This thread is for debate on options G and H:
G.
- All state and non-state funding to be pooled into a "democracy
capital fund". Parties, candidates and others - i.e., ngos etc - could
then bid for funds, in relation to specific activities. - Donations and/or membership/affiliation fees may be from either corporate and/or individual sources, but all go to the fund.
- Political activities at both constituency and national level to be
under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities,
ads etc, banned).
H.
- State funding to be in kind only: party political broadcasts,
election leaflets, occasional newspaper advertisements, all-party
round-table debates, etc., such activities being more common at
election times. - Donations/membership fees to parties/candidates to be from individuals only.
- Political activities at both constituency and national level to be
under tighter controls, both fiscal and functional (certain activities,
ads etc, banned).
H seems the best option presented. I began with the premise of "what should the state's involvement be?" Having concluded that not to give an equal footing for parties in (for example) broadcast would be imprudent, but that to provide any kind of state funding in money would be against the whole principle of parties as private concerns, this made H the natural choice.
If it then came to a debate between the other two extremes - that is to say, state funding or not, I would err towards no state funding, precisely for the reasons already given - that parties should remain separate to the state.
One query I would have is whether it is necessary to ban corporate funding under option H? Surely if there is stricter policing for constituency and party concerns, and there is a cap imposed on individual levels, something similar can be done for corporations?
{Ed. You're right. Are you suggesting another option, namely H with corporate funding? Peter Emerson.}
To Peter on the proposed alternative to Option H - yes that would be exactly what I have in mind. Will probably doom the option to non support, but best captures my own position!
1. I continue to question whether the origintaing premise of the status quo of parties rather than individuals is valid. If we look to the roots of democracy in Greece and why and how we have got to where we are today we should question whether the drivers for the party system are still there.
2. Both G and H are flawed either because are not clearly defined (scope, purpose and arbitration of NGO bids in G) or they contain contradictions - ads and no ads in H.
3. In general terms accepting corporate or variable individual will always be the route to buying influence and thus, corruption. As we have seen recently, third party donations can always be disguised albeit that those involved of late have not been clever enough to make the process work so as to remain hidden.
4. Because it recognises the need to pool and then redistribute funds (although the method for determining how much and to whom is not specified) G is more likely to frustate corruption than H so is surely to be preferred. However, who is to be the arbiter of determing the validity of NGO bids for money. I believe this will introduce a complexity, and thus an opportunity for abuse through influence, so should be dropped.
5. G is my choice here.
{Ed. Yes, you're right on point 2: there is indeed a bit of a contradiction in H viz-a-viz ads. Apologies. Peter Emerson.}
State funding does equate to the State 'owning' the parties. State funding equates only to the State collecting and accounting for the funding which it then redistributes in accordance with a rule-set determined through the sort of debate we are having now. The distribution could be overseen by a body totally independent from the State. Benefitting politicians would be under no obligation to the State so independence therefrom would be preserved. Removing corporate and unequal private funding moves politics out of the arena of buying favours and into the arena of the success of reasoned logical debate on the best course of action for UK Ltd as a whole to treat a particular proiblem.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that funding goes directly to "Election UK Ltd." and then distributed accordingly ... so technically it is an organ outside political control and influence?
To address this, I would counter firstly that:
1) It doesn't change the fact that political parties (by which I mean the wider party apparatus, and not just the narrow definition of elected representatives) are private independent bodies, privately owned, and that therefore they should be privately funded, based on the local willingness to pay contributions to that party.
2) Can the appointing body be truly independent? For one thing, it will be ultimately subject to whatever legislative restrictions Parliament imposes - say for example, Parliament imposes a threshold of 20 seats before parties can access a higher band of funding - you immediately doom smaller parties to a capped budget (regardless of public support) and the independent body can do nothing.
...is really interesting, but who would evaluate the 'bids'?
Plans G and H have a lot of merits, and would (and do) work well in places like Switzerland and Scandinavia. My only worry is that of excessive government involvement and the problems that it would pose. Would the involving the state in paying for and organizing leafletting etc. be a good idea? It would probably mean the founding of new departments and hiring of many new employees, largely needlessly when money could be donated to parties and candidates who would then be charged with executing their own campaign. Similarly, I reject plan G because I think that it could lead to patronism in that sense that a government body would get to decide who gets money from the 'democracy fund'. That seems destined for bias and scandal.
... seems to me to be a crucial flaw for G, although as he says it's really interesting. I'm deeply uncomfortable with the idea of some body having monopoly control of all funding for political activity. John Swainson's answer doesn't really convince me - it doesn't sound like "bidding for funds" as I understand it, and politicians may be independent of the state but they're totally dependent on the distributing body (surely a tempting target for corruption?).
I suppose H also implies some body determining the allocation of the state's in-kind contributions; I assume that's meant to be based on very transparent rules like "every party gets the same", and at least in that option parties do have some recourse to other funds. I could support that.
I, having written the long answer Max H crystallised the problem - as I saw it with bids. I didn't provide an answer on bidding for funds because I don't have one either. My comment related to the problem, not the solution. If we expand the scope of the funding issue beyond electioneering to embrace day to day party activities such as research we have a whole new ballpark because, for instance, the cost of research is broadly constant so we need a fair mechanism to award small parties similar sums for research activities to the big parties?
hmm yeah i think these 2 are better than AtoF - i really like the idea of G, but cannot quite see a solution to the issue about who would allocate funding. H is good in it restrictiveness on the means parties can use, although I think you would need good controls on individual contributions to stop it becoming a situation where the parties that represented the rich were the only ones getting any funding.
I found the Pooled Fund and In Kind Only ideas interesting. What happens when you combine them? Funds are raised from participating parties, candidates and others, and the government. Instead of bidding for funds, the fund is used for specific activities engaged in by all. Thus, if ten candidates stood in one constituency, ten would be invited to take part in a broadcast, ten leaflets distributed, etc.
This would benefit small, new parties, which seems to be a principle worth aiming for among others, though I have reservations about it. Proliferation of waste paper from posters and leaflets, already a problem, would increase with the emergence of each new candidate. Radio and TV stations would have trouble interviewing, say, 50 candidates, and electors would have trouble considering the issues.
Both G and H refer to tighter controls, which could be conducive to greater equality of participation. These might have to include a ban on broadcasting and leafletting for the above reasons. That could leave the internet as the main or only source of information on candidates; this could have both advantages and disadvantages.
G is the best option to my point of view.
The only real problem is ensuring the fair distribution of funds. It may be impossible to be totally fair. Whatever is done, somebody will think they are hard done by. The distributing authority needs to have strong powers and to be totally independent of government.
This is my favourite option.
I like the idea of a central collector of funds and controls on where the money can be spent, but again, there would need to be consensus on this point and a highly respected arbiter. Such a person seems ever harder to produce. How despairing that sounds!
H has some appeal, but it might prove to be administratively unwieldy. Do you have to apply for paper clips and pens?
The idea of payment only in kind has the air of treating people like children and taking away all elements of choice and discretion. Requiring a strict accounting for the use of funds with a legal penalty for misuse might focus the mind more clearly.
G-first bullet point- what motivation would anyone have to donate or pay a membership fee, etc. (as envisaged in the second bullet point), if it would go not to the party or project they wanted to support but be allocated by a state body (a lottery without prizes), possibly for something the donor was totally opposed to, and what is the intended/envisaged extent of the impact upon NGOs, given the stipulative assumption that linked (or rather merely "sympathetic") bodies such as trade unions and thank-tanks would be similarly liable to this regime, presumably according to iv), for "political" activities? In imagined practice, this seems a State funding only option. What proportionate justification could there be for so dramatic a restriction, if not deprivation, of existing freedoms -no political activity without State permission and funding? Is confiscation of existing assets envisaged? And what about commercial lobbyists? Are they left unaffected, to flourish even more?
John Swainson rightly raises the issue of who would be the putatively non-political allocators of this funding,? Then, on what neutral or even rational criteria could funding for which the BNP, the Greens, Sinn Fein, the DUP, the Cornish Nationalists, the Monster Raving Loony Party, the Tories, Labour,etc., etc., let alone a raft of prospective new parties that might arise, would be all equally eligible to apply for be allocated?
On H, I'm slightly surprised that a contradiction should be conceded, about ads; there is none between including ads as among the uses to which State funding would be newly limited, and envisaging that there would be new restrictions upon ads, surely, reading "certain" as qualifying "ads" as well as "activities"? That is how I originally took it. This seems a fairly minor example of much work of disambiguation and defining needs to be done before the voting can begin.
Surely the problem with G is that individuals and (especially) corporations don't donate to the political process as a whole but to one party. Might the effect of a pooling system - which sounds good in theory - actually be to reduce donations? Or for donors to devise other ways of supporting parties that wouldn't count e.g. use of premises? or to try to get round the rules?
I don't support H either because I think organisations need to be given the opportunity to donate as long as details of their donations are available to the public. So actually I support A.
Banning corporations and corporate representatives from funding political parties (and closing the loopholes) must be the number one priority of anyone seriously wanting to see the emergence of true Democracy in this country.
I believe H is the 'most democratic' option although it, like all the other options, is very much 'inside the box' in terms of generating radical alternatives to the elitist shambles that governs today.
I used to believe that state funding per vote cast was the answer to
a lot of this, but the problem with this is that it benefits certain
candidates disproportionately:
Those candidates that can have
their campaigns funded 'up front' by parties or corporations, or who
can get parties or corporations to cover the risk of a low vote and a
low payment, have a big advantage over individuals who may literally
risk their house for a cause they believe in, only to be blown away by
well-funded campaigns by other candidates with richer friends who can
cover the risk of a low vote.
The answer has to be H, state funding for reaching and involving
the electorate, whether by public debates with tea and coffee, colour
leaflets, webcasts, electoral TV broadcasts, the use of schools
and public buildings for meetings in between elections.
<>Currently many public venues are banned to political parties.
I liked Mary Taylor's concept of a combined G + H option. Using the money for a pooled 'in kind only' fund would negate my objection to corporate funding (although it would also negate any advantages for corporations to bother offering donations so its probably a moot point whether they're allowed to or not).
Measures which benefit newer smaller parties should be a primary goal for changes to the current system, since the current system suffers from a lack of credible alternatives to the converging major parties.
I would like to see the process by which candidates for election are severely restricted on the costs and length of time spent on canvassing. so i would like to have all expenses curtailed and all contributions made public. I think options under H most fulfil these.
i am totally opposed to both state funding and individual funding. all income should be derived from membership fees only which should be capped to prevent a few individuals trying to get around the rules.
according to wikipedia the tories have 290,000 members, labour 200,000 (tho' another site suggested this had fallen to 150,000) and the libdems 70,000.
multiplying this by their membership fees they have incomes of:
tories: £7,250,000
labour: at least £1,800,000 (150k x min.fee of £12)
libdems: at least £700,000 (70k x min.fee of £10)
this would mean no-one could spend more than £700k/yr though i would have no objection to lowering this even further, the libdems were simply a convenient example. i can see the 2 bigger parties objecting to even lower limits however as it reduces their chances of "spinning" us into submission.
the question is, why do they need to spend money "getting their message across" at all? all they need is enough to set up a website with their policies clearly displayed which would cost them just a few hundred pounds a year.
as for the excess income they receive, they could either spend it on research (but it would have to be monitored to ensure they weren't using that to influence voters' opinions) or reduced by reducing membership fees or even given to charity :)
perhaps if we all join forces we can convince jon bright to put in an option N to limit funding to membership fees only?
G is still my favourite idea. The obvious problem is, of course, who distributes the cash? How about a touch of Athenian democracy - appoint commissioners by lot for each funding round and let the general public decide? The key criterion for allocating funds would simply be to give money to projects that support the quality of British democracy.
Notwithstanding the complications that go with it, option G is the only one that seems much of an advance on how things are at present, and it takes account of the complex interplay of politics and civil society. Without getting starry-eyed about it, strengthening civil society goes hand in glove with raising political standards. Like some other people, I'm struggling with the idea of parties & ngos bidding for the funds, but wonder if it'll help if there two funding pots - one national, the other at constituency level - and bids are were voted on at the same time as national or local elections ... only parties and major ngos being allowed to bid for national funding, and only local groups/r ngos being allowed to bid locally.
G seems the most interesting option as it represents the biggest departure from the current style of business-as-usual. The problem of how such a fund would be huge, but could it itself be part of the opening up of the political process G aims to encourage, with local electoral commissions obliged to explain their decisions regularly? Another problem would be that, if individual, corporate and organizational contributors are being asked to pay in towards the political process in general rather than their own preferred option, it is quite likely that money from these sources will be reduced or gradually dry up, so the percentage of state funding could increase by inertia. Even so, I still think G is worth developing further.
...I could support. I agree with above posters that G is the only option that really 'moves civil society on' in the sense of offering a radical but realistic departure from current methods of funding, and recognising that money is just another form of power.
There appears to be two options in answer to how funding is allocated:
1) We clean up our collective act around corruption so that the public can have confidence in an independent body. This seems a bit pie in the sky.
2) The funds used are allocated to specific activities that offer an equal voice to all candidates - the control of money (and therefore its power) is neutralised between parties. In reality, this could be achieved by offering funding for each party to: run a website, have an equal number of ads at similar times (if people feel that parties should be allowed this), produce a certain number of leaflets, attend local hustings etc.
The second option raises the question of why people would pay membership fees for parties. But the level of spending would not need to be high so the membership fees could be supplemented by state funding if necessary.