For most public, high-profile relationships, when rumours of a rocky patch surface there is plenty of 'advice' around. So it is with that most celebrated political marriage: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Intense debate has raged about its imminent break-up or whether Britishness can be 're-forged'. The recent publication of the Calman Report has energised such debates in Scotland though with significantly less impact in England which would appear to be more concerned about on-going quandary of whether Andy Murray is British or Scottish. Those who suggest that the UK is in its death throes often draw attention to the decline of ascription to British identity and the institutions by which it is defined. They point to the concurrent growth in identification with the historical nations of the UK or other ethno-religious identities. Musician Billy Bragg recently suggested that England needs to be ‘freed from this unhappy Union’, thus appearing to agree with Scottish National Party leader, Alex Salmond, that Scottish and English independence is the only way to solve the inequalities of the current devolution settlement.
Gordon Brown is seen by those who seek such a divorce as the ‘Bard’ of a Britishness that is a politically-motivated act of ‘terminal Britishry’. However, Brown has avoided reference to the ‘common ground of Britishness’ recently. Plans for future constitutional reform outlined in June focused on re-asserting the propriety of Westminster in the wake of the expenses scandals, this linked to further devolution of power, reform of the House of Lords, and encouraging youth participation in politics ‘to lift our politics to a higher standard’. This signalled a marked difference to previous constitutional statements which allied such reforms to developing ‘a stronger sense of shared national purpose’.
Brown has not been quiet on the issue though, and recently penned the introduction to the edited volume Being British. There are a number of critical voices within the volume, which highlights the refreshingly open ‘hands off’ approach to the project adopted by Brown. Contributions from the editor Mathhew D’Ancona and a host of others from the left and right treat Brown’s version of ‘Britishness-plus’ with justified scepticism and suspicion. He is rightly accused of drawing on a simplistic, uncritical Anglo-British historical narrative in defining a ‘golden thread’ of British values, such as liberty and tolerance, which overlooks many negative aspects of the imperial past. Such values remain abstract and ill-defined for most Britons, and are actually universal to most modern nation-states.
Dr Andrew Mycock is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Huddersfield. He is co-founder of the Academy for the Study of Britishness based in Huddersfield and a member of the Ministry of Justice Youth Citizenship Commission which reported last week
This noted, the quality of the contributions is variable, many lacking depth of insight or argument. The volume is a lost opportunity to bring new perspectives to the fore and extend the remit of debates about identity, culture and citizenship in the UK in any significant sense. The most disappointing feature though is that most contributors are either English born or based, thus highlighting that Brown’s Anglicsed Britishness also shapes this volume. Moreover, most authors replicate Brown’s erroneous conflation of Britishness and a homogenous British national identity with UK citizenship. Important questions regarding the constitutional and symbolic role of the Monarchy, the enduring legacy of the British Empire, and the role of the European Union which stretch sovereignty and citizenship within transnational frameworks are unfortunately overlooked in preference for a loose collection of uneven deliberations about Britishness and Englishness.
Furthermore, discussion of the impact of devolution on understanding Britishness is largely absent from the volume. Paul Bew provides one of the few original and thought-provoking contributions, raising important questions about how sentimental and uncritical attitudes towards devolution have led the further weakening of the Union. As a moderate Unionist, Bew’s concerns for the future stability of the post-devolutionary UK state strangely chime with many the contributions to Mark Perryman’s latest edited volume, Breaking Up Britain: Four Nations after a Union (the subject of a recent OurKingdom collection of essays). Separatist nationalist authors from across the UK promote a range of political, cultural and economic arguments to suggest that devolution is an irreversible process which highlights ‘a Union that has run out of time’. The introduction claims the volume ‘seeks to be universal’ in establishing a contemporary dialogue which reflects post-devolution and pre-independence politics in the UK. Chapters from such a diverse range of writers provide some engaging and thought-provoking discussion of how devolution has re-shaped our understanding of identity politics in the UK. Many of the criticisms raised in the volume concerning Labour’s partial programme of constitutional reform are valid; it would appear that Blair and Brown had scant understanding of any intended outcomes other than to kill separatist nationalism, particularly in Scotland and Wales, ‘stone dead’.
If Perryman really sought to develop ‘a conversation between individuals, parties and social movements who rarely talk to each other’, there are some glaring omissions. Unionist voices from across the UK could have highlighted the rich and complex nature of such debates but are conspicuous by their absence - though Mike Kenny and Guy Lodge provide a persuasive critique of those who follow Nairn’s doom-laden analysis of the future of the UK, suggesting greater acknowledgement of the cultural and political needs of England within the Union by those hastily promoting its demise. Perryman in particular appears to be blinded by post-devolutionary nationalist politics in Wales and Scotland, suggesting they inculcated new inclusive forms of civic nationalism which override historical and contemporary political and social divisions. Such analysis is, at best, short-sighted and overlooks a number of key issues.
For example, Alex Salmond has suggested that, whilst ‘Britishness is narrow, bland and boring’, post-colonial Scottish nationalism is wholly civic, being ‘inclusive, diverse and even exciting’, noting that Scots Asians are more likely to describe themselves as Scottish than British. Research data suggests, however, that many Scots display similar patterns of xenophobia and racism as their counterparts in England or elsewhere. Though the leadership of the SNP has moved from ethnicised view of Scottish identity to one founded on more inclusive dynamics, it is not at all clear whether all Scots have followed this shift. The lack of comparative success of far-right parties such as the BNP in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is seen by separatist nationalists as further evidence of a progressive shift in politics outside of the England. This is questionable. The BNP’s support grew in Wales and Scotland in the recent European elections, with UKIP also taking 13% and 5% respectively. There is an appetite for exclusory nationalism which also reflects divisions within Plaid Cymru and the SNP over the issue of national sovereignty and European Union membership.
However, many of those supporting independence would have difficulty in supporting a ‘British’ or ‘UK’ party. But psephologists such as John Curtice have suggested that nationalism was the key driving force behind the success of the SNP in the 2007 Scottish elections. It is unclear though how many who voted for the Party remain wedded to an ethnicised view of Scottishness. Moreover, if devolution has led to a progressive politics outside England, why has the gap between rhetoric on civic inclusivity and the political representation of minorities within their legislatures increased? There is only one ethnic minority representative in the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies and none in the Scottish Parliament. If the English are finally sent packing, there is the potential for far-right Scottish or Welsh ethnic nationalist parties like the BNP to gain popularity, as in small states lauded by Scots nationalists as successful democracies such as Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.
Those seeking to promote independence display behaviour that typifies reductive nationalism, often insular and selfishly focused on this key aim without considering the impact that this might have for others across the UK. Winning ‘wars of independence’ would appear more important than planning for the aftermath. However, post-British tensions across the UK would not easily be contained within revised borders. Northern Ireland continues to prove an ‘invisible issue’ for most separatist nationalists. Though the Scottish government has expended considerable energy in addressing sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants, it continues to sharply divide communities in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Though ascription to a shared Ulster Scots Britishness in Scotland and Northern Ireland has grown, Unionists continue to be considered misguided Britons who will see the error of their ways in a United Ireland or independent Scotland. Orange identity remains a strong cultural, religious, and patriotic facet of Scottish society. The potential implications of independence on a peace process whose fragility was brutally highlighted by recent murders are often overlooked, as is the potential for the ‘West Belfast Question’ merging with the ‘West Lanarkshire Question’.
The break-up of the UK also raises important questions regarding nationality, as legal status defining membership of a state, and citizenship, which follows on from nationality but encompasses conditional rights and obligations. It is possible for two differing but overlapping forms of identity to emerge within a single state, one based on civic constructions founded on a common citizenship and another founded on national ethnic community. Separatist nationalists consistently project their independent nation-states along lines of contiguous territorial and state boundaries encompassing the Scottish, Welsh etc people. This raises some interesting question as how post-independence citizenship will be articulated. Though Salmond has identified a ‘powerful and influential’ Scottish diaspora of 40 million, it is unclear as to how citizenship will be defined and what potential strains it could place on the Scottish state if large numbers ‘come home’. Moreover, does the Scottish diaspora include those newer Scots who have relatives across the Commonwealth and elsewhere or is Scots blood the defining factor for the eligibility of citizenship outside of the Scottish state? The borders of civic nationalism begin to look a little frayed.
Separatist nationalists overlook such complications, particularly what will happen to the large numbers of internal migrants across the UK such as the 1 million Scots self-identifiers in England or the sizeable English population in Wales. The SNP has suggested that continued ‘social, cultural and historical ties with England’ will endure, though there is considerable ambiguity as to what this actually means. The recent Home Office publication, Path to Citizenship, provides some interesting insight in potential complications, with conditionality tied to economic potential increasingly undermining reciprocal frameworks of citizenship between the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the Commonwealth. If such approaches were adopted within the former UK, there is potential for some to be given a ‘forced choice’ on citizenship and residence. This could have serious implications for Ulster Unionists if the bilateral dynamics of the Good Friday Agreement are reductively reframed to curb social, political and economic rights. If, on the other hand, open citizenship agreements are maintained, there is scope for tactical citizenship as dissonance increases between the independent states. This could allow people to move from state to state as when and their social and economic circumstances change or they wish to gain access to particular services not available elsewhere. This could have significant implications for access to education, healthcare and other key social services and could lead to curbing of such rights.
Furthermore, whilst we have seen a marked growth in ascription to English national identity in recent years, evidence suggests many minority groups in England identify themselves as primarily British. Recent research by colleagues at Huddersfield University found young Asians and white youths sharply divided on issues of identity. Many young Asians see Englishness as exclusory, ethnicised and linked with cultural practice such as binge-drinking and sexual promiscuity. Conversely, young white youths see Britishness ‘tainted’ by multilculturalism, meaning Englishness is a more instinctive identity. For some, British identity is a looser, more flexible identity that can mean anything or even nothing. The push for independence at a time of such significant societal transition and community tensions in England could have significant implications, particularly for young Asians who may feel isolated and excluded.
Difficult constitutional questions also persist such as the future of the Monarchy. Those seeking independence adopt a contradictory stance, tactically maintaining short-term support for the Monarchy in the period after independence whilst refuting post-Union associated responsibilities concerning the remnants of empire. What of the Monarch in the new post-Union Britain? The Queen remains Head of State of 15 other countries and retains sovereignty over 14 British Overseas Territories (BOTs), highlighting that the imperial past invades the present, complicating issues of post-Union citizenship and identity. Though some states, such as Australia, may well choose a republican future, some will certainly continue to maintain what they see as a stable political system. Many people outside the UK still identify as being British, passionately so in Gibraltar and the Falklands. If separatist nationalists seek to consistently adhere to the principle of self-determination then surely those BOTs who wish to remain part of the UK have an input in debates about its future? The conspicuous absence of policies on such issues would suggest that separatist nationalists assume that England would undertake all post-imperial responsibilities and their associated costs, though Perryman and other English progressive nationalists fail to acknowledge such complications.
Neil Sedaka was right when he suggested ‘breaking up is hard to do’. Those who seek a non-British future must provide answers to a number of complex questions if they are to validate their claims for independence. There is little evidence that separatist civic nationalism has mercurial properties when compared to a necessarily ill-defined and somewhat more accommodating Britishness. Indeed separatist nationalists across the UK draw on many of the same themes and narratives as Brown, highlighting political institutions, values and culture, which inform a distinct civic Scottish, Irish, Welsh or English national identity. The congruence of nation and state, and nationality and citizenship, is as unclear with the borders of post-independence nation-states as ill-defined as those of the UK state. Moreover, independence is unlikely to prove a panacea for many social, economic and political divisions that have deeper roots. Current government approaches in reforming the UK state are piecemeal and often ill-defined, thus stimulating more uncertainty. But those who seek its hasty demise must provide a more coherent and comprehensive view of the post-Union settlement, or they might simply replicate or even intensify divisions within British society.
Comments
Young Asians feel excluded from Englishness? The answer is an English Parliament and an inclusive national English civic identity. Simple. The Government needs to lead. As it is, the UK Government demonises England and Englishness and forces "Britishness" down the throats of migrants.
The answer is rather that we need to mark the transition from childhood into adulthood and do this at an English level. The moment when one becomes a citizen rather than a dependant currently lacks a proper ceremony.
This has been an important event for tribal societies around the world and throughout history. Englishness is nothing if not deeply tribal at root as an identity. Yet today we have nothing much that does this bar the driving test.
That will draw various minorities into an inclusive English identity and mark a common thread between them and the majority. That they are all part of the same 'tribe' even if they don't look the same.
The historical route would be handing over a spear and shield, symbols of ones duty to fight for the tribe and markers of the right to vote..
”Furthermore, whilst we have seen a marked growth in ascription to English national identity in recent years, evidence suggests many minority groups in England identify themselves as primarily British. Recent research by colleagues at Huddersfield University…”
Woah, hang on a minute. You talk about “evidence suggests” and then quote a local study for Rochdale as national proof that Asians ascribe to a British identity more than an English one?
A much better source is the Ipsos MORI poll, published by the Ministry of Justice who found that “BME”s (Black and Minority Ethnic) strongly feel themselves to be English above being British. See here for the PDF http://governance.justice.gov.uk/british/
It makes perfect sense for BMEs to identify more strongly with an English identity, with its values (real or imagined) of tolerance and fair play. Why would they identify more with an identity that reflects the BNP, Empire and sectarian violence of Northern Ireland and Scottish football?
The converse is an oft repeated lie that is put about by those who fear the resurgence of an English identity (for reasons well argued in your article) and wish to wrongly associate it with intolerance.
Andy
An interesting article, but your assertions that independence would intensify divisons in "British Society" are wholly unsubstantiated.
You state that: "The push for independence at a time of such significant societal transition and community tensions in England could have significant implications, particularly for young Asians who may feel isolated and excluded".
Are you really suggesting that the claim of right by the people of Scotland to govern its own affairs - including matters currently reserved to Westminster - should be put on hold so that England gets its house in order first? I am not for a minute suggesting that Scotland does not have its own challenges, but that is a matter for Scotland.
It will be for England to resolve English challenges. My own opinion is that Scottish Independence would actually be hugely positive for England. It would force its political and civic structures to look to its own solutions. Progressive forces in England (of which there are many) would have the opportunity (to mix my metaphors) to set out their stall and raise their game.
Within two weeks of the report being published, David Cameron has already kicked the Calman Commission's recommendations into the long grass - for at least 6 years. We are back to a straight Yes/No on independence.
Cameron has clearly made his political judgement that protecting the Middle England heartland is more important. That's fine, but clearly leaves the people of Scotland with a choice of an asymetrical union or grasping the opportunity that next year's Referendum Bill will present. It's time to move on from the 1707 Union. England and Scotland both free, both independent, best of pals, but each forging our own way in the world, as open, inclusive, outward looking democracies.
Post-indepndence, no doubt there will be a very significant realignment of politics, both in Scotland and England.
Your comment that Gordon Brown recenly signalled a marked difference to previous constitutional statements which allied such reforms to developing ‘a stronger sense of shared national purpose’, falls into the default unionist language. We are not one nation, we are four nations constrained by a unitary, centralised state.
Independence is a natural state of being for all nations. Scotland is ready to move on. Is England?
Its Time.
A further thought....
Andy, you state that:
"If separatist nationalists seek to consistently adhere to the principle of self-determination then surely those British Overseas Territories who wish to remain part of the UK have an input in debates about its future. The conspicuous absence of policies on such issues would suggest that separatist nationalists assume that England would undertake all post-imperial responsibilities and their associated costs, though Perryman and other English progressive nationalists fail to acknowledge such complications".
So, your proposition is that not only should England Wales & NI get a say in whether Scotloand is "permitted" to seek independence, but all the overseas territories as well? That logic implies that those in the UK could excercise a veto on Australia becoming a republic.
Self determination means exactly that. It is true that Scottish traders, adventurers and soldiers were as involved as any in the spread of Empire post 1707. However, the question of independence and Scotland taking its own place in the world again is about a post-Empire environment. If the remaining nations of the "United Kingdom of England, Wales & Northern Ireland" wish to continue with Imperial dreams and memories, then that is surely a matter for them.
Complicated maybe, but it will ultimatley come down to a rather simple question in a 2010 Referendum, which has never before been put to the Scottish people. Yes or No to negotiating a settlement to become (once more) an independent state.
The debate about identity in Scotland has been going on for years and it's interesting to see English articles on identity as they often cover areas or use terminology that have become cliché in Scotland.
On Brian Taylor's blog several posters started to discuss what selection of the usual unionist catch-phrases should be on a "Unionist Bingo Card" and "separatist nationalist" would fit on there fine along with "insular" and "selfish". What is a "separatist nationalist" by the way? Is it the opposite of an "I want to be part of someone else's country nationalist"?
These terms may be cutting edge in England but for nationalists in Scotland we've heard it all before. It's the Watership Down syndrome, been there, read the book, seen the film, eaten the pie.
The article is odd in many ways with a lot of assertions such as that Scottish nationalism was based on an ethnic view of Scottish identity and identification with Northern Irish unionism is growing in Scotland but with no evidence given to back these statements up.
Then there is misdirection with information that the BNP vote grew in Scotland and that UKIP got 5% of the vote at the Euro elections as if both these statements were somehow significant. The BNP vote did grow in Scotland between the 2009 and 2004 European elections but only by 0.81% and UKIP did get 5.23% of the vote this time but that's a fall from the 6.7% they got last time in 2004. In simple terms the BNP vote flatlined and UKIP vote fell in Scotland which is not what happened in England.
On the matter of ethnic minority representatives in the Scottish Parliament there was one, Bashir Ahmad, but sadly he died this year. He was an SNP MSP.
One snippet I particularly liked was the shock horror revelation that nationalists want a geographically defined nation. Well slap me with a wet kipper, I thought that was how all nations were defined. I must have missed some critical part of my political education.
Then there's the "problem" of how Scotland would deal with its Diaspora. Probably much the same as Ireland I suppose with the same for its citizenship rules. And it's only if England gets kicked out of the EU that problems of nationality and residence will arise. A little point. We already have economic migration internally inside the EU and it's not a problem now so why would it be a problem in the future?
The whole thrust of the article is that Scotland can't have independence till the nationalists sort out England's identity problems.
Scotland's right to self-determination cannot be denied because England needs Britishness like a security blanket.
"Not my country, not my problem. England is big enough to sort it out on its own.
Scotland's right to self-determination cannot be denied because England needs Britishness like a security blanket."
Well, I suppose it depends what you mean by 'country'. As an Englishman, I don't regard Scotland as part of 'my country' in the sense of 'my nation'. However, I do regard it as part of my country in the sense of being part of the same political state of which my country, in the other sense, is also a part. Meaning that I, too, have a stake in what happens in and to Scotland, just as Scots have a fairly massive stake in what happens to England. Just think what your statement would sound like put the other way round, i.e. as an expression of English nationalism: 'Scotland: not our problem. Their social and economic needs can't stop England being independent if we want to - just because Scotland needs the Union security blanket'. Not nice, is it?
In reality, the 2010 referendum, if it goes ahead, will be merely a consultative referendum, i.e. delivering a mandate to negotiate Scotland's independence in the case of a 'yes' vote. Then, if a negotiated settlement were reached, there'd have to be a further referendum to ratify the deal. At this point, I think the other nations of the UK should be consulted: not on the point of principle but on what shape the residual UK would take, because Scotland's departure inevitably raises questions about the governance of the remaining UK nations.
In other words, if we did get to the point of reaching a negotiated independence settlement for Scotland, the flipside is that it should be part of a new constitutional settlement for the remaining UK. And I think that's only fair for the people of Scotland, too; i.e. the alternative to independence for Scotland might be participation in a new UK constitutional settlement, such as a federation of four (or five, if you include Cornwall) nations. But even if this more comprehensive constitutional option were not on the table (e.g. if it was just assumed that the Union minus Scotland would continue as an admittedly less asymmetric Union with no distinct national tier of governance for England but continuing devolved government for Wales and N. Ireland), those living outside Scotland should still be consulted, as the future of 'their country' (in both senses) is also at stake.
If, in such circumstances, there were a 'yes' vote in Scotland but a 'no' vote in the rest of the UK, this would not constitute a 'veto' on Scottish independence but would be a rejection of the deal that was on offer for the / a new UK. In actual fact, though, I think a majority would vote for Scotland to be allowed to leave (so long as the deal was reasonably fair for England), as it would effectively mean that England could then also govern its own affairs.
The1707 Union was voluntary (let's set aside the trade embargoes, armed forces at the border and huge financial bribes to the decision makers). Continuation in the Union is also voluntary.
A "Yes" vote in Scotland is all that is required. It is far from clear that a second referendum would be required to ratify the negotiated settlement. Politically it may be sensible, but legally, constitutionally and in terms of international law, I am not so sure that it is necessary. I would be interested to hear of other examples where two votes were required. Were two votes needed in Czechoslovakia? Yugoslavia? Ukraine? Norway?
My understanding is that an Act of the UK Parliament would also be required to ratify the settlement, as it is a fact that Holyrood is a creation of Westminster
The negotiations would take at least three or four years, by which time a further Scottish General Election would be held. The Scottish people, though their elected representatives at Holyrood would then agree to the new Constitution of a new Scottish state. Just as Westminster would need to agree arrangements for EWNI.
Scottish independence would certainly have a significant impact on English politics, but in what way should people in England and Wales be consulted? In a scenario of English and Welsh voters saying "No" to Scottish independence (though unlikely) how would a UK Government respond?
A parallel consultation in England and Wales about what a UK would look like (Federation of England, Wales & Northern Ireland?) may well happen, but that could not impede Scotland from moving on.
Cruachan
"Were two votes needed in Czechoslovakia? Yugoslavia? Ukraine? Norway?"
Not sure these are good examples: Czechoslovakia broke up by the mutual agreement of its two parts (i.e. they both wanted the separation, which would tend to support my view); Yugoslavia: unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia leading to four years of horrendous civil war; Ukraine (unilateral DOI as part of explosion of the USSR); Norway - got to plead ignorance there, I'm afraid.
My understanding is that the question to be put in the 2010 referendum was whether the Scottish government should negotiate with Westminster for the creation of an independent Scottish state. Don't you think the Scottish people should have the right to give or withhold their consent to the settlement that's negotiated for them via a second referendum?
"Scottish independence would certainly have a significant impact on
English politics, but in what way should people in England and Wales be
consulted?"
It wouldn't have a significant impact just on English politics. It would change the very identity, composition and constitution of the state of which England is a part. It's supposed to be a Union (an entity in its own right: the UK), not an artificial joining together of distinct parts - the heart of the Union is supposed to be 'Great Britain', not 'England and Scotland'. And it would have huge social, cultural, economic and security implications, too.
This is not a view that I personally hold, but there are some people that think of their 'nation' (not just their state) as Britain / the UK; and, on this basis, they feel they are just as entitled to have a say on Scottish independence as 'the Scots' - by which is not in fact meant all Scottish people, or even all Scots living in the UK, but only all UK citizens living in Scotland at the time of the referendum. Which includes English, Welsh and N. Irish (even Republic of Ireland) people. Therefore, by implication, the principle of non-Scots voting (because they are citizens of the 'country' of which Scotland is a part) is admitted.
Given Scottish independence would involve such major constitutional change for the rest of the UK, then I think the people of the other UK countries are entitled to give their assent or otherwise to the deal negotiated on their behalf by politicians - especially as the Westminster parliament is not a valid representative body for England.
My real concern here is that a new change would simply be imposed on England without any consultation, just as the present devolution settlement was. In the case of the devolution vote, the option for England would not have been 'Do you agree there should be a Scottish parliament / Welsh assembly?' but 'Do you agree there should be an English parliament?'. In the case of an independence referendum (the second, ratifying one, not the in-principle one), the option for EWNI people would not be whether they agreed to Scottish independence (because that principle would already have been established); but, for instance, 'Do you agree to the creation of a new federal United Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, following the withdrawal of Scotland from the present United Kingdom?'. If the answer is 'no', this is not a veto on Scottish independence; but an insistence that an alternative constitutional settlement for the residual UK should be sought, which might or might not delay Scottish independence assuming the majority voted for it in the second referendum.
In that second Scottish referendum, I imagine that voters would be invited to choose between two alternatives: 1) the independence settlement as negotiated by the Scottish parliament; or 2) participation in a new federal UK. After all, they're already talking in terms of a two-option referendum for 2010: independence or Calman.
It's always possible, though, as I said, that the option might still be independence vs. Calman in a second or conclusive referendum, with no option or say on its own constitutional future being offered to England at all. So my issue is not with preventing Scots people having the definitive say in their national-political future; but letting England have a say in determining its own future as part of that process; as whatever the outcome in Scotland, the constitutional implications for England are undeniably substantial.
Not sure what happened with the link.
Here is the correct one.
Brian Taylor's Blog.
I’d like to comment on Andy Mycock’s opening summation of how the debate is being framed. As he notes, this ‘we all used to be so much more British’ line is being trotted out endlessly but how is the alleged ‘growth in identification with the historic nations’ being measured? Purely in terms of support for Plaid Cymru and the SNP? If we go back a little further in history, before the establishment of the these parties, the Welsh were embroiled in a long campaign for the disestablishment of the Church of England in Wales on the basis of nationhood. Are we to believe that the Welsh were ‘more British’ a century ago even though we were seeking to sever ties with a so-called state Church and establish a Welsh national church settlement?
This ‘disunited kingdom’ stuff can be pretty selective. We have elective devolution and everyone shouts ‘Disunity!’. We have four church settlements and no-one is particularly bothered.
TH44 wrote
""It makes perfect sense for BMEs to identify more strongly with an
English identity, with its values (real or imagined) of tolerance and
fair play. Why would they identify more with an identity that reflects
the BNP, Empire and sectarian violence of Northern Ireland and Scottish
football?""
While I agree in large part with your POV I do think your clear cut separation of 'nasty British' and 'nice English' is flawed.
That nasty British imperialism grew from, and was a natural product of, the nasty English imperialism the preceded it. From a Cornish point of view it is the English identity that is the centrally imposed imperial and intolerant phenomena. Britishness is simply an extra and complicating layer.
As a Cornish man I'm not aware of much 'English fair play' when it comes to my nation.
The Cornish Democrat
Isn’t it really the Establishment who likes to go on about fair play because (a) it justifies all manner of interference in the affairs of other nations (b) it helps to brainwash the ‘plebs’ into thinking they live in a fair society?
Thanks for your posts on this subject. I fear that the general thrust of the article has been misunderstood by some. I am no apologist for Brown’s Britishness project and the paper is explicitly critical of the piecemeal nature of constitutional reform. I do however see myself as primarily British through the multi-nationality of my parents. I also feel that, as separatist nationalists draw on many of the same themes as those promoted by the two main Unionist political parties (which I have questioned elsewhere), many of the same questions should be raised. My academic work focuses on the exclusory nature of civic nationalist discourses regardless of their origin.
Dougthedug, my use of the term ‘separatist nationalist’ is not simply a case of ‘Unionist’ semantics. The multi-layered nature of identity within the UK means that those seeking Scottish independence cannot claim universally claim to be Scottish nationalist. As the late Bernard Crick noted last year in his Political Quarterly article ‘The Four Nations’, ‘nationalism is not necessarily separatism’ (p.73). A significant number of Scots (see Stone and Muir’s excellent IPPR report (2007) Who Are We) who support the maintenance of the Union are both Scottish Nationalists and British Unionists. To put it another way, it is possible to be both Scottish and British, it is not a binary equation. Therefore the distinction is valid, as those who seek independence are Scottish nationalists but their identity is defined by their desire to separate from the United Kingdom.
With regards to the point concerning Ulster Scots identity, i would draw attention to the work of Stapleton and Wilson and also survey data from the Northern Irish Life and Times. Political devolution and the peace process have led to growth in cultural nationalism which has seen some growth in ascription to Ulster Scots identity in Northern Ireland. The Orange Order has been particularly keen to promote such cultural nationalism, thus highlighting transnational dimensions of Unionist identity. Again, put it another way, Strathclyde police did not put out a warning about the recent 12th July because they were concerned about the behaviour of British Unionists.
The issue regarding the BNP/UKIP in Scotland is not that support has grown significantly, more that there is potential within any nation for exclusory ethnic-based nationalism. Nationalism is an ideology founded on exclusion as well as inclusion. Research suggests that a significant minority of Scots hold attitudes which, as in all nations, could potentially develop into a less-inclusive ethnicised Scottishness. This does suggest that it will but those states that have separated in Europe and elsewhere, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or even separatist nationalist groups in states who have not yet divided such as Spain or Belgium provide examples of ethnicised nationalism which is not wholly civic and can be anti-immigrant (see Vlaams Belang). I am not comparing Plaid Cymru or the SNP to such parties merely raising some questions as to the potency of nationalism itself.
The point regarding the congruence of nation and state is not that it is a ‘shock horror revelation’, more that current SNP projections of the nation are not consistently territorially-bounded. I would not like to cast aspersions regarding your political education but would draw your attention to the work of Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and others who note that the congruence of the nation and the state is rarely, if ever, successfully achieved. Alex Salmond’s has consistently projected the Scottish nation to have transnational dynamics without balancing the ethnicised construction of Scottishness outside of the Scotland with the territorially-bounded view of an independent Scotland. Murray Leith’s excellent article on the SNP’s projection of the Scottish nation and state highlights the change in emphasis from an ethnicised to a civic nationalism. The SNP draft constitution of 2002 is extremely vague on the borders of inclusion and exclusion of Scottish citizenship but it would appear that patriality would be key, thus defining citizenship through ethnicity. As for Ireland, their citizenship encompasses the citizens of two separate states. The European Union actually dilutes political sovereignty and citizenship, a point raised by some within the SNP.
I certainly do not advocate the idea that Scotland should be ‘permitted’ to seek independence, more that those who seek it acknowledge the complex nature of the UK’s continued constitutional ties, particularly those with the 14 BOTs. As I note, these are questions which separatist nationalists overlook.
As for the ‘simple question’ of the 2010 referendum, I would draw your attention to the work of John Curtice who highlights that support for independence is strongly shaped by the wording of this question. The simple ‘yes/no’ question on independence actually produces a higher no vote (over 50%) than ‘negotiate a settlement...so Scotland becomes an independent state (under 40%).
Cruachan 2, thanks for your response. Again, please do not shoot the messenger. My comments on Brown merely acknowledged a shift in his rhetoric. I agree wholly that there are at least four nations within the UK, maybe more if you acknowledge claims from some of the Islands and also Cornwall. That, as they say, is a debate for another day. However, any student of nationalism will challenge your assertion that independence is a ‘natural state for all nations’. This is not always practicable or desirable. Indeed, not all national groups seek independence. To extend your logic further, would an independent Scottish government countenance self-determinist claims of some in the Shetlands who trace their origins to Scandinavia? See Tallack (2007) for an interesting discussion of this issue - http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/malachy-tallack/2007/04/shetland-scotland-independence.
TH44, I would draw your attention to national studies by Muir and Stone (2007) Who Are We or Commission for Racial Equality (2005) Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness. Both were major studies of survey data over significant periods rather than a single small sample survey. The CRE report notes ‘most ethnic minority participants (except for black Africans, as discussed below) saw themselves as British, to the exclusion of any identification with England, since they strongly associated England with white English people’ (p.37). The clear point here is that some BME communities are more comfortable with a looser British identity, particularly in England. For many members of the BNP, Britishness remains Englishness writ large. To suggest that issues such as post-empire transition, sectarian violence in Northern Ireland or Scottish football would not continue to influence an independent England is simply myopic.
I am not against those proposing a progressive case for English, Scottish or other national independence. There are however strong similarities. There may well be a post-independence realignment of politics in England and Scotland but I merely seek to question why such progressive politics would emerge within reduced national frameworks.
andrew mycock, You may find the following paper of interest: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13785319/Ethnic-Minorities-Concept-and-MeaningPhilip Payton Institute of Cornish Studies, University of Exeter ‘Inconvenient Peripheries: Ethnic Identity and the “United Kingdom Estate” – The cases of “Protestant Ulster” and Cornwall’ The Cornish Democrat
Andy, thanks for the reply. What confused me was that in both your original piece and in your reply the concepts and terms you use are not compatible with the concepts and terms used in the independence debate in Scotland.
You confuse cultural identity where both nationalists and unionists can identify themselves as Scottish with political identity where Scottish nationalism is distinct political movement. You can identify yourself as Scottish and still be a unionist but you can't be a union supporting Scottish Nationalist.
In Scotland if you identify yourself as a nationalist then it is taken as a given that you want an independent Scottish state. Nobody ever queries that. I went back and re-read the IPPR "Who are we?" report because I didn't remember any mention of union supporting Scottish Nationalists and though it does identify that many Scots regard themselves as both Scottish and British it doesn't even use the phrase, "Scottish Nationalist".
Your confusion between cultural and political identity results in the odd term, "Separatist Nationalist". In Scotland, "nationalist", describes the political aspirations of any voter quite clearly, you don't have to add the qualifier, "separatist".
In fact the use of the qualifying word, "separatist", to mark the word, "nationalist", to define someone who wants an independent Scottish state means the unmarked or default state for a nationalist is someone who doesn't want an independent Scotland. In a Scottish context this concept is meaningless and since the qualifying word, "separatist", is used pejoratively by unionist commentators and politicians then the gratuitous use of it in the phrase, "Separatist nationalist", would be regarded by any nationalist Scots as inflammatory and the continuous use of it in your article may be unintentional but it is jarring.
I'm not sure why you don't regard the Orange Order as British Unionists because that's exactly what they are and they have explicitly come out against the SNP in Scotland.
Your failure to use the terms and context of the Scottish independence debate correctly appears to be result of remoteness from the cultural, political and identity components of the debate about independence in Scotland.
Hi Dougthedug, thanks again for your further post. You note 'What confused me was that in both your original piece and in your reply the concepts and terms you use are not compatible with the concepts and terms used in the independence debate in Scotland.'
The point in my argument is exactly that there needs to a greater sophistication in the language used in such debates. My use of such terms is not born from remoteness as you kindly suggest. The SNP have claimed the political expression of the term 'Scottish Nationalist' without there being a debate about the interrelation between cultural and political nationalism. To be a Scottish nationalist within either context does not theoretically or normatively mean you necessarily seek independence. I do not mean to utilise the term 'separatist' in a pejorative sense, more that there needs to be a greater sensitivity to the complex nature of identity politics in the UK.
It is possible to be a Scottish nationalist and unionist both politically and culturally. Within federal states, such as Switzerland, national groups may seek strong national political and cultural institutions without seeking to secede from the overarching state. Similarly, in multi-national states, such as the Russian Federation and the UK, national groups can form autonomous or highly-devolved political territories and institutions without seeking independence. The article does not seek to deride Scottish Nationalists, simply to highlight that the language used needs to be refined further to highlight constitutional preferences.
You note that ‘if you identify yourself as a nationalist then it is taken as a given that you want an independent Scottish state’. My point is this is short-sighted and overlooks the possibility that you might vote for the Scottish National Party, and support the expression of Scottish political nationalism, but might not seek independence from the UK state. A good example of the complex nature of nationalist politics is provided in Northern Ireland. A poll by Yougov last year indicated that some Irish nationalists and republicans supported the maintenance of the Union. http://www.newsletter.co.uk/politics/Nationalist-support-for-Union-revealed.4370940.jp. This study might be limited but if we assume that most of those supporting the SDLP and Sinn Fein are Catholics then the recent research by the Northern Irish Life and Times suggests that political nationalism and attitudes to secession are not congruent http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2008/Political_Attitudes/NIRELND2.html#religion. I would draw your attention to the research of John Curtice who highlights that growth in support for the SNP has not translated into growth of support for independence. Therefore a number of Scots are voting for the SNP but seek to remain in the Union at present. This of course might change.
As for the Orange Order, many of their members might well be British Unionists but I suspect that the constitutional future of the UK is not of paramount importance to the lodge members in New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US who gathered in Belfast last week. The growth in Ulster Scots emphasis is a reaction in part to devolution and highlights a transnational dynamic which potentially excludes its membership in England and other parts of the Commonwealth.
I am not rejecting Scottish claims to become a nation-state projected by the SNP, i am simply highlighting that, though it constructs a civic nationalism in Scotland, it views Scottishness outside of Scotland ethnically. You are absolutely right that this is not unique. My point is that politicians and political parties across the UK, including the Labour and Conservative parties, fail to acknowledge the complexity when projecting simplistic narratives of the nation-state. Put it another way, was the Scottish government’s call for the ‘homecoming’ open to the relatives of newer Scots from south Asia and elsewhere? Again, not unique to Scotland but it does highlight the difficulties of projecting a wholly civic construct of the nation-state.
As for the support for the BNP, i am not suggesting that there has been significant growth in its support in Scotland. Indeed, it would be highly-surprising that, in light the growth of Scottish identity, that an Anglo-British political party would gain significant support. The point here is that within an independent Scotland there is potential for an exclusory right-wing Scottish nationalist party which projects an ethnicised (and possibly anti-immigration) view of Scottishness. If you read the original post, it highlights that some the social and political attitudes in English society are also evident in Scotland. Again, this is not to say this will happen, more that there is potential and it is an issue for discussion.
If you want to debate about Scottish independence with Scots you will have to use the terms they do or they won't understand you and you won't understand them. Here are the terms.
1. Nationalists are those who want an independent Scottish state.
2. Unionists are those who want to remain part of the UK
3. Those who want a measure of Scottish self-government but within the Union are a subset of the Unionists and are called Devolutionists.
The SNP and their supporters are nationalist, the Tories, Labour and the Lib-Dems are Unionist and Labour and the Lib-Dems are a devolutionist sub-group with the Unionists.
Culturally, Scots who identify themselves as Scots may be unionist or nationalist.
If you use the terms nationalist, unionist and devolutionist within Scotland everyone knows precisely what your talking about.
The problem with your phraseology is that you have adopted the word "nationalist" as a blanket term for cultural activists, language activists and nationalists which is a very imprecise use of language. In Scotland the term "unionist nationalist" is an oxymoron and "separatist nationalist" is a tautology. I would also say this is true for the rest of the world
The language groups in Switzerland may want to promote their culture but they are all Swiss nationalists. None of them advocate carving out their language area into an independent state. They are language and cultural activists not French, German, or Italian nationalists. It is not a model that can be applied to the UK.
Many areas of Russia are not Russian and the reason they don't seek independence is that they recognise that they will never be granted independence and that they don't have the population or firepower to leave unilaterally. The example made of Chechnya was a warning. They are simply making the best of a bad job with as much regional power as they can get.
You're right to say some people vote SNP without subscribing to its aims of independence but they would never describe themselves as nationalists and if you believe the Orange Order isn't composed of British Unionists I'll leave you to your delusion.
A couple of points:
1. Andy you write: "The BNP’s support grew in Wales and Scotland in the recent European elections, with UKIP also taking 13% and 5% respectively." So in Scotland in the wake of the expenses scandal wand with Westminsters reputation in shred UKIP manage 5% and this is seen as significant? Its worth remembering the SNP polled 42% in the Western Isles. Its like an elephant walks into a room and you are pointing at the flea on the window-sill.
2. But its really on the Monarchy that this article become bizarre... "If separatist nationalists (sic) seek to consistently adhere to the principle
of self-determination then surely those BOTs who wish to remain part of
the UK have an input in debates about its future? The conspicuous
absence of policies on such issues would suggest that separatist
nationalists (sic) assume that England would undertake all post-imperial
responsibilities and their associated costs, though Perryman and other
English progressive nationalists fail to acknowledge such
complications." So the Cayman Islands should have a say in the British Constitutional future, via a vis Scottish Independence? This is just a very odd argument. If Pitcairn Island is attached to the English Monarchy then good for them, but what on earth does this have to do with self-determination?
3. The old Shetland canard. This is indeed Unionist Bingo time. "Would an independent Scottish government countenance self-determinist
claims of some in the Shetlands who trace their origins to Scandinavia?" Frankly, yes. But again, as a point of argument it seems obtuse. As someone comented on the New Statesman article you linked to "If Shetlander's really want to be part of Denmark, pay £8 a pint and
speak Danish then that is a matter for them of course... didn't see any
evidence of them wanting to do that when I was living there for 16
years. What I found that the people proposing this were usually
Brit nationalists."
4. "There are a number of critical voices within the volume, which
highlights the refreshingly open ‘hands off’ approach to the project
adopted by Brown.
What, the prime Minister contributed to a publishing venture without controlling its entire content? That is indeed admirable.
On your point 3. Shetland would more likely remain under English government, carry on using English backed Pounds and use English as their language.
Since the most obvious supporter of Shetlands independance from Scotland is.....England of course.
On point 2.
Loyalty is not quite the same thing as subservience. But then I would take issue with the word 'monarchy' in describing a Kingdom.
There must be other 'positive' ways out. 'A disunited [dismembered?] Kingdom' would indeed sadden many 'outsider' onlookers. Difficult times call for more honest debates but need not be driven by excessive slices of "conflicting" sentiments - to avoid the real course getting choaked-up hence meaninglessly defeating own purpose! ISN'T IT ALL ABOUT SURVIVAL IN THE "BEST POSSIBLE" WAY? Hard times might be testing but need not disorganise in the guise of looking for best ways out: the much wanted solution!
I'm not sure I quite get your drift Lawrence. But qouting Andy: "Neil Sedaka was right when he suggested ‘breaking up is hard to do’.
Those who seek a non-British future must provide answers to a number of
complex questions if they are to validate their claims for independence."
Except its actually just about democratic free will, if politicians allow a referendum supported by 58% of the people (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8125041.stm).
The Constitution Unit is keen for us to abandon bilateralism within the union, i.e. Anglo-Welsh, Anglo-Scottish, Anglo-Irish arrangements, but they face an uphill struggle to eliminate these deep-rooted relationships. It’s noticeable that any discussion on the constitution tends to revert to the now dominant Anglo-Scottish relationship. Nicola Sturgeon declared during one edition of Question Time that independence for Scotland meant independence for England. Nice rhetoric, but as Britologywatch outlines, a load of rubbish constitutionally speaking.
When it comes down to it very few people would seek a veto on Scottish independence but in turn the least the Scottish nationalists can do is stop pretending that the Treaty of Union can be rescinded as if we were all still living in 1707.
Thanks again for your posts. Mike, the point i am raising is that there is the potential for far-right parties to emerge and succeed electorally in all states regardless of their size. Exclusionary nationalist politics can emerge in states where nationalism has historically been viewed as benign such as Switzerland. All i am highlighting is that research data indicates that societal attitudes in Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, suggest some Scots do not wholly subscribe to the inclusive civic model of nationalism projected by the SNP. This is an area for further research and discussion. As i noted previously, the point regarding constitutional issues is not whether the Pitcairn Islands has an input into the independence debate in Scotland, more that the SNP has no stated position on such constitutional issues. It would appear they would simply abrogate all responsibilities to the rump post-independence UK state. The issue of the UK’s constitutional relations with the BOTs is one for further consider by those seeking secession.
However, as Britology suggests, there is a clear issue for further discussion about whether all UK citizens of various classifications have a legitimate input into debates and potential changes to the constitutional arrangements of the UK. BOTs are not sovereign states and are therefore reliant on the UK for governance. The issue of self-determination appeared again this week with the Spanish visit to Gibraltar. It is clear that any changes in the status quo would have implications across the whole of the UK and elsewhere. I am merely asking the question as i believe it is worthy of discussion.
The point regarding the Shetlands is one simply of principle; it highly-unlikely to ever be realised. Those claiming the right of all nations to seek statehood do not consider the accepted fact that the congruence of the nation and state is rarely achieved. This not simply ‘Unionist Lingo Bingo’; study of nationalism across Europe provides numerous cases of state formation where significant national minorities are encompassed. The logic of that the nation must always become a state is not born out theoretically or normatively and would have serious implications for the stability of many parts of Europe and elsewhere is strictly applied.
Dougthedog, thanks again for your thoughts. It is clear that we will not agree on our interpretations of nationalism. The existence of two predominant forms of nationalism in modern nation-states is widely-accepted. The first is civic nationalism which is founded on national citizenship and mutually accepted institutions in society. The second is ethnic (or cultural) nationalism which is based on common national characteristics such as language, religion and beliefs in shared ancestry. In most modern nation-states, there is evidence of both in the shaping of a national identity supported by a national historical narrative. Dictionaries might not be the best source of evidence in defining the rich and complex literature on nationalism and national identity. I would recommend those authors i highlighted earlier as a good starting point. The point here is I believe is that there is a need to shift the language of debates about nationalism and nationalists away from one which is founded on oppositional positions. A more civilised and less-confrontational approach would be achieved through greater recognition of the complexity of debates about nationalism in the UK.
Your typology simply does not reflect the complicated nature of nationalism in states across Europe and the rest of the world. It is clear that you do not accept the notion that you can be a Scottish (or Breton, Bavarian, Quebecois) nationalist but seek a political future within a devolved multi-national, confederal or federal state. Your views are born out of necessity to present Scottish independence as a binary choice whereby devolution is simply a stepping stone. Those of Unionist persuasion can be, when opportunity arises, portrayed as being ‘disloyal’. There is no mid-point or recognition of potential that such arrangements can bring much-needed stability in periods of transition.
Many states have adopted asymmetric devolution as a political model which has provided such stability after traumatic periods of their history. For example, in Spain, survey data indicates that most Spaniards are happy with the devolutionary model adopted, though many in Catalonia and the Basque Country seek more autonomy. Within many multi-national states, devolution, confederation or federation is adopted as a form of government which is accepted by minority and majority national groups. Such arrangements are a constant process of re-negotiation and may well eventually bring independence for some national groups. I would draw your attention to an article by Montserrat Guibernau (2007 - National identity, devolution and secession in Canada, Britain and Spain) on this issue.
The Swiss example is an excellent one. The confederal model adopted recognizes not only the multi-lingual nature of Swiss society but also the distinct political aspirations of each national group. Indeed, Swiss citizenship is founded on the recognition of the central role of confederal citizenship across the 26 cantons which provide significant political, cultural and economic autonomy. Swiss identity is strongly shaped by a historical narrative which promotes tolerance of national political and cultural difference as key to the Swiss state (see the work of Guy Marchal on Swiss historiography). However, as Oliver Zimmer has noted, Swiss claims to nationhood have had to be realised in a polyethnic environment. Swiss claims for nationhood have therefore been founded on claims of the organic and voluntary nature of the confederal union. Liberal Swiss nationalists who have focused on the voluntarism have constructed a national narrative which seeks to highlight the civic exceptionalism of the Swiss state with regards to its neighbours but also acknowledges some common cultural traits. Those who draw on the organic nature of Swiss nationhood similarly acknowledge the importance of Swiss federalism but have also focused on the issues of historicism and genealogy.
The tensions presented with Swiss national identity are more akin to British national identity – though the existence of either within ‘national’ contexts is contested by some. The organic, genealogical construction of the Swiss nation has led to the growth of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) who have had considerable electoral success standing on an anti-immigration platform (particularly with regards to Swiss Muslims). Swiss far-right nationalists draw heavily on their own German, French or Italian national language and culture, though this is often projected within a broader Swiss context. Those on far-right in the BNP, who share many policies with the SVP, would argue there is distinct ethnic Britishness, although this is often simply code for Englishness. The difference is that in Switzerland there is evidence of an explicit acceptance of dual nationalism founded on civic exceptionalism. Most members of the BNP struggle to see the difference between Englishness and Britishness. If Swiss nationalists followed your logic that nations will always seek to become a state, secessionist political parties would have emerged who would wish to merge with their larger national cousins in Italy, France and Germany.
As for the situation in the Russian Federation, it is much more complex than you suggest. Many of the autonomous ethnic republics do not have titular majorities so again cannot cite the congruence of nation and state. Of those republics with sizeable Muslim populations, only Chechnya has seen significant conflict emerge. There are a number of reasons for this. The situation of Chechnya is unique in the Russian Federation. It was incorporated into the Russian Empire much later than say Tatarstan or Bashkortistan, has experienced a more coercive and violent relationship with Russia, has an external border and its ethnic Russian population was much smaller. This noted, such tensions are spreading to Dagestan and other territories in the Caucasus. However, considering the shift in the projection of Russian nationalism under Putin from a civic (Rossiyskaya) to a more ethnicised (Russky) identity, was is surprising is how many non-ethnic Russians still ascribe to some form of Russian civic national identity (see the work of Richard Sakwa on Russian identity across the federation). To simply suggest that secessionism has not emerged in Russia because of the threats of the centre is to overlook the fact that many non-ethnic Russian regions and republics voluntarily seek to remain within the Russian Federation – though it is true that their political elites have vested political and economic reasons. The point I made holds true, the Russian Federation provides an example of a multi-national federation which, at present, represents the political aspirations of most citizens within a hyper-diverse multi-national political space.
The situation in the UK could change radically in the near future but it is not certain that independence is the natural outcome. Bavarian secessionist nationalism of the 1920s dissipated (though as a the result of unprecedented events) to the point that The Bavaria Party that stood in the recent Euro elections stood on a (tongue in cheek) platform to abolish Bavaria - http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,628349,00.html.This point could be made also with regards to the position of Texas within the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The example of Quebec is more instructive still. From the position in the 1995 referendum where those seeking independence came within 1% of a majority, support has declined. Recognition of the national status of Quebec has actually shifted the debate for many towards issues of partnership. Moreover, when issues of identity are not placed in an ‘either-or’ context, most Quebeckers acknowledge some Canadian dynamic (See Matthew Mendelsohn’s 2002 article, Measuring national identity and patterns of attachment: Quebec and nationalist mobilization). The point of my argument is not to deride Scottish secessionists, simply to highlight that political support is variable and can go down as well as up. Similarly, support for secessionist parties should simply be interpreted as support for independence itself.
As for your kind suggestion that i am deluded on the issue of the Orange Order, well possibly. However, if i am deluded, i like to think such a position is evidentially supported. Together with colleagues, i have spent the past two years surveying the members of the Orange Order and interviewing members from across the UK and overseas. We have a sample of over 3,000 questionnaires, garnering considerable data which will be published next year. My position is drawn from such interviews and data. You are of course more than welcome to purchase a copy of the book of our research project and review on the pages of Open Democracy.
Regarding the ‘Homecoming’, my point is not that it is obvious that it is those who have a genealogical attachment to Scotland who would be attracted, it is that an ethnicised view of Scottishness persists. Again, i would draw your attention to Murray Leith excellent article from last year which charts the shift in rhetoric of the SNP in their construction of the Scottish nation. That the ‘Homecoming’ sought to appeal to Scottish diasporas simply highlights that an ethno-cultural element of Scottish nationalism, as with all Western European states, persists. As noted earlier, Scottish nationality will probably be defined by patriality, as it is many other states. Ignoring nationality serves to create a false illusion that ‘civic’ states are purely civic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors.
It is also likely that an independent Scottish state will utilise a range of symbols, rituals and cultural components which will be historically-justified and therefore will draw on a Scottish historical narrative which ethno-nationally defined. How newer citizens of any state fit into national narratives is a contentious and complex issue. Tom Devine has already begun to question the rigour of the predominantly positive articulation of the Scottish past which some suggest should be taught in Scottish schools. Again, none of these points are unique to Scottish civic nationalism. I merely raise them in response to Alex Salmond’s claim that his Scottishness is wholly civic.
The key point of my piece is to suggest the language we use reflects the complexity of nationalist politics in the UK. It is politically expedient for the SNP to claim rights to Scottish nationalism. The multiplicity of nationalism within many states is however real, as is the multiplicity of constructions of the nation. It is valid to acknowledge that each nation in the UK is not universal in its articulation or understanding. Chris Bryant in his book Nations of Britain (2006) provides an excellent typology which highlights the fractured nature of popular interpretations the English, Scottish, and Welsh nations. It is also appropriate to recognise those who ascribe to differing political outcomes, be they independence, devolution, federation can all be considered nationalists. However, discussions on this post have proved instructive. The term ‘separatist’ is probably a little too pointed and it might be appropriate to use the term ‘secessionist’. This noted, the general point stands, even if you feel it might not have popular recognition. I suspect we will not be able to reach consensus on this point though and my holidays are calling!
Britologywatch:
Once Scotland leaves the UK it won't be part of your political state and since England's identity problems are homegrown it is not up to Scots to solve them either before or after independence.
And reversing that statment makes no sense. 10% of the current UK deciding to leave is very different from 90% of the current UK throwing it out. Not that that would bother me.
Once the referendum has been won it is down to the negotiations on the split of assets and liabilities. If the Remainder of the UK (RUK) wants to decide on a name and constitution at the same time that's fine but it will be a completely separate event and internal to the new RUK.
Your idea that this would be part of the asset negotiations and in fact an attempt to keep the UK intact with some new "Federal" solution and that Scotland leaving would depend on a vote in the RUK on the terms and conditions is not going to happen.
A yes vote on Scottish independence is not the starting gun to find a new constitutional settlement for the UK it is the end of the UK. How the RUK works out its internal identity and name afterwords is not a matter for Scots and nor should it be.
Well, yes and no, as we equivocal English like to say. Of course, the political and constitutional future of Scotland is for the Scots to determine. But what the Scots decide has an impact on a wider 'national' community of which Scotland is a part. You can deny that you have any responsibility towards that national community; but this is essentially a form of selfishness and even bad faith (disguising malevolence as indifference), as your example of Moe the Barman illustrates.
Your point of view is dependent on the assumption that Scotland is a completely discrete, self-defining and 'self-determining' nation and not also an integral part of a larger, homogeneous entity (the UK). This allows you to say, for instance: "Once Scotland leaves the UK it won't be part of your political state". But if Scotland is an integral part of that political state, this would have to be re-expressed as: "Once the UK breaks up owing to the wishes of the Scots, Scotland won't be part of the new political state that will have to be formed". I.e. it's not a case of entity a (Scotland) 'leaving' entity b (the UK), which then remains essentially the same; but entity b breaks up into entity a plus new entity c - a new 'UK' or whatever state replaces the existing one.
As a citizen of entity b, I think I should have a choice as to what shape entity c should take, and not just leave that up to the residents of entity a. Also, the residents of entity a are entitled to choose to be part of entity c as an alternative to entity a. Or do you think that once an in-principle majority in favour of independence has been reached, that's a done deal and the people of Scotland (let alone their fellow-UK citizens) aren't entitled to be consulted on the final settlement, especially if that involves decisions about national assets and liabilities, including - presumably - maritime borders and their associated oil reserves? And how big does an in-principle majority have to be: 50% + 1 vote? And if the vote is 'no' (e.g. Calman rather than independence), will you accept that as a definitive verdict?
By the way, FTAOD, I'd be quite happy if the Scots voted 'yes' to independence, as this would mean a chance for English self-governance - a chance only, as the political elite might still try to deny us the opportunity to create a new English-national identity and constitution.
Andy,
It is clear that we will not agree on our interpretations of nationalism. Language defines how we think and your use of nationalism as a term to cover language activists, cultural activists and nationalists results in odd terms such as, "Separatist Nationalist", and in weak arguments such as the following.
Because you believe the language and cultural activists in Switzerland are nationalists you believe it proves your point. Because I don't see them as nationalists it doesn't disprove mine. It all comes down to the use of language and I use the univerally accepted terms used in the debate in Scotland.
I'm not sure what you mean here. Again your use of language colours your thinking. Nationalism in Scotland is about the break-up of the UK and because of that it has to be confrontational. I'm not sure whether you are advocating abandoning the idea of an independent Scotland to talk only on cultural matters and the revision of internal local government within the UK but if you do take that position it is again a position which has been advocated before by many unionist politicians and commentators in Scotland. If only the SNP would abandon independence then everything would be much more to everyone's liking. In other words a small northern Lib-Dem-a-like party would pose no electoral threat to any of the big three in Scotland or to the UK as a state.
It is a binary choice. Scotland as an independent state or as a region in a larger one. What powers the region of Scotland has in that state does not alter its status as a region. Both devolution and federalism are simply the reorganisation of local government within a unitary state and as the Calman report has shown the nerve of the establishment has broken and any further devolution of powers beyond tinkering is simply is not going to happen.
The failure to agree even on what the term nationalist means is a result of looking at Scottish independence from two different perspectives. You are looking at it from outside Scotland as an academic excercise while I am inside Scotland pushing leaflets through doors and talking to people on the street to ensure that the independence argument wins.
One other interesting take on language is your use of the words, "secession", and, "secessionist". The words are not used in debates on independence in Scotland and as before, if you were to debate independence in Scotland it would result in misunderstanding on both sides due to differences in concepts and language. "Secessionist Nationalist", is still a tautology.
As a final point, the question of the ethno-cultural element of Scottish nationalism has never come up on the doorstep.
Passing the message of "direct" and or "participatory" democracy across circumstances should obviously be healthy for ideas about strengthening democracy. Political histories present a lot of state sample structures. At the same time, one may see some such histories old. It doesn't have to be only under exceptional cases that it might be pretty difficult or less 'turmultous' to 'recreate' them! The "bird in hand worth twice in the bush": a common saying, for certain obvious cases, only admonishes a 'cool-headed' thinking out, and beyond cultural or language sentiments, not to mention the 'ethnic' dimensions. "Nationalism": a function of many values and realities, depending on maturity of those seeking to capitalise on the value of 'democractic pragmatism' and 'reform', must be made to look beyond, if the outcome wouldn't regrettably be that of throwing stones into 'ponds of water' and ugly "waves" thereafter! Isn't this new and an 'over sensitive' world to be free and but 'treat' with care? 'Nationalism' is seldom without lessons!
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