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# Lula, Bolsonaro, and Trump: The high-stakes election for Brazil’s future
- URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/brazil-election-lula-flavio-bolsonaro-trump-tariffs-shape-race-future-democracy/
- Published: 2026-10-01T12:44:33.000Z
- Updated: 2026-10-01T12:44:33.000Z
- Description: Flávio Bolsonaro’s Washington-aligned programme amounts to a subordinate economy confined to the US sphere of influence
- Author: Guilherme Klein
- Tags: Opinion, Brazil election, Lula, Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, democracy

On 4 October, Brazilians will go to the ballots in the tenth presidential election since the country’s return to democracy in 1985\. But the vote is much more than that – and the outcome could affect democracy beyond Brazil’s borders.

To take power, a candidate must win more than 50% of the valid votes. Only two candidates have a real chance of reaching this threshold: incumbent centre-left president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is seeking a fourth term, and right-wing senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who is in prison for plotting a coup after his 2022 defeat. If no candidate wins enough votes, a runoff between the top two will be held on 25 October.

It is hard to overstate what is at stake. For Brazil, the result will decide the fate of the [social and economic gains that began during Lula’s first two terms in office in the 2000s](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/brazil-democracy-vs-poverty/), the country’s place in a world economy in flux, and whether its democratic space narrows again. For Latin America, it will reveal whether we are in a new era of overwhelming US influence. Globally, it could mark another step towards the erosion of middle powers’ sovereignty. 

Brazil has long seen itself as “the country of the future”, a phrase it owes to Stefan Zweig, an Austrian writer who fled Nazism in the 1930s and was struck by Brazil’s vast economic potential and the apparently peaceful coexistence of its peoples. This election will decide what that future looks like. 

When Lula took office in January 2023, Brazil was emerging from a decade of economic and political turmoil. The deep recession of 2015-16, the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s trial and imprisonment (widely viewed as politically motivated), and the authoritarianism of the Bolsonaro government between 2019 and 2023 had all taken their toll. [Real GDP per capita had fallen](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-brazils-permanent-austerity-policy-harming-its-economic-future/), and annual inflation had peaked at more than 12% in April 2022; by the end of that year, unemployment was 7.9%, almost a third of Brazilians lived below the World Bank poverty line, and 5.9% were in extreme poverty. More than 2.5% of the population was undernourished – enough to put the country back on the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Hunger Map, which it had left in 2014.

The turnaround since then has been significant. Annual inflation has dropped to 4.2%, while GDP has grown by close to 3% a year since 2023\. Unemployment is now 5.3%, while rates of poverty and extreme poverty fell to record lows of 23.1% and 3.5% in 2024, the most recent year for which data is available. The country also left the UN Hunger Map once again last year.

As well as rebuilding what was constructed in the 2000s and dismantled post-2014 (when the economic crisis broke), Lula’s third term has produced new income tax reforms, raising the threshold for tax repayment to remove millions of lower– and middle-income workers from the tax rolls entirely, and introducing a minimum tax on the very rich. These are rare steps in a country where [the top 1% receives about 26% of national income](https://wid.world/country/brazil/?ref=opendemocracy.net), more than double the share in France (11.8%) and higher than in other very unequal countries such as South Africa (21.9%).

Yet polls point to a very tight race. This is partly political; polarisation has hardened, and at least a third of voters identify deeply with Jair Bolsonaro. But [it is also economic](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brazilian-economy-strong-with-negative-public-sentiments-by-laura-carvalho-and-guilherme-klein-2026-06?ref=opendemocracy.net): improvements in living conditions have fallen short of what voters expect – a Brazilian version of the *vibecession* that has harmed incumbents elsewhere, though one with real roots.

Households remember prices, not inflation rates, and food remains expensive. The economic recovery of recent years also started from a very low base: in 2024, the income of the poorest half of the population was about 80% of its 2014 level. 

Older voters compare the present not with the Bolsonaro years, but with the fast social mobility of the 2000s, when millions bought their first car or took their first flight. And younger Brazilians who reached university through policies of Lula’s first governments have entered a labour market short of skilled jobs: by 2023, 38% of workers were overqualified for their job, up from 26% in 2012.

The other factor that sets this election apart is Washington. A plot by Bolsonaro and his allies to keep him in power after [losing the 2022 election](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/brazil-election-bolsonaro-far-right-movement-latin-america/) included a draft decree to annul the result and a plan by supportive military officers to assassinate Lula, his vice-president and a Supreme Court justice. The refusal of the army and air force commanders to join the coup was decisive, as was the US position, with Joe Biden’s administration recognising Lula’s victory within hours and making clear that any attempt to overturn the result would leave Brazil isolated.

But Donald Trump has since entered the [White House](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-us-far-right-donald-trump-steve-bannon-eduardo/) and made clear his support for Bolsonaro, blaming the [“witch hunt”](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/trump-investigate-brazil-trade-lobby-group-big-tech-ccia-report/) for a [50% tariff he imposed on Brazilian goods](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/eduardo-bolsonaro-lobbying-us-sanctions-brazil-justice-supreme-court-marco-rubio-figueiredo-moraes-magnitsky-act-coup/) as the Supreme Court trial began. The US Treasury has also sanctioned Alexandre de Moraes, the justice in charge of the case, and most of the court justices lost their US visas – measures that Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flávio’s brother, [moved to Washington to lobby for](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/eduardo-bolsonaro-lobbying-us-sanctions-brazil-justice-supreme-court-marco-rubio-figueiredo-moraes-magnitsky-act-coup/).

[Brazil election: The US far-Right is acting to get Bolsonaro re-electedBolsonaro is unlikely to give up power without a fight. Key Trump supporters are preparing to do battle for him![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/3f/80/3f804bea-4b2d-4ddf-9ff0-6ec7d0afa5fa/content/images/icon/multi_solo-244b6924-3b03-47d8-a2af-cc716cecac5f.png)openDemocracyKen Silverstein![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/3f/80/3f804bea-4b2d-4ddf-9ff0-6ec7d0afa5fa/content/images/thumbnail/T0FF9X-1776184950320-0a137909-60dd-437b-99f4-d73d67913442.jpg)](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-us-far-right-donald-trump-steve-bannon-eduardo/)

[Inside Bolsonarists’ campaign to impose US sanctions on Brazilian judgesFormer president’s son and his allies are lobbying US government to punish judges investigating 2022 coup attempt![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/3f/80/3f804bea-4b2d-4ddf-9ff0-6ec7d0afa5fa/content/images/icon/multi_solo-3dc80c67-048b-4d97-b8c6-edd56f3527da.png)openDemocracyAlice Maciel![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/3f/80/3f804bea-4b2d-4ddf-9ff0-6ec7d0afa5fa/content/images/thumbnail/CAPA_alt_O_cerebro_Paulo_Figueiredo_articula_sancoes_contra_STF_nos_EUA-1776273166210-0194dc28-151b-4e75-88c9-15424096eede.jpg)](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/eduardo-bolsonaro-lobbying-us-sanctions-brazil-justice-supreme-court-marco-rubio-figueiredo-moraes-magnitsky-act-coup/)

The US’s political pressure came with an economic agenda. A US draft sent to Brazilian negotiators in October 2025 and recently made public [listed 21 conditions for tariff relief](https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/governo-trump-impos-21-exigencias-brasil-negociar-tarifaco/?srsltid=AU7gw4VUWWtJQ7GX%5FgVrHIdT3i8XeA6eHMWBG1C56E%5FD4Orfzgh7v4Ny&ref=opendemocracy.net). Two stand out: a guarantee that “political dissidents” – that is, Jair Bolsonaro and his allies – would be allowed to participate in the election, and privileged access for US firms to Brazilian critical minerals. 

A new 25% tariff, imposed on specific sectors in July in addition to the blanket 50% tariff, reveals other US interests – particularly in Pix, the Brazilian Central Bank's instant payment system. The US objects to the very features that made Pix work, in effect treating a free public system as unfair competition for private US card networks.

While Lula’s administration has firmly rejected these demands, Flávio Bolsonaro has made the US agenda his own. Brazil holds about 23% of the world’s known rare-earth reserves, second only to China. A memo titled [Prosperity Partnership](https://amadomundo.com/documento-eua-terras-raras-governo-flavio-bolsonaro/?ref=opendemocracy.net), bearing Flávio's campaign logo and drafted by an ally, proposes fast-track environmental licensing, pricing set within a [US-led critical minerals ‘club’](https://www.eenews.net/articles/us-launches-critical-minerals-club/?ref=opendemocracy.net) and priority supply to US and NATO defence chains. At a conservative conference in Texas in March, Flávio openly [asked the audience to pressure Brazilian institutions](https://brazil.substack.com/p/inviting-foreign-interference) ahead of October's election. In May, at the White House, he discussed tariffs and rare earth minerals with Trump and pledged to join the US-led ‘Shield of the Americas’ if elected.

Two days later, [at Flávio’s request](https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20260527-bolsonaro-asks-trump-designate-brazil-crime-groups-terrorists?ref=opendemocracy.net) and despite the Brazilian government’s objections, the US designated Brazil’s two largest criminal organisations as terrorist groups. The designation adds little to the domestic fight against the groups, but provides a legal basis for unilateral US action. In Venezuela, similar designations preceded strikes on alleged drug boats and, eventually, the capture of former president Nicolás Maduro.

None of this is isolated, and Trump has not hidden the logic behind it. Presenting his Venezuelan oil deal, which gives the US access to [around a fifth of Venezuela’s proven reserves](https://www.opendemocracy.net/trumps-venezuela-why-seek-regime-change-if-you-can-get-regime-compliance/), at the UN this month, he put it plainly: “To the victor belong the spoils.” Elsewhere, in [Argentina](https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c0mxnp3kr90t?ref=opendemocracy.net) and [Honduras](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyp36dwnezo?ref=opendemocracy.net), Trump made clear ahead of elections that the US’s financial support would depend on his allies’ victories.

### **What next?**

The “country of the future” label always assumed that Brazil would one day grow rich and leave its immense inequality behind. 

Yet Brazilian philosopher Paulo Arantes noted the irony of this in an essay penned in the early 2000s: equality never came; the rich world instead began to converge on Brazil, widening the gap between rich and poor, eroding the welfare state and leading to more precarious work and living conditions – what European and North American writers had, since the 1990s, been calling Brazilianisation.

Brazil's choice now, therefore, matters beyond its borders. 

If Lula remains in power, he will face a challenging next stage of Brazil’s economic development. Tax progressivity must go further, and spending on health, education and urban transport, which directly lowers the cost of living, has to rise. Ambitious, well-designed industrial policy must work with public investment to upgrade the country’s productive structure. None of this will be easy, politically or technically. But only Lula’s coalition seems interested in attempting it.

A Flávio victory, meanwhile, will lead to an economy subordinated to US interests and averse to other partnerships, such as with China, which specialises in exporting raw materials and has little room for the industrial policy needed to employ a more educated workforce. The outcomes could resemble those seen under his father’s government, or could be worse, since Brazil would also give up instruments of economic sovereignty as it enters Washington's sphere of influence.

For Latin America and other middle powers beyond the region that face similar pressures, Brazil may once again be the country of the future – offering a preview of their own fate: development and sovereignty, or stagnation and subordination.

*Guilherme Klein is a professor of economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and research associate at the Research Center on Macroeconomics of Inequalities, University of São Paulo (Made/FEA-USP)*