Following on from Hugh Barn's articles on the Russian elections and Putin: But is it all about Putin? A number of features of the current situation suggest otherwise. One of the characteristics of Russia's ruling elite is their self-perceived vulnerability. The wealth of a significant percentage of Russia's elite depends on their ability to receive what are in effect rents from the export of raw materials, above all gas and oil, and on their access to government contracts. Rent dependency however has consequences: elite groups have to play the patronage game, passing wealth up and down the political and social ladder in order to maintain their privileged position. And they have to be careful. There are dangers in amassing too much personal wealth and running foul of other patronage groups eager to usurp key positions. Patronage networks thus hold the ruling elite together in a precarious embrace. In this context the ruling elite's self perceived vulnerability is not in itself surprising, especially given the vast and frequent transfers of wealth that have characterised the transition from Soviet to Russian realities over the last two decades. This vulnerability (or should we say fear) provides ample explanation for continued elite support for the Putin status quo, smothering all the possible alternatives. The fascinating, and thus far largely unanswered question in all of this, is the role of the FSB. To what extent can one speak of the FSB as a unitary organisation promoting its members to key positions of patronage and power where they can usefully access rents? Or is the FSB itself subject to the same sort of patronage politics and internal competition for key positions as the rest of society? The answer is probably some combination of the above. Though Putin would seem to be the clear victor in the last election (fraud or no fraud), the emphasis must be on "seem". Constraints on his power come not so much from the institutions of the Russian state, and certainly not from opposition parties, as from the patronage networks of which he is a part and which he too has to cultivate to maintain his precarious position. Patronage (like corruption) cuts both ways. In the absence of functioning institutions, it provides the ruling elite with its power base but also forces that same elite to address the needs of considerable segments of society. If this analysis is accepted, it might be wiser not to concentrate on the person of Putin alone. The power structures that support his continued control of high office would not seem to be to be those of a personal dictatorship, but rather those of an loose and flexible oligarchy, struggling to maintain its privileged position. Oligarchic government and not dictatorship then? The oligarchic model, with all its negatives, might permit a clearer explanation as to why, despite many limitations, Russian citizens under the current regime enjoy many of the freedoms that they have been denied in the past. Iannis Carras, Athens, Greece.