According to sources inside Afghanistan, Taliban leader ‘Mullah' Mohammed Omar sent a secret envoy to President Hamid Karzai earlier this year to discuss his possible entrance into the Afghan government. This remarkable move culminated in Karzai's recent offer of talks with the elusive cleric, followed by a Taliban announcement that the group would consider speaking with Kabul.
The moment is ripe for negotiations; diplomacy promises benefits to both Kabul and the Taliban's political leadership. Unfortunately, this window of opportunity will most likely be squandered. For talks to succeed, Mullah Omar must play a central role in discussions between the Taliban and the Karzai government. But it is his centrality to any peace deal that sets a number of key external and internal actors against talking with the Taliban, making negotiations impossible.
No justice, but peace? Philip Jakeman is the Afghanistan and Bangladesh researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi.
In a country where many elected officials are documented human rights violators, adding Taliban politicians to parliament provides further cause for concern. Afghanistan's recent history of accommodating criminals in its politics makes bad reading for many human rights activists, who have consistently opposed legislation such as the notorious "amnesty bill". Bringing in members of the Taliban will do little to repair the sense that justice remains a distant prospect in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, a sustainable political system cannot permanently exclude perhaps the country's third largest political force. According to the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Abdul Qadar Noorzai, "The Taliban were a part of this country... they must be brought back for there to be peace." And with a military solution to the conflict looking increasingly unlikely, there is little to be lost in negotiations, providing they adhere to the constitution and maintain clear objectives, including the cessation of violence as a political tool.
Prevailing conditions allow both sides to benefit from talks. From the perspective of Kabul and Karzai - a consistent advocate of Taliban involvement in the political process since 2002 - the gains are clear. Military efforts to eliminate the ‘Taliban' have demonstrably failed (see Paul Rogers on openDemocracy, "Afghanistan: Six Years of War") while the repercussions of violence nourish a vicious circle that undermines the government, disenfranchises and endangers significant sections of the population, and slows the arduous task development and reconstruction.
Re-centralising
the Taliban Also on Afghanistan in toD:
Marcus Skinner,
"Treading softly in Afghanistan",
10 July, 2007
Philip Jakeman,
"India's soft allure",
25 June, 2007
Ahmed Rashid,
"Tackling the Taliban",
12 December, 2006
Negotiations are now also in the interest of certain influential Taliban leaders. Their enforced exile, the evolution of the group from an organised governing entity into a dispersed guerrilla force, and the concomitant decentralisation of responsibilities and strategy have all led to the disempowerment of the original, non-military leadership, of which Mullah Omar is the head.
This fragmenting of control is evident in the growing importance of suicide and kidnapping strategies, in the apparently autonomous "Taliban" activity in the north and west of the country, and in the extraordinary latitude afforded field commanders - most famously evidenced in the actions of the late Mullah Dadullah - all of which undermine the authority of the organisation's political wing. A role in government could therefore help to wrest the animating force of the Taliban movement away from pan-Islamist and apocalyptic forces such as al-Qaida and back towards original Taliban "values" - namely, the consolidation of what they consider to be traditional Islamic and local Pashtunwali tribal codes.
While the designation "Taliban" is used in the media with apparent conceptual clarity, in reality it is a catch-all term for a diverse number of groups working towards similar ends with quite different means. The "Taliban" insurgency includes foreign jihadis, Afghan warlords, Pakistani militants and narcotics criminals. "Official" statements by self-proclaimed spokespeople like Qari Yousef Ahmadi rejecting negotiations should not necessarily be seen as representative. That many Taliban fighters continue to use brutal military tactics should not preclude discussions with other, more moderate factions of the Taliban.
Man of the moment
However, the sheer diversity of individuals and factions identified as Taliban suggests that a heavyweight authority figure needs to be involved for the talks to have any impact. The only person who could plausibly fit this profile is Mullah Omar himself.
Not simply the Taliban's spiritual founder and leader, he is revered by many as the personal embodiment of the movement. During the late 1990s, the 46 year old effectively ruled by fiat, drawing legitimacy from an interpretation of the concept of bay'ah, an oath of allegiance that carries with it the Prophet's authority. This was most famously enacted by his emergence on a Kandahar rooftop in 1996 enveloped in the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed while hundreds of mullahs shouted "Amir al Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful).
Most importantly, he also has the respect of many local, non-Taliban people in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban movement enjoys a large degree of popular support. And unlike Osama bin Laden, who has little operational influence over the group he heads, Mullah Omar is still a crucial driving force behind the Taliban, despite numerous attempts to undermine him.
It is in this context that Mullah Omar's secret offer of talks with Karzai is extremely significant. Unfortunately, his centrality to successful negotiations is also their biggest stumbling block.
Opponents to negotiation
While some US officials and their allies have suggested that they're warming to the idea of negotiation, there is still a $10 million bounty for the capture or assassination of Mullah Omar. It is unlikely that the Bush administration will allow the Karzai government to embrace a fugitive leader who American officials have vilified almost on the same level as Osama bin Laden al-Qaida. Indeed, many officials in Afghanistan privately express deep scepticism that US policy-makers would ever countenance negotiations with the Taliban, let alone Mullah Omar.
For its part, and currently enjoying a resurgence of good relations with Afghanistan, India has no wish to empower what it considers a proxy of Pakistan. New Delhi is happy to support the US position.
While Iran may benefit from the difficulties that Taliban fighters are causing the US in the region, it is also keen to preserve the influence of its allies in western Afghanistan. Tehran has always had a stormy and suspicious relationship with the movement.
Some argue that Pakistan would benefit from an increase in Taliban political power, especially if former sponsor Benazir Bhutto again regains control in Islamabad. However, it is also likely that Pakistan would be unwilling to cede the control that it is currently able to exert over the movement's political leadership in exile.
Finally, the United Front, an Afghan political party formed earlier this year and mainly composed of senior members of the Northern Alliance, has no desire to welcome their former enemies into parliament. In the increasingly ethnic politics of the country, they consider it a ploy by Pashtun-speaking Karzai to shore up his shaky power-base ahead of the 2009 elections.
Unless these various actors prioritise the future of Afghanistan above their own interests, meaningful negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government remain only a distant possibility. Geopolitics, in spite of local realities, will prevent any peace-deal with the Taliban from taking place.
