Louisa Loveluck https://www.opendemocracy.net/taxonomy/term/11206/all cached version 14/07/2018 11:38:52 en Resisting relocation: active communities in revolutionary Egypt https://www.opendemocracy.net/louisa-loveluck/resisting-relocation-active-communities-in-revolutionary-egypt <div class="field field-summary"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Residents’ actions highlight growing expectations that a more inclusive model of decision-making is both possible and achievable.&nbsp;</p> </div> </div> </div> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>For a brief period in January 2011, the revolutionary promise of Egypt&rsquo;s uprising seemed limitless. But the eighteen months that have followed those eighteen days have seen hopes of wholesale change largely extinguished as the </span><a href="http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/egypts-regime-fights-back-7075"><span>old order slowly reconstitutes itself</span></a><span>. Yet this is not the whole story. If we confine examination to the arena of institutional politics, little will appear to have changed. But if our gaze drifts to the shifting sands upon which community-led activism is taking place, a different picture begins to emerge. The undulations of revolutionary energy may not have produced a new political order, but they have significantly weakened the constraints within which grassroots dissent can emerge and develop. <span>&nbsp;</span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>During the Mubarak years, formal opposition movements were tightly regulated by the state and those operating independently faced formidable obstacles to action. This is not to say that mobilization was impossible &ndash; labour activism steadily increased throughout the 2000s and on a more informal level, urban communities tacitly engaged in </span><a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/15229/A.+Bayat+-+Life+as+Politics.pdf?sequence=1"><span>daily low-level challenges to state authority</span></a><span> &ndash; but the very real possibility of night-time arrests and torture at the hands of the state security services remained a constant threat. <br /></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Egypt&rsquo;s revolution may not have led to a fundamental restructuring of the political arena but is has delivered a significant blow to what the barriers to community-based activity. Community-based movements organsie themselves outside the confines of parliament, a forum that is seen as increasingly removed from the day-to-day issues for which residents are campaigning. Protests and sit-ins are still subject to careful policing, but this now occurs within a context of shifting power relations between citizens and the state that polices them. The increased ability of organised movements to elicit specific concessions from elites represents one key development in the post-Mubarak era. A closer look at one such campaign in El Dabaa, a <em>markaz</em> on Egypt&rsquo;s northwestern coast, reveals the small but significant gains that community mobilization can now achieve.</span></p> <h3 class="MsoNormal"><strong><span>The El Dabaa campaign</span></strong><span> <br /></span></h3> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>El Dabaa&rsquo;s campaign targets a nuclear development project dating back to the Sadat era. In 1981, a presidential decree allocated 65km of Bedouin land for the construction of a nuclear plant. The project was sold with the promise of significant developmental benefits for the area, but its reality has been very different. Despite little evidence that construction has even begun, the indigenous population have been required to demolish the homes and land which sustained their livelihoods. Compliance was compensated with a mere LE2000 per house. </span></p> <p><img src="http://www.opendemocracy.net/files/el%20dabaa%20sit%20in.jpg" alt="Tunis" width="460" /><span class="image-caption">Photograph from the El Dabaa sit-in; courtesy of Ahmed Mansour of Habitat International Coalition </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>In Egypt, this practice of forced resettlement is nothing new. Similar cases have been well-documented in Suez, Aswan, and Giza. But for the affected communities, its debilitating effects are always experienced afresh. Existing modes of production tend to be rooted in the land on which they have lived for generations, leaving communities with no choice but to cultivate new groves and crops from scratch after resettlement. Forced resettlement also disrupts community networks. These grievances have lain at the heart of the El Dabaa campaign. They were then accelerated in 2003 when families who had resisted orders to destroy their own land were forcibly evicted without reparation or compensation. <br /></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Egypt&rsquo;s January revolution presented fresh chances to push back against the nuclear project. Following the temporary withdrawal of El Dabaa&rsquo;s security services, residents formed popular committees to defend their land, forging links which would </span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-nuclear-dream-or-nuclear-nightmare"><span>develop into a series of sit-ins, marches and protests continuing throughout the year</span></a><span>. The movement eventually attracted the attention of a coalition of NGOs. These have joined forces with the residents to demand the termination of the nation&rsquo;s nuclear project. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>The El Dabaa strategy raises important questions regarding the logic of authority and compliance in revolutionary Egypt. What happen, for example, when citizens demand a system of effective reparations for the community as a whole, in place of one-off compensation payments for individuals? This means guaranteeing the Bedouins new plots of land, a move that would help the community regain the sense of cohesion that was endangered by resettlement. The result of this confrontation will reveal much about the state&rsquo;s ability to deprive communities of their rights when faced with growing local resistance. <br /></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Further, how does a state with deeply authoritarian roots react when communities challenge the increasingly malleable boundaries of authority with clear demands for a more inclusive model of decision-making? In El Dabaa, residents are putting forward their own ideas for how the land should be developed. This proactive approach has also been seen by campaigns elsewhere. In </span><a href="http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.12642.aspx"><span>North Giza</span></a><span>, </span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/bp-project-idku-raises-environmental-concerns"><span>Idku</span></a><span> and </span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/mopco-plant-resumes-work-after-4-month-closure"><span>Damietta</span></a><span>, community groups have opposed large energy and environmental projects that were established after only the most basic of local consultations. The success of these campaigns has been variable, but all have managed to limit the ability of their respective targets to operate in the same manner as before - a small but significant shift in the potential of such movements to curb abuses of state power in the post-Mubarak era. Residents&rsquo; actions highlight growing expectations that a more inclusive model of decision-making is both possible and achievable. What we see today forms an important part of the legacy of Egypt&rsquo;s uprising. The revolution may not have occurred in the realm of politics, but in the confines of the imagination. Triumphs against state authority remain limited and piecemeal, but for many communities, the key difference is that they are now seen as possible.</span></p> <h3 class="MsoNormal"><strong><span>Policing the social context</span></strong><span><span><span> <br /></span></span></span></h3> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>But for all the fledgling promise of El Dabaa&rsquo;s campaign, it also serves as a reminder of the extent to which political elites remain in control of Egypt&rsquo;s overall social and political framework. Two weeks ago, the residents arrived in Cairo to stage a protest outside a conference held by the nuclear authorities to counter the campaign&rsquo;s accusations. This protest was immediately shut down. Adding further pressure, </span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/nuclear-power-authority-warns-against-encroachment-dabaa-site"><span>Egypt&rsquo;s Nuclear Power Plants Authority yesterday spelled out the consequences of further action</span></a><span>, emphasizing their power to prosecute.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>On a broader level, the campaign&rsquo;s strategic approach has also been shaped by the state&rsquo;s ability to limit the narrative boundaries within which resistance takes place. As a Bedouin community, the residents of El Dabaa are theoretically afforded a certain degree of protection by the Egyptian government under </span><a href="http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx"><span>international law</span></a><span>. But since the campaign is opposing a nuclear project that had been cast as a symbol of national strength, the state media has selectively depicted the resistance as an act of treachery without reference to the social and economic damage it has inflicted at community level. For this reason, there has been fierce debate amongst El Dabaa residents as to whether to identify as Egyptians or as Bedouins for the purposes of the campaign. Opting for the former, they have been forced to distance themselves from the very identity which would &ndash; on some level &ndash; afford them recourse to rights protection at international level. This, of course, highlights the gulf between the theoretical protections afforded by international law and the realities within a state which retain control over the social context on the ground. It also reveals the continuing power of the Egyptian authorities to control the context within which debates take place, aided by an unreformed state media. <br /></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>For the residents of El Dabaa, the fate of their campaign remains uncertain. But they have negotiated one key success for now: following negotiations with the military, the displaced have been allowed to return to their land. This victory may be temporary &ndash; the nuclear project seems far from being terminated &ndash; but it still represents a significant achievement that only became possible within an environment in which community movements are winning greater freedom to assert themselves. To ignore this struggle from below is to misrepresent the potential of Egypt&rsquo;s unfinished revolution.</span></p><div class="field field-country"> <div class="field-label"> Country or region:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Egypt </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-city"> <div class="field-label">City:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Cairo </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-topics"> <div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Civil society </div> <div class="field-item even"> Conflict </div> <div class="field-item odd"> Culture </div> <div class="field-item even"> Democracy and government </div> <div class="field-item odd"> Economics </div> </div> </div> Cairo Egypt Civil society Conflict Culture Democracy and government Economics Editors Pick Social innovation Louisa Loveluck Tue, 31 Jul 2012 07:16:36 +0000 Louisa Loveluck 67315 at https://www.opendemocracy.net The contradictory aims of USAID in Egypt https://www.opendemocracy.net/louisa-loveluck/contradictory-aims-of-usaid-in-egypt <div class="field field-summary"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Prior to the Egyptian revolution, the US democracy-promotion strategy helped consolidate the power of an authoritarian regime and today, the course adopted by its funding bodies is facilitating the marginalization of alternative social forces.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://news.yahoo.com/us-democracy-aid-went-favored-groups-egypt-181529301.html"><strong><span>Reports of America’s chaotic and partisan democracy-promotion strategies in Egypt</span></strong></a><span> met with derision this weekend as commentators pointed to the contradiction between high-minded US rhetoric and the reality of its efforts on the ground. Yet this should come as no surprise. In the decades prior to Egypt’s January revolution, the contradictory US democracy-promotion strategy helped consolidate the power of an authoritarian regime and today, the course adopted by its funding bodies is facilitating the marginalization of social forces that do not sing from the same hymn sheet of ‘democracy-speak’.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>In the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s fall, American officials were keen to emphasise </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all"><strong><span>the role that US funding had played in empowering key revolutionary groups</span></strong></a><span>. Whilst democracy-promotion funds undoubtedly played a role in training a sizeable number of activists, it would be crass to draw too strong a line of causality between the training programmes and what happened next. During this period, the fact that the Bush and Obama administrations had in fact offered tacit and active support for an institutional reality at odds with the mission statements of democracy-promotion NGOs, has exposed the fact that this remained very much a secondary concern for American political elites. In the years leading up to the January revolution, opposition movements were repeatedly thwarted by pseudodemocratic institutions that satisfied international demands for democratic structures without fundamentally altering the character of the political order. Instead of offering direct encouragement, the sporadic nature of American diplomatic pressure would allow Mubarak to turn US funding and rhetoric to his own advantage, marginalizing Islamist opposition and constructing systems that were neither democratic nor sustainable.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>After 2005, a shift towards funding civil society as a counterweight to autocratic political structures would in fact exacerbate this trend further. The good intentions were there: aid would be allocated to projects that increased ‘</span><a href="http://photos.state.gov/libraries/tunis/5/PDFs/MRO_APS%20-%20Local%20Grant%20Announcement_Posted.pdf"><strong><span>political openness and democratic processes, create new economic opportunities, enhance access to and quality of education systems, and/or empower women</span></strong></a><span>.’ Yet honourable intentions gave rise to unintended consequences, and this funding strategy led to the weakening of the very organisations that could have represented an avenue for organised dissent. Instead of representing a cogent political challenge to Mubarak’s regime, the NGOs that emerged through these efforts came to exist in a different sphere to the government, focusing on the social rather than the strictly political. By encouraging these groups to fill the gap left by the government’s failure to offer effective welfare provisions, support for civil society initiatives played directly into Mubarak’s hands. Ultimately, this strategy redirected potential channels of resistance towards activities that allowed the autocrat to consolidate power without providing the sort of services required by a social contract.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>This weekend’s revelations show that the strategic vision underpinning the latest round of US democracy-promotion efforts remains confused and counterproductive. In backing ‘winners’, US democracy funding sends out a message that it will support the Egyptian political process, but only along a path that is ideologically palatable to a western audience.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>This is problematic for two reasons: firstly, it risks discrediting the work of the organisations it funds. Proof that </span><a href="http://www.arabist.net/blog/2012/6/4/on-aps-piece-on-us-democracy-promotion-funding-in-egypt.html"><strong><span>contrary to its mission and its statements</span></strong></a><span> IRI – one of the key financial beneficiaries – was engaged in biased political activity will reinforce the notion that democracy-promotion funding is simply another tool with which to further American strategic interests, rather than a contribution to building a more free and democratic Egypt in line with the wishes of its people. This leaves recipients open to accusations of foreign interference, striking a chord with fears the of the broader Egyptian population at a time of heightened nationalism. Such claims are today being played out across the nation’s television screens as&nbsp;</span><a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ngo-funding-case-be-resumed-tuesday-nehal-news-2-hold"><strong><span>43 civil society workers are tried for illegally operating political, campaign and election training programmes financed with US and other foreign money</span></strong></a><span>.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Secondly, the highly specific process through which organisations must apply for funding has&nbsp;narrowed the field of ‘suitable’ candidates, strengthening long-established international organisations at the expense of smaller domestic groups. With an </span><a href="https://twitter.com/erin_snider/status/209610528992133120"><strong><span>organizational advantage that comes from decades of experience in writing similar grants</span></strong></a><span>, it is organisations such as IRI and NDI that benefit from the funding that was originally conceived as a boost for the struggling liberal political and civil society organisations with which American funding bodies would wish to publicly align themselves. The fact that these groups remain the most disadvantaged in terms of institutional representation reveals the failure of US democracy-promotion funding to make an effective impact in the ideologically ‘suitable’ circles that its funding strategy has earmarked.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span>The muddled reality of US democracy-promotion efforts in Egypt reveals that little has changed in the wake of the January revolution. Prior to the fall of Mubarak, these had helped strengthen the very authoritarian structures that the funding was supposed to challenge. Today, the reality of American rhetoric about a desire to support groups that suffered under Mubarak is in fact undercutting the political legitimacy of these groups. Of course, the elephant in the room here is the continued US commitment to Egyptian military funding. This annual aid package of $1.3 billion continues to empower a junta that has&nbsp;consistently interfered with the work of liberal groups that democracy-promotion funding bodies are simultaneously supporting. Whilst the American government continues to pursue its strategic interests through such inconsistent funding strategies, it can only weaken its credibility as arbiter of democracy on the Egyptian stage.</span></p><div class="field field-country"> <div class="field-label"> Country or region:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Egypt </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-topics"> <div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Civil society </div> <div class="field-item even"> Democracy and government </div> <div class="field-item odd"> Economics </div> <div class="field-item even"> International politics </div> </div> </div> Egypt Civil society Democracy and government Economics International politics Revolution Louisa Loveluck Wed, 06 Jun 2012 14:01:37 +0000 Louisa Loveluck 66224 at https://www.opendemocracy.net Louisa Loveluck https://www.opendemocracy.net/author-profile/louisa-loveluck <div class="field field-au-term"> <div class="field-label">Author:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Louisa Loveluck </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-au-firstname"> <div class="field-label">First name(s):&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Louisa </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-au-surname"> <div class="field-label">Surname:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Loveluck </div> </div> </div> <p>Louisa Loveluck<a href="leloveluck.wordpress.com"> blogs </a>on the Middle East, with a particular focus on Egypt and Yemen. After graduating from King’s College, Cambridge she now works at the International State Crime Initiative</p><div class="field field-au-shortbio"> <div class="field-label">One-Line Biography:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Louisa Loveluck blogs (leloveluck.wordpress.com) on the Middle East, with a particular focus on Egypt and Yemen. After graduating from King’s College, Cambridge she now works at the International State Crime Initiative </div> </div> </div> Louisa Loveluck Tue, 05 Jun 2012 14:03:01 +0000 Louisa Loveluck 66225 at https://www.opendemocracy.net