One assumes this is what Pius XII told German Catholics in the 1930s. He didn't ? Must have been a moral coward then. 

In reference to the present Catechism, would be somewhat speculative since Pius XII died in 1958 whereas the current edition of the Catechism from which I have quoted was not published until 1992. 

Cambrensis

WJC;

Using the Pope's criteria, the Vatican, as well as the UN, must have approved Saddam's overthrow.

1)Violation of Fundamental Rights: It is no secret that Saddam massacred his fellow Iraqis from the day he seized power. 300,000 graves uncovered since 2003 would attest to that as well as the suffering of the Kurds.

2)Options Exhausted: Saddam refused to fulfill UN mandates following the first Gulf War in l991 up to the invasion in 2003. For suspicious reasons, the UN did fail to authorize this invasion, but they did not oppose it either. They have authorized coalition efforts to stabilize the country every year since. The elected Iraqi government has approved the mandate every year also.

3) Resistance Provoking Disorder: A combination of Al Qaeda, Syrian, Iran, criminal and sectarian elements have provoked violence in Iraq since Saddam's fall. The US has tried to establish stability.

4)Hope of Success: There was every expectation of success following Saddam's outster. The influences in paragraph 3) were unexpected elements.

5) Foreseeing Better Solutions: No one can predict the future. For Example, the latest events in Iraq may end in a peaceful outcome for the country. I hope they do. Don't you?

WJC; You're a confusing guy. On one post you approve the actions of the UN when they include violators of human rights on the Human Rights Council. On this post you criticize the US for staying within a UN mandate to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. That mandate did not extend to invading Iraq. Criticizing George Bush for staying within the mandate brings up an interesting question. Since you're saying the first coaltion should have toppled Saddam in 1991, why oppose the same action in 2003? We didn't invade Irag in 1991 because of the "Wrong kind of Moslems"? How about the wrong kind of UN mandate instead? Success depends on the "Support of Indigenous Populations"? What kind of support are you talking about? 100 percent of the population, 99 percent...? The vast majority of Iraqis danced in the streets when Saddam fell. We saw it on television. It took only a small number of Iraqis (and outside agitators) to create the anarchy of the last several years. If the vast majority of Iraqis had really wanted to eject the small coalition presence in Iraq, they could have done it years ago. Based on the latest news, insurgent groups are coming around to the supposed puppet government in Baghdad. Who are you to criticize that? "Puppet Government" Gee, I guess the millions of votes cast in three elections across Iraq in 2005 didn't meet with your approval. What a shame. "Luckless deaths"? At who's hands? The Iraqis have been the victims of sectarian violence created by their own people and outside elements like al Qaeda, Iran and Syria. Don't believe the nonsense coming from hacks like those at The Lancet. "Smash and grab raid by one country..."? Which country is that? US, Britain, Italy, Spain, Australia, Japan...? What cut does the UN get for authorizing the coalition presence every year? "The Outcome in Iraq"? Are we suppose to consider your outcome over everyone else's? "Justification"? The justification will come when Iraq is democratic and at peace. Based on the big drop in violence of the last several months, that may be soon. I hope so, don't you?

The above greeting sums you up nicely.

The view of Rabinder Singh, QC and Charlotte Kilroy regarding the legality of the US-led invasion of Iraq are now generally accepted to be an accurate statement of the law; that resolution 1441 did not authorise the use of force in the event that Iraq failed to comply with its terms. Their opinion states as follows:

Firstly, resolution 1441 did not expressly authorise "coalition" member States to use force. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council over the years, including resolution 678, show that the language used to authorise force is bold and consistent. Member states are ‘authorised’ to ‘use all necessary means’ or ‘take all necessary measures’ in pursuit of a specified goal.  These words were absent from Resolution 1441.

Secondly, as a matter of principle, international law precluded member states from relying on any implied authorisation to use force. The prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is one of the most fundamental principles in the Charter. Member states may only derogate from that prohibition in self-defence or following an authorisation from the Security Council to use force made under Chapter VII of the Charter. The fundamental nature of the prohibition against the use of force means that if a resolution is ambiguous on the question of whether force is authorised, then it should be assumed that force is not authorised.  Furthermore the power given to the Security Council alone under Chapter VII to decide to use force to restore peace is intended to ensure that any decisions on the use of force are reached collectively. Article 1 of the Charter which sets out the Purposes of the UN makes it clear that collective measures are all that is envisaged by the Charter. Use of force without clear collective authorisation (as in this case) was therefore in conflict with the fundamental principles of the Charter and in violation of international law.

Thirdly, even if implied authorisation to use force were permissible under international law, resolution 1441 did not contain any such an implied authorisation. The wording and scheme of resolution 1441 and the discussions leading up to its adoption make it abundantly clear that any decision on the actions to be taken in the event of breach of resolution 1441 by Iraq was to be taken by the Security Council. Paragraphs 4 and 11 provided that, in the event of false statements or omissions in Iraq’s weapons declaration or non-compliance with its disarmament obligations, either UNMOVIC or the IAEA would make a report to the Security Council. Paragraph 12 of Resolution 1441 provided as follows: "[The Security Council] Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security”.This therefore contemplated that the Security Council, not member states acting unilaterally, were to decide on any further action to be taken against Iraq in the event of any non-compliance by Iraq with its obligations under Resolution 1441. In other words Resolution 1441 did not set out what will happen if it was breached, but left it to the Security Council to decide. Use of the word ‘serious consequences’ in paragraph 13 of resolution 1441 did not amount to an authorisation to member states to use force. Paragraph 13 of resolution 1441 stated that the Security Council “Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”

The words ‘in that context’, clearly indicated that any serious consequences which Iraq was to face was to have been decided upon in the context of the discussion by the Security Council envisaged by paragraph 12 of resolution 1441.  In any event, this paragraph did not itself warn of serious consequences but was a reference to warnings made on previous occasions which this part of the resolution “recalls”.   

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The UN Human Rights Committee consists of 18 independent experts "of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights". They are elected for a term of four years by member States and serve in their personal capacity (not as representatives of the countries that may have nominated them).

A typical example of the calibre of committee members is Rafael Rivas Posada, the present Chair.

He has a doctorate in Law and Political Science (1956) of the Universidad Nacional, Faculty of Law, Santafé de Bogotá. He also completed other postgraduate studies at the Institute of Comparative Law at the Université de Paris (1956-1958) the Institute for Social Studies at The Hague (1961-1963) and a further PhD at Princeton University (1965-1968).

He served as a district Judge at Utica in Colombia (1955-1956) and became Minister of Public Finance, Bogotá in 1958. He was then Attorney General of the Province of Cundinamarca, Colombia (1958-1960).

He was then a Professor at Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (ESAP), Bogotá (1963-1965) and Professor at Universidad del Valle ( Cali , Colombia ) (1965-1970). He served concurrently as Head of the Political Science Department, Universidad del Valle (1968-1969) until appointed Dean of the Department of Economic and Social Science, Universidad del Valle in 1970. He became Dean of the Department of Arts and Sciences, Universidad de Los Andes (Bogotá) (1970-1971), Professor at Universidad de Los Andes (1970-1975).,Head of the  Universidad de Los Andes (1982-1985) and Director of the Center for International Studies, Universidad de Los Andes (1996-1997).  

Between 1971 and 1975 he was in private practice as a lawyer in Bogota. In 1975 he was appointed National Coordinator of the UNDP/UNESCO Programme for Colombia. He then served as Colombia’s Minister of National Education (1977-1978). He was then appointed as a Member of the Peace Commission of the Colombian Government (1982-1985).

Between 1975 and 1977, he was Deputy Ambassador for Colombia to the United Nations, New York and during 1976 was appointed Vice-President if the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at New York.

He was at the same time also Vice-President of the Economic and Social Council. President of the Social Committee and the Economic Committee of the Council and from 1976-1977, Chairman of the Ad-hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices, United Nations. In 1978, he was appointed President of the Intergovernmental Conference of UNESCO on Cultural Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean at Bogotá as well as Chief of the Colombian delegation to the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, devoted to disarmament, New York.

He was Regional Coordinator of UNESCO for Latin America and the Caribbean , Caracas, Venezuela (1979-1981), Colombia’s Delegate to the World Conference on Culture, organized by UNESCO, Mexico in 1982 and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the study of the human rights situation in Uruguay between 1982 and 1985.

Between 1986 and 1988 he served as Colombian Ambassador to Belgium , Luxembourg and the European Communities, Brussels. He was a Member of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Geneva (1988-1991), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Colombia at the United Nations Office and other international bodies based in Geneva (1989-1991), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights situation in Cuba (1991-1992), Member of the Consultative Group of International Experts for the International Committee of the Red Cross (1992-1995), Commissioner member for Panel “A” on the study of reparations concerning the Gulf War, UN Compensation Commission, Geneva (1994-1996) and is also presently a Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Ivan Shearer, the Deputy Chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee has been a member of the committee since 2001. He is Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Sydney, Australia, is President of the Australian branch of the International Law Association and has been a Member of the Panel of Arbitrators at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague since 1986.

Professor Shearer is a distinguished teacher, scholar and practitioner of human rights law specifically and international law generally. He has served as a Judge ad hoc in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and formerly occupied the prestigious Challis Chair of International Law at the University of Sydney (1982-1990). He was the International Law Adviser to the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho under the UN Development Programme (1971-1973) and was a member of the Lesotho delegation to various UN conferences.

Professor Shearer's special fields of interest are human rights law, the law of armed conflict (including international humanitarian law), international criminal law (including extradition law) and the law of the sea. In April 2004, he presented seminars on the reporting obligations of states parties to international human rights instruments to the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and was also a lecturer on human rights for visiting government legal officers from Vietnam , Bangladesh and China sponsored by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) in 1998 and1999.

Cambrensis