Senior pundits are moving from talking about how to prevent civil war in Iraq to talking about how to manage civil war in Iraq...
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack for Brookings:
http://tinyurl.com/2njmlh
James Fearon in Foreign Affairs:
http://tinyurl.com/yqf62m
The Brookings piece is long, but even the summary is worth reading. The FA piece is manageable. Both are worth a look.
This comment from Fearon interested me:
As in Lebanon, there will probably be a good deal of intervention by neighboring states -- especially Iran -- but it will not necessarily bring them great strategic gains. To the contrary, it may bring them a great deal of grief, just as it has the United States.
I suspect that this is true. It's often assumed that a US withdrawal would leave Iran in a dominant position in Iraq, but that's debatable. They may try to swallow the place, but it's quite likely that they'll choke on it.
Steven,
My apologies, but we had something of a civil war on the original thread, and I think we demolished any momentum you were generating about this topic.
First off, let me say thanks for posting these links. I finally finished reading the Brookings piece (140 pages of intensely interesting material that absorbed my free time for three days) but am still getting around to reading the other.
If anyone has the desire to inform themselves about what we may be facing in Iraq over the next decade, I can't think of a better place to start. The Brookings piece (the first link) goes into great detail about past civil wars and creates a profound degree of perspective. There is a hefty concentration on the Lebanese civil war, the actors involved, their ambitions in the region, and the effects of the spillover from the war on their countries. All of these players are still active today, and their motivations have not changed. We should thus expect more of the same.
The piece took my understanding of the Syrian situation to another plane, and I now have a better understanding of what motivates the Assad regime. As presented in the study, their intentions are not necessarily dangerous. A better understanding of Syrian interests might go a long way in helping America work with the Syrians in the region. If there is going to be a massive civil war in the region, then we are going to have to start working with some states that we would prefer not to.
The overall picture is bleak, but it is somehow reassuring to know that someone out there is studying the situation in such detail. I can't exactly agree with the recommendations of the authors on how to contain the civil war, but I think the overall study is the foundation for some better ideas.
we had something of a civil war on the original thread
That's become the a normal circumstance on OD; wouldn't be so bad if the civil war was occasionally fought with more sophisticated weapons. It usually seems on the clubs-and-spears level, which is not terribly attractive.
I can't exactly agree with the recommendations of the authors on how to contain the civil war, but I think the overall study is the foundation for some better ideas.
I would say the same; these items are a starting point, not the last word. There's actually quite a bit of intelligent analysis and discussion going on out there, though you wouldn't know it from looking at the partisan civil wars, which tend to dominate by virtue of volume, not quality.
Jay,
Since the Iranians are Persian and not Arab, it would not be surprising if sectarian groups in Iraq would thank Iran for weapons and then tell them to keep off the sand dunes.
Tt,
Since the Iranians are Persian and not Arab, it would not be surprising if sectarian groups in Iraq would thank Iran for weapons and then tell them to keep off the sand dunes.
This is entirely true. You shouldn't judge a group by who they accept aid from. This, for me, was one of the most frustrating aspects of American policy during the cold war. If a group accepted money and weapons from the USSR, they immediately became enemies of Washington. In reality, the acceptance of aid from communists didn't prove they were communists as much as it proved they were savvy and resourceful.
As most current and former world powers have learned, you can never count on your proxies to do your bidding, no matter how much they are indebted to you. Iran is a regional power looking to spread its influence. It may be quite fortunate for those opposed to the Iranian regime or at least its foreign policy that Iran has become so ambitious lately. The country is run by theologians who apparently lack the terrestrial sense of urgency required to right the faltering economy, and who are instead concentrating on spreading Iranian-style revolution in the middle east whilst the revolution rots from within due to some very ungodly economic mismanagement.
Perhaps we should applaud Iran squandering its resources on Shi'ite militant factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi, and whereever else until the cost of empire eventually bankrupts them.
Jay,
"If a group accepted money and weapons from the USSR, they immediately became enemies of Washington"?
With good reason. They used those weapons to invade our friends. South Korea and Vietnam are two examples. China fell to the Reds with Russian guns.
Exactly how many non-communsts do you think Russia supported militarily?
Iran is spreading revolution while ignoring their economy?
Here is an interesting thought. Doesn't the current situation in Iran parallel Russia after their revolution? Many in the victorious communist party wanted to export revolution, especially Trotsky.
They didn't want to waste their valuable time with something as mundane as the economy and government function, so they left that to a party hack named Stalin.
By the time party leaders realized their mistake, Stalin had placed his own lackeys in control of the government and the party. He wiped them out along with millions more.
Could Ahmajenidad be a new Stalin? A party hack gaining control of the government and the bomb?
