On 16 September President Lukashenka went to Vilnius. During his visit the Belarusian leader met the Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė and attended the opening of the Lithuanian-Belarusian International Economic Forum "Belarus and the Baltic Sea States: new opportunities for enhanced cooperation".  The Lithuanian public reacted to A. Lukashenka's visit in three ways:

• the business community offered him a very warm welcome, based on high hopes of successful economic cooperation which could help to move Lithuania out of the economic crisis;
• there was a high level of interest from the media and that part of society which was curious about the exotica of Lithuania hosting the "last European dictator", thus affording the Belarusian president a platform for promoting his current political regime and rejecting accusations of human rights violations;
• official political reaction was reserved after the meeting with the Lithuanian president, which kept well within protocol formalities and covered issues of economic cooperation, unresolved bilateral problems and human rights in Belarus. 

This was Lukashenka's first visit to Lithuania since 1998 and his second to an EU member state during the last decade. What does the visit mean to the EU and Lithuania?  And to Belarus itself, which has been trying to improve its relations with the West lately?

The EU opts for a two-tier strategy

The decision to host Lukashenka was not taken unilaterally by Lithuania; it was thoroughly coordinated with EU institutions. The Georgia-Russia military conflict changed EU policy towards Belarus. The policy of democratisation and the isolation of Lukashenka's regime has now been replaced by a two-tier strategy: continued cooperation with the opposition forces in Belarus (the democratisation tier), and selective involvement with the Belarusian political regime. In other words, the EU has made the economic and political self-sufficiency of Belarus (reducing Belarusian dependence on Russia) a priority.  Democratisation remains on the agenda, but as part of a wider approach. 

Lithuania positions itself as the "Belarusian window to Europe". This obviously raises ethical issues in Lithuanian foreign policy. Just before the visit, relatives of missing Belarusian activists appealed to the Lithuanian president not to meet A. Lukashenka. Their argument was a telling one: the visit could legitimize Lukashenka‘s political regime in the West, but to no avail, since any attempts to strengthen the dependence of his regime on the EU were doomed to fail. Lukashenka will go on playing the game by his own rules and will not commit to any EU requirements. There are strong arguments to back up this viewpoint: a decade of isolating the Belarusian political regime has brought no results and EU restrictions have not forced Lukashenka to move towards greater democracy.

There are at least two reasons to consider the double-tier strategy towards Belarus a plausible choice.  Firstly, conditionality and isolation had proved ineffective.  Secondly, Belarus seems to be extremely willing to talk to Europe. Russia is growing stronger and more aggressive and it is unlikely that Belarus finds being part of the Russian sphere of influence congenial, as this distinctly limits the possibilities for its strategy of balancing between Russia and the West.

Belarus represents a classic example of how the EU conditionality clause is unable to foster democratisation and economic modernisation. Until recently EU policy towards Belarus has on the whole been marked by an unfortunate combination of ignorance, sticks rather than carrots and successful conditionality. EU policy initiatives have not only been purely reactive, but also tardy. There was no clear EU strategy towards the CIS countries until the 2004 enlargement.  It adopted a "Russia first" approach, which meant that the CIS area was generally left to the Russian sphere of influence. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003-2004, was intended to address this problem, but came too late as economic and political ties with Russia had developed and Lukashenka's regime had embarked on an overwhelmingly undemocratic path. Unlike the EU, Russia never tried to push Lukashenka's regime towards democratisation. It has, however, worked hard to establish levers of influence over Belarus, which the EU failed to do. The Belarusian "economic miracle" was largely predicated on low-cost Russian energy resources and "forgivable loans".  Good relations with Russia were a strong factor of Lukashenka's domestic success: if he wanted to remain in power, he had to stay close to Moscow.

Under these circumstances the ENP and its strict conditionality were self-defeating: it failed to produce instruments of political pressure and its existing potential was exhausted far too early. Every time the EU applied its "sticks", it consolidated Lukashenka's authoritarianism and Belarusian dependence on Russia. The EU had less and less leverage over Belarus.  The suspension of the EU-Belarus PCA and the TACIS program (1997) resulted in a lack of institutional ties with Belarus and the creation of the Russian-Belarus Union State, the customs union agreement and military integration.  Visa restrictions for high-ranking representatives of the Belarus' regime (1998) reinforced the concept of the Union State and Belarusian support for some of Russia's dubious foreign policy goals. The EU Council of Ministers excluded Belarus from the Generalised System of Preferences (2004-2007) at the time the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (the Russia-dominated NATO analogue) and the Common Economic Area (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) were emerging. Meanwhile, the EU's support for civil society brought few results as the suppression of the opposition intensified.

This was, however, not only a failure of EU conditionality; it was also a failure of Lukashenka's multivector foreign policy. This year Belarus has accepted the conditions of the $2.5 billion IMF loan and participation in the Eastern Partnership initiative. This is clear indication that the 2008 Russia-Georgia military conflict, the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute and the Russian push for more economic integration put too much pressure on Lukashenka's regime. His administration is clearly ready for more cooperation with the EU. This does not mean that the civic dimension must be abandoned, but points up the need for a truly country-tailored multi-tier approach.

A door opens for Lukashenka's games?

Alexander Lukashenka's visit seems to fit into the framework of the two-tier strategy. It also coincides with Lithuanian business interests (fostering the export of fertilizers via Klaipėda port and the entrance of some business groups into the Belarusian market). Large Lithuanian companies were among the most important initiators of this visit.

On the other hand, Lithuania has also opened a window of opportunity for Lukashenka to conduct his own political games. He obviously regards the thaw in EU-Belarus relations as a chance to make fools of both the EU and Moscow. Lukashenka needs EU financial assistance to revitalise the moribund Belarusian economy, gain access to the European market and increase Belarusian bargaining powers against Moscow. But as soon as the EU mentions terms that touch on Belarusian domestic politics, Lukashenka is likely to be the first to close all the windows of opportunity and the "new historical pages of bilateral relations". The Belarusian president realises perfectly well that it is his relationship with Russia, not the EU, that offers prospects for the further development of his regime.

Obviously, Russia has many more levers of influence over Lukashenka‘s regime than the EU.  Moscow can play the energy card at any time (by setting a flat rate for Belarusian and European gas prices), or cancel its huge orders for Belarusian industrial goods.  Both would destroy the fragile Belarusian social and economic system. Lukashenka used to avoid this by allowing Russian capital to take over strategic Belarusian enterprises; however, this may not suffice in the future. Until the EU develops levers of influence similar to those of Moscow, any "thaw" in EU-Belarus relations will develop according to Lukashenka's scenario.

The main question Lithuanian and EU foreign policy makers should be addressing is how to lock Belarus into a set of rules that cannot be unilaterally altered by Lukashenka. The 2008 IMF loan is an example of how difficult this can be. It came with a clear set of conditions for strengthening monetary control and liberalising the Belarusian economy.  During the May 2009 evaluation of progress, the IMF concluded that the changes were purely "cosmetic". The privatisation and liberalisation processes appeared fragmentary and had introduced no real change (the private sector share in the Belarusian economy only constitutes 25-30% of GDP). A. Lukashenka remains the sole initiator and arbiter of reform. All privatisation agreements in the period 2007-2009 were only signed with the approval of A. Lukashenka. The centralised Belarusian economy enables him to keep control over the bureaucracy and political elites in return for limited access to the economic resources, so every reform is strictly controlled.

There is no point in talking about transparent "rules of the game" in Belarus. Even if Lithuanian business were to enter the Belarusian market successfully, their investments could easily be eliminated when the political wind changes (when Lukashenka‘s geopolitical games come into play). One thing should be clear about Lukashenka‘s rapprochement with the EU: his multivector policy still stands.  He is seeking more financial injections from the West, but will continue to avoid any obligations for structural reform, economic liberalisation or changes in the political system.

What should the EU expect?

Lukashenka's concessions to the West can only be very limited.  Western long-term plans continue to envisage Belarus as a democratic state "without Lukashenka".  This would mean improving the standards of democracy in the longer term, which in turn means that the thaw between Lukashenka and the West would come to an end. It is important to emphasise that in his relations with Russia, Lukashenka is on the horns of a dilemma between self-sufficiency and loyalty.  In his relations with the West the choice is between the sustainability of the regime and democracy. These are completely different dilemmas: in the first case Lukashenka's political future is still secure (even if it means ending up as a governor in the Russian Federation); in the other case, there is no political future for him whatsoever. Thus the most the EU can expect is that Lukashenka will take small steps towards market liberalisation and privatisation. This would pave the way for European investment, decreasing the role of Lukashenka's social guarantee system and state enterprise.  It would also reduce Belarusian people's dependence on the social and economic monopoly of the state. Economic liberalisation might then spill over into the Belarusian political system.

Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Živilė Dambrauskaitė, Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius, Lithuania: http://www.eesc.lt/en

No one in the journalist world seemed to have had any warning that Medvedev would be gripped with a "sudden passion" to write. There was no mention in the morning papers that the article was going to come out. But several Internet publications immediately reacted, and also posted the article on their sites. Its appearance was picked up soon afterwards by the democratic radio station "Ekho Moskvy".

The most surprising thing was that Medvedev's article was only posted on the official presidential site http://www.kremlin.ru/ at midday. All this combined to make it look as if the appearance of the text on the Internet was spontaneous, which gave an aura of sincerity to Medvedev's address to Russian citizens.

But what was behind all this? What did the text actually contain?

As I am finishing a book about the history of Russian reforms since the time of Mikhail Gorbachev (since the mid-1980s) at the moment, it all felt very familiar.  It was as if I'd suddenly gone back a quarter of a century, to the time of my youth, of naïve hopes, empty shops and the rusting iron curtain.

I don't know whether the similarities are obvious to young Russians, who don't remember the events of 1985 very clearly, or to my contemporaries, for whom the events are not fresh in their minds. But it seemed to me that Medvedev's text might almost have been written at the time of Gorbachev's perestroika.

I should remind you that it was then that the leader of the Soviet Communists Mikhail Gorbachev began tentatively to undermine the system that had existed since Lenin's day, and remove conservatives from the political leadership of the USSR. In 1985, it seemed that he was only trying to improve the effectiveness of the Soviet system, while with every year changes took place which turned this system into its opposite - into a society with elements of a market and democracy.

But let us return to Medvedev. The first important point his article makes is to admit that mistakes have been made. This is a cautious affirmation, one that does not undermine the foundations of the system. Medvedev points out the problems that have been revealed by the crisis, the "drop in production that is greater that in other economies (my italics - DT) during the present crisis. The excessive fluctuations of the stock exchange. All this proves," the Russian president concludes, "that we certainly did not do everything that was necessary in previous years. And we certainly did not do everything correctly."

Many Russian readers probably did not realize that in saying this he was taking issue directly with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and with the report of the Russian government on results of activity for 2009. Putin, who presented the report at the Duma on the 6^th of April, declared: "A severe slump is being experienced by practically all industries of the world economy. In some places, things are better, in some they are worse, but on the whole the situation in the Russian economy is fundamentally no different (my italics - DT) from world tendencies".

In Russia, official Kremlin propagandists constantly emphasize the fact that Medvedev is Putin's successor to the position of president, that he is his younger comrade, and that there can be no disagreements between the two leaders. However, Medvedev's article demolished this notion. And significantly, this is taking happening thanks to an initiative taken by the president himself, and not during a press conference or interview, when things might get said in the heat of the moment which shouldn't have been.

Medvedev is not setting out to confront Putin directly. But at the start of perestroika Gorbachev did not directly oppose his predecessors, either. He was giving the Soviet intellectuals, who were used to picking up on Aesopian allusions, the chance to fill in the blanks for themselves.

Medvedev not only discussed the economy in his article, but also political problems. He noted that "democratic institutions have on the whole been formed and stabilized, but their quality is very far from ideal". This also looks like an attack on Putin, who - even if ironically - in one interview called himself such an absolute and pure democrat that since the death of Mahatma Gandhi he did not even have anyone to talk to.

Medvedev's assessment of the state of Russian democracy is very similar to the early theses of Gorbachev, who showed his confidence in the correctness of the socialist democracy, but proposed to strengthen it. In the spirit of Lenin, so to speak.

Medvedev is essentially saying directly that in future, Russia must move to a parliamentary democracy, where the "leaders in the political struggle will be parliamentary parties which regularly replace each other in power". He is practically repeating the theses of the democratic opposition. But where this is something that  the opposition wants to happen today, for Medvedev it is a task for the future. For the moment, according to the president, we must be satisfied with the fact that "political parties have received fresh opportunities to influence the formation of executive power in federation regions and municipalities".

We should remember that under Gorbachev, democratization also began in 1988-89 with the construction of a very unusual system, in which elections were not actually equal, secret and direct, as is customary in modern democracies. That is to say, Gorbachev was prepared to experiment with democratization, but he was afraid to start building a real democracy right now.

It is characteristic that Medvedev is categorical about one thing: we cannot return to the "democratic 1990s". In this, he agrees with Putin, who in recent years has said again and again that in the 1990s capitalism established itself in the country under the guise of democracy, serving its own selfish interests, and also those of its foreign (primarily American) sponsors. Medvedev does not dare to make a drastic break with his older comrade.

In Gorbachev's early years, he too rejected a return to capitalist democracy. The feeling was: why should we move backwards? We will do everything better than under capitalism, we will build socialism with a human face.

Another feature very characteristic of Medvedev is the way he declares a new way of thinking in international relations. He talks of the need for rapprochement with western democracies, something that Putin has not discussed seriously for many years. Medvedev also stresses that "petulance, arrogance, insecurity, mistrust and especially hostility must be eliminated from Russia's relations with leading democratic countries".

As Vladimir Putin has essentially been responsible for creating the parameters of Russian foreign policy since 2000, and foreign ministers have simply been the obedient followers of his policy, words about petulance and arrogance can only apply to Putin. And indeed, some Russian analysts have noted that Putin's behaviour betrays the marks of his difficult childhood, and his unwillingness to forgive insults by other boys, a subject I have written about in detail for openDemocracy.

Another view of Medvedev's: "We must be able to interest partners, and involve them in joint activity. And if we need to change something in ourselves, get rid of prejudices and illusions, in order to be able to do so, and then we must do so." In the mid-1980s, the idea of the need to change something in ourselves was first expressed not by Gorbachev, but by Boris Yeltsin in his speech in the 27^th Communist party congress.  This was very much in the spirit of Gorbachev's perestroika.

Now let us try to compare the specific picture of the changes which Medvedev is now announcing with the changes Gorbachev was announcing a quarter of a century ago.

Right at the start of perestroika in the USSR, the issue of combating drunkenness came up. Quite recently, it came up once again, and Medvedev gives it pride of place in his article. Under Gorbachev, the war on drunkenness was virtually the only large-scale campaign of his first two years in power.

But there is also another important similarity between Medvedev's approach and that adopted under perestroika. People do not remember that well today that along with the anti-alcohol campaign, the head of the Soviet government Nikolai Ryzhkov did his best to speed up socio-economic development. And the way being proposed was by developing machine-building, i.e. through technology alone. It was only in June 1987 that the issue of changing the economic system was raised. Before that what we mainly heard about was the wonderful breakthroughs that would be achieved by advanced technology combined with sober workers.

And now Medvedev has outlined the five strategic vectors of economic modernization. Typically, he says nothing about the issues that are being discussed by economists. Medvedev, as a new-wave technocrat, simply paints a picture of a bright future where Russia will become a leading country in all key spheres of high technology: new types of fuel, nuclear technology, information technology, advanced satellites, and breakthrough in creating medical equipment. But how are we going to achieve all this, given the raw materials focus of the country, and our dependence on world oil prices, which I have written about in detail in another of my articles? Medvedev does not offer us any insightful discussion about this.

As we may recall, in the 1980s Gorbachev meant to raise Russian automobile construction to a world level by developing the Volga automobile factory (VAZ), without any foreign investments and equipment. To this day, VAZ produces very poor cars that are inferior to western models. Medvedev also forgets about the poor quality of the automobile industry, and immediately talks about more advanced technology.

And in conclusion. How did Soviet citizens see the structure of society during the time of perestroika? On the one hand, there were supporters of perestroika, and on the other there were opponents. This naïve approach pitted good against evil on different sides of the barricades. All the officials and appratchiks were declared to be opponents of perestroika, and the entire people headed by Gorbachev were declared to be supporters.

What does Medvedev write? "People will try to interfere with our work. Influential groups of corrupt officials and "entrepreneurs" who do not engage in any actual enterprise." Once more, we can see an attempt by the political leader to identify himself with the people, and marginalize his opponents.

Even yesterday it was perhaps still hard to imagine to what extent Medvedev would strive to copy Gorbachev's path. He was afraid to oppose Putin, and only took symbolic steps to consolidate his popularity in intellectual circles - a subject I have also written about for openDemocracy.

Russia is one of those countries for which the economic crisis ought to be a blessing in disguise. Over the last boom decade, high energy prices have excused a multitude of pathologies: corruption got worse because there was more to steal; Putin brokered the creation of giant inefficient ‘national champions' that are a deadweight on the more productive parts of the economy; even Russia's one copper-bottomed asset, oil and gas, will decline in the future, as its giant energy companies like Gazprom and Rosneft have simply failed to invest enough to meet supply commitments.

Getting rid of presidents in Northern Caucasian republics rarely ends well. An explosion is bad news: when Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov came to power.  When Murat Zyazikov was replaced in Ingushetia, Basaev immediately attacked and anti-terrorist activity in the republic became much worse. The assassination attempt on Ingushetia's Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has brought Ramzan Kadyrov into the picture once more.

The day of the attempt, 22 June, Kadyrov announced after a meeting with Medvedev that the Russian president had asked him to take charge of counter-terrorism in Ingushetia. He added that the prosecutor's office and interior ministry could do whatever they considered necessary, but that he himself would be guided by the laws of the mountains in dealing with the people who had tried to kill his "brother", the president of Ingushetia.   Ramzan Kadyrov had previously said in an interview with Ekho Moskvy that he would personally deal with those who even knew anything about the murder of his father (let alone those that carried it out) - and now they are all dead. The prosecutor's office took no action against Kadyrov after these virtual admissions of extrajudicial executions and we can be sure that they will not take any now.

The issue of how to control the war on terrorism in Ingushetia is becoming critical. Ingushetia is currently among the least economically developed regions of Russia, with the highest level of unemployment, but also with one of the highest percentages of young people in the country. The local authorities - at any rate, during the period of Murat Zyazikov's rule - did virtually nothing to address social and economic problems. For the last few years almost every day has seen the murder of members of law-enforcement organisations or other government representatives. So "controlling the anti-terrorist operation" here effectively means controlling the republic.

Actually the possible unification of Chechnya and Ingushetia has been on the cards for a long time. Or rather the annexation i.e. a return to the protection of its "elder brother", as throughout almost the entire Soviet period.

Ingushetia's Soviet history

The Ingushetia Autonomous Oblast with its capital in Vladikavkaz existed for just 10 years (1924-34) as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 

From 1934 Ingushetia was part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR with its capital in Grozny (from 1934 to 1936 the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast).  All that time the Ingush, who with the Chechens belong to the group of Vainakh peoples, shared the fate of the Chechens.

By 1939 there were a total of 92,000 Ingush living in the Soviet Union, while there were over 408,000 Chechens. In 1944 both these peoples suffered a common tragedy - they were declared traitors and deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan.  Approximately a third of the population died in the process and their autonomy was destroyed.

It was only in 1957, after a law on rehabilitation had been passed, that the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic was restored and the Ingush and Chechens returned from exile. According to data for 1959, there were a total of 56,000 Ingush and around 250,000 Chechens living in the RSFSR (and although the total number of them in the Soviet Union reached the figures of 1939 by 1959, only half of the Ingush and Chechens returned home)[1].

About one sixth of the former Ingush lands were not returned to the restored Chechen-Ingush autonomy: the greater part was transferred to North Ossetia. The largest area that became part of Ossetia in 1957 was the Prigorodny region.  In 1944 around 30,000 Ingush were living there (almost a third of the ethnic group), accounting for over 90% of the population of the region[2].

After the deportation of the Ingush, the Prigorodny region and a number of other Ingush territories were settled by Ossetians from the mountainous part of South Ossetia.  When the Malgobek and Nazran regions were returned to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1957, the settlers from South Ossetia were not allowed to go back to Georgia.  They had to make do with the Prigorodny region and this process continued after 1957 as well.  By 1959 the population of the Prigorodny region was 63% Ossetian, 19% Russian and only 12% Ingush. (In 1990, Ingush made up 44% of the population of the region, or 17,500 people)[3]. Although the Ingush were not formally prohibited from returning to the region, the authorities de facto not only gave them no assistance, but actually prevented them from doing so. Many of the Ingush who were unable to return to the Prigorodny region, never saw their native villages again and settled in Grozny.

Relationship with Chechnya

For almost 60 years the Ingush remained in the shadow of the more numerous Chechen people.  All the major industries, higher education facilities and administrative buildings were located in Grozny. Ingushetia remained a primarily rural area throughout this time, and did not develop in any way. The Ingush intelligentsia was also mainly concentrated in Grozny or in Vladikavkaz. Formally rehabilitated, but still "unreliable", the Vainakhs were hardly ever allowed to take positions of leadership, or work in qualified positions in their own republic - and this affected the Ingush more than the Chechens.

When Chechnya declared independence in the autumn of 1991, the Ingush confirmed at a national referendum that Ingushetia was part of the Russian Federation and no longer belonged to the splinter Chechen-Ingush Republic.  On 4 June 1992 the Supreme Council of the RSFSR passed the law "On the formation of the Ingush Republic as part of the Russian Federation". This had a lot to do with the understanding that if they seceded from Russia, the Ingush would lose any hope of getting back the Prigorodny region.  In the spring of 1991 the Supreme Council of the RSFSR passed the law "On the rehabilitation of repressed people", which among other things recognised "their right to the restoration of territorial integrity".

However, the first law did not determine the administrative borders of the new territorial formation, and the second ("On rehabilitation") failed to lay down a procedure for the return of the territories.   Georgia's claims on South Ossetia at the time of the collapse of communism led to a new wave of refugees into the Prigorodny region.  All this effectively planted a time bomb that was to explode less than six months later when Ingushetia became involved in an armed conflict in the Prigorodny region of Northern Ossetia, the consequences of which in many ways still determine policies in the region.

One of these consequences was a wave of refugees. Almost all ethnic Ingush were forced to leave the territory of North Ossetia. Ingushetia, which had a total population of around 170,000 in the national census of 1989, took in 30-60,000 people, which created huge problems for the republic. 

It was this week-long conflict that brought the Ingush together, gave them an acute sense that they were a separate people, and that their republic should be an independent administrative entity. So you might say that modern Ingushetia came into being as a result of the clashes with Ossetia when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The border with Ossetia was practically closed for the Ingush after this conflict. At the same time, neighbouring Chechnya had unilaterally announced independence and was leading its own internal political life, keeping its distance from the Prigorodny conflict. To this day the Ingush resent the fact that the Chechens failed to come to their aid at this time.

President Aushev

When the Soviet army general Ruslan Aushev came to power in Ingushetia, it embarked on a political life of its own.  It had to demonstrate its independence not only to its neighbours, but to the rest of Russia, which the Ingush felt had treated it unjustly, joining the conflict entirely on the side of their opponents.

President Aushev succeeded in having Ingushetia declared a privileged economic zone.  From 1 July 1994 all enterprises registered in the republic were exempted for a year from paying local taxes, and received considerable privileges in paying federal taxes. As a result of Aushev's efforts, by the end of 1994 there was a state concern, Ingushneftegazkhimprom, uniting 14 oil and gas processing enterprises, the first asphalt factory had opened and there were regular flight to and from Moscow.

Refugees from the 1^st Chechen War

However, the period of calm was not to last long. In December 1994 the first Chechen war broke out and, although military operations did not spread to Ingushetia, there was a wave of refugees from Chechnya.  There are no precise figures, but estimates suggest this was around 150,000 people.  The combination of new refugees and those from the Prigorodny region proved an insufferable burden for the republic. Ingushetia became a hub of refugee camps.

After the end of the war in 1996, the majority of Chechen refugees returned home, while many Ingush who had been living in Grozny preferred to stay in Ingushetia and settle down there, closer to their relatives. The Ingush intelligentsia returned, which was important for the subsequent development of the republic, especially as the exodus of the non-Vainakh population was continuing. The population of the capital at the time, Nazran, grew swiftly: in 1989 it had been under 20,000, but by this time it had grown to 125,000.

The second Chechen war meant a new wave of refugees for the republic, bigger than ever before. Approximate estimates show that around 350,000 people left Chechnya at that time. General Shamanov decreed that all regions of the Russian Federation were to close their administrative borders to refugees. President Aushev alone refused to do this, which saved thousands of lives.  Ingushetia took almost all the migrants from Chechnya and the population of the republic doubled over several months. Subsequently, the number of refugees dropped to 150,000 over the course of half a year, and remained at this level until the end of 2002.

Humanitarian organisations, both international and Russian, helped the Ingush government to deal with this very difficult situation and until 2007 their missions were based in the peaceful city of Nazran[4]. Their work included the distribution of humanitarian aid, supporting educational projects and giving mini-loans to help small businesses. The Ingush themselves say that there were many positive changes when the Chechens came to Ingushetia.   The service sector began to develop - shops, hair salons and sewing workshops opened up and privately-owned public transport became more efficient. However, the large number of refugees also contributed to a rise in crime, and in a country with major employment problems, humanitarian aid tended to corrupt people - especially the younger generation. As the situation in Chechnya became relatively stable, the number of refugees dropped, but there are still quite a lot of them.

Last year a Chechen refugee in the village of Ekazhevo stopped my colleague and me on the street. She had seen that we were clearly not locals (in other words, Muscovites - almost no one else comes here), so she threw on a jacket and rushed out, thinking that perhaps we could help her.  She had been living in a barn with her children for almost 10 years.

Chechen insurgency

With the refugees almost inevitably came the insurgents. Anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya were continuing, so militants in Ingushetia were no longer just "sitting it out": after 2002 they started operating from inside the republic.  Counter-terrorism became part of life in the republic and led to mass crimes and human rights violations: militants attack police and the military, officials are killed, there are "special operations", in which law-enforcement officers carry out executions without trials and kidnap people.

Originally the armed underground consisted mainly of Chechen rebels, who had moved to the neighbouring republic to escape from federal troops, but later (and to a large degree because of the brutality of the law-enforcement officers), the Ingush began to take a more active role in the underground. Once peaceful Ingushetia is no more.

The Chechen wars exacerbated internal problems, but they also complicated relations between the Ingush and the outside world. The average Russian citizen cannot really tell a Chechen from an Ingush, and neither can the average policeman or any other government representative. Negative attitudes towards Chechens began to be extended to the related Vainakh people, the Ingush.  This made it difficult for them to move around and affected their relations with the rest of the country.

President Zyazikov

The beginning of 2002 was a turning point in the life of the republic: Ruslan Aushev, who had led the country since 1993, resigned. He had called for an immediate ceasefire by federal troops in Chechnya and peace talks.  He was accused of sympathising with Chechen insurgents.  Former allies within the republic accused him of establishing a dictatorship. In December 2001 Aushev stood down.

In April 2002 presidential elections were held.  The FSB general Murat Zyazikov was actively promoted by central government and in the second round on 28 April 2002 he was elected president of Ingushetia. The authorities lost no opportunity of manipulating the elections and made good use of the advantages of administrative office.

On 21-22 June 2004 the republic was stunned when a large group of militants led by Shamil Basaev seized several towns in the space of a few hours, including the cities of Nazran and Karabulak. The militants established checkpoints at crossings, checked documents and shot law-enforcement officers on the spot. This was the largest operation by insurgents in Ingushetia.  It resulted in the deaths of 78 law-enforcement officers and escalating internal conflict.

The terrorist act in the North Ossetian city of Beslan on 1-3 September 2004 led to a new escalation of the conflict in the Prigorodny regions.  Ethnic Ingush took part in the seizure of the school, where over 300 people were killed and immediately after the tragedy there were calls in the Ossetian media for " revenge on the Ingush".

In the second half of 2007-2008 attacks on uniformed officers and government representatives and acts of terrorism took place almost every day. In the summer of 2007 an additional military contingent of 2,500 Russian troops was sent to Ingushetia to maintain order.

Now there are ever fewer people in Ingushetia: the entire population is under half a million.... This winter a friend who came to Moscow to work told me: "Yesterday I waited about half an hour for a friend in the metro underpass.  I saw 15 or so people from Ingushetia. I know the Ingush by their faces. Sometimes I think that over the last year and a half there are more of them in Moscow than in Ingushetia. Whoever you ask about, they're all here. It's all rather strange. But what sort of a life can people have there now?"

At the same time the inefficiency of the local government became a real problem. President Murat Zyazikov's powers were extended in 2005 at the request of the Russian President[5], but he had no influence on the situation and was unable to solve of the most important problems.  He failed to protect people from insurgent attacks or the lawlessness of uniformed officers, to ensure economic development, create jobs, to uphold what the majority of the population sees as their national interests, or deal with corruption.

In 2007 social dissatisfaction in society reached a critical level. There was no democratic system for exerting pressure on the government, so new forms of protest started appearing - mass street rallies, an attempt to revive the traditional legislative body, the Mekkh Kkhel, and the use of various information technologies. The local political opposition took up the movement that had begun at grass roots level with demands to stop the practice of kidnapping people.

Protests continued for over a year and resulted in the replacement of the president in October-November 2008. Murat Zyazikov was removed from his post by a decree of the Russian president. The new president was a native of Ingushetia, career army officer Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.

Ingush refugees

But in spite of all the changes and upheavals the republic continued to exist. An existence full of resentment and in complete isolation. They can't travel freely westwards to Ossetia because of the conflict that flared up in 1992 when communism ended, and also because of the Beslan incident in 2004.   But their relationship with Chechnya is much more complicated. Or rather, much more painful.  The Chechens are the people closest to the Ingush, they share a common history, a common life, but... they can't go there anymore, and a return to Grozny for the Ingush is not possible.

The Ingush, who fled from the war in Grozny to their villages, found their apartments destroyed or looted when they returned. They had not been able return to check their homes as often as the Chechens - the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya with its checkpoints became one of the most dangerous places in the entire Caucasus. After the war, when there are no relatives around to help, it is not so easy to rebuild your house. For many, Grozny simply ceased to exist.

Ingushetia, the smallest republic of all the Russian republics, is shaped like a telephone receiver - 50-60 km wide in the southern and northern extremities and not more than 20 km in the middle.  Squashed between two neighbouring republics, for the Ingush the border represents the dividing line between home and a hostile outside world.

This is why in Russia today many Ingush have become refugees twice over:  first they were forced to abandon their homes in the Prigorodny region and begin a new life in Grozny, then they had to flee again from the Chechen wars. The more traditional rural Ingush did not find it easy to become integrated, even in Chechen society, and to this day Ingush families try not only to marry their daughter to an Ingush man, but to marry their son to an Ingush woman as well. Once in Ingushetia, they are often unable to resettle in rural life after having lived in one of the largest and most developed cities of the North Caucasus.

Magomed left Grozny during the first war and now lives in Karabulak.  He only remembers Grozny occasionally:

"Go back there? What have they got there? I was in Grozny recently, on the street I grew up on, where I spent almost all of my childhood. I don't know anyone there now - just one or two families have remained. The people who used to live there are not there any more. I consider myself a local here now."

There are many "locals" here now. Very many. What used to be the Grozny urban intelligentsia (those who didn't move further away) have ended up in small, rural Ingushetia.  They live in the town of Nazran, which is essentially an overgrown village, but a peaceful place. Even if former teachers from Grozny universities say with a sigh that there used to be several technical colleges there and now there are five universities, they don't want to go back either. They don't even want to go back to a Grozny that is being actively rebuilt. A Grozny that has ceased to become an anti-terrorist operation zone:

"Is there a feeling of stability there? Of course not. Where could it come from? It's a serious ordeal when a person is living there, going to work and bringing up children, when suddenly bombs start falling. We had to flee to this place, and if we go back, no one guarantees that we won't have to flee again tomorrow. So perhaps we are better off here."

Of course, not all the Ingush left Chechnya.  There were some who survived both wars. And some of them didn't.   In 2007 the European court for human rights handed down a decision on another "Chechen case" - the Tangieva case.  The elderly parents of a friend and colleague were killed together with their Russian neighbour in Grozny, in their own house, during a "clean-up operation" in January 2000.  After a few months and with great difficulty, their children were able to take their bodies to Ingushetia and bury them there. They didn't return to Chechnya. Shamil is the only one of the brothers and sisters who remained in Grozny, in his parents' burnt-out house.  Now the house has been almost completely rebuilt, but as soon as they can, both he and his relatives want to rebuild their house in their native village in the Prigorodny region.

Ingushetia as a transit point

After 17 years of independence in the shadow of the more famous Chechnya, the Ingush still feel that they are regarded as an add-on and people often don't even know about the existence of Ingushetia:

"On many sites, when you want to fill in the box about where you are from, you write Checheno-Ingushetia. I recently registered on the Classmates [Friends Reunited equivalent ed.] site, and Ingushetia was not there at all. Our towns - Nazran and Karabulak - were classified as part of the Chechen republic, i.e. it didn't even show that this was Ingushetia. So I ended up writing that I was from the Chechen Republic, Nazran".

Chechnya has overshadowed almost everything: by now Ingushetia had become simply a transit point for human rights advocates, journalists and politicians. Planes flew here, there was a hotel, there was Internet, there was running water - but almost everyone was going on to Chechnya. Then it became possible to fly directly to Chechnya, Internet access improved there, and Ingushetia turned into one of the least stable republics in the Caucasus.

People started to talk and write about Ingushetia.  At the end of 2007 a paper by the Memorial Human Rights Centre was published, "Whither Ingushetia?" and in December 2008 there was a Human Rights Watch report "As if they've come from the moon! Anti-terrorism, human rights violations and impunity in Ingushetia". Moscow journalists began coming here to report on protest meetings.  The local authorities, unaccustomed to so much attention, clearly didn't know what to do about it - journalists and human rights advocates were kidnapped and beaten up, or "deported" to neighbouring Ossetia.  Press conferences were organized in Moscow to explain the hostile actions of the slanderers.

No investment

In neighbouring Chechnya there are ongoing building programmes, the young president is bringing money into the republic and the job opportunities are better.  People in Ingushetia may feel envious of this, but when Ramzan Kadyrov came to power and there was talk of unifying the two republics, the Ingush were almost unanimously opposed. When asked why, they simply said: "Then there will be a war here too. There will be a lot of blood".

Despite the poverty of the region, the Ingush understand very well what is happening in Chechnya. When asked about independence from Russia, they say: "No. We remember too well what happened to Chechnya." They also know how the Chechen law-enforcement officers work: how they came to refugee camps in Ingushetia and took people away, or shot Ingush policemen who tried to inspect them. They also know that if they become part of Chechnya again, then they will be the "younger brother": they won't be able to take any decisions, and they won't be able to return to "their" Grozny anyway - simply because this Grozny no longer exists.

The issue of national self-determination became a hot topic again at the end of last year. The occasion for this was the Federal Law „On organising local government in the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic" of 24 November 2008.  The republic has disputed territories on all sides, so there was active discussion about how the border with Chechnya would be determined, and most importantly what would happen to villages of the Prigorodny region. The passing of the law practically coincided with the appointment of the new Ingush president.

Kadyrov's pretensions to Ingushetia

One of the main disappointments concerning Yevkurov that I picked up in Ingushetia was that he made no attempt to get the Prigorodny region back.  All he did was declare that refugees should be able to return there. The Prigorodny question still comes up in almost every conversation with any resident of Ingushetia. In the past people have even said that if Kadyrov were here in Ingushetia, then perhaps he would be able to get the region back.

Kadyrov's current move on Ingushetia is not his first attempt to lay claim to neighbouring territory. When he was the first deputy prime minister of Chechnya in 2005, Ramzan Kadyrov said that the most important problem for the newly-elected Chechen parliament was to extend the borders. "This question has been dragging on for about 15 years. During this time, the borders were moved by anybody who felt like it, and the territory of Chechnya has been significantly reduced." He emphasised that "...the issue of Chechen native land concerns the whole people. Now the time has come for parliament to investigate."

The Dagestan and Ingush authorities alike expressed their bewilderment over this statement. But back then Ramzan Kadyrov was only deputy prime minister, and it seemed that this was simply the naked ambition of a young leader who didn't have enough power.

The Chechen leadership subsequently acted more cautiously.  In 2006 only the chairman of the National Assembly of the Chechen republic, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, expressed an opinion on the territorial claims.  He said that a number of Chechen regions were located inside Dagestan, and that the unification of the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia was essential, because the division had taken place artificially and without a referendum. Ramzan Kadyrov tried to distance himself from these statements, saying that this was the personal opinion of the Chairman of the National Assembly, and in no way connected with the official position of the Chechen authorities. However, the official who came out with this controversial statement which ostensibly went against the official position of the national leader (not yet the president at that time) continued to hold his post - clearly there were no real disagreements on this issue.

The following year, when he became president, Kadyrov began to declare his ambitions to extend his informal suzerainty in the region.  But this time he went about it much more tactfully and at a different level: at a meeting of leaders of North Caucasus regions, the Chechen president proposed to meet each month to discuss common problems.

The future

The future of Ingushetia, Russia's youngest republic, has been much discussed over the past few years. But now, after Ramzan Kadyrov has moved in there, it is time to formulate the question differently: will it now exist at all?  They've had 17 years of independence, but to what end?  17 years of living with a feeling of injustice, that they've lost everything and will have to start from scratch.   A feeling that all this has to be endured, because things are even worse for their neighbours and that all there is to hope for is that one day this will end.

Kadyrov has come to Ingushetia, but I don't think we should expect that he will bring us money, as he did to Chechnya.  He has none of the right connections here yet, nor anyone who is personally obliged to him.  He doesn't have a local support system, whereby everyone is obliged to pay tribute to him. The danger is that the Ingush won't get from Kadyrov the things that they like about him - only the things that they don't.

After the August 2008 war in Georgia, people in Ingushetia didn't wonder (as they did in Chechnya): "How come Russia gave independence to these people who only number in the tens of thousands, but not to us, of whom there are a million?!"    But they did wonder: "What about the Ossetians? Are they really independent now?" What the Ingush remember is that at the fall of communism in 1992 Ossetians had come from South Ossetia to fight them.

In August 2008 central TV channel correspondents were saying that Ossetia had been, and remains, Russia's outpost in the Caucasus.  The Russian Prosecutor's Office was talking about genocide. And yet again the Ingush got the feeling that no one cared about them.

When Zyazikov was dismissed and Yevkurov appointed,  many people became hopeful again and some even came back to live in Ingushetia. But now there's Kadyrov.

On the day after the Chechen President's statement, Ruslan Aushev, who had refused all proposals to return to the republic after 2002, announced publicly that he was ready to be the leader of Ingushetia while Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in hospital, if everything was organised according to correct legal procedures. Aushev also said that the president of the neighbouring republic had enough problems of his own. The Ingush opposition, citing Ruslan Aushev's statement, began gathering signatures to support this course of action. Aushev was forced to explain that he had not called on anyone to take any action.

Kadyrov's reaction was immediate.  He described Aushev's statements as inappropriate and incorrect, and announced that it was under Aushev's rule that "bandits of all kinds had made their nests in Ingushetia". Kadyrov believes that Aushev not only took no action against members of illegal armed formations, but had "concealed Maskhadov, Basaev and other heads of bandit groups on the territory of Ingushetia". "We pointed out on several occasions during  Aushev's rule that there were militant ringleaders hiding out in Ingushetia, that they were being sheltered.   Aushev reacted badly to these reports, and took no steps to fight terrorism as we did in Chechnya". "Today in Ingushetia, the results of Aushev's irresponsible attitude to the problem of terrorism are still making themselves felt," the Chechen president concluded.

Now that Kadyrov is making all these statements after the assassination attempt on Yevkurov, giving orders to the Chechen law-enforcement officers to deal with the terrorist underground in Ingushetia in two weeks, we should remember his speech in 2005 about the poor work of the law-enforcement bodies of neighbouring republics in dealing with armed opposition groups. "Militants feel comfortable in Dagestan and Ingushetia, and some other republics. In my opinion the Dagestan Interior Ministry is particularly ineffective in dealing with them. They relax there, get treatment for their injuries, and then slip across the border into Chechnya, kill state officials and policemen, and leave to go into hiding until the next time". At the same time, Kadyrov claimed there were no ethnic Chechens left among the insurgents in Chechnya itself.

Kadyrov talked about the rebels in Ingushetia and Dagestan in 2005 at the same time as he was making claims on the neighbouring territories.

It seems very unlikely that Aushev will stand in for Yevkurov in Ingushetia now, even temporarily, in which case the Russian authorities will have to make Kadyrov's appointment official. The Kremlin does not look as though it is prepared to do this or that it even wants to. So the issue now is not only whether Ingushetia continues as an independent republic.  It's not just a question of whether the Ingush will continue to be loyal to Russia.  In the end it's about what Russia decides to do with its policy in the Caucasus as a whole.

[1] "Demoscope" http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_59.php?reg=1

[2] V. Belozerov. Etnicheksya Karta severnogo Kavkaza (Ethnic Map of the North Caucasus). Moscow, OGI, 2005. 304 p.

[3] Ibid.

[4] In 2007, in connection with the escalating situation in the republic and shots fired at the "UN town" in Nazran, the UN raised the danger level of Ingushetia to 4 points on the 5-point scale, and moved its offices to Vladikavkaz. All other international organizations subsequently followed their example.

[5] Murat Zyazikov did not wait until the end of his presidential term.  In accordance with the new procedure of appointing regional heads, the question of confidence was put before the president of the Russian Federation.   The republican parliament was asked to approve the extension for another term. 

If you are planning to come and see us, you have to bear in mind that our metro is quite unusual. It doesn't go into the historic city centre, only to the industrial districts.