Devolution

As delegates decanted from Manchester recently, many will have reflected on what they view as a successful conference. The gathering, the biggest seen for a long time, contributed to the on-going rebranding and definition of ‘modern Conservatism'. The conference also proved instructive for those who seek to understand how the Conservatives will approach issues of citizenship, identity and constitutional reform. And what the last five days has highlighted is that Conservatives, progressive or traditionalists alike, have little time for or comprehension of the complexities, dilemmas and subtleties of post-devolution politics in the UK. The conference instead revealed a party which remains Anglo-centric in its political outlook and language.

In his keynote address David Cameron again stated his commitment to the defence of the Union, claiming he would never do anything to put it at risk. However the view that emerged from the conference is one which is confused, often contradictory and likely to further undermine the cohesion of the UK. The Conservatives gave scant attention to issues linked to constitutional matters either in the main debating hall or at fringe events. The only session scheduled in the main conference hall which explicitly dealt with the Union had representatives from Scotland and Wales, plus Sir Reg Empey, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. Empey's party is now again formally linked to the Conservatives, even though the memory of the previous connection, from the 1920s until the 1970s, is a bitter one for many Catholic nationalists.

The promotion of ‘Britishness' in Northern Ireland is set against a Good Friday Agreement which explicitly acknowledges the equal legitimacy of its two traditions. Owen Paterson, Shadow Secretary for Northern Ireland, claimed that the Conservatives were the only political party who campaigned in all four nations, yet it was instructive that the session was mis-titled ‘Great Britain' rather the ‘United Kingdom'. Although the Conservatives claimed to seek to build ‘a stronger union' and ‘a greater Britain', it was not felt necessary to provide representation for England, thus suggesting that the quasi-colonialist Thatcherite view of Anglo-Britishness still shapes the Conservative thinking.

During the conference, the Party avoided discussion of the central plank of their constitutional reform platform, namely English votes for English Laws. This is presented as solution to the vacuum created by New Labour radical constitutional programme, the West Lothian or English Question, whereby power has been devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but not England. David Mundell, the Conservatives' only Scottish MP, described such reforms as ‘sensible proposals' to give English MPs equitable powers of decision-making as those afforded to the Scottish Parliament and the other devolved assemblies.

In a series of four newly commissioned essays to mark the opening of the SNP's Annual Conference in Inverness, the party's 75^th anniversary and the publication of the first ever study of the contemporary party, ‘The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power' this week, OurKingdom brings together four commentators on the changing nature of the politics of Scotland and the UK.

Britain, as has often been observed (including, of course, in many articles in OurKingdom), is a country in the grips of a profound identity crisis. This is so much the case that it is even unclear, I would say, what and who we are referring to by the ‘Britain' that is in crisis: who are the British, and what is Britain?

For me, the crux of the issue is the splitting up of the old Anglo-British national identity that was at the heart of imperial Great Britain: the way in which the English have tended informally and instinctively to regard England and Great Britain as indivisible, and as interchangeable names for a single, unitary ‘nation'. Of course, the reality of imperial and pre-devolution Great Britain was never that simple, as Scotland, for instance, always retained many of the institutional trappings and the cultural identity of a distinct nation. But for the English, the English-national and British-state identities merged, making Great Britain (and later, the United Kingdom) to all intents and purposes the proxy-English nation-state.

Devolution changed all of that, once and for all. It was a definitive refutation of the ‘absolute' character of the Union, in both senses: not only the unitary character of the British polity but the ‘union' (merger, (con)fusion) within the English national identity between England and Great Britain. It was this cultural and psychological union that had sustained the political Union throughout its history, as it secured the loyalty and ‘ownership' of the greater part of the UK, which viewed Great Britain as ‘our nation' and the UK as "one of the great creations of this country", to quote Vince Cable's words at this week's Liberal Democrats' conference (The unconscious irony in Vince Cable's statement is that the UK is supposed to be ‘this country' not something that ‘this country' (England) has created!).

But as a result of devolution, it became possible, indeed necessary, to see the UK no longer as the seamless extension of English parliamentary democracy, nationhood and power. And, more fundamentally still, the English could begin to separate their English and British national identities at a subjective and psychological level, precisely because those identities had also been split apart at the objective, political level - with ‘great(er) Britishness' no longer being defined as a continuation and extension of Englishness but as a set of different national identities from which the English identity, too, was differentiated and distinct.

The world of politics and history sometimes throws up by complete accident fascinating and revealing coincidences. So it proved on the 70th anniversary of Britain and France reluctantly declaring war on Nazi Germany after Hitler had taken the decision two days previously to unleash his war machine on Poland. On such a day laden with history the SNP administration fired the first official shots in the referendum on Scottish independence. Alex Salmond, First Minister, committed his administration to bring forward a bill to hold a referendum in the next year.

More than the date of September 3rd connects these two separate events for they tell us something profound about the nature of Britain, what it became, the state it is currently in and what fate awaits it in the near-future.

The fallout after the al-Megrahi case continues to show that devolution – and Scottish devolution in particular – has the capacity to show the limited understanding that many have about the current constitutional state of the UK. Worse than that for many this boils over into resentment, anger and rage, which at points is directed at the Scottish Government and Parliament, and sometimes ‘Scotland’ as an entity.

James Macintyre’s short piece in today’s New Statesman, ‘The Folly of Devolution’, is a breathtaking example of incomprehension falling into anger and hyperbole. He states of the al-Megrahi release decided by the SNP administration:

This is precisely the sort of decision that should be taken – and be seen to be taken – at a national level by the British government, not by nationalists in one part of the UK

This is part of the typical British/Westminster gaze that the ‘little platoons’ and troublemakers are nationalists, while the big, grown-ups are serious and statesmanlike, rather than British nationalists. Macintyre’s next sentence is a gem:

But devolution has led to a grave failure of accountability.

This sentence in its assumptions does not understand the nature of the UK or Scotland’s place in it. The Scottish legal and judicial systems, indeed Scotland as a place of autonomy which has often escaped or put itself beyond Westminster’s reach, did not arrive with devolution. As long as the parliamentary union between Scotland and England has existed, Scotland has had such a position in the UK.

OurKingdom on Lockerbie and the devolution of justice: see also Gerry Hassan on Lockerbie, justice and the price of devolution and Guy Aitchison on Tory reactions

Tom Griffin (London, OK): The Spectator's Alex Massie argues that yesterday's decision on whether to free Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi would have been dealt with by a Scottish official even before devolution. The BBC's Laura Kuenssberg believes it would have been taken by a member of the UK Government.

The two views aren't necessarily mutually exclusive, and either way, Scottish Justice Minister Kenny McAskill's role in releasing the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing has shown that the power exercised by Scottish Ministers can have implications of not only UK-wide but international significance.

Splintered Sunrise suggests that the SNP might for once have been happy to defer to Westminster, but that won't have stopped some in the other devolved jurisdictions coveting similar powers.

Plaid Commons leader Elfyn Llwyd called on Tuesday for the Welsh Assembly to be given responsibility for justice. According to the Western Mail's Tomos Livingstone, some Welsh police chiefs would welcome the move.

It's in Northern Ireland that devolution of justice is highest on the agenda, but also most contentious. Nationalists want to see a justice ministry established as soon as possible, while unionists are more wary.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): Is there a fundamental flaw at the heart of the Calman Commission's  proposals for devolution of tax powers to Scotland?

Economists Jim and Margaret Cuthbert believe the plans would have some perverse effects that could leave Scotland caught in a deflationary trap, as The Scotsman reports: 

the Cuthberts warn that under Calman – set up by Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats – growth in Scotland's economy could also disproportionately benefit the Treasury, rather than the Scottish Government, because Holyrood would get to keep only 10p out of every tax band. 

For every 1p cut in income tax, Scotland would need to raise an extra 5 per cent income from the basic tax payer, an extra 7.5 per cent from those in the 40p bracket and an additional 8 per cent from those in the top 50p bracket, which will be brought in next year.

The Herald carries a Labour reaction:

"This is Alice in Wonderland economics. It is right that if the Scottish Parliament used tax-varying powers that would have consequences for the budget of the Scottish Government - that is the point. It's barmy to argue that the Treasury should make up the shortfall."

All the major parties in Scotland would agree that part of the point of devolving tax-raising powers is to strengthen the incentive for the Scottish Government to manage public spending responsibly and to grow the Scottish economy. If the Cuthberts are right, Calman may not achieve this. They foresee circumstances where tax cuts could boost the Scottish economy and swell UK Treasury receipts yet leave Scottish finances worse off. Conversely, they think Holyrood might well be forced to raise taxes at the expense of economic growth to maintain revenues.

The Cuthberts argue that these effects can be avoided if the Scottish Government receives a fixed percentage of all income tax in Scotland, on the model of a revenue-sharing system currently used in Canada.

That would mean that while decisions made at Westminster would continue to affect Holyrood's revenue,  Holyrood's decisions would also start to have an impact on Westminster's revenue from Scotland:

Successful operation of such a system would require that the UK and devolved governments are willing to operate in a collegiate manner – being appreciative of, and respecting, the impact that their own actions will have on the revenues of the other parties. The implication is that a successful tax sharing system would have to involve a more federal way of working than is the current practice in the UK. It would be very unfortunate if the Calman Commission had been forced towards its flawed proposals on tax sharing because it was unwilling to countenance the implication that a proper system of tax sharing would inevitably involve a more federal aspect to the operation of the UK constitution.

The Cuthbert's open letter to the Calman Commission is available as a word file, along with some other very interesting papers, from their website.

For most public, high-profile relationships, when rumours of a rocky patch surface there is plenty of 'advice' around. So it is with that most celebrated political marriage: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Intense debate has raged about its imminent break-up or whether Britishness can be 're-forged'. The recent publication of the Calman Report has energised such debates in Scotland though with significantly less impact in England which would appear to be more concerned about on-going quandary of whether Andy Murray is British or Scottish. Those who suggest that the UK is in its death throes often draw attention to the decline of ascription to British identity and the institutions by which it is defined. They point to the concurrent growth in identification with the historical nations of the UK or other ethno-religious identities. Musician Billy Bragg recently suggested that England needs to be ‘freed from this unhappy Union’, thus appearing to agree with Scottish National Party leader, Alex Salmond, that Scottish and English independence is the only way to solve the inequalities of the current devolution settlement.

Gordon Brown is seen by those who seek such a divorce as the ‘Bard’ of a Britishness that is a politically-motivated act of ‘terminal Britishry’. However, Brown has avoided reference to the ‘common ground of Britishness’ recently. Plans for future constitutional reform outlined in June focused on re-asserting the propriety of Westminster in the wake of the expenses scandals, this linked to further devolution of power, reform of the House of Lords, and encouraging youth participation in politics ‘to lift our politics to a higher standard’. This signalled a marked difference to previous constitutional statements which allied such reforms to developing ‘a stronger sense of shared national purpose’.

Brown has not been quiet on the issue though, and recently penned the introduction to the edited volume Being British. There are a number of critical voices within the volume, which highlights the refreshingly open ‘hands off’ approach to the project adopted by Brown. Contributions from the editor Mathhew D’Ancona and a host of others from the left and right treat Brown’s version of ‘Britishness-plus’ with justified scepticism and suspicion. He is rightly accused of drawing on a simplistic, uncritical Anglo-British historical narrative in defining a ‘golden thread’ of British values, such as liberty and tolerance, which overlooks many negative aspects of the imperial past. Such values remain abstract and ill-defined for most Britons, and are actually universal to most modern nation-states.

"The contrast [over the last 25 years] has been between a determined (if stricken) agent of history and a mere sleep-walker. In 1977 the Cold War political palsy still prevailed, a profound inertia favouring all the tropes of states, parties and intellectuals I have described. By 2000 most instinctive allegiance to ‘establishments' had drained away, leaving hollow routines and vacant symbols behind. A combination of official servility with violent socio-economic changes led to universal ‘apathy'; but such withdrawal is also a still voiceless wish for better political things - for democratic nations that peoples can more honourably call their own."

Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, 2003 on the difference between the context of the first and latest edition

Breaking Up Britain summons in its introduction The Break-up of Britain, Tom Nairn's powerful and controversial thesis, written over the course of a series of inter-lapping domestic and global crises in the 1970s and originally published in the year of the Queen's Jubilee.

Here in part lies the problem for the outset. Nairn's thesis was not just a blast from a northern outpost about Scottish nationalism, but a counterblast about the whole edifice. Nairn examined and took apart the English, Welsh and Northern Irish dimensions, while addressing the problematic nature of the British state and irrevocable way in which the European project challenged this and the small nation, little islander British left..

In this extract from Breaking up Britain Charlotte Williams questions the degree to which post-devolution identities are any more inclusive or egalitarian.

We are often reminded that devolution is a process and not some event that happened back in 1999. A process in which we were assured of the development of more open and inclusive governance, a refreshed democracy and a reworking of the old nationalist politics that provoked such a guarded response to the referendum for self government, in Wales at least. The rather simplistic axiom that prevailed at the time implied that independence or even partial independence from what was seen by many to be the oppressive grip of British , or more accurately English, rule would somehow ensure a collective sense of unity in the constituent parts of this re-nationalised Britain. A sense that national solidarity might just produce more egalitarian relationships is perhaps a folly of all proto nationalists but nevertheless it held sway. However, from within the ranks of Britain's ethnic minorities the schism that characterised their relationship to Britishness, had taken on a new dimension. Now that erstwhile ambivalent positioning, being somehow both of the place but not quite allowed to belong, would have to be reassessed in the light of the reasserted identity claims being made by the four nations.  How would they sit within the spectre of a reclaimed Welshness, Scottishness, Irishness? Did this new separateness offer the potential for a reconciliation with or retreat from the notion of Britishness?

Tom Griffin (London, OK): Over at Unlock Democracy, Deputy Director Alexandra Runswick warns the Calman Commission against considering Scottish devolution in isolation from the wider UK constitutional settlement.

Sadly the First Report suggests this may well happen. For example, it warns against greater financial autonomy on the grounds that it would lead to less ’shared social citizenship.’ That may be true in Scotland but the experience suggests that, if anything, the lack of financial autonomy is causing resentment in England and goes to the heart of Tam Dalyell’s West Lothian Question. Fundamentally, we believe this to be a false dichotomy; a fairer and more transparent financial settlement will be good for Anglo-Scottish relations on both sides of the border.

The BBC's Brian Taylor suggests that Calman's concept of 'shared social citizenship' is at the heart of an intellectual defence of the union.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): The Calman Commission on the future of  Scottish devolution has today published its first report. It's very much a provisional exercise, but it provides some important indications of the Commission's thinking.

The maintenance of the union was always going to be a key principle for the Commission, which is backed by the three main unionist parties in Scotland and boycotted by the SNP.  However, even within the unionist spectrum, it has become increasingly clear that Calman is headed for a much more cautious set of proposals than the fiscal autonomy advocated by the Lib Dem Steel Commission. 

Today's report states:

our consideration of finance follows from our discussion of the nature of the Union. As well as being an economic Union, the UK has a shared social citizenship. Greater tax devolution would be associated with less shared social citizenship, while high dependence on grant funding implies some common expectations about the need for welfare services like health and education. We have not reached a view on the appropriate point in what is a spectrum of possibilities, but we do recognise that this must reflect the expectations of the Scottish population. In the next phase of our work, with further help from the Independent Expert Group, we will identify the possible combinations of the funding mechanisms and their implications for the nature of the Union.

Tomorrow's Wales (Cardiff): The report in the Western Mail on Friday on Sir Emyr Jones Parry’s call for politicians to give concrete examples of laws they would like to see passed in order to better explain why the Assembly needs primary law-making powers raises some interesting question about what the Convention’s role is and how the case is best made for giving the Assembly primary legislative powers.

Firstly,  politicians obviously have a responsibility to put the case for further powers to the people, and would by necessity have to do so during any referendum campaign. But it is also one of the core purposes of the All Wales Convention, as set out in its terms of reference, to explain to people how moving to primary legislative powers would affect the future governence of Wales. It is rather worrying if the members of the Convention see this as a role for others to fulfil while the Convention sits back and simply assesses the effect of such arguments on public opinion.

John Osmond (Cardiff, Institute of Welsh Affairs): Hints from the Prime Minister on future funding options for the Scottish Parliament are rare and usually Delphic in their meaning. So close attention was paid to Gordon Brown’s relatively unambiguous remarks on the theme in a speech delivered to a CBI Scotland dinner in Glasgow in early September.

Although observing that on the whole devolution had worked pretty well, he said he did see one problem: fiscal accountability. As he put it: “The Scottish Parliament is wholly accountable for the budget it spends but not for the size of its budget. And that budget is not linked to the success of the Scottish economy.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): The Calman Commission on Scottish devolution today received a report on the future of taxation and public spending from its economic advisors. 

The report's contents have been heavily spun over the past couple of days. Several members of the expert group told Scotland on Sunday that it would favour greater powers for Holyrood.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): The Independent Commission set up to examine the funding of the Welsh Assembly Government began its work this week.

The Commission's call for evidence from interested parties comes as rising inflation is forcing the Government to dip into its reserves to cover its spending plans.

It will take over £200m from reserves, cutting them to 1% of the total budget, as spending rises to £15.2bn.

The money released will fund priorities including £60m over two years for the Foundation Phase education for three-to-seven-year-olds.

But opposition parties said local government was being "clobbered".

Over at the Institute of Welsh Affairs blog, James Foreman-Peck of Cardiff Business School argues that the Commission should consider the option of greater borrowing powers:

Devolving borrowing powers will be resisted by the Treasury on the grounds that there is an implicit Treasury guarantee to such borrowing although they cannot control the amount. The UK central government would be obliged to pick up the tab if the Welsh Assembly Government defaulted. But are we not seeing something like this for our big commercial banks at the moment? Anyway the Treasury’s point will need addressing in any recommendation for greater powers.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): Northern Ireland is to abolish prescription charges from 2010, Health Minister Michael McGimpsey of the UUP announced today. The move will follow a reduction to £3 in January 2009.

"The introduction of free prescriptions was one of my party's manifesto commitments and was also one of my earliest assembly debates. A key consideration for me was the loss of around £13m income each year from prescription charges, and while it is only 3.5 per cent of the total drugs bill, it is still a lot of money."

He added: "After looking closely at the financial position with my officials, I have concluded that the cost of free prescriptions can be found within my existing budget and without impacting on any existing service."

Wales has already abolished prescription charges, and Scotland is set to follow suit in 2011. Although Gordon Brown announced moves to abolish charges for cancer patients last week, England is now the only UK nation in whch there are no plans to abolish prescription charges outright.

Tom Griffin (London, OK): The All Wales Convention holds its third meeting in Cardiff Bay today. As the Western Mail's Martin Shipton notes, it's been a slow start for the body that is meant to consider the case for more powers for the Welsh Assembly.

Stephen Glenn (Linlithgow, Lib Dems): What next for the Liberal Democrats in Scotland? They're no longer in a coalition administration but just part of the opposition to an SNP minority government. It's a dangerous position with the Tories strengthening and Labour weakening.

Three candidates have stepped forward to fill the void left by Nicol Stephen's resignation as leader, by the end of next week one of them will be leader. Tavish Scott, a close ally of Stephen, is seen by many as the continuity candidate. Ross Finnie, served eight years in the cabinet when the party was in coalition with Labour after the Scottish Parliament was created. He says the party needs to find its 'narrative' again. Mike Rumbles, who chaired the Holyrood's Standard's Committee for four years, sees a radical path ahead.

Guy Aitchison (London, OK): Last week I reported on Government plans to abolish the territorial departments of state and replace them with a new devolution "super department". I argued that this move should have been carried out long ago since it would have provided for a more ambitious, creative and coherent government policy on devolution as well as a more formalised, and hence more effective, system of intergovernmental relations. Some of our commenters were more suspicious of the proposal.

Writing in today's FT, George Parker provides more details on the re-structuring, now expected to take place late September. Contrary to earlier speculation, government officials have said that the new department will not have any responsibility for the English regions. There will be no Department for the Nations and Regions, then, but a single central Department focussing on work presently carried out by the Scotland, Welsh and Northern Ireland offices.