The five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ended without any agreed commitments, unbalanced as ever between the nuclear-armed states and the rest. Time to change the agenda. 

The UK doggedly maintains an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ but a naval officer has blown the whistle on the system’s inherent insecurity—with its potentially incalculable implications.

The conventional wisdom among nuclear-weapons powers is that their arsenals can only be dismantled multilaterally, step-by-step—yet the associated co-ordination dilemmas keep proving insuperable.

Right-wing US and Israeli venom against the outline agreement is one thing; genuine concern about the Islamic regime’s Shia expansionism and human-rights record is however another.

The outline Iran nuclear deal has highlighted divisions in the region—not just between majority Shia and Sunni states but between those supporting the status quo and those challenging it.

It may sound like an oxymoron but we need a new global conversation which engages all nuclear-armed states en route to disarmament.

Conservatives in the US, Israel and Iran itself are all opposed to the outline nuclear accord. So it looks like progress.

A quarter-century on from the 'Islamic' revolution, Iran's beleaguered economy and its reformist leader desperately need a deal to end sanctions. But will the ideologically-driven Khamenei allow it?

It appears self-evident to a key Westminster committee that global insecurity requires a significant upgrade in UK military capability. Self-evident—and wrong.

The Conservative-led government of austerity Britain is facing the sacrifice of its sacred cow of high military spending—to preserve the even more precious elephant in the room: the UK’s ‘independent’ nuclear weapon.

The P5 process was a British attempt to spark multilateral nuclear disarmament. It should no longer be accepted as an excuse for inaction.  

Continued Republican efforts to force further sanctions on Iran threaten the fragile coalition making progress on nuclear negotiations, which already show wear from an outdated zero-sum approach. 

Fatalism over the chances of achieving agreement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is symptomatic of a failure that goes deeper than the inefficiencies of the diplomatic process.

The world is getting restless with some states' attachment to nuclear weapons. So why is Britain going out of its way to deepen its nuclear relationship with the United States? 

The world would be a much safer place without nuclear weapons but nuclear-armed states’ belief in the efficacy of “deterrence” continues to stymie progress at the UN.

A group of UK peacebuilding professionals invite participation in a new civic conversation about alternatives to the current approach to national security there. Here they outline their concerns about the existing model and offer a different vision for the future, welcoming input from anyone who wishes to engage in this debate.

If Scotland votes yes for independence this week, the chances of the UK having to disarm its nuclear arsenal rise dramatically–and the global non-proliferation regime needs just such a shot in the arm. But even a close no vote should be cause for reassessment over the future of Trident.

NATO’s summit this week offers the opportunity to turn the tide against the re-emergence of the cold war in the context of the Ukraine crisis. It is an opportunity, however, unlikely to be taken.

The renewal of the “independent British nuclear deterrent” has met remarkably little debate in the UK. Except in Scotland, that is.

Despite Hiroshima's scars, history cruelly reveals one instance after another in which the US elected to maintain the power of nuclear weapons for statecraft, squandering opportunities to de-escalate in favor of building the case for the national security state.