Charter of Fundamental Rights

Anthony Barnett (London, OK): I've been taking another look at the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights (opens as pdf). As I wrote in OK, when I first looked at it it seemed great and I asked why we should not sign it. In particular, according to Spyblog these principles seemed designed to protect us from a database state:

Geoffrey Bindman (London, BIHR): The age of Brown has begun with the dramatic offer of a new constitutional settlement that “entrusts more power to Parliament and the British people”. The Prime Minister has presented his proposals under four headings, but these really fall under two broad moves: the specific transfers of power in some defined areas; and longer term national consultations and debate for potentially more fundamental changes. This is a clever approach because the specific items are largely uncontroversial and have already been widely acclaimed. They relate to glaring anomalies which have allowed the executive to make major decisions without  democratic accountability. These include  powers to declare war, to ratify international treaties, to restrict oversight of the intelligence services, to appoint judges and bishops, to direct prosecutions, and to control the civil service.

Anthony Barnett (London, OK): I was puzzled by John Palmer’s post (below) on the EU summit. If he is right, what is so wrong with making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding? I’d gone along with the general prejudice against all forms of Euro-penetration from above. All I’d read about the Charter recently was Bill Emmott insisting that if it was agreed then whatever opt outs Britain might have there should still be a referendum. A little bit of research led me to the excellent Spyblog. This points out that Europe’s Charter stipulates:

John Palmer (London, EPC): Shakespeare might have described the EU summit meeting in Brussels as "Much Ado about Rather Little." But without the new treaty the Union would have been incapable of facing immediate global challenges. Most important, it strengthens the capacity of the EU to pursue a more independent foreign and security policy. Capacity is one thing: whether or not the political will exists is another.