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# Qatar: prestige and gamble
- URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/qatar-prestige-and-gamble/
- Published: 2011-01-27T19:01:32.000Z
- Updated: 2019-02-14T22:10:41.000Z
- Description: The small Gulf state of Qatar has translated economic assets and creative diplomacy into extraordinary global influence. But the eclipse of regional giants such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia is also a high-risk strategy, says Khaled Hroub.
- Author: Khaled Hroub
- Tags: Conflict & security, #Migrated, Middle East & North Africa, Politics & activism, conflict, International politics, democracy & power, globalisation, middle east, Democracy and government, institutions & government, Qatar, #en, #Import 2026-04-09 17:11

“It’s nothing but a short lady in high heels”, one Arab politician described Qatar to me after it was named the 2022 host of football’s world cup. The reaction is typical, in that a mix of envy, cynicism and disparagement colours the attitudes (whether publicly or privately expressed) of Arab “big brothers” towards this tiny yet wealthy and influential Gulf [state](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle%5Feast/country%5Fprofiles/791921.stm?ref=opendemocracy.net). No wonder, for [Qatar](http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm%5Fhtm/qatar.htm?ref=opendemocracy.net) boxes above its own weight, and is efficient and ambitious on various fronts. Its clear lesson to larger yet lazier neighbours, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is that size doesn’t matter.

Its [triumph](http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/12/201012374444141404.html?ref=opendemocracy.net) in winning the bid to host the world’s biggest sporting event is, after all, a continuation of previous successes. Its organisation of Asian sports, Asiad, in 2006 provoked similarly stunned reactions. But by [winning](http://edition.cnn.com/2010/SPORT/football/12/02/world.cup.qatar.opinion/index.html?ref=opendemocracy.net) the contest over 2022, Qatar scored not only regionally but also globally, particularly [against](http://msn.foxsports.com/foxsoccer/worldcup/story/world-cup-bid-usa-loses-2022-world-cup-bid-to-qatar?ref=opendemocracy.net) a battered United States and (as England was also a competitor) Britain. Yet sport is perhaps the softest side of the Qatari story.

The roughness comes with politics. Qatar’s aggressive and proactive diplomacy has been causing waves of nervousness across those Arab capitals that like to think of themselves as “regional leaders”. Washington too has joined the club of the irritated. Much of Qatar’s regional diplomacy has [deviated](http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/index.php?Lang=en&Page=21&TypeId=&ArticleId=5113&Action=ArticleBodyView&ref=opendemocracy.net) from preferred American positions, especially its relations with anti-American countries and movements. The sympathies of (Qatar-based and -owned) [Al-Jazeera](http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/aljazeera%5Fqatar%5F4466.jsp) with causes opposed to Washington also play into this; some of the ensuing annoyance is [revealed](http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/america-panoptic-shiver) in the Wikileaks documents.

In relation to a number of protracted regional issues, it is the Qataris who have succeeded in mediating and brokering deals. To Egypt’s south, the Qataris have [fronted](http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/02/2010222124520248470.html?ref=opendemocracy.net) efforts to bring peace between in Sudan's government and rebels in Darfur, while Cairo merely watched. To Saudi Arabia’s south, the Qataris have [engaged](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/7247696.html?ref=opendemocracy.net) the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels in talks, gaining the confidence of both parties, while Riyadh merely watched. In 2009, it was the Qataris who effectively prevented Lebanon from sliding into what appeared another imminent civil war by [convening](http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/05/200861501514388216.html?ref=opendemocracy.net) the main protagonists in Doha and striking a last-minute agreement.

**A risky game**

The larger picture is no less telling. Qatar at the same time hosts the biggest American military base in the world, has a friendly relationship with Iran, and maintains open commercial links with Israel (which have survived tremendous strains, including the second Palestinian [*intifada*](http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745325477&&ref=opendemocracy.net) \[2000-05\], and Israel‘s war against [Hizbollah](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-middle%5Feast%5Fpolitics/hizbollah%5Fvictory%5F3809.jsp) in Lebanon \[2006\] and Hamas in [Gaza](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/israel-and-gaza-rhetoric-and-reality) \[2008-09\]; all the more remarkably in that Qatar enjoys the confidence of both these organisations as well as many other Islamist movements).

The ruling Qatari Emir and his globally [active](http://www.mozabintnasser.qa/pages/default.aspx?ref=opendemocracy.net) wife, Sheikha Moza, are close friends to a number of Arab presidents and ruling families. Yet Qatar is also the main destination for the leading political opponents (mainly Islamist) of many of those Arab regimes. Doha may be committed to the policies and decisions collectively adopted by the [Gulf Cooperation Council ](http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?ref=opendemocracy.net)(GCC), the regional body (controlled by Riyadh) that comprises all six Arab Gulf states; but it has created margins in which to manoeuvre its own independent diplomacy, frustrating the other GCC states in the process.

Its tactic of inducing each major player with a different prize allows Qatar to float above threats, remain off-target and build regional and global status. Within the current intra-Arab rivalry between the “axis of moderation” (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE and most Gulf states) and the “axis of resistance” (Iran, Syria, [Hizbollah](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-hizbollah-project-last-war-next-war) and Hamas), it is difficult to pigeonhole Qatar. It chooses to stay close to the middle-point, shuttling relatively freely across sides.

**A state in full**

The question that arises is less why the Qataris are [doing](http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/Qatar/Foreign%5FPolicy/Pages/QatarDiplomacy.aspx?ref=opendemocracy.net) this than, perhaps, why the Egyptians or the Saudis are not. It is deeply puzzling for Arab intellectuals and publics alike how timid the big Arab countries have been over the past decade or so. The result of their inactivity or ineffectuality in most regional issues (Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia...) has been to create a political-regional vacuum that allows Iran and Turkey (states with regional agendas of their own) to assume more energetic roles - and opened [space](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog%5Fdetail/qatars%5Fwell-funded%5Fpublic%5Fdiplomacy/?ref=opendemocracy.net) for small states like Qatar to stand out and gain prestige.

The benefit for Qatar extends far beyond mere pride and appearances, for with the prestige comes further layers of success and networking that becomes a strong aspect of its national-security strategy where potential threats are offset against each other and deflected away from the tiny state. The risks are evident: a strategy that has the US and Israel on board along with Iran, Hizbollah and [Hamas](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-middle%5Feast%5Fpolitics/hamas%5F3982.jsp) requires iron nerves. If the extreme brinkmanship fails the consequences could be catastrophic.

Money helps. Doha would have never been able to achieve what it has thus far without resting on comfortable reserves of gas that make Qatar’s GDP the [highest](http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar?ref=opendemocracy.net) in the world. But money does not function on its own: examples of wealthy failures abound in the region and beyond. Qatar’s economy and finance are less based on credit and loans than its neighbours, allowing it to escaped the fate of Dubai, which found itself at the heart of the global financial whirl.

The ambitious Qatari Emir has supplemented active diplomacy by making his country a leading media hub, with Al-Jazeera now a [flagship](http://english.aljazeera.net/?ref=opendemocracy.net) global brand; a leading regional education laboratory, with first-rate American and European universities establishing branches there; and a sports destination, with various international tournaments (the Asian football cup as well as the world contest) moving to Doha.

By allocating around $50 billion to [build](http://www.meed.com/home/hot-topics/qatar-world-cup/?ref=opendemocracy.net) the infrastructure for the 2022 world cup, Qatar has set out both to outstrip wounded Dubai economically and to continue to surpass the much bigger Arab-Islamic states in the region in prestige and political clout for at least the next decade.