A customer examines a gun at the Top Gun shop in downtown Sao Paulo, Brazil, on 21 January 2019, the day that President Bolsonaro passed a law easing access to firearms in Brazil. Photo by Cris Faga/NurPhoto/Sipa USA. PA Images. All rights reserved
2018 was a year in which political issues were still often framed as left or right in the Americas, but the only ideology that mattered was organized crime.
Some of the worst news came from Colombia, where coca and cocaine production reached record highs amidst another year of bad news regarding the historic peace agreement with the region’s oldest political insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The demobilization of ex-FARC members has been plagued by government ineptitude, corruption, human rights violations, and accusations of top guerrilla leaders’ involvement in the drug trade. And it may have contributed directly and indirectly to the surge in coca and cocaine production.
Duque and Uribe's alliance in Colombia could impact not just what's left of the peace agreement but the entire structure of the criminal underworld.
It was during this tumult that Colombia elected right wing politician Iván Duque in May. Duque is the protégé of former president and current Senator Álvaro Uribe.
Their alliance could impact not just what’s left of the peace agreement but the entire structure of the underworld where, during 2018, ex-FARC dissidents reestablished criminal fiefdoms or allied themselves with other criminal factions.
Meanwhile, a new generation of traffickers emerged, one that prefers anonymity to the large, highly visible armies of yesteryear.
Also of note in 2018 was a surge in synthetic drugs, most notably fentanyl. The synthetic opioid powered a scourge that led to more overdose deaths in the United States than any other drug.
Fentanyl is no longer consumed as a replacement for heroin. It is now hidden in counterfeit prescription pills and mixed into cocaine and other legacy drugs. It is produced in China and while much of it moves through the US postal system, some of it travels through Mexico on its way to the United States.
During 2018, the criminal groups in Mexico seemed to be shifting their operations increasingly around it, especially given its increasing popularity, availability, and profitability.
The result is some new possibly game changing alliances, most notably between Mexican and Dominican criminal organizations.
Among these Mexican criminal groups is the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG), another of the three criminal winners for 2018.
That is not the say it is invulnerable. The group took some big hits in its epicenter last year, and the US authorities put it on its radar, unleashing a series of sealed indictments against the group.
2018 showed that the days of the US using drug policy as a foreign policy hammer may be nearing an end.
Mexico’s cartels battled each other even as they took advantage of booming criminal economies. The result was manifest in the record high in homicides this year.
The deterioration in security opened the door to the July election of leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. AMLO, as he is affectionately known, did not necessary run on security issues, but he may have won on them, and in the process, inherited a poisoned security chalice from his predecessor.
While Peña Nieto can claim to have arrested or killed 110 of 122 criminal heads, AMLO faces closer to a thousand would-be leaders and hundreds of criminal groups.
The rise in the availability of cocaine and fentanyl greatly impacted the United States, which remains one of the world’s largest consumers of drugs.
But 2018 showed that the days of the US using drug policy as a foreign policy hammer may be nearing an end.
In the run-up to the United Nations General Assembly, for example, the Trump administration’s four-pronged “Call to Action” went largely unanswered by other countries in the region.
Still, two years of Donald Trump’s strange, haphazard foreign policy has had a devastating impact on foreign relations in the region and has opened the door to transnational organized crime.
To begin with, Trump has largely abandoned years of anti-corruption efforts in Central America, while his administration faces near constant accusations of corruption inside his own regime.
Specifically, 2018 will be remembered as the year the US government stopped supporting the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), the UN-backed adjunct prosecutor’s office in that country.
During nearly 10 years in Guatemala, CICIG-led cases have imprisoned presidents, vice presidents, vice presidential candidates, former ministers, bank owners, hotel owners, and many more.
But this year, current Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales - who is also under CICIG investigation - began lobbying the White House and its allies directly and eventually succeeded in cobbling together a coalition of accused elites.
Other presidents, most notably Honduras President Juan Orlando Hernández, has played a similar game and largely succeeded in neutralizing that country’s version of the CICIG, the Support Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).
In February, Juan Jiménez Mayor, the head of the MACCIH, abruptly resigned. In an open letter published on his Twitter account, Jiménez said he left because of lack of support from MACCIH’s progenitor, the Organization of American States (OAS), and concerted efforts by the Honduran congress to undermine the Mission.
But, on a positive note, the re-election of the relatively active attorney general in Honduras may make efforts to neutralize anti-corruption forces there moot, most notably on one investigation that inches very close to President Hernández himself.
None of this seems to bother Trump, who spent 2018 engaged in a near permanent political campaign in the US, much of which revolved around conflating immigrants fleeing criminality with the actual criminal groups going after them, like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13).
Even worse, his administration’s border policies are actually helping organized crime. And his administration seems to have abandoned any pretense of pushing for human rights or a free press, even while the region remains the most dangerous place on earth to be a journalist largely because of the organized crime, corruption, and impunity that US allies like Morales and Hernández foster.
If 2018 is any indication, Bolsonaro bullying his way towards a more secure Brazil may not be so easy.
Indeed, Trump’s disregard for law, order and the truth allowed demagoguery to flourish, and nowhere was this clearer than in Brazil, where the rightward turn was even sharper than for its Colombian neighbors.
After getting stabbed during a political rally, the military-evangelical populist Jair Bolsonaro - who was often described as a “Brazilian Donald Trump” - surged to the presidency on a racist, xenophobic platform that combined higher prison sentences, militarization of the war on crime, and turning back regional efforts to legalize certain illicit substances.
The year witnessed another round of fighting in different parts of the country, including a series of battles between the Family of the North and the Red Command, which effectively ended a 3-year pact between the two groups.
However, it was the First Capital Command (PCC), which continued to pose the biggest threat, expanding both within Brazil and the region, and putting it at the top of our list of criminal winners for 2018.
Ironically, it was the leftist government of El Salvador that most resembled the militaristic Bolsonaro anti-crime strategy in 2018.
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), effectively green-lit a hardline strategy that reminds many of the same regimes that FMLN guerrillas once battled against before it turned into a political movement.
In 2018, the party also codified its most draconian measures and largely protected the intellectual authors of the most egregious human rights violations, even while the results of these measures remained spotty at best.
Meanwhile, gangs like the MS13 showed their ability to adapt in 2018, and to exert their political muscle in ways that continue to surprise, most notably in the capital city, San Salvador.
Here the former mayor and current leading presidential candidate Nayib Bukele - himself a political chameleon who swapped from the leftist FMLN to a rival centrist party -negotiated with the gangs so he could start reshaping the city’s Historic Center into a more family-friendly - or at least, tourist friendly - area.
The approach in many respects worked; as violence was down, the center got some much-needed structural upgrades, and new businesses opened.
A drop in homicides this year suggests that the FMLN and other political operators may have also noticed the political results and may be seeking to accommodate the gangs as well in the lead up to the February elections.
Towards the middle of the political spectrum was Costa Rica, which in April elected Carlos Alvarado Quesada of the center-left Citizens’ Action Party (PAC) as president. T
here, the election did not seem to turn on citizen security, but the survival of the new president’s administration may.
Homicide rates are at record levels, in large part because Costa Rica is playing a greater role in transnational criminal activity, but possibly also because 2018 showed that the country’s security forces may be more deeply involved in crime than ever.
Venezuela has effectively become a vehicle for criminal interests.
On a political spectrum all his own was Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, who was reelected in April in an exercise that seemed to confirm that he has long since dispensed with any pretense of democracy.
Venezuela has effectively become a vehicle for criminal interests. The reasons for this center on the emergence of homegrown criminal groups that are both inside of the government and connected to it; the abdication of the state of its duties especially as it relates to prisons; and the death of any viable economic system to support the corruption and ineptitude that prevail in the Maduro government.
The result was nothing less than chaos, with thousands of refugees who flowed daily into other countries.
The unprecedented refugee crisis brought with it desperation and, inevitably, more organized crime. In short, Venezuela became a regional crime hub in 2018, a place where everything from stolen fuel to teenage girls and rotten food was for sale and every space was open for competition.
Amid the stark zero-sum political squabbles, there is an outlier, a beacon of hope even.
In 2018, Argentina seemed to be searching for some sort of happy medium in the battle against crime.
The government made a push to improve data collection and intelligence gathering, while it punched up its arrest and seizure statistics. It has implemented a community policing program, even while it has flirted with using a militarized approach along the borders and elsewhere.
The results are coming in fits and spurts. The dismantling and trial of one of the co.untry’s most violent criminal groups, for example, was upstaged by its continued ability to operate from prison.
And a new plea deal law opened a window into official corruption, most notably among politicians connected to the former government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
As Argentina’s Security Minister Patricia Bullrich puts it, the government’s plan is almost perfect. “We set into motion what we call the 80/20 model: 80 percent intelligence, 20 percent chance,” she says.
It is a refreshingly candid remark, an admission that not every program is as advertised.
This article was previously published by InSight Crime. You can read the original here.