mom spending some extra time on the computer.. Heck they understand. They were even ok with mom spending the movie money on some fast food. I didnt mind driving out of town, really.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-08-04 05:26
reply Dissed?
Candace,
Am I missing something?
iron Mike,
So help me, I didn't repost 'The body of young men'. Have no idea what is going on.
Submitted on Sat, 2007-08-04 13:54
reply Oh you are just kidding me.
Oh you are just kidding me. Let's see..scroll up to to my post called formatting. On your double post, its probably one that you had tried to post before but didnt go through. Gawd, I hope that isnt a new trend here; I had quite a few of those.
Submitted on Sun, 2007-08-05 01:15
reply
Candace and Ron
Geez...thanks Ron for acknowledging Candace's contribution. I surely don't want her kids to starve further! I probably should have corrected Ron when he mistook the formatting suggestions as coming from me, but in the heat of argument, my focus was on the issue, not the formatting. Mea Culpa!
Submitted on Mon, 2007-08-06 14:21
reply The Sargeants Speak
iron Mike, Check out this from today's New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print It is by a group of seven sargeants serving in Iraq. Sadly, it reflects my pessimistic view of the of the current reality more than the optimistic one at the top of this thread. A sample: [quote]. . . . .Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias. . . . . creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. [/quote]Overall the article offers important insights and is brilliantly argued. That these Non-Coms are capable of producing such should be a source of immense pride and a ringing affirmation that 'average' Americans can be responsible - and probingly thoughtful - citizens as well as, and even before, they are soldiers. Citizen soldiers in the finest and most constructive sense. Score one for Democracy!
Submitted on Mon, 2007-08-20 13:58
reply
Interesting Article
Ron, Very thoughtful and well written article that speaks well of the quality of our NCO corp. The educational level, integrity, and professionalism displayed by these citizen-soldiers undermines the frequently heard argument of the military as the employer of last resort for those whose economic birthright leaves them few options. Having said that, I also might suggest their tactical perspective (ground truth on the battlefield) is like viewing the larger war through a straw. It's a limited perspective at best, and flawed at worst. Their observations are true to them, but these truths may not generalize to the entire AOR. Few NCOs at their ranks have direct knowledge of senior officer thought processes. P.S. How did you manage to insert a hyperlink?
Submitted on Mon, 2007-08-20 18:52
reply
Another Democrat convert!
Yet another Democrat acknowledges success of the surge. [quote]The Olympian U.S. Rep. Brian Baird said Thursday that his recent trip to Iraq convinced him the military needs more time in the region, and that a hasty pullout would cause chaos that helps Iran and harms U.S. security. We have a responsibility to the Iraqi people and a strategic interest in making this work." Baird, a five-term Democrat, voted against President Bush ordering the Iraq invasion — at a time when he was in a minority in Congress and at risk of alienating voters. He returned late Tuesday from a trip that included stops in Israel, Jordan and Iraq, where he met troops, U.S. advisers and Iraqis, whose stories have convinced him that U.S. troops must stay longer. With Congress poised next month to look at U.S. progress in Iraq and a vote looming on U.S. funding for the war, Baird said he's inclined to seek a continued U.S. presence in Iraq beyond what many impatient Americans want. He also expects Gen. David Petraeus, who oversees U.S. troops in Iraq, to seek a redeployment of forces. "People may be upset. I wish I didn't have to say this," Baird said. He added that the United States needs to continue with its military troops surge "at least into early next year, then engage in a gradual redeployment. … I know it's going to cost hundreds of American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars." It was Baird's fifth trip to the Middle East, and he conceded that what he has learned has put him again in an unpopular position with some voters. He no longer thinks partitioning Iraq into Sunni, Shiite and Kurd sections is possible, for instance; no one he spoke to in Israel, Jordan, Palestinian cities or Iraq liked the idea, he added. Baird said he would not say this if he didn't believe two things: • "One, I think we're making real progress." • "Secondly, I think the consequences of pulling back precipitously would be potentially catastrophic for the Iraqi people themselves, to whom we have a tremendous responsibility … and in the long run chaotic for the region as a whole and for our own security."[/quote]
Frankly, I'm most intrigued by his conclusion that a segregated Iraq is no longer a workable plan. That represents a significant change.
Submitted on Tue, 2007-08-21 02:10
reply Post new comment |
Boring and enraging Liberals with the truth since 2004