Tom Griffin (London, OK):In the wake of the Glasgow East by-election, commentators such as Iain MacWhirter, Peter Oborne and Simon Jenkins, have been examining the prospect of Scottish independence with increasing seriousness.
The Constitution Unit's Professor Robert Hazell provides a useful counterpoint over at Comment is Free. He suggests that there are four major obstacles the SNP must overcome to achieve its goal.
- Winning a vote in the Scottish Parliament authorising a referendum.
- Winning a referendum to authorise independence negotiations.
- Negotiating terms with the British Government and with the European Union.
- Winning a second referendum on the agreed terms.
The final hurdle is Hazell's most distinctive contribution, as Guy Aitchison noted back in May, and may be the most contentious. Some might equate insisting on a second referendum with a eurocrat-style refusal to accept the result of the first.
Such tactics look increasingly unlikely to save the Lisbon Treaty, and they would not necessarily save the union.
Comments
I don't think the fourth hurdle you outline should necessarily be equated with eurocratic-style obstructionism. In fact, at this fourth stage, all of the UK should be given a vote because the settlement negotiated with the SNP would affect us all and could radically alter the state that we're living in. This doesn't mean that England, Wales and Northern Ireland should exercise an absolute veto on Scottish independence. But if any of these countries votes 'no', while Scotland votes 'yes', then it should be back to the negotiating table to come up with a deal that the dissenting country can be satisfied with - on the assumption that Scotland's will would eventually be satisfied.
This means that stage three you refer to becomes one where a new deal for each of the countries of the UK can be worked out; and this is the opportunity for constitutional reformers to press for a new settlement for the remaining UK, if possible, and for England absolutely. Otherwise, you'd just have a repeat - but a far more grave one - of the abuses of the first devolution settlement, which allowed Scotland and Wales to vote on a deal that was asymmetric and unfair to England but denied England a say.
In other words, Scotland's independence is not just about Scotland: it's about the future for all our nations.
Robert Hazell often makes things too complicated and leaves the impression that he is the only one who 'really' understands how to things should be done. If Scotland votes for independence in a referendum, all the arguments about the EU etc will have been rehearsed. The outcome will be a decision. If it votes 'yes' then all British politicians have already said that they will accept the outcome. It is inconceivable that the EU would refuse to let the new country join. Of course, Scotland might prefer an economic union with Norway as a fellow energy exporter, but I don't imagine that Brussels would be too well pleased at that prospect. The idea that there will have to be a second referendum is ridiculous.
I'm afraid that David at his thoughtful Britology watch is quite wrong that others countries in the UK must vote on Scotland's destiny. The Scots have the right to self-determination in terms of separation. If they want it, it is their choice.
Anthony, I didn't actually say the other countries of the UK should decide whether Scotland should leave the Union; but they should have a say on the deal that is done, as it automatically affects them and the constitution of the continuing UK; if there is a continuing UK. The analogy is with a marriage break up: both parties are entitled to give their consent to the terms.
As a matter of interest, has there been much debate about the threshold of support in any referendum? Would it be carried by a straightforward 50% of those voting, or will there be an attempt to move it to, say, a two-thirds majority in favour?
Hendre
That raises a particularly sensitive issue. In 1979 Scots voted 52% to 48% for devolution but were denied it because of the notorious clause in the legislation that stipulated 40% of the eligible electorate was needed to carry it. The percentage of the total electorate that voted for was 32.9%, so the devolution vote failed and Scotland was exposed to the years of Tory rule without a mandate in Scotland. In Wales in 1979 the vote went 80% to 20% against, which illustrates the difference in the history of devolution in the two countries.
It was partly this sense of having been cheated in this first referendum and left exposed to Thatcher's policies that gave the campaign for home rule during the Thatcher/Major era an extra edge. Labour had opposed the 40% rule in 1979 but was defeated in the House of Commons’ vote. Donald Dewar ensured that the second referendum was free from such hurdles. Any party in Scotland suggesting a resurrection of a similar proposal in an Independence Referendum would be liable to suffer in popularity due to association with this historical precedent.
Yes, in view of what happened in Scotland in 1979 I can appreciate that a similar proposal from one or more of the unionist parties would lead to accusations of attempting to ‘rig’ the vote in favour of unionism. Nevertheless I shouldn’t think many would look forward to the prospect of a vote on independence being carried by 51% or 52% - it’s a pretty momentous decision to be made on such a narrow margin.
Ten years on you still get the occasional letter in the Western Mail questioning the legitimacy of the Welsh devolution settlement due to the narrowness of the vote in favour.
Without referring to a history book. I thought the 40% rule was brought in by Labour secretly, by a certain Robin Cook, although George Cunningham had to publicly say it was him, for which her was rewardedly handsomely with titles and peerages. It was realised that no political party has EVER achieved 40% vote of the entire electorate, so they knew it was scuppered no matter what.
I don't think any referendum before or since has ever had such a clause. It shows how desperate Labour were to deny Scotland self determination of any kind.
Labour MP George Cunningham thought up that amendment which meant that all those who failed to vote, who couldn't vote, who had left the country or who had died counted as no votes.
He did this with the support of five Labour MP's, Robin Cook, Tam Dalyell, Peter Doig, Willie Hamilton and Bob Hughes. Brian Wilson later joined in with them to actively campaign against devolution. They were all Labour MP's.
Because the referendum failed this hurdle it meant that the Westminster Parliament voted to repeal the Scottish Devolution Bill and the vote to repeal was won only with the support of Labour MP's. Callaghan also failed to whip the Labour MP's into voting to keep the Bill
Doug
I am especially grateful to you for these details because I feel they help to show that the prevalent view that Labour did not need to grant devolution to Scotland in 1997 is based on a lack of knowledge of the historical process that preceded it. The 1979 referendum, as I recall, was a belated response to the threat to the union caused by the SNP’s spectacular breakthrough in 1974 and the knowledge in Whitehall that, with the discovery of oil, arguments against the viability of an independent Scotland were no longer convincing. Labour was involved throughout in appearing to do something, as in the case of the Kilbrandon Royal Commission, while in reality staling for time. When time ran out other tactics were required, as you point out.
All this lay in the very recent historical past when Thatcher and her new form of immobilist unionism gained ascendancy. The rejection of Thatcher by the Scottish middle classes is often thought to be because of her Englishness, but it was equally a reaction to her British Raj style refusal to countenance the genuine grievances in Scotland as regards the union and her own lack of electoral legitimacy. This led to protest and eventually to a very Scottish response, steeped in respectability and historical allusions, in the form of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which picked up on the prevalent mood and galvanised civil society. It’s Claim of Right resurrected the 1689 doctrine of popular sovereignty enshrined in the legislated contract that the Scottish Parliament made William and Mary sign in order to gain the Scottish thrown.
Labour, out of office and powerless in the face of the devastation Thatcher was reeking, had to make a choice whether to support this or not. It did so, spurred on by a by election defeat to the SNP in Govan on a far greater swing than in Glasgow East, in order to hang on to its political hegemony in Scotland. The reason the devolution settlement that Labour brought in was asymmetrical is because it was a reaction to the very concrete historical logic of the periphery, not the centre. It's approach was essentially political, rather than constitutional. From the very start in 1974 the whole process was one of damage limitation in the face of threats to the continuance of the UK, whether they were due to Scotland's oil wealth or the destabilising effect of Ireland's example.
As i said, i think it was actually Robin Cook who dreamt up the 40% rule but he didn't want to be associated with it, so he made Cunningham say it was him.
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