Imposing peace in the middle east

Ahead of the return to direct peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the forecast is bleak. Over a year of shuttle diplomacy and a few months of bilateral negotiations led by George Mitchell, the US special envoy for middle east peace, have delivered little but increasing pessimism, highlighting the diminishing returns of nearly two decades of negotiation. Eighteen years of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have not delivered the two state solution and the stability necessary, not just for the region, but also the wider world. Considering that the vacuum left by another failed attempt at building peace could result in serious conflict, it may be time for the US and the international community (in the guise of the Quartet), including a more forceful “Lisbonised” EU, to adopt a different strategy - peace imposition. This course of action is not ideal but could potentially solve the vexed problem of how to achieve stability in the middle east.

Negotiations have not delivered the two state solution, and when Palestinian Authority President Abbas returns to the negotiating table with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (as predicted in a leaked letter by the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton) next week, the overwhelming likelihood is that these will end with little or no substance agreed and in recrimination, once again setting back prospects for a sustainable peace. The failure of diplomacy would empower violent extremists on either side, and a new conflagration would be depressingly predictable. The failure of these negotiations cannot be allowed, which is precisely why the international community must intervene with decisiveness. The international community must stand ready to intervene if negotiations fail.

The reasoning for the negativity surrounding a resumption of peace talks is that some of the core elements necessary for resolving conflict are absent from the middle east at this time. The contention must be that if Netanyahu and Abbas could not agree on the terms of reference for negotiations, despite eleven months of indirect talks, agreement on issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and borders must be beyond them.
 
In any process of conflict resolution, political will and the strong leadership necessary to take risks in the cause of peace are critical. The past year has shown up the absence of this from both Abbas and Netanyahu. The Palestinians are hopelessly divided and Abbas’ mandate as leader is tenuous. The Netanyahu government has shown an inability or unwillingness to engage in a genuine fashion. Allied to this lack of political will in forging consensual agreement is the complete absence of trust between both sides. In contrast, Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, still holding after twelve years despite dissident violence, is a good example of sworn enemies engaging with one another and showing strong leadership in selling the agreement to their constituencies. Dropping the zero-sum approach is crucial to agreement - as it was in Northern Ireland - but it is not apparent in the actions and words of Netanyahu and Abbas.

The international community must take firm action to establish the two state reality because it is clear that the leaders of Israel and the Palestinians simply cannot do it themselves. The establishment of two states is time-sensitive. Continued Israeli settlement building on occupied land (and the demolition of Palestinian housing in East Jerusalem) threatens to render the two state solution impossible - as undoubtedly this building takes place on land that could be part of a new Palestinian state. The end can justify the means because of the support for the two state solution from within Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Javier Solana, former EU high representative for foreign and security policy, in a speech one year ago to the Ditchley Foundation, noted that peace imposition may be necessary to bring stability to the middle east. He pointed out that the contours of a peace settlement are well-known and that a comprehensive peace settlement could build upon the vast body of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative. Indeed, there has even been some recent speculation that President Obama has developed a contingency plan along these lines.

Peace imposition, although drastic, is nothing new. One example is the international community’s role in drawing up an agreement for Kosovo’s status. The so-called “Ahtisaari plan” for Kosovo was necessary because neither Serbia or the Kosovans were willing, or able, to drop the zero-sum approach. The international community and Ahtisaari realised this, ended negotiations and presented a settlement plan to the UN Security Council. Although agreement was not reached, the plan served as a blueprint for Kosovo’s future status. An approach such as this has potential to deliver two states.

A reinforced Quartet, as called for by the EU and the US, should have the authority to present a draft proposal (based largely on previous agreements) to both parties who will have a time-limited period to submit amendments. Modifications could be incorporated into a comprehensive peace settlement before being returned to the Israelis and the Palestinians. If they cannot agree the deal here, the settlement could pass directly to the UN Security Council, of whom four out of the five permanent members form part of the Quartet. In this case, a solution could be within reach. The international community must grab the bird by the hands and stop beating about the bush.